[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
AUGUST 22, 2003
No. 01-17158 THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 01-00201 CR-BU-S
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHITTAKONE CHANTHASOUXAT,
Defendant-Appellant.
______________
No. 01-17163
______________
D.C. Docket No. 01-00201 CR-BU-S
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
KEOPASEUTH XAYASANE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
(August 22, 2003)
Before DUBINA, MARCUS and GOODWIN*, Circuit Judges.
DUBINA, Circuit Judge:
Chittakone Chanthasouxat (“Chanthasouxat”) and Keopaseuth Xayasane
(“Xayasane”) (collectively, “Defendants”) appeal their convictions for drug-
related offenses. Specifically, Chanthasouxat and Xayasane argue that the district
court erred in denying their motions to suppress drug evidence and statements
obtained pursuant to a stop for an alleged traffic violation and a subsequent
detention. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.
I. BACKGROUND
Chanthasouxat was driving a van in which Xayasane was a passenger,
traveling from Texas to North Carolina. Officer Phillip T. Carter (“Officer
_______________________
*Honorable Alfred T. Goodwin, United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by
designation.
2
Carter”) of the Birmingham, Alabama Police Department, testified that he stopped
the van in Alabama for failure to have an inside rear-view mirror. Officer Carter
asked Chanthasouxat to step out of the van and stand behind it. He then
questioned Chanthasouxat, who stated that he and Xayasane were driving back to
North Carolina after having attended a party in Texas. Chanthasouxat told Officer
Carter that a friend had loaned Defendants the van. Apparently, Chanthasouxat
could not remember the friend’s full name, so Officer Carter recorded the friend’s
name only as “Honroe.” Officer Carter then questioned Xayasane, who stated that
he and Chanthasouxat had been at an engagement party for Chanthasouxat’s
sister. Officer Carter observed that Xayasane appeared to be nervous and that one
of his eyes was twitching.
Officer Carter placed Chanthasouxat in the patrol car and informed him that
he would receive a citation for failure to have an inside rear-view mirror. Officer
Carter then asked Chanthasouxat if he was carrying drugs and if the police could
search the van. The patrol car was equipped with a video recorder, and the tape
demonstrates that Officer Carter did not display his weapon or use any force or
threats when he asked Chanthasouxat if he could search the van. Chanthasouxat
agreed to the search. Officer Carter then asked Xayasane to join Chanthasouxat in
the patrol car and called for back-up. After additional officers arrived, the police
3
searched the van and found approximately fifteen kilograms of cocaine. While
Chanthasouxat and Xayasane were in the patrol car, the patrol car video camera
recorded their discussion of how they would reconcile their stories. Their
conversation also demonstrated that they knew they were carrying cocaine.
The government charged Chanthasouxat and Xayasane with conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and
possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
Defendants filed motions to suppress the evidence seized at the traffic stop and all
of their statements on the grounds that Officer Carter did not have probable cause
or reasonable suspicion to stop the van or search its interior. Chanthasouxat also
contended that his consent to the search was not knowing, intelligent, or
voluntary. Xayasane argued that the traffic citation was a pretext and that the
Defendants were stopped because they were foreigners driving a van with Texas
license plates. Xayasane also claimed that there was no Alabama or Birmingham
law requiring a vehicle to have an inside rear-view mirror. He argued that,
without probable cause or reasonable suspicion as grounds for the traffic stop, any
evidence obtained from the stop was “fruit of the poisonous tree,” and therefore
should be suppressed. In addition, Xayasane contended that Officer Carter should
4
have informed Defendants of their right to refuse consent to the search of the van,1
and that, given the fact that English is not Defendants’ native language, Officer
Carter should have made it clear that Defendants’ consent to the search was
optional.
Chanthasouxat reiterated Xayasane’s arguments and asserted that the
detention after the traffic stop was invalid under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.
Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). He also argued that the questioning was
improper because, while a detention and any subsequent questioning must be
reasonably related to the reason for the traffic stop, Officer Carter’s questions
were not. Chanthasouxat disputed the government’s claim that Officer Carter had
probable cause for the traffic stop under the totality of the circumstances.
Moreover, he asserted that any consent to a search was tainted. Thus, any
evidence obtained from the search was inadmissible under the exclusionary rule
requiring courts to exclude evidence gathered by violating a defendant’s Fourth
Amendment rights. Terry, 392 U.S. at 12-13, 88 S. Ct. at 1875.
In response to Defendants’ motions to suppress, the government argued that
the Alabama Code required inside rear-view mirrors. Thus, because
1
We question whether Xayasane may challenge Chanthasouxat’s consent to the van’s search.
Xayasane had no expectation of privacy in the van in which he was a passenger. See Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1978).
5
Chanthasouxat’s vehicle had no inside rear-view mirror, Officer Carter had
probable cause to believe that a traffic violation had occurred. Pointing to Rule 20
of the Birmingham City Magistrate’s fine schedule, the government also
contended that the twenty dollar fine for “improper or no rear-view mirror”
supported its position that the Defendants did, in fact, violate Birmingham’s traffic
code. In addition, the government argued that once Officer Carter properly
stopped the van, Officer Carter’s questioning of the Defendants was also proper.
From the Defendants’ answers to his questions, Officer Carter formed an
articulable suspicion of other illegal activity. The government noted that an
officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a consent to search a vehicle.
The government also asserted that there were no coercive police procedures and
that, viewing the totality of the circumstances, Chanthasouxat’s consent to the
search was voluntary. Finally, the government contended that the police are not
required to inform Defendants that they have the right to refuse consent to a
search.
At an evidentiary hearing on the motions to suppress, Officer Carter was the
only witness for the government. He testified, among other things, that his duties
involved highway patrol and narcotics investigations and that he often stopped
vehicles for violations of traffic laws on the interstate and then interviewed the
6
individuals he stopped. On cross-examination, Officer Carter testified that he
wrote the citation at issue under section 10-11-5 of the Birmingham City Code.
That section states as follows:
No person shall drive on any street of the city a motor
vehicle which is so constructed or loaded as to prevent
the driver from obtaining a view of the street to the rear
by looking backward from the driver’s position unless
that vehicle is equipped with a mirror so located as to
reflect to the driver a view of the streets for a distance of
at least 200 feet of the rear of the vehicle.
Birmingham City Code §10-11-5. Officer Carter acknowledged that this section
did not specify that vehicles must have inside rear-view mirrors. He further
acknowledged that there were no state statutes that specifically required that
vehicles have inside rear-view mirrors. The Code of Alabama provides only that
“[e]very motor vehicle, operated singly or when towing any other vehicle, shall be
equipped with a mirror so located as to reflect to the driver a view of the highway
for a distance of at least 200 feet to the rear of such motor vehicle.” Ala. Code §
32-5-214 (2002).
7
However, Officer Carter stated that a city magistrate had told him that the
failure to have an inside rear-view mirror is a violation under section 10-11-5.
More specifically, Officer Carter testified that he considered the lack of an inside
rear-view mirror a violation based on his training, the magistrate’s interpretation
of the statute, and the fact that he had written over 100 tickets for the same
violation.
After hearing all of the evidence, the district court denied the Defendants’
motions to suppress. Specifically, the district court determined that, based on
Officer Carter’s training, his instructions from a magistrate concerning the
interpretation of section 10-11-5, and his history of having written more than 100
traffic citations for the same violation, Officer Carter had probable cause to stop
the Defendants’ vehicle. Both Chanthasouxat and Xayasane subsequently entered
conditional pleas of guilty, reserving the right to appeal the denials of their
motions to suppress. The district court sentenced each defendant to concurrent
terms of sixty months imprisonment. Chanthasouxat and Xayasane then perfected
their appeals.
II. ISSUES
A. Whether the district court erred in finding that Officer Carter had
reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop the Defendants’ vehicle.
8
B. Whether Chanthasouxat’s consent to search the Defendants’ vehicle was
voluntary.
C. Whether Chanthasouxat had an expectation of privacy in his
conversation with Xayasane as they waited in the back of the police car.
D. Whether the district court erred in determining that Officer Carter did
not exceed the scope of a permissible traffic stop.
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
This court reviews a district court’s findings of fact for clear error, United
States v. Zapata, 180 F.3d 1237, 1240 (11th Cir. 1999), viewing all facts in the
light most favorable to the party that prevailed in the district court. United States
v. Santa, 236 F.3d 662, 668 (11th Cir. 2000). This court reviews the district
court’s application of law to facts de novo. Zapata, 180 F.3d at 1240. “A district
court’s ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact.”
Id.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Whether the district court erred in finding that Officer Carter had
reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop the Defendants’ vehicle.
i. Reasonableness and the Fourth Amendment
9
“The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable search and
seizure.” United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
534 U.S. 830, 122 S. Ct. 73, 151 L. Ed. 2d 38 (2001); U.S. Const. amend. IV.
However, a traffic stop is a constitutional detention if it is justified by reasonable
suspicion under Terry or probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred
under Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772, 135 L.
Ed. 2d 89 (1996).2 “The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness
. . . .” United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118, 122 S. Ct. 587, 591, 151 L. Ed.
2d 497 (2001). Thus, in order to determine whether or not a specific Fourth
Amendment requirement such as probable cause or reasonable suspicion has been
met, the court must determine if the officer’s actions were reasonable. See
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1661-62, 134 L. Ed.
2d 911 (1996).
ii. The Parties’ Contentions
The Defendants contend that Officer Carter did not have reasonable
suspicion or probable cause to stop the van because the lack of an inside rear-view
2
The Ninth Circuit held in United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1104-05 (9th Cir.
2000), that the Supreme Court’s statement in Whren that probable cause justifies a traffic stop did
not change the Court’s previous holding in Terry that “reasonable suspicion is all the Fourth
Amendment requires [for a traffic stop].” Id. at 1104-05 (noting that the Ninth Circuit would join
the Eighth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits in so holding).
10
mirror is not a violation under either municipal or state law. Therefore, they argue,
the district court should have suppressed the evidence seized from the van and
Chanthasouxat’s statements. The Defendants rely on cases from two other
circuits, United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2000), and United
States v. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 1999), in support of their argument.
The government distinguishes Lopez-Soto and Lopez-Valdez on the ground
that in those cases, the language of the applicable statutes was clear, rendering the
officers’ beliefs as to the subject traffic violations unreasonable. In contrast, the
government argues that, in the present case, the applicable statute is ambiguous,
and the applicable traffic laws can reasonably be construed to cover the violation
in question. Thus, according to the government, Officer’s Carter’s interpretation of
the law was objectively reasonable. The government relies on the holding of the
Seventh Circuit in United States v. Cashman, 216 F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 2000), in
support of its contention that if Officer Carter’s interpretation of the law was
reasonable, then his stop of the Defendants did not violate their rights under the
Fourth Amendment.
iii. Analysis
The government’s argument and its reliance on Cashman fail to take into
account that, for a Fourth Amendment analysis, the difference between a mistake
11
of law and a mistake of fact is critical. As discussed infra, an officer’s reasonable
mistake of fact may provide the objective grounds for reasonable suspicion or
probable cause required to justify a traffic stop, but an officer’s mistake of law
may not.
a. An Officer’s Mistake of Fact and the Fourth Amendment
A traffic stopped based on an officer’s incorrect but reasonable assessment
of facts does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,
205, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 2158, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2001). See also United States v.
Gonzalez, 969 F.2d 999, 1006 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. Garcia-Acuna,
175 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Lang, 81 F.3d 955, 966
(10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1503 (10th Cir. 1996);
United States v. Hatley, 15 F.3d 856, 859 (9th Cir. 1994).
Thus, if an officer makes a traffic stop based on a mistake of fact, the only
question is whether his mistake of fact was reasonable. Great deference is given
to the judgment of trained law enforcement officers “on the scene.” See Saucier,
533 U.S. at 205-206, 121 S. Ct. at 2158 (discussing excessive force claims while
noting that excessive force and probable cause questions are subject to the same
Fourth Amendment analysis). “The principal components of a determination of
reasonable suspicion or probable cause will be . . . viewed from the standpoint of
12
an objectively reasonable police officer . . . .” Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696, 116 S. Ct.
at 1661-1662. In Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2800,
111 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1990), the Supreme Court noted that “what is generally
demanded of the many factual determinations that must regularly be made by
agents of the government . . . is not that they always be correct, but that they
always be reasonable.”
An officer’s mistake of fact may provide the objective basis for reasonable
suspicion or probable cause under the Fourth Amendment because of the intensely
fact-sensitive nature of reasonable suspicion and probable cause determinations.
See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 695-696, 116 S. Ct. at 1661. The Supreme Court has
noted that “[a]rticulating precisely what ‘reasonable suspicion’ and ‘probable
cause’ mean is not possible” because they “are . . . fluid concepts that take their
substantive content from the particular contexts in which the standards are being
assessed.” Id. The Court has also noted its “long-established recognition that
standards of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment are not susceptible of
Procrustean application.” Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33, 83 S. Ct. 1623,
1630, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726 (1963). Thus, an officer’s mistaken assessment of facts
need not render his actions unreasonable because what is reasonable will be
13
completely dependent on the specific and usually unique circumstances presented
by each case. See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 695-696, 116 S. Ct. at 1661-62.
For example, in Cashman, on which the government relies, the Seventh
Circuit found that an officer had probable cause to stop a car with a seven to ten
inch crack in the windshield under a state law that required that no vehicle’s
windshield be “excessively cracked or damaged.” Cashman, 216 F.3d at 586
(quoting WIS. ADMIN . CODE § Trans. 305.34(3) (1997) (internal quotations
omitted). The Wisconsin Code further specified exactly what constituted an
excessive crack or damage, and Cashman argued that the crack in his windshield
did not meet that criteria. Id. at 586-87. The Seventh Circuit held that even if
“[c]areful measurement after the fact . . . reveal[ed] that the crack” was not
excessive, the police officer still had probable cause to stop Cashman: “the Fourth
Amendment requires only a reasonable assessment of the facts, not a perfectly
accurate one.” Id. at 587. The Seventh Circuit also held that the “propriety of the
traffic stop does not depend . . . on whether [the defendant is] actually guilty of
committing a traffic offense . . . . The pertinent question instead is whether it was
reasonable for [the officer] to believe that [a traffic offense had been committed].”
Id. (citing United States v. Smith, 80 F.3d 215, 219 (7th Cir. 1996)). The Seventh
Circuit also noted that “so long as the circumstances confronting a police officer
14
support the reasonable belief that a driver has committed even a minor traffic
offense, the officer has probable cause to stop the driver.” Id. at 586.
b. An Officer’s Mistake of Law and the Fourth Amendment
The government’s reliance on Cashman is misplaced because Cashman
involved an officer’s possible mistake of fact, not a mistake of law. In the case
before us, however, the officer’s mistake was one of law. Relying on Lopez-Soto
and Lopez-Valdez, the Defendants argue that under the Fourth Amendment, an
officer’s mistake of law cannot provide the objective grounds for reasonable
suspicion or probable cause required to justify a traffic stop.
In Lopez-Soto, the officer stopped the defendant because, based on his
police academy training, the officer mistakenly believed that the Baja California
vehicle code required that each vehicle’s registration sticker be visible from the
rear of the vehicle. In fact, the code required that the sticker “be placed on the
upper right hand corner of the windshield.” Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d at 1105 (citing
Ley de Transito y Transportes art. 44 (Baha California, Mex.)) (internal quotations
omitted). The Ninth Circuit held that the stop “was not objectively grounded in
the governing law” and thus was unconstitutional, even though the officer’s
“mistaken view of the law [was held] in good faith.” Id. at 1106.
15
In Lopez-Valdez, an officer stopped the defendant for a broken taillight.
The plastic cover of the taillight was broken, but the bulb itself was intact. 178
F.3d at 284-85. However, because of a previous case regarding the same statute
ten years earlier, the Fifth Circuit noted that “no well-trained Texas police officer
could reasonably believe that white light appearing with red light through a
cracked red taillight lens constituted a violation of traffic law.” Id. at 289.
Therefore, the traffic stop was not “objectively reasonable.” Id. at 289 n.6. In
addition, the Fifth Circuit held that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary
rule should not be extended to cover an officer’s mistake of law. Id. at 289.
In the present case, Officer Carter testified that at the time he wrote the
citation, he believed, based on information from his training officer and the city
magistrate and his history of having written over 100 tickets for “improper or no
rear-view mirror” that the Birmingham City Code required vehicles to have inside
rear-view mirrors. Despite the government’s arguments to the contrary, we see no
ambiguity on the face of either the Alabama statute or the Birmingham ordinance.
The Birmingham law merely requires that a driver be able to “obtain a view of the
street to the rear by looking backward from the driver’s position” or have “a
mirror so located as to reflect to the driver a view of the streets for a distance of at
least 200 feet of the rear of the vehicle.” Birmingham City Code § 10-11-5.
16
Under the plain language of this ordinance, drivers who can look backward from
the driver’s position to see out a back window would not be required to have any
rear-view mirror. But even if a rear-view mirror is required because the driver
cannot “obtain a view of the street to the rear by looking backward from the
driver’s position,” the ordinance says nothing about requiring that the mirror be on
the inside of the vehicle.
The Alabama statute requires a rear-view mirror, but specifies only that the
mirror be “so located as to reflect to the driver a view of the highway for a
distance of at least 200 feet to the rear of such motor vehicle.” Ala. Code § 32-5-
214 (2002). Again, there is no requirement that the mirror be inside the vehicle.
Admittedly, the requirement that the driver be able to see 200 feet to the rear of his
vehicle creates a question of fact,2 but since the statute does not assume that this
requirement can only be met by an inside rear-view mirror, there is no reason for
2
The Birmingham ordinance would require a fact determination as to whether the van was
loaded or constructed in such a way that the driver could not turn around and see out the back, and
if so, whether the van had a mirror which provided the driver a view of the street 200 feet behind the
vehicle. The Alabama statute would require a fact determination only on the second question. In
the present case, these questions are irrelevant because the Defendants were driving a Mercury
Villager, pictures of which demonstrate that the van had rear windows which would allow
Defendants to “obtain[] a view of the street to the rear by looking backward from the driver’s
position.” Furthermore, there was no testimony that the van was “loaded so as to prevent
[Defendants]” from being able to see out the rear windows of the van. Thus, the van would have
complied with the Birmingham ordinance even if it had not had any rear-view mirror. The van
would have complied with the Alabama statute because it was equipped with outside rear-view
mirrors (assuming that these mirrors would provide the driver a view 200 feet to the rear of the
vehicle).
17
Officer Carter to make such an assumption. The magistrate’s fee schedule for
“improper or no rear-view mirror” also says nothing about requiring an inside
rear-view mirror.
Even if the statutes were ambiguous, that ambiguity could not help the
government’s case. This is because the government asks us to use the alleged
ambiguity of a statute against a defendant. More specifically, the government
would have us sweep behavior into the statute which the authors of the statute may
have had in mind but failed to put into the plain language of the statute. To do so
would violate the fundamental principle that a criminal statute that is so vague that
it does not give reasonable notice of what it prohibits violates due process. See
Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 456-457, 121 S. Ct. 1693, 1698, 149 L. Ed. 2d
697 (2001) (“Deprivation of the right to fair warning [of what a criminal statute
prohibits] . . . can result both from vague statutory language and from an
unforeseeable and retroactive judicial expansion of statutory language that appears
narrow and precise on its face.”). Of course, the statutes at issue are not criminal
statutes. Nonetheless, we decline to use the vagueness of a statute against a
defendant.
In United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 278 (5th Cir. 1998), the Fifth
Circuit noted that “[i]t should go without saying that penal statutes are to be
18
strictly construed.” The traffic stop at issue in Miller was based on the
defendant’s prolonged use of his left turn signal without turning left or moving
into the left lane. Id. at 276. The officer believed this was an infraction and
pulled the defendant over. After obtaining consent for a search, the officer found
marijuana in Miller’s vehicle. The Fifth Circuit held that, because the defendant’s
conduct was “not a violation of Texas law, no objective basis for probable cause
justified the stop of Miller.” Id. at 279. Thus, the stop was unconstitutional, and
the drug evidence would have to be excluded unless “Miller’s consent to the
search . . . cured the constitutional taint on the evidence.” Id. The court explained
that
The rule articulated by the Supreme Court in Whren
provides law enforcement officers broad leeway to conduct
searches and seizures regardless of whether their subjective
intent corresponds to the legal justifications for their
actions. But the flip side of that leeway is that the legal
justification must be objectively grounded.
Id.
We agree with the government that taken together, Officer Carter’s
training, the city magistrate’s statement to Officer Carter regarding the law, and
19
his history of having written more than 100 tickets for lack of an inside rear-view
mirror make Officer Carter’s mistake of law reasonable. The district court
credited Officer Carter’s testimony that, for the reasons mentioned, Officer Carter
believed that the Birmingham Code required inside rear-view mirrors. We do not
question that finding. Furthermore, we note that Officer Carter’s mistake of law
was more justified than the mistakes at issue in Lopez-Soto, Lopez-Valdez, and
Miller. In Lopez-Soto, the officer’s mistake of law was based only on incorrect
police academy training. In Lopez-Valdez, the police officer had the benefit of an
identical case from ten years earlier. In Miller, the officer had no objective reason
for his mistake of law. In contrast, Officer Carter had not merely been trained that
the failure to have an inside rear-view mirror violated the Birmingham traffic
code. In addition, a city magistrate had told him the same thing and, most
significantly, he had written more than 100 tickets for this particular “violation.”
Nonetheless, the government’s argument is misguided because it proposes
that we ask the wrong question: i.e., whether Officer Carter’s mistake of law was
reasonable under the circumstances. We would answer that question in the
affirmative. However, the correct question is whether a mistake of law, no matter
how reasonable or understandable, can provide the objectively reasonable grounds
for reasonable suspicion or probable cause. And to that question we join the Fifth
20
and Ninth Circuits in holding that a mistake of law cannot provide reasonable
suspicion or probable cause to justify a traffic stop.
We also agree with the Fifth Circuit, Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d at 289, and the
Ninth Circuit, Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d at 1106, that the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule established by Leon should not be extended to excuse a
vehicular search based on an officer’s mistake of law. The Ninth Circuit
explained that
there is no good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule for
police who do not act in accordance with governing law.
To create an exception here would defeat the purpose of the
exclusionary rule, for it would remove the incentive for
police to make certain that they properly understand the
law that they are entrusted to enforce and obey.
Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d at 1106 (internal citation omitted). We also note the
fundamental unfairness of holding citizens to “the traditional rule that ignorance
of the law is no excuse,” Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 196, 118 S. Ct.
1939, 1947, 141 L. Ed. 2d 197 (1998), while allowing those “entrusted to enforce”
the law to be ignorant of it.
Because Officer Carter’s mistake of law cannot provide the objective basis
21
for reasonable suspicion or probable cause, we conclude that the traffic stop at
issue violated the Fourth Amendment.
B. Whether Chanthasouxat’s consent to search the Defendants’ vehicle was
voluntary.
As a general rule, the evidence gathered as a result of an unconstitutional
stop must be suppressed. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85,
83 S. Ct. 407, 416, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963). However, a defendant’s consent to a
search may cure the constitutional taint on evidence obtained by violating a
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 486, 83 S. Ct. at 416-17. In this
case, to cure the taint on the drug evidence obtained after the illegal traffic stop,
the government would have to prove (1) that Chanthasouxat’s consent to the
search was voluntary, Santa, 236 F.3d at 676, and (2) that his consent was
obtained “by means sufficiently distinguishable [from the illegal stop] to be
purged of the primary taint.” Id. at 677 (internal quotations omitted). “[T]he
second requirement focuses on causation . . . .” Id. at 676. We consider three
factors in determining whether a voluntary consent was obtained by exploitation
of an illegal seizure: (1) the temporal proximity of the illegal conduct and the
consent; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and
flagrancy of the initial misconduct. Id. at 677 (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S.
22
590, 603-04, 95 S. Ct 2254, 2261, 45 L. 2d. 416 (1975)); United States v. Valdez,
931 F.2d 1448, 1452 (11th Cir. 1991).
In the present case, there was an extremely close temporal proximity
between the illegal stop and Chanthasouxat’s consent to the search because the
video tape revealed that only three minutes elapsed between the time Officer
Carter stopped the van and Chanthasouxat consented to a search. Thus, the
temporal proximity prong indicates that Chanthasouxat’s consent to search the van
was not an independent act of free will. As for the second prong, “intervening
circumstances,” it is difficult to imagine that significant changes in circumstances
could arise in a mere three minutes; but even if intervening circumstances could
arise in such a short period of time, none are mentioned in the record. As for the
third factor, “the purpose and flagrancy of the initial conduct,” we conclude that
this prong also weighs toward suppression because we have found that the initial
stop violated Defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights. Thus, all three factors
indicate that there was no break in the causal chain between the illegal traffic stop
and Chanthasouxat’s consent to search the van; therefore, Chanthasouxat’s
consent was a product of the illegal stop rather than an independent act of free
will, and the drug evidence must be suppressed. Because we hold that
Chanthasouxat’s consent was a product of the illegal stop, it is unnecessary for us
23
to discuss whether Chanthasouxat’s consent was voluntary. See Santa, 236 F.3d at
676-77.
C. Whether Chanthasouxat had an expectation of privacy in his
conversation with Xayasane as they waited in the back of the police car.
Chanthasouxat contends that his statements to Xayasane, which were
recorded as he waited in the back of the patrol car during the search of the van,
should be suppressed. If the initial stop had been constitutional, Chanthasouxat’s
argument would be foreclosed by our decisions in United States v. Gilley, 43 F.3d
1440 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that a defendant does not have an expectation of
privacy in recorded statements made to a co-defendant in the back seat of a police
car), and United States v. McKinnon, 985 F.2d 525, 528 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding
that a defendant “did not have a reasonable or justifiable expectation of privacy for
conversations he held while seated in the back seat area of a police car”).
However, because we hold that the initial stop violated Defendants’ rights under
the Fourth Amendment, Chanthasouxat’s presence in the back of the patrol car and
his statements made to Xayasane while in the back of the patrol car are “fruits of
the poisonous tree,” and, as such, must be suppressed. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at
484-85, 83 S. Ct. at 415-16.
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D. Whether the district court erred in determining that Officer Carter did not
exceed the scope of a permissible traffic stop.
Because we conclude that the initial traffic stop violated the Fourth
Amendment, the violation was not cured by voluntary consent, and that
Chanthasouxat’s statements made to Xayasane while seated in the patrol car were
fruits of the poisonous tree, we hold that the drug evidence and Chanthasouxat’s
statements must be suppressed. Therefore, we need not reach the issue of whether
the traffic stop was reasonably limited in scope and duration as required by
Purcell.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district court erred in denying
Defendants’ motions to suppress the drug evidence and Chanthasouxat’s
statements made in the back of the patrol car. Accordingly, we reverse the
Defendants’ convictions and remand this case for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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