Richard Cottone v. Kenneth C. Jenne, II, Joseph D'Elia, George Williams, Patrick Tighe, Dwight St. Claire, Delores Watson, Barbara Law, Broward County Sheriff's Office, John Does

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-14529 APRIL 11, 2003
________________________ THOMAS K. KAHN
D. C. Docket No. 00-7545-CIV-ZLOCH CLERK

RICHARD COTTONE, as personal representative
of the Estate of Peter Anthony Cottone, Jr.,
PETER COTTONE, SR.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,

versus

KENNETH C. JENNE, II, in his official capacity
as Sheriff of Broward County, Florida,
JOSEPH D’ELIA,
GEORGE WILLIAMS, individually and in his official
capacity as Deputy Sheriff and/or Correction Officer of the
Broward County Sheriff’s Office,
PATRICK TIGHE, individually and in his official capacity
as Executive Director of the Department of Detention, Broward
Sheriff’s Office, DWIGHT ST. CLAIRE, DELORES WATSON,
BARBARA LAW,
Defendants-Appellants,

BROWARD COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE,
JOHN DOES, individually and in their
official capacity as Directors and/or
supervisors of the North Broward Detention Center,
et al.,
Defendants.
 ________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________

(April 11, 2003)

Before HULL, MARCUS and FARRIS*, Circuit Judges.

HULL, Circuit Judge:

In this § 1983 suit, defendants Joseph D’Elia, George Williams, Patrick

Tighe, Dwight St. Claire, Delores Watson, and Barbara Law, all in their individual

capacities, appeal the district court’s order denying their Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss raising the defense of qualified immunity. After review and oral

argument, we affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity for

defendants D’Elia and Williams, and reverse its denial of qualified immunity for

defendants Tighe, St. Claire, Watson, and Law.

I. BACKGROUND

This appeal involves the death of Peter Cottone, Jr. (“Cottone”) while he

was detained in the North Broward Detention Center. Given the Rule 12(b)(6)

*
Honorable Jerome Farris, United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by
designation.

2
posture of the case, we first review the allegations of the amended complaint as if

all the allegations contained therein were true.1

A. Cottone’s Detention

On March 9, 1999, Cottone was involved in a physical altercation with his

father, Peter Cottone, Sr. As a result of this violent incident, Cottone involuntarily

was transported to Memorial Hospital in Broward County, Florida under Florida

Statute § 394.467, for observation and evaluation.2 On March 14, 1999, Cottone

was moved to the Broward County Jail and was booked, assessed, and classified.

As a result of the assessment and classification, Cottone was transferred from the

Broward County Jail to Unit 1 of the North Broward Detention Center, which

houses mentally ill inmates.

At the time of Cottone’s detention, the Broward County Sheriff, employees

working at the jail, and the Broward County Board of Commissioners were subject

1
See Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1023 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (setting
forth the facts in the case by “[a]ccepting all well-pleaded factual allegations (with reasonable
inferences drawn favorably to Plaintiffs) in the complaint as true”). Because we must accept the
allegations of plaintiffs’ amended complaint as true, what we set out in this opinion as “the facts”
for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes may not be the actual facts. Cf. Swint v. City of Wadley, 51 F.3d
988, 992 (11th Cir. 1995).
2
Florida Statute § 394.467, known as the “Baker Act,” allows a person to be placed
involuntarily in a treatment facility if clear and convincing evidence indicates that the person is
mentally ill, and, inter alia, there is a substantial likelihood that, based on recent behavior, the
person will inflict serious bodily harm on himself or another person. Fla. Stat. § 394.467(1)(a).

3
to a consent decree stemming from Carruthers v. Cochran, Case No. 76-6068-CIV-

HOEVELER (S.D. Fla.), which was intended to ameliorate unconstitutional

conditions of confinement in the Broward County jail system. The consent decree

prescribed, inter alia, requirements for classification, separation, housing, and

monitoring of inmates, as well as acceptable use-of-force levels, minimum medical

care requirements, and availability of recreational activities.

B. Charles’s Detention

On March 1, 1999, Widnel Charles (“Charles”) was arrested. Prior to his

arrest, Charles had been detained involuntarily under Florida Statute § 394.467 on

numerous occasions due to his violent tendencies and a history of schizophrenia.

While in the booking area of the Broward County Jail on March 1, Charles struck

another inmate. Both a deputy sheriff and a nurse in the booking area observed

and documented Charles’s outburst. Charles originally was placed in the general

population at the Broward County Jail. On March 6, however, he was reassessed

and transferred from the Broward County Jail to the North Broward Detention

Center.

On April 1, a staff psychiatrist at the North Broward Detention Center

determined that Charles was mentally stable and reduced the psychotropic

medicine to be administered to him. On April 6, Charles was placed into Unit 1 of

4
the North Broward Detention Center with Cottone and Albert St. Hubert, the third

and only other inmate in Unit 1. Although there were three separate cells in Unit

1, the doors to the cells remained unlocked, allowing the three inmates to interact

with each other.

C. Charles Attacks Cottone

On April 7, guards D’Elia and Williams were summoned to Unit 1 by

inmate St. Hubert. When D’Elia and Williams arrived, they found Cottone

unconscious on the floor with ligature marks around his neck. During a

schizophrenic episode, Charles allegedly strangled Cottone with shoelaces. After

Charles’s attack, Cottone was taken to North Broward Medical Center, where he

died.

The amended complaint alleges that Charles’s mental condition and the risk

of serious harm that Charles posed to the other inmates was known by D’Elia and

Williams. Specifically, the amended complaint alleges that prior to the murder

incident, Charles was violent, out-of-control, and experiencing a schizophrenic

episode and that Charles’s mental condition would have been obvious to D’Elia

and Williams if they had been watching the monitor. The amended complaint

5
further alleges that D’Elia and Williams did not monitor the inmates housed in

Unit 1 that day but were watching computer games, as follows:

Surveillance cameras mounted in the Day Room of Unit 1 were aimed
at the three cells, however, they were not being monitored at the time of
the incident.

At the time of the incident, a computer game was observed on the screen
of the computer in the control room where the Defendants D’ELIA and
WILLIAMS were stationed.

Amended Complaint, para. 50-51.

D. Procedural History

Plaintiffs Richard Cottone, on behalf of the Estate of Peter Cottone, Jr., and

Peter Cottone, Sr. brought this § 1983 action against numerous defendants,

including defendants D’Elia, Williams, Tighe, St. Claire, Watson, and Law in their

individual capacities as a result of Cottone’s death while he was detained in Unit 1

of the North Broward Detention Center.3 In their amended complaint, the

plaintiffs allege two separate claims against the defendants. First, the plaintiffs

allege that the defendants D’Elia’s and Williams’s reckless indifference toward a

substantial risk of serious inmate harm at the North Broward Detention Center,

which led to Cottone’s death, violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition

3
All parties agree that Sheriff Kenneth C. Jenne, II is not a party to this appeal. The
amended complaint names Sheriff Jenne as a defendant solely in his official capacity.

6
against cruel and unusual punishment.4 Second, the plaintiffs allege that

defendants Tighe, St. Claire, Watson, and Law have supervisory liability for

Cottone’s death due to their failure to train and to supervise deputy sheriffs and

corrections officers under their control.

On April 18, 2002, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court denied the defendants’ Rule

12(b)(6) motion, concluding, inter alia, that the defendants in their individual

capacities are not entitled to qualified immunity. The defendants subsequently

filed this interlocutory appeal.5

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a district court’s denial of qualified immunity. See

Jordan v. Doe, 38 F.3d 1559, 1563 (11th Cir.1994); Hutton v. Strickland, 919 F.2d

1531, 1536 (11th Cir.1990). The determination of whether a complaint

sufficiently alleges a constitutional violation also is a matter of law reviewed de

4
Because Cottone was a pretrial detainee at the time of the incident, the relevant
constitutional guarantee is not the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment, but rather the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977). Nonetheless, we previously have stated that “the
standard for providing basic human needs to those incarcerated or in detention is the same under
both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1024 n.5. The plaintiffs’
amended complaint notwithstanding, we will refer to their claims as arising under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
5
The denial of qualified immunity on a motion to dismiss is an appealable interlocutory
order. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985).

7
novo. See GJR Invs., Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th

Cir.1998). In reviewing a complaint, we accept all well-pleaded factual

allegations as true and construe the facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. See id.; Williams v. Alabama State Univ., 102 F.3d 1179, 1182 (11th

Cir.1997).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Rule 12(b)(6) Motions

A complaint is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when its

allegations, on their face, show that an affirmative defense bars recovery on the

claim. Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1022 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc).

“Once the affirmative defense of qualified immunity is advanced . . . [u]nless the

plaintiff’s allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a

defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the

commencement of discovery.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Absent

such allegations, “[i]t is . . . appropriate for a district court to grant the defense of

qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage.” Gonzalez v. Reno, __ F.3d __,

2003 WL 1481583, at *3 (11th Cir. 2003). Thus, if the defendants in this case are

entitled to qualified immunity, then their Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss must be

granted and the plaintiffs’ suit must be dismissed.

8
B. Qualified Immunity Principles

“The defense of qualified immunity completely protects government

officials performing discretionary functions from suit in their individual capacities

unless their conduct violates ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Gonzalez, __ F.3d at __, 2003

WL 1481583, at *3 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 2515 (2002));

Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002). To receive qualified

immunity, a government official first must prove that he was acting within his

discretionary authority. Gonzalez, __ F.3d at __, 2003 WL 1481583, at *4 (citing

Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1346). In this case, it is clear–and undisputed–that

defendants D’Elia, Williams, Tighe, St. Claire, Watson, and Law were acting

within their discretionary authority.

Once a defendant establishes that he was acting within his discretionary

authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the defendant is not

entitled to qualified immunity. Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1346. The Supreme Court

has established a two-part test to determine the applicability of qualified

immunity. “The threshold inquiry a court must undertake in a qualified immunity

analysis is whether [the] plaintiff’s allegations, if true, establish a constitutional

violation.” Hope, 122 S. Ct. at 2513. If, under the plaintiff’s allegations, the

9
defendants would have violated a constitutional right, “the next, sequential step is

to ask whether the right was clearly established.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,

201 (2001).

C. Liability of Guards D’Elia and Williams

We first examine whether the plaintiffs’ amended complaint alleges a

Fourteenth Amendment violation committed by defendants D’Elia and Williams.

1. Constitutional Violation Under the Fourteenth Amendment

“A prison official’s deliberate indifference to a known, substantial risk of

serious harm to an inmate violates the [Fourteenth] Amendment.” Marsh, 268

F.3d at 1028. A Fourteenth Amendment violation occurs when a substantial risk

of serious harm, of which the official is subjectively aware, exists and the official

does not respond reasonably to the risk. Id. Furthermore, such risk must be an

objectively substantial risk of serious harm to prisoners, and the prison official

must respond to that risk in an objectively unreasonable manner. Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 844-845 (1994). Finally, a plaintiff must show that

the constitutional violation caused the injury. Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1028.

We conclude that the plaintiffs’ amended complaint sufficiently alleges a

violation of Cottone’s Fourteenth Amendment rights. According to the amended

complaint, Cottone’s co-inmate, Charles, had a history of violent outbursts and

10
mental instability and was in the midst of a violent schizophrenic outrage prior to

his murdering Cottone. Given his visibly violent, mentally unstable state, Charles

posed an objective risk of serious harm to other inmates, including Cottone.

Furthermore, based on the allegations in the plaintiffs’ amended complaint,

D’Elia and Williams were subjectively aware of the substantial risk of serious

harm that Charles posed to the other inmates. First, D’Elia and Williams were

assigned to Unit 1 in the North Broward Detention Center. Thus, D’Elia and

Williams knew they were monitoring mentally ill inmates, who were so mentally

ill that they had been assessed, classified, and separated for housing in Unit 1 of

the North Broward Detention Center. Second, they were aware of the substantial

risk of serious harm that Charles individually posed to other inmates based on his

violent, schizophrenic outbursts which occurred prior to the murder incident.

They were the guards on duty when Charles entered the throws of a violent

schizophrenic outburst prior to murdering Cottone.

D’Elia’s and Williams’s response to the risk also was objectively

unreasonable. According to the plaintiffs’ amended complaint, neither D’Elia nor

Williams was monitoring the inmates at all during the time either of Charles’s

violent schizophrenic outburst prior to the murder or of Charles’s murder of

Cottone. Plaintiffs allege that D’Elia and Williams took consecutive breaks

11
during this time and that a computer game was observed on the computer screen at

their monitoring station at the time of the murder.

Plaintiffs’ amended complaint also alleges that the total lack of monitoring

and supervision of Charles caused Cottone’s death. They further allege that

D’Elia’s and Williams’s failure to monitor a known violent, unstable inmate, like

Charles, caused Cottone’s death.

In sum, at this Rule 12(b)(6) stage, we conclude that the plaintiffs’ amended

complaint adequately alleges (1) an objective, substantial risk of serious harm to

inmates existed, (2) D’Elia and Williams subjectively were aware of the

substantial risk of serious harm, (3) D’Elia and Williams responded in an

objectively unreasonable manner to that risk, and (4) this constitutional violation

caused Cottone’s death.

2. Violation of Clearly Established Law

Because the plaintiffs’ amended complaint sufficiently alleges a

consitutional violation, we next determine whether preexisting law clearly

established that the defendants’ conduct amounted to a constitutional violation.

Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1349 (“Because [the defendant]’s conduct violated a

constitutional right, the next question is whether that constitutional right was

‘clearly established’ at the time of the violation.”); Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1030-31

12
(“A government-officer defendant is entitled to qualified immunity unless, at the

time of the incident, the preexisting law dictates, that is, truly compels, the

conclusion . . . that what Defendant was doing violated Plaintiffs’ federal rights.”)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “‘The relevant, dispositive

inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be

clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he

confronted.’” Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1350 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202). In

making this inquiry, “the salient question . . . is whether the state of the law . . .

gave [the guards] fair warning that their alleged [conduct] was unconstitutional.”

Hope, 122 S. Ct. at 2516.

We can locate at least two factually similar cases, decided prior to the

conduct in question, in which a lack of monitoring and supervision of known

violent inmates, which led to inmate-on-inmate violence, constituted

impermissible unconstitutional conduct. In LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526,

1536-38 (11th Cir. 1993), this Court determined that a prison official’s failure to

ensure adequate supervision and monitoring of inmates with a history of inmate-

on-inmate violence was a violation of the Eighth Amendment. In LaMarca,

despite reported incidents of prior inmate-on-inmate violence, prison authorities

did not station officers to patrol throughout the inmate dormitories, particularly at

13
night. Id. at 1538. Prison authorities also allowed inmates to hang sheets,

obstructing the guards’ views, and preventing them from adequately supervising

the inmates. Id. Thus, in LaMarca, there was an absence of adequate supervision

despite a substantial risk of serious harm from inmate-on-inmate violence.

Similarly, in Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1584 (11th Cir.

1995) an inmate was assaulted by another inmate during the lengthy time between

the jailer’s scheduled rounds. Id. at 1581. This assault occurred despite past

incidents of inmate-on-inmate violence because, other than making rounds, the

jailer in Hale was “stationed out of eyesight and earshot” of the inmates. Id. at

1584. Based on these facts, this Court in Hale recognized unconstitutional

conditions of confinement existed because there was a lack of inmate supervision

and a substantial risk of serious harm from known violent inmates.

The plaintiffs have made similar allegations in this case. Under the

plaintiff’s version of the facts, the guards knew that Charles represented a

substantial risk of serious harm because he was violent, out-of-control and in the

throes of schizophrenia during his detention in Unit 1 prior to the murder incident.

D’Elia and Williams were assigned to supervise Charles as one of the mentally ill

inmates in Unit 1, but did not do so. Instead, they took consecutive breaks and

watched video games. Thus, just as there was no supervision of known violent

14
inmates in LaMarca and Hale, in this case guards D’Elia and Williams did not

monitor and supervise Charles, a known violent inmate who posed a substantial

risk of serious harm to the other inmates.

We conclude that prior factually similar case law gave fair and clear

warning to D’Elia and Williams that it was their duty to monitor and to supervise

known violent inmates who posed a substantial risk of serious harm to other

inmates. See Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1346. The law of this circuit “clearly

establishes” that their total failure to monitor a known violent inmate housed in

Unit 1, a housing unit for mentally ill inmates, constitutes unconstitutional

deliberate indifference to Cottone’s Fourteenth Amendment rights. Thus, given

the plaintiffs’ version of the events, defendants D’Elia and Williams are not

entitled to qualified immunity at this Rule 12(b)(6) stage.

D. Supervisory Liability of Tighe, St. Claire, Watson, and Law

“It is well established in this Circuit that supervisory officials are not liable

under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of

respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263,

1269 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Gonzalez,

__ F.3d at __, 2003 WL 1481583, at *4 (concluding supervisory officials are not

liable on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability). Instead,

15
supervisory liability under § 1983 occurs either when the supervisor personally

participates in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or when there is a causal

connection between the actions of a supervising official and the alleged

constitutional deprivation. Gonzalez, __ F.3d at __, 2003 WL 1481583, at *5 ;

Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990). The necessary causal

connection can be established “when a history of widespread abuse puts the

responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and

he fails to do so.” Gonzalez, __ F.3d at __, 2003 WL 1481583, at *5 (quoting

Braddy v. Fla. Dept. of Labor & and Employment, 133 F.3d 797, 802 (11th Cir.

1998)); Brown, 906 F.2d at 671. Alternatively, the causal connection may be

established when a supervisor’s “‘custom or policy . . . result[s] in deliberate

indifference to constitutional rights’” or when facts support “an inference that the

supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that the

subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.”

Gonzalez, __ F.3d at __, 2003 WL 1481583, at *5 (quoting Rivas v. Freeman, 940

F.2d 1491, 1495 (11th Cir. 1991)); Hartley, 193 F.3d at 1263; see also Post v. City

of Ft. Lauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552, 1560-61 (11th Cir. 1993). “The standard by which

a supervisor is held liable in [his] individual capacity for the actions of a

16
subordinate is extremely rigorous.” Gonzalez, __ F.3d at __, 2003 WL 1481583,

at *4 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The plaintiffs do not allege that defendants Tighe, St. Claire, Watson, and

Law personally participated in the alleged unconstitutional conduct which led to

Cottone’s death. Instead, the plaintiffs allege that there is a causal connection

between these defendants and Cottone’s death based on the defendants’ failure to

train and to supervise guards D’Elia and Williams. The plaintiffs allege that the

defendants were on notice of the widespread unconstitutional conduct at the

Broward County Jail through the consent decree and that the defendants failed to

rectify such conduct.

The consent decree generally addresses unconstitutional practices at the

Broward County Jail with respect to conditions of confinement, specifically the

classification, separation, housing, and monitoring of inmates. In broad terms, the

consent decree requires that assessment and classification of inmates be ongoing,

that inmates continuously be assessed and classified based on an inmate’s “social,

legal, and . . . medical history,” and that each Broward County detention facility

have its own classification officer. The consent decree also requires prison

officials to separate and to supervise inmates closely, particularly those “who

present a threat to the staff, other inmates, or themselves.” With respect to

17
monitoring these types of inmates, the consent decree requires “regular,

documented sight checks . . . at intervals not to exceed 15 minutes.” Other than a

time interval, however, the consent decree does not specify any details as to how

such monitoring should be performed.

The problem for the plaintiffs here is that the allegations in the amended

complaint itself show that the supervisors complied with the relevant terms of the

consent decree. According to the amended complaint, Broward County Jail

officials, including Dr. Maurice Waldman,6 assessed Charles and classified him as

a mentally ill inmate. As part of the ongoing inmate assessment procedures in

place, Dr. Waldman reduced Charles’s psychotropic medication. Based on the

assessment and classification procedures in place, Charles was transferred to

separate housing for mentally ill inmates in Unit 1 of the North Broward Detention

Center. Furthermore, there were surveillance cameras installed that allowed the

guards to monitor continuously the inmates housed in Unit 1. Indeed, two guards,

D’Elia and Williams, specifically were assigned to monitor the inmates in Unit 1.

By its own allegations, the amended complaint itself acknowledges that the

supervisors put in place the necessary procedures to abide by the consent decree.

6
Although not a party to this appeal, Dr. Waldman is a defendant in this case before the
district court.

18
Thus, the consent decree itself does not provide notice to establish a causal

connection between the supervisors and Cottone’s death.

Furthermore, the plaintiffs do not allege any specific facts at all connecting

the supervisors to D’Elia’s and Williams’s failure to monitor the inmates in Unit 1.

There is no allegation that supervisors directed the subordinate guards not to

monitor inmates or to act unlawfully. The amended complaint also does not make

any allegations that the supervisors had any knowledge of D’Elia’s and Williams’s

failure to monitor inmates or that D’Elia and Williams had any past history, or

even one prior incident, of failing to monitor inmates or of watching computer

games. The supervisors were not on any notice of D’Elia’s and Williams’s

unconstitutional conduct so as to put the supervisors on notice of the need to

correct or to stop the conduct of D’Elia and Williams by further training or

supervision. Thus, the plaintiffs fail to establish the necessary causal connection

between the supervisors and the unconstitutional conduct in issue for supervisory

liability to be imposed. See Gonzalez, __ F.3d at __, 2003 WL 1481583, at *6

(concluding that in the absence of a causal connection between the supervisors and

the alleged unconstitutional conduct, there is no basis for supervisory liability).

The plaintiffs also do not allege any affirmative custom or policy

implemented by the supervisory defendants that played a role in Cottone’s death.

19
See id. Nor do they allege that the supervisors instructed D’Elia and Williams to

commit constitutional violations. See id. As a result, the amended complaint does

not allege the causal connection required to impose supervisory liability against

these defendants.7

Thus, the plaintiffs have failed to allege that defendants Tighe, St. Claire,

Watson, and Law committed a constitutional violation.8 Because the amended

complaint fails to allege a constitutional violation committed by the supervisory

defendants, we need not reach the “clearly established law” prong of the qualified

immunity inquiry with respect to supervisory liability. See Vinyard, 311 F.3d at

1346 (“If a constitutional right would have been violated under the plaintiff’s

version of the facts, the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly

established.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added).

Accordingly, we conclude that defendants Tighe, St. Claire, Watson, and Law are

7
In examining the factual allegations in a complaint, we must keep in mind the heightened
pleading requirements for civil rights cases, especially those involving qualified immunity. GJR
Invs., Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir. 1998). However, as to
supervisory liability in this case, the plaintiffs’ amended complaint fails to meet even a relaxed
pleading requirement.
8
At all times, the plaintiffs have been represented by legal counsel. Never in the district
court did the plaintiffs seek to amend the complaint (for example, by adding facts), even after the
complaint’s sufficiency had been challenged specifically and the qualified immunity defense
expressly advanced by opposing counsel. Thus, we decline to remand this case to the district
court for further amendments to the plaintiffs’ already amended complaint.

20
entitled to qualified immunity and that the district court erred in failing to grant

these defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we reverse the district court’s denial of the

defendants Tighe, St. Claire, Watson, and Law’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss

based on qualified immunity and affirm the district court’s denial of defendants

D’Elia and Williams’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss based on qualified

immunity.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART.

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