Major Harden v. George E. Pataki

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
____________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
February 10, 2003
No. 01-15186
THOMAS K. KAHN
____________________________ CLERK

D. C. Docket No. 01-01830-CV-TWT-1

MAJOR HARDEN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

GEORGE E. PATAKI, Governor, State of New York,
JACKIE BARRETT, Sheriff, Fulton County, Atlanta,
Georgia, JANE DOE, Employee, Fulton County Jail,
Atlanta, Georgia, JOHN #1 DOE, Agent, Private
Extradition Agency, New York City, JOHN #2 DOE,
Agent, Private Extradition Agency, New York City,
JOHN DOE AGENCY, Private Extradition Agency,
New York City,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
____________________________
(February 10, 2003)

Before BIRCH, DUBINA and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
BIRCH, Circuit Judge:

In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2372-73 (1994),

the Supreme Court “held that a state prisoner’s claim for damages is not cognizable

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if ‘a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily

imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,’ unless the prisoner can

demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has previously been invalidated.”

Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643, 117 S. Ct. 1584, 1586 (1997). This case

presents the question whether a claim for damages and declaratory relief brought

by a state prisoner challenging the validity of the procedures used to extradite him

from Georgia to New York, otherwise cognizable under § 1983, is barred by Heck.

We hold that it is not and, therefore, REVERSE the district court’s order

dismissing the prisoner’s action.

I. BACKGROUND

In May 1986, while serving a twenty-five year sentence in the Federal Prison

in Levenworth, Kansas, Appellant Major Harden was extradited to Suffolk County,

New York, and convicted and sentenced to a term of twenty-five years to life for

another crime. In his pro se complaint, he alleged that, several days after his

release in May 2000 from his later confinement in the Atlanta federal penitentiary

on a different crime, he was arrested and, without a signed extradition warrant, a

2
waiver of his extradition rights, or a habeas hearing, and over his protests,

extradited to New York by a private extradition company, presumably to serve his

sentence imposed pursuant to the 1986 conviction. He filed a federal complaint

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Southern District of New York, seeking a

declaration that the defendants violated his constitutional rights, injunctive relief,

and compensatory damages. His case was transferred to the Northern District of

Georgia, where the court sua sponte dismissed his suit for failure to state a claim

for which relief could be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Applying Heck,

the district court found Harden’s suit premature because, while his challenge to the

extradition procedures necessarily implied the invalidity of his underlying

conviction, he had not alleged that his conviction or sentence had in fact been

invalidated. This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

We review a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a suit for failure to state

a claim for relief under § 1915A(b)(1) de novo. Leal v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 254

F.3d 1276, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).

3
 In his complaint, Harden alleges that he was denied the right to a pre-

extradition habeas corpus hearing, the right to be turned over to government

agents, not a private extradition company, and the right to have a Governor’s

warrant issued for his arrest. The first two rights are based on Art. IV, § 2, cl. 2 of

the Constitution (“Extradition Clause”)1 and 18 U.S.C. § 31822 implementing the

provision, and are therefore federal in nature.3 Prior to Heck, we held that a cause

1
The Extradition Clause provides: “A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or
other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the
executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State
having Jurisdiction of the Crime.”
2
Section 3182 provides:

Whenever the executive authority of any State or Territory demands any person
as a fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of any State, District, or
Territory to which such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment
found or an affidavit made before a magistrate of any State or Territory, charging
the person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime,
certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the State or Territory
from whence the person so charged has fled, the executive authority of the State,
District, or Territory to which such person has fled shall cause him to be arrested
and secured, and notify the executive authority making such demand, or the agent
of such authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and shall cause the fugitive to
be delivered to such agent when he shall appear. If no such agent appears within
thirty days from the time of the arrest, the prisoner may be discharged.

18 U.S.C. § 3182.
3
The right to a pretransfer habeas corpus hearing is a federal right first recognized in Roberts v.
Reilly, 116 U.S. 80, 94-95, 6 S. Ct. 291, 299 (1885). That the right to be turned over only to
government agents is federal is far less clear, but we find it at least arguable in the language of
18 U.S.C. § 3182, when it refers to “the agent of [the executive authority of the demanding state]
appointed to receive the fugitive,” where, as here, there is some basis to conclude that private
extradition services are not authorized under the law of the demanding state. See Off. Att’y
Gen., New York, Informal Op. No. 90-18 (March 19, 1990).

4
of action under § 1983 is stated where officials violate extradition procedures

protected “by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Crumley v. Snead,

620 F.2d 481, 483 & n.9 (5th Cir. 1980). In that case, the sheriff of one state

delivered the prisoner to authorities in another state while the prisoner’s petition

for a writ of habeas corpus collaterally challenging the extradition was pending in

state court. Id. at 482. Recognizing “that individuals have a federal right to

challenge their extradition by writ of habeas corpus,” we specifically held that

“[a]ny denial of th[at] right gives rise to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. s 1983.”

Id. at 483. The majority of circuit courts agree.4

The right to a signed Governor’s warrant of arrest, however, is based on the

Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (“UCEA”) as it has been adopted and codified

in state law, not on the Extradition Clause or § 3182 explicitly. See Ga. Code Ann.

§ 17-13-27 (1997). As we have not held so before, today, we join our five sister

“circuits that have held that a violation of state extradition law can serve as the

basis of a section 1983 action ‘[w]here the violation of state law causes the

4
See, e.g., Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 1986); Ross v. Meagan, 638 F.2d
646, 649-50 & n.4 (3d Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Brown v. Nutsch, 619 F.2d 758, 764 (8th Cir.
1980); McBride v. Soos, 594 F.2d 610, 613 (7th Cir. 1979); Wirth v. Surles, 562 F.2d 319, 323
(4th Cir. 1977); Sanders v. Conine, 506 F.2d 530, 532 (10th Cir. 1974); but see Barton v.
Norrod, 106 F.3d 1289, 1295 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that, since “the constitutional and statutory
extradition provisions are not designed to protect fugitives[, but r]ather . . . are designed to
facilitate the administration of justice between states[, the] failure to comply with established
procedures does not deprive the fugitive of any protected right” and, therefore, provides no basis
for a § 1983 claim).

5
deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution and statutes of the United

States.’” Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 921 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Wirth v.

Surles, 562 F.2d 319, 322 (4th Cir. 1977)); accord Brown v. Nutsch, 619 F.2d 758,

764 n.8 (8th Cir. 1980); McBride v. Soos, 594 F.2d 610, 613 (7th Cir. 1979);

Sanders v. Conine, 506 F.2d 530, 532 (10th Cir. 1974).5 Thus, we find that, in the

absence of any bar imposed by Heck, Harden properly stated a § 1983 damages

claim for failure to comply with both federal and state extradition laws.6

5
The Supreme Court has also suggested as much. In Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 101 S. Ct.
703 (1981), the Court concluded that a prisoner transferred involuntarily under Article IV of the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers is “entitled to whatever ‘safeguards of the extradition process’
he might otherwise have enjoyed . . . [under] the [UCEA] (in those States that have adopted it),
as well as any other procedural protections the sending State guarantees persons being extradited
from within its borders.” Id. at 448, 450, 101 S. Ct. at 711-12. Because the prisoner alleged that
state officials had transferred him to another jurisdiction pursuant to Article IV without granting
him a pretransfer hearing to which he would have been entitled had he been transferred under the
UCEA, the Court held that he had adequately stated a § 1983 claim. Id. at 436-37, 450, 101 S.
Ct. at 706, 712. This at least suggests that an alleged violation of the procedural protections
afforded a person to be extradited pursuant to the UCEA would also state a cause of action under
§ 1983. Even if a signed Governor’s warrant does not state a cause of action under § 1983
merely because it is required by the UCEA, we find that it does so because it is derived from the
language and intent of 18 U.S.C. § 3182. Section 3182 requires that the “executive authority” of
the asylum state “shall cause” the fugitive “to be arrested and secured.” Because Congress could
not have intended that a state executive would violate his or her own state law on lawful arrests,
and because Georgia requires a Governor’s warrant before arresting a person to be extradited,
see Ga. Code Ann. § 17-13-27, we find that Harden has stated a cause of action on this ground.
6
We find that any claim for injunctive relief is precluded by Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,
93 S. Ct. 1827 (1973). There, the Court considered a § 1983 action brought by state prisoners,
alleging that prison officials had unconstitutionally deprived them of “good-conduct-time
credits,” and seeking “injunctive relief to compel restoration of the credits, which in each case
would result in their immediate release from confinement in prison.” Id. at 476-77, 93 S. Ct. at
1829. The Court held “that when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his
physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate
release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas
corpus.” Id. at 500, 93 S. Ct. at 1841. Because non-prospective injunctive relief in the case of

6
 In Heck, however, the Court considered a state prisoner’s § 1983 claim

arising out of alleged unlawful acts by state prosecutors and police officers that had

led to his arrest and conviction. 512 U.S. at 479, 114 S. Ct. at 2368. It held that “a

§ 1983 cause of action for damages attributable to an unconstitutional conviction

or sentence does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.”

512 U.S. at 489-90, 114 S. Ct. at 2374. The Court reasoned that, because Ҥ 1983

creates a species of tort liability,” “the appropriate starting point for the inquiry

under § 1983” is the common law rules of tort. Id. at 483, 114 S. Ct. at 2370-71.

Recognizing that “[t]he common-law cause of action for malicious prosecution

provides the closest analogy to” Heck’s § 1983 claim, and that “[o]ne element that

must be alleged and proved in a malicious prosecution action is termination of the

prior criminal proceeding in favor of the accused,” the Court imposed a favorable-

termination requirement on Ҥ 1983 damages actions that necessarily require the

plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement.” Id. at 484,

486, 114 S. Ct. at 2371, 2372. In doing so, it invoked “the hoary principle that

civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of

outstanding criminal judgments.” Id. at 486, 114 S. Ct. at 2372.

procedural violations during extradition could only mean immediate release from confinement,
Harden’s prayer in this regard is foreclosed by Preiser.

7
 We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused
by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence
invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence
has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,
declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such
determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of
a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages
bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been
so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state
prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must
consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it
would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can
demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been
invalidated.

Id. at 486-87, 114 S. Ct. at 2372 (footnote omitted). Though cognizant that the

case lay “at the intersection of the two most fertile sources of federal-court prisoner

litigation—the Civil Rights Act of 1871 . . . , as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and

the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254,” id. at 480, 114 S. Ct. at 2369,

the Court was careful to emphasize that it did “not engraft an exhaustion

requirement upon § 1983 [because of the habeas statute], but rather den[ied] the

existence of a cause of action” altogether. Id. at 489, 114 S. Ct. at 2373.

In short, the Court held “that a state prisoner may not maintain an action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the direct or indirect effect of granting relief would be to

8
invalidate the state sentence he is serving.”7 Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 21,

118 S. Ct. 978, 990 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). By contrast, “if the district

court determines that the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate

the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action

should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.”8 Heck,

512 U.S. at 487, 114 S. Ct. at 2372-73 (footnote omitted). “If, for example, [a

plaintiff] were to seek damages ‘for using the wrong procedures, not for reaching

the wrong result,’ and if that procedural defect did not ‘necessarily imply the

invalidity of’ the [conviction or sentence], then Heck would have no application at

all.” Spencer, 523 U.S. at 17, 118 S. Ct. at 988 (citations omitted). Thus, Heck

does not bar purely procedural claims brought under § 1983.9

7
One example of a damages claim for an alleged violation that would be indirectly invalidating,
or what the Court in Heck calls “other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render
a conviction or sentence invalid,” 512 U.S. at 486, 114 S. Ct. at 2372, is one alleging an
unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment by a police officer when arresting
the prisoner for resisting arrest. Id. at 486 n.6, 114 S. Ct. at 2372 n.6. Because “the crime of
resisting arrest [is] defined as intentionally preventing a peace officer from effecting a lawful
arrest,” a claim of unreasonable seizure, or unlawful arrest, if successful, would necessarily,
though indirectly, invalidate the underlying conviction for resisting arrest. Id.
8
“For example, a suit for damages attributable to an allegedly unreasonable search may lie even
if the challenged search produced evidence that was introduced in a state criminal trial resulting
in the § 1983 plaintiff’s still-outstanding conviction. Because of doctrines like independent
source and inevitable discovery, and especially harmless error, such a § 1983 action, even if
successful, would not necessarily imply that the plaintiff’s conviction was unlawful.” Heck, 512
U.S. at 487 n.7, 114 S. Ct. at 2372 n.7 (citations omitted); see also Datz v. Kilgore, 51 F.3d 252,
253 n.1 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).
9
The difference between a purely procedural claim cognizable under § 1983 and a procedural
claim where “the nature of the challenge to the procedures could be such as necessarily to imply

9
 The question here, then, is whether Harden’s damages claim challenging the

validity of the procedures used to extradite him is purely procedural, or whether, if

successful, it would necessarily invalidate the underlying conviction or sentence

for which he was extradited, directly or indirectly. We hold that it does not;

indeed, it cannot.

the invalidity of the judgment,” not cognizable under § 1983, Edwards, 520 U.S. at 645, 117 S.
Ct. at 1587, is demonstrated by the contrary holdings in Edwards and Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 94 S. Ct. 2963 (1974). In the latter, the Court held that prison disciplinary procedures
violated due process if they did not provide for “advance written notice of the claimed”
misconduct resulting in discipline or “a written statement of the factfinders as to the evidence
relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action taken.” Id. at 563, 94 S. Ct. at 2978. The
Court in Heck distinguished Wolff because the damages sought were “for the deprivation of civil
rights resulting from the use of the allegedly unconstitutional procedures,” Wolff, 418 U.S. at
553, 94 S. Ct. at 2973, and not for deprivation of good-time credits. Heck, 512 U.S. at 482, 114
S. Ct. at 2370. In essence, the claim was “for using the wrong procedures, not for reaching the
wrong result (i.e., denying good-time credits). Nor is there any indication in the opinion, or any
reason to believe, that using the wrong procedures necessarily vitiated the denial of good-time
credits. Thus, the claim at issue in Wolff did not call into question the lawfulness of the
plaintiff’s continuing confinement.” Id. at 482-83, 114 S. Ct. at 2370. In Edwards, as in Wolff,
the “complaint[] limited [the plaintiff’s] request to damages for depriving him of good-time
credits without due process, not for depriving him of good-time credits undeservedly as a
substantive matter. That is to say, his claim posited that the procedures were wrong, but not
necessarily that the result was.” 520 U.S. at 645, 117 S. Ct. at 1587. However, in Edwards,
unlike in Wolff, “[t]he principal procedural defect complained of [—“the deceit and bias of the
hearing officer”—] would, if established, necessarily imply the invalidity of the deprivation of
[the] good-time credits,” which would inevitably invalidate the prisoner’s sentence by
challenging the duration of his confinement. Id. at 646, 647, 117 S. Ct. at 1588. Thus, claims
brought by state prisoners are not cognizable under § 1983 if they necessarily invalidate, directly
or indirectly, an underlying criminal conviction or period of confinement, even if they allege
only procedural violations and seek damages only for the procedural violation and not for the
substantive result. Only if such claims are purely procedural, as in Wolff, where the alleged
procedural defects—lack of advance written notice of the charges and a written statement of the
basis of the decision—or the outcome of the action, would not necessarily invalidate an
underlying conviction or sentence, will they be cognizable under § 1983. See e.g., Jenkins v.
Haubert, 179 F.3d 19, 21 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that Heck and Edwards do not bar a prisoner’s
§ 1983 claim alleging bias by the prison’s hearing officer in a disciplinary proceeding affecting
only the conditions, but not the fact or duration, of confinement).

10
 In the first instance, the jurisdiction of a trial court over a criminal defendant

is not vitiated by the violation of extradition procedures. Lascelles v. Georgia, 148

U.S. 537, 544, 13 S. Ct. 687, 690 (1893) (“The jurisdiction of the court in which

the indictment is found is not impaired by the manner in which the accused is

brought before it.”). In Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 440, 7 S. Ct. 225, 227 (1886),

the Court concluded that “for mere irregularities in the manner in which [a criminal

defendant] may be brought into custody of the law, we do not think he is entitled to

say that he should not be tried at all for the crime with which he is charged.”

[W]hen the governor of one state voluntarily surrenders a fugitive
from the justice of another state to answer for his alleged offenses, it
is hardly a proper subject of inquiry on the trial of the case to examine
into the details of the proceedings by which the demand was made by
the one state, and the manner in which it was responded to by the
other.

Id. at 441, 7 S. Ct. at 228.

[The] Court has never departed from the rule . . . that the power of a
court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had
been brought within the court’s jurisdiction by reason of a ‘forcible
abduction.’ . . . [D]ue process of law is satisfied when one present in
court is convicted of crime after having been fairly apprized of the
charges against him and after a fair trial in accordance with
constitutional procedural safeguards. There is nothing in the
Constitution that requires a court to permit a guilty person rightfully
convicted to escape justice because he was brought to trial against his
will.

11
Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522, 72 S. Ct. 509, 511-12 (1952) (footnote

omitted).

We, too, adhere to this doctrine “unequivocally established in United States

v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. [1975]).” United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508,

1530 (11th Cir. 1984). “[W]e are convinced that . . . a defendant in a federal

criminal trial whether citizen or alien, whether arrested within or beyond the

territory of the United States may not successfully challenge the District Court’s

jurisdiction over his person on the grounds that his presence before the Court was

unlawfully secured. . . . [T]he Supreme Court has not receded from Ker or Frisbie,

and neither has this Court.” Winter, 509 F.2d at 985-87 (footnotes omitted); see

also Remeta v. Singletary, 85 F.3d 513, 518-19 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that

denying a pretransfer hearing to a defendant extradited under the Interstate

Agreement on Detainers in the absence of a waiver “did not deprive [the

demanding state] of jurisdiction to try him for murder”).

Moreover, extradition procedures, even if they violate federal rights, have

no bearing, direct or implied, on the underlying guilt or innocence of the person

extradited. See In re Strauss, 197 U.S. 324, 333, 25 S. Ct. 535, 537 (1905) (“[T]he

process of extradition . . . is but one step in securing the presence of the defendant

in the court in which he may be tried, and in no manner determines the question of

12
guilt.”). Neither do the extradition decisions of asylum states. See Michigan v.

Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 290, 99 S. Ct. 530, 536 (1978) (“[W]hen a neutral judicial

officer of the demanding state has determined that probable cause exists, the courts

of the asylum state are without power to review the determination.”). “Interstate

extradition was intended to be a summary and mandatory executive proceeding

derived from the language . . . of the Constitution,” which “served important

national objectives of a newly developing country striving to foster national unity”

by “preclud[ing] any state from becoming a sanctuary for fugitives from justice of

another state and thus ‘balkanize’ the administration of criminal justice among the

several states.” Id. at 287-88, 99 S. Ct. at 534-55.

[Thus, o]nce the governor has granted extradition, a court considering
release on habeas corpus can do no more than decide (a) whether the
extradition documents on their face are in order; (b) whether the
petitioner has been charged with a crime in the demanding state; (c)
whether the petitioner is the person named in the request for
extradition; and (d) whether the petitioner is a fugitive.

Id. at 289, 99 S. Ct. at 535. Indeed, the UCEA, as codified in Georgia, precludes

inquiry into “[t]he guilt or innocence of the accused as to the crime of which he is

charged . . . by the Governor or in any proceeding after the demand for extradition .

. . , except as it may be involved in identifying the person held as the person

charged with the crime.” Ga. Code Ann. § 17-13-40.

13
 If the asylum state has no power to question the probable cause

determination of the demanding state or the guilt or innocence of the defendant,

except as it relates to his or her identity, such that an entirely innocent person may

be properly extradited, then the converse must also be true: improper extradition

by the asylum state in violation of those rights cannot impugn the probable cause

determination of the demanding state or the subsequent adjudication of guilt of the

person extradited. Whether the person was convicted or sentenced after the

extradition or, as here, before, is inconsequential.10

10
It could be argued that Heck bars a § 1983 damages claim if the alleged violation of
extradition procedures necessarily implies the invalidity of the extradition decision itself, not
necessarily the underlying conviction or sentence. We find this implausible. First, the reason
for imposing the favorable-termination requirement in Heck, as it was in malicious prosecution
actions at common law, was to “avoid[] parallel litigation” and preclude inconsistent judicial
results, “in contravention of a strong judicial policy against the creation of two conflicting
resolutions arising out of the same or identical transaction,” in accordance with the Court’s “long
expressed . . . concerns for finality and consistency” of judicial decisions. 512 U.S. at 484-85,
114 S. Ct. at 2371. Under section 10 of the UCEA, codified at Ga. Code Ann. § 17-13-30, the
person to be extradited is entitled to an initial hearing “before a judge of a court of record in th[e
asylum state], who shall inform him of the demand made for his surrender, of the crime with
which he is charged, and that he has the right to demand and procure legal counsel.” However,
“[t]he person being extradited has no right to challenge the facts surrounding the underlying
crime or the lodging of the custody request at th[is] first hearing.” Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 443 n.11,
101 S. Ct. at 709 n.11. Also, “[a] governor’s grant of extradition is [merely] prima facie
evidence that the constitutional and statutory requirements have been met” and is not, therefore,
a judgment. Doran, 439 U.S. at 289, 99 S. Ct. at 535. Thus, where the extradited person is not
afforded his federal right to challenge the extradition by a writ of habeas corpus, there is no
parallel litigation on, and there can be no inconsistent judicial results from, the extradition
decision itself. Second, it cannot be true that Heck stands for the broad proposition that any
damages claim that necessarily invalidates a prior substantive adjudication is not cognizable
under § 1983. If that were the case, Heck would have, in one fell swoop, barred virtually any §
1983 claim alleging constitutional violations occurring in prior judicial proceedings, including
many substantive and procedural due process violations. Moreover, the opinion in Heck made
clear that the favorable-termination requirement was being imposed in reliance on “the hoary

14
 Thus, we find that the violations of extradition procedures alleged in this

case—the failure to provide a habeas corpus hearing or a signed Governor’s

warrant, and release into the hands of a private extradition agency—in no way

relate to Harden’s guilt or innocence and therefore do not impugn his conviction or

sentence.

There is a second reason to conclude that Heck does not bar most § 1983

damages claims based on improper extradition. In both Heck and Edwards, the

Court was careful to emphasize that its holding did not impose an exhaustion

requirement on § 1983 actions that would require a prisoner to first petition for a

writ of habeas corpus under 18 U.S.C. § 2254, thus suggesting that the bar would

apply even where habeas corpus review is unavailable. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 483,

489, 114 S. Ct. at 2370, 2373; Edwards, 520 U.S. at 649, 117 S. Ct. at 1589.

Justice Souter, by contrast, concurred in the judgment “because it was a ‘simple

way to avoid collisions at the intersection of habeas and § 1983.’” Spencer, 523

U.S. at 20, 118 S. Ct. at 989 (Souter, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Thus, in his

concurring opinion in Spencer, joined by Justices O’Connor, Ginsburg, and

Breyer, he explained that Heck should be read as permitting a prisoner to “bring a

§ 1983 action establishing the unconstitutionality of a conviction or confinement

principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of
outstanding criminal judgments.” 512 U.S. at 486, 114 S. Ct. at 2372 (emphasis added).

15
without being bound to satisfy a favorable-termination requirement that it would be

impossible as a matter of law for him to satisfy” because a habeas claim would be

unavailable under the circumstances, for instance, to a prisoner who was released

while his or her petition was pending. Id. at 21, 118 S. Ct. at 990. Otherwise,

Heck would “deny any federal forum for claiming a deprivation of federal rights to

those who cannot first obtain a favorable state ruling.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 500, 114

S. Ct. at 2379 (Souter, J., concurring). In her separate concurring opinion, Justice

Ginsburg indicated that she had come to agree with Justice Souter’s reasoning:

“Individuals without recourse to the habeas statute because they are not ‘in

custody’ . . . fit within § 1983's ‘broad reach.’” Spencer, 523 U.S. at 21, 118 S. Ct.

at 990. In his dissent, Justice Stevens added that, “[g]iven the Court’s holding that

petitioner does not have a remedy under the habeas statute, it is perfectly clear . . .

that he may bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Id. at 25 n.8, 118 S. Ct. at

992 n.8. Thus, “five justices hold the view that, where federal habeas corpus is not

available to address constitutional wrongs, § 1983 must be.” Jenkins v. Haubert,

179 F.3d 19, 26 (2d Cir. 1999).

In the case of extradition, “[o]nce a fugitive has been brought within custody

of the demanding state, legality of extradition is no longer proper subject of any

legal attack by him.” Siegel v. Edwards, 566 F.2d 958, 960 (5th Cir. 1978) (per

16
curiam).11 Specifically, “a person forcibly abducted from one state without warrant

or authority of law and placed in the demanding state’s custody does not have a

claim for release in habeas corpus.” Johnson v. Buie, 312 F. Supp. 1349, 1351

(W.D. Mo. 1970) (cited with approval in Siegel, 566 F.2d at 960). “Once the

fugitive is returned to the demanding state, the right to challenge extradition

becomes moot: the fugitive is no longer being detained by the asylum state, and

so, the legality of his or her detention there is no longer at issue.” Barton v.

Norrod, 106 F.3d 1289, 1298 (6th Cir. 1997). Thus, because federal habeas corpus

is not available to a person extradited in violation of his or her federally protected

rights, even where the extradition itself was illegal, § 1983 must be. If it were not,

a claim for relief brought by a person already extradited would be placed beyond

the scope of § 1983, when exactly the same claim could be redressed if brought by

a person to be, but not yet, extradited. See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 20-21, 118 S. Ct.

at 989 (Souter, J., concurring) (explaining a similar disparity in the case of a

habeas petition made moot by the prisoner’s subsequent release).

11
While the “legality of extradition” may be not be contested, our holding did not intend to
preclude appropriate § 1983 actions challenging alleged violations of federal rights during
extradition, whether or not the extradition itself was legal. See Crumley, 620 F.2d at 483
(recognizing a cause of action under § 1983 for failure to provide an opportunity to challenge an
extradition by writ of habeas corpus).

17
 Furthermore, we disagree with the Seventh Circuit’s analysis—the only

other circuit court to have addressed this issue in a published opinion. In Knowlin

v. Thompson, 207 F.3d 907, 907, 908 (7th Cir. 2000), a state prisoner filed a §

1983 damages action against Arkansas law enforcement officers for allegedly

violating the UCEA by extraditing him to Wisconsin before a hearing could be

held on his habeas petition. Though recognizing its prior holding in McBride, 594

F.2d at 613, that such conduct states a cause of action under § 1983, the court

nevertheless affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case as barred by Heck.

Id. at 908-09.

The court’s analysis began, like Heck’s, by analogizing the § 1983 claim to

the tort of malicious prosecution. Id. at 909. Because of this, “Knowlin cannot

prevail in his claim based on the denial of an opportunity to test the facial validity

of the extradition demand through habeas proceedings absent a showing that he

was not, in fact, extraditable through proper procedures.” Id. In other words,

“Knowlin will have to prove that he suffered some deprivation of liberty greater

than that which he would have suffered through extradition in full compliance with

the UCEA. That showing, in turn, would necessarily imply the invalidity of his

Wisconsin parole revocation, which Heck instructs cannot be shown through a §

1983 suit. Heck therefore bars the instant suit.” Id.

18
 The court’s reasoning, though syllogistic, is fundamentally flawed. First, the

court concludes that, because the tort of malicious prosecution provides the closest

analogy to his claim, Knowlin must prove that he was otherwise extraditable,

without explaining its minor premise, that is, why the conclusion inevitably

follows from the first principle.12 If it is because of the favorable-termination

requirement in that tort, the opinion seems to treat the requirement as a cause of the

further requirement that Knowlin prove he is not otherwise extraditable. Under

Heck, however, the malicious prosecution analogy, and therefore the favorable-

termination requirement, apply only as a consequence of the claim’s direct or

indirect substantive challenge, say, for example, to extradition on the ground that

the plaintiff was innocent of the underlying charges and therefore not extraditable.

See 512 U.S. at 486-87, 114 S. Ct. at 2373. Yet, Knowlin apparently applies the

requirement across the board: “It is irrelevant that Knowlin, in his complaint,

alleges only that the defendants denied him a procedure guaranteed by federal law;

he does not allege that he was innocent of the charges in the demanding state or

was otherwise not extraditable.” 207 F.3d at 909. Even if the requirement were to

sweep so broadly, the result would not be a requirement that Knowlin show that he

12
The opinion is far from a model of clarity.

19
was not extraditable, but rather that the underlying judgment was invalidated,

expunged or reversed.13

Second, irrespective of the analogy to the malicious prosecution tort, a

showing that the plaintiff was not extraditable, and that, had a pretransfer hearing

been held, he or she would not have been extradited, is not required to recover

damages in a § 1983 action alleging violation of extradition procedures. In Carey

v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S. Ct. 1042 (1978), the Court did conclude that an

“injury caused by a justified deprivation, including distress, is not properly

compensable under § 1983.” Id. at 260, 263, 98 S. Ct. at 1050, 1052 (emphasis

added). The Court did not, however, foreclose damages for injuries associated

with the denial of procedural due process itself, though it refused to presume them.

Id. at 264, 98 S. Ct. at 1052. Accordingly, we agree with the Tenth Circuit’s

conclusion that, if “the extradition itself was justified, even though the procedures

used to accomplish it were deficient . . . , [a] plaintiff cannot recover for any injury

13
If, on the other hand, the court applied the requirement in a tort action for malicious
prosecution that the plaintiff show an absence of probable cause for the proceeding to reach the
conclusion that Knowlin must prove that he was not otherwise extraditable, we agree with
Justice Souter in Heck that doing so would also require application of the tort’s malice
requirement, which § 1983 does not require. Heck, 512 U.S. at 493-94, 114 S. Ct. at 2376
(Souter, J., concurring). It also “would mean that even a § 1983 plaintiff whose conviction was
invalidated as unconstitutional . . . could not obtain damages for the unconstitutional conviction
and ensuing confinement if the defendant police officials (or perhaps the prosecutor) had
probable cause to believe the plaintiff was guilty and intended to bring him to justice,”
something Heck does not hold. Id. at 494, 114 S. Ct. at 2376 (Souter, J., concurring).

20
caused by the extradition; he can [however] recover for any injury, such as

emotional distress, caused by the deprivation of due process itself.” Long v.

Shillinger, 927 F.2d 525, 528 (10th Cir. 1991); see also Draper, 792 F.2d at 921

(concluding that “dismiss[ing prisoner’s § 1983 claim based on unlawful

extradition] on the ground that he was ultimately convicted of the crime involved

and, therefore, suffered no ‘actual’ damage . . . is simply incorrect”).14

Even if Harden’s extradition was justified, and even if he cannot show actual

injury from the procedural violations, he still may be entitled to nominal damages.

See Carey, 435 U.S. at 266, 98 S. Ct. at 1053. “Because the right to procedural due

process is ‘absolute’ in the sense that it does not depend upon the merits of a

claimant’s substantive assertions, and because of the importance to organized

society that procedural due process be observed, . . . the denial of procedural due

process [is] actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury.”15 Id.

14
We have held that “[e]motional injury is actionable under section 1983 for humiliation,
embarrassment, and mental distress resulting from the deprivation of a constitutional right.”
Hewett v. Jarrard, 786 F.2d 1080, 1088 (11th Cir. 1986); accord Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d 736,
738 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (finding that awarding $500 to prisoner as compensatory
damages for emotional distress resulting from a procedural due process violation was not clearly
erroneous). In fact, “[p]unitive damages may be awarded in a § 1983 action even without a
showing of actual loss by the plaintiff if the plaintiff’s constitutional rights have been violated.”
Dykes v. Hosemann, 743 F.2d 1488, 1500 (11th Cir. 1984). While injuries must be specific,
“real injury can [even] be inferred from the facts.” Hewett, 786 F.2d at 1088.
15
“For purposes of Piphus it does not matter whether the underlying claim involves a
deprivation of a procedural or substantive constitutionally-based right” such as those provided in
the Extradition Clause and implementing statutes. Draper, 792 F.2d at 921. As the Seventh
Circuit itself has noted, the extradition statute is similarly absolute: “‘The statute is one

21
at 266, 98 S. Ct. at 1054 (citations omitted); accord Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea, 71

F.3d 837, 841 (11th Cir. 1996). Thus, Harden may be able to recover nominal,

compensatory, and even punitive damages for the constitutional and statutory

violations he is able to prove, whether or not the extradition itself was otherwise

justified.16

Finally, the opinion in Knowlin incorrectly concludes that proving

unjustified extradition “would necessarily imply the invalidity of [Knowlin’s]

Wisconsin parole revocation, which Heck instructs cannot be shown through a §

1983 suit.”17 207 F.3d at 909. Any successful showing by Harden that, had he

been afforded a habeas corpus hearing, he would not have been extradited, even if

he were required to prove this—which we conclude he was not—would not

necessarily imply the invalidity of his underlying conviction or sentence and,

therefore, would not be barred by Heck.18

involving the substantial rights of citizens, and its essential elements must be strictly followed . .
. Only by faithfully following the provisions of the statute may a person be lawfully deprived of
his liberty and extradited from an asylum state to another state, there to be tried for the
commission of a crime.’” McBride, 594 F.2d at 612 (quoting United States v. Meyering, 75 F.2d
716, 717 (7th Cir. 1935)).
16
Of course, “actual, compensable injury . . . does not encompass the ‘injury’ of being convicted
and imprisoned.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n.7, 114 S. Ct. at 2372 n.7.
17
The opinion also fails to mention that this is true only if the prisoner cannot show that the
revocation was invalidated, reversed or expunged.
18
As previously noted, an extradition request can only be challenged in an asylum state court
habeas corpus hearing on four grounds. See infra p. 13. Demonstrating the facial invalidity of

22
 III. CONCLUSION

We hold that a claim filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking damages

and declaratory relief for the violation of a state prisoner’s federally protected

extradition rights is not automatically barred by Heck. We also hold that such a

claim is not barred by Heck, where the specific allegations are that law

enforcement officials failed to provide an extradited prisoner with a pretransfer

habeas corpus hearing or a signed warrant by the governor of the asylum state, or

released him into the hands of a private extradition service instead of government

agents. Accordingly, we find that the dismissal of the action by the district court

was incorrect and remand for further proceedings. REVERSED AND

REMANDED.

the extradition papers or that the petitioner is not a fugitive, clearly, does not invalidate a
subsequent conviction. Showing that the person to be extradited has not been charged with a
crime in the demanding state also does not undermine a subsequent conviction, so long as the
person was properly charged in accordance with that state’s rules of criminal procedure once
returned. Similarly, showing that the extradited person was not the person named in the request
for extradition does not necessarily invalidate a subsequent conviction. First, the conviction may
be for another offense of which the extradited person was guilty. See Lascelles, 148 U.S. at 547,
13 S. Ct. at 691 (holding that, upon return to the demanding state, a fugitive “may be tried . . .
for any other offense than that specified in the requisition for his rendition”). Second, the error
may have been merely a scrivener’s error. If, however, the wrong person was ultimately
convicted, or the person was convicted without ever having been properly charged, a § 1983
action brought on these grounds would amount to a direct challenge to the conviction, not the
extradition itself, to which the Heck rule would apply.

23