[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR TH E ELEV ENTH C IRCUITU.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
January 20, 2004
No. 03-10154 THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 01-00130-CV -2-WDO-5
HOR TON HOM ES, IN C.,
Plaintiff-Counter-
Defen dant-A ppellant,
versus
UNI TED STA TES OF A MER ICA,
Defendant-Counter-
Claiman t-App ellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the M iddle D istrict of G eorgia
_________________________
(January 20, 2004)
Before EDMO NDSO N, Chief Judge, BIRCH and FA RRIS *, Circuit Judges.
BIRCH, Circuit Judge:
*
Honorable Joseph Jerome Farris, United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit,
sitting by designation.
In this appeal we must decide whether Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”) §
4051(a)(1)(E),1 26 U.S.C. § 40 51(a)(1)(E), clearly expresses the intent of Con gress
or is instea d ambig uous, th ereby allo wing th e Treasu ry Dep artment ( “Treasu ry”) to
promulgate regulations to eliminate any ambiguity. After review, we have decided
that § 4051(a)(1)(E) is clear on its face and d oes not apply to the “toters” 2 used by
plaintiff-appellant Horton Homes, Inc. (“Horton”). Accordingly, the judgment of
the district c ourt is R EVE RSE D.
I. BACKGROUND
Horton purchased certain vehicles, known as “toters,” from LJL Truck
Center (“LJL”) used to transport manufactured homes from the plant where they
are built to the retail dealer of the home. When purchased from LJL, the toters
were not yet complete and, thus, were not yet capable of towing manufactured
homes. In order to com plete the toter, Kingsley-Fisher Industries (“Kingsley-
Fisher”) arranged with LJL and Horton to have the incomplete toters sent to yet
another manufacturer, Double Eagle, for the installation of sleeper cabs and then
1
Section 4051 imposes an excise tax “on the first retail sale” of, inter alia, “[t]ractors of
the kind chiefly used for highway transportation in combination with a trailer or semitrailer.”
I.R.C. § 4051(a)(1)(E).
2
A “toter” is a tractor-like vehicle specially designed to transport manufactured homes
from the plant where they are built to the retail dealer of the home.
2
back to Kingsley-Fisher w here the vehicles’ assembly was com pleted. Kingsley-
Fisher in stalled sev eral com ponen ts to com plete the fin ished pr oduct:
a heavy duty vertical power hitch, coil spring boxes, a 200-gallon fuel
tank, a “Wide Load” sign, a mirror and light bar, a spare tire rack,
fenders, a lighting receptacle and a manual control box mounted on
the dash or the w indow frame o f the cab th at could a ctivate the lig hts
and electr omagn etic brake s on the m anufactu red hom e.
R2-68 at 2. After these improvements, the toters were capable of towing or pulling
a manu factured home, and they w ere delive red back to Hor ton.
Beginning in 1989 and continuing until 1995, the Internal Revenue Service
(“IRS”) assessed a 12% excise tax on Horton’s toters. The IRS determined that the
toters fell within the definition of a “tractor” in I.R.C. § 4051(a)(1)(E). Since
1983,3 this section has imposed a 12% tax “on the first retail sale”4 of “[t]ractors of
the kind chiefly used for highway transportation in combination with a trailer or
semitrailer.” 26 U.S.C. § 4051(a)(1)(E) (2003). From 1963 to 1982, the term
“tractor” was defined in Treasury Department regulations mirroring the language
3
The language of current § 4051(a)(1)(E) was enacted originally as part of the Revenue
Act of 1938 in 26 U.S.C. § 3403(a). See 26 U.S.C. § 3403(a) (1938). In 1954, the language in §
3403(a) was moved to § 4601(a). See 26 U.S.C. § 4601(a) (1954). Section 4061(a)(1)(E) was
repealed in 1983 and its language was relocated in current § 4051(a)(1)(E), the only change
being that a 10% tax was imposed on the “manufacturer, producer, or importer” under §
4061(a)(1) and a 12% tax was imposed on “the first retail sale” in § 4051(a)(1). 26 U.S.C. §
4051(a)(1)(E) (1983). The kinds of tractors subject to the tax in (a)(1)(E) have remained
unchanged. See 26 U.S.C. § 4051(a)(1)(E) (2003).
4
“First retail sale” is defined in section 4052 as “the first sale, for a purpose other than for
resale or leasing in a long-term lease, after production, manufacture, or importation.” 26 U.S.C.
§ 4052(a)(1) (2003).
3
of § 4051(a)(1)(E): “[t]he term ‘tractor’ means any tractor chiefly used for
highway transportation in combination with a trailer or semitrailer.” Compare 26
C.F.R . § 48.40 61(a)-3 (c) (196 3), with 26 C.F.R. § 48.4061(a)-3(c) (1982). In
1983, however, the Treasury Department enacted new, temporary regulations
expand ing the d efinition o f “tractor”:
[t]he term ‘tractor’ m eans a hig hway v ehicle prim arily desig ned to
tow a vehicle, such as a trailer or semitrailer, but does not carry cargo
on the same chassis as the engine. A vehicle equipped with air brakes
and/or towing packag e will be presumed to be prim arily designed as a
tractor.5
26 C.F .R. § 14 5.4051 -1(e)(1 )(i) (198 3). This regulatio n remain s uncha nged to day.
See 26 C.F.R. § 145.4051-1(e)(1)(i) (2003).
Following a non-jury trial, the district court ruled in findings of fact and
conclusions of law that “[f]or Horton Homes’ toters to be subject to the excise tax
5
The regulation goes on to state that
(ii) An incomplete chassis cab shall be treated as a tractor if it is equipped with
one or more of the following:
(A) A device for supplying pressure from the chassis cab to the brake
system (air or hydraulic) of the towed vehicle;
(B) A mechanism for protecting the chassis cab brake system from the
effects of a loss of pressure in the brake system of the towed vehicle;
(C) A control linking the brake system of the chassis to the brake system
of the towed vehicle;
(D) A control in the cab for operating the towed vehicle’s brakes
independently of the chassis cab’s brakes; or
(E) Any other equipment designed to make it suitable for use as a tractor.
26 C.F.R. § 145.4051-1(e)(1)(ii)(A)-(E) (2003). Section (e)(2) defines “truck” as “a
highway vehicle that is primarily designed to transport its load on the same chassis as the
engine even if it is also equipped to tow a vehicle, such as a trailer or semitrailer.” Id. §
145.4051-1(e)(2).
4
they must be ‘tractors’ and not ‘trucks.’” R2-68 at 4. Under the current regulatory
definition of “tractor ,” the distric t court he ld that H orton’s to ters fit with in its
languag e and w ere, thus, s ubject to th e 12% tax. Ho rton app ealed this ju dgmen t to
us.
II. DISCUSSION
We review an agency’s interpretation of a federal statute by using the two-
step process articulated by the Supreme Court in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U .S. 837 , 104 S . Ct. 277 8 (198 4). Southern Co. v.
F.C.C., 293 F .3d 133 8, 1343 (11th C ir. 2002 ). As w e have sta ted,
Chevron’s first step requires us to ascertain whether Congress has
spoken unambiguously ‘to the precise question at issue.’ If the
language of the statute is unambiguou s, we go no further, for w e must
give effect to clear congressional intent. If, however, we determine
that Congress’s intent is ambiguous as to the question at issue, we
must move on to the second step of the Chevron test and ask whether
the agency’s interpretation of congressional intent is reasonable.
Id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S. Ct. at 2781-82). Our first step,
therefor e, is to deter mine w hether th e langua ge of § 4 051(a)(1)(E) is clear or in
need of agency interpretation. “[T]he starting point for interpreting a statute is the
language of the statute itself.” Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 447 U .S. 102 , 108, 10 0 S. Ct. 2 051, 20 56 (19 80). M oreove r, “[a]s a bas ic rule
of statuto ry interpr etation, w e read the statute usin g the no rmal me anings o f its
5
words. . . . ‘[A]bsent a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that
language is generally dispositive.’” Consolidated Bank, N.A. v. United States
Dep’t of Treasury, 118 F.3d 1461, 1463 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Gonzalez v.
McNary, 980 F.2d 1418, 1420 (11th Cir.1993)).
Section 4051(a)(1)(E) clearly states the kinds of tractors that Congress has
decided are subject to the 12% excise tax. Since 1938, when tractors first were
subject to this tax, the kinds of tractors defined in § 4051(a)(1)(E) have not
changed, even while Treasury regulations have been enacted modifying the
definitions of “tractor” and “truck.” See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 48.4061(a)-3(c) (2003);
26 C.F.R. § 145.4051-1(e)(1)(i) (2003). While perhaps the terms “tractor” and
“truck” were in need of regulatory clarification, and we need not rule on that issue
in this appeal, clarifying the definitions of those terms by way of regulation does
not chan ge the clea r statutory languag e of § 40 51(a)(1 )(E).
Under the plain language of § 4051(a)(1)(E), only “[t]ractors of the kind
chiefly used for highway transportation in combination with a trailer or
semitrailer” are subject to the 12% tax. 26 U.S.C. § 4051(a)(1)(E). The IRS stated
in its brief and admitted at oral argument before us that Horton’s toters cannot tow
trailers or semitrailers; rather, they are used exclusively for the transport of
manufactured homes. Appellee’s Br. at 18. Accordingly, Horton’s toters cannot
6
be “[t]ractors of the kind chiefly us ed . . . in combination with a trailer or
semitrailer.” 26 U.S.C. § 4051(a)(1)(E) (emphasis added).6 Therefore, even
though Horton’s toters fall within the regulatory definition of “tractor,” they do not
fall within the plain statutory language dictating that only those tractors “of the
kind chiefly used . . . in combination with a trailer or semitrailer” are subject to the
tax. Id. (emphasis added).7
For the foregoing reason s, Horton’s toters are not subject to the 12% excise
tax levied under § 4051(a). Contrary to the district court’s conclusion that to find
Horton’s “toters are not subject to the excise tax would be to elevate form over
substance,” R2-68 at 6, such a finding impermissibly would stretch the statutory
6
Because Congress did not define “trailers or semitrailers,” nor has the Treasury
promulgated regulations defining those terms, we will define the words “trailer or semitrailer”
according to their common meaning. Old Colony R.R. Co. v. Comm’r, 284 U.S. 552, 560, 52 S.
Ct. 211, 213 (1932); Consolidated Bank, 118 F.3d at 1464. “[C]ourts often turn to dictionary
definitions for guidance.” CBS, Inc. v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 1223 (11th
Cir. 2001). Under the dictionary definition, both trailers and semitrailers are used for the
purpose of hauling goods or freight. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED (2002), available at http://mwu.eb.com/mwu. “Freight” is defined as
“goods . . . loaded for transportation.” Id. A “good” is defined as “personal property.” Id.
Manufactured homes are permanent dwellings, not personal property or freight. Accordingly,
manufactured homes would not be used “in combination with a trailer or semitrailer.” 26 U.S.C.
§ 4051(a)(1)(E).
7
Because we hold that congressional intent is clear, we need not reach the second part of
the Chevron test. Additionally, since we decide that Horton is not subject to the tax, we need not
reach the merits of Horton’s argument that LJL, rather than Horton, should be responsible for
paying the tax.
7
meaning at issue here beyond the clearly expressed congressional intent in §
4051( a)(1)(E ).
III. CONCLUSION
We fin d that H orton’s to ters are no t subject to the 12% excise tax levied in
I.R.C. § 4051 b ecause the toters are not “[t]racto rs of the k ind chief ly used . . . in
combin ation w ith a trailer o r semitraile r.” 26 U .S.C. § 4 051(a) (1)(E) .
Accor dingly, th e judgm ent of the district cou rt is REV ERS ED an d this case is
REM AND ED fo r further proceed ings con sistent w ith this op inion.
8