[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
FILED
No. 03-14387 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
OCTOBER 21, 2004
THOMAS K. KAHN
D. C. Docket No. 03-00011-CV-AR-S CLERK
TERRY LEE PASSMORE SWANN,
as Administrator of the Estate of
Merri Elizabeth Passmore,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SOUTHERN HEALTH PARTNERS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_________________________
( October 21, 2004 )
Before BIRCH, BARKETT and COX, Circuit Judges.
COX, Circuit Judge:
The Plaintiff, Terry Lee Passmore Swann (“Swann”), executor of the estate of
Merri Elizabeth Passmore, appeals the district court’s judgment for the Defendant,
Southern Health Partners, Inc. (“SHP”). The court granted the Defendant’s motion
to dismiss the Plaintiff’s second amended complaint for failure to satisfy the
heightened pleading standard applicable to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1988). Because we conclude that the heightened pleading standard is not applicable
in a § 1983 action against a non-governmental entity that cannot raise qualified
immunity as a defense, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The facts alleged in the complaint may be summarized as follows. Merri
Elizabeth Passmore (“decedent”) was incarcerated at the Blount County Detention
Center from January 3, 2001, until January 9, 2001. SHP, a private corporation, had
contracted with the Sheriff of Blount County and/or Blount County to provide
medical care to inmates at the Blount County Detention Center. While incarcerated,
the decedent repeatedly reported to SHP’s employees at the detention center that she
had not urinated in several days, but was not given a urine test until January 7, 2001.
SHP staff received the results of decedent’s test on January 8, 2001, acknowledging
that she had an infection, but decedent was still not treated. On January 9, decedent
became disoriented and was released on a recognizance bond and sent to the
emergency room at the Blount County Medical Center. The decedent was transferred
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to Medical Center East in Birmingham, Alabama, where she went into a coma and
died on January 25, 2001, due to acute renal failure.
Swann filed an action in the district court asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. In his initial complaint, Swann named as defendants SHP, Georgette Denny,
Blount County Sheriff Larry E. Stanton, and a medical doctor identified as L. Gewin.1
The district court granted SHP’s motion to dismiss the Plaintiff’s first amended
complaint for failure to comply with the Eleventh Circuit’s heightened pleading
standard applicable to actions brought under § 1983. The court gave the Plaintiff the
opportunity to file another complaint within ten days of the court’s order, providing
the Plaintiff with another chance to “comply[] with the higher pleading standards
enunciated in Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 963 F.2d 1481 (11th Cir. 1992), and
alleg[e] facts reflecting deliberate indifference and reaching the level of a
constitutional violation.” (R.1-22 at 1.) The Plaintiff then filed a second amended
complaint naming SHP as the only defendant.
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Plaintiff’s initial complaint asserted claims against Larry E. Stanton in his official capacity
only. Plaintiff amended the complaint in order to name Stanton in his individual capacity only.
Thereafter, the district court granted Stanton’s motion to dismiss, finding that he was entitled to
qualified immunity.
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The district court determined that “[a]lthough the concept of qualified
immunity is not available to Southern Health, as a defense, Southern Health is the
beneficiary of the heightened pleading standard applicable to all claims brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (R.1-31 at 1.) The court concluded that the Plaintiff’s second
amended complaint did not meet this standard, granted SHP’s motion to dismiss the
Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, and entered judgment for the Defendant.
II. ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in applying a
heightened pleading standard to a § 1983 action against a private entity that could not
assert qualified immunity as a defense. We review de novo a district court’s
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, accepting the allegations in
the complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003).
III. DISCUSSION
Appellant contends that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S.
163, 113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993), prohibits the application of a heightened pleading
standard to § 1983 actions against private entities, like SHP, who cannot raise
qualified immunity as a defense. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a
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complaint only need contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” In Leatherman, the Supreme Court held that a court
may not apply a heightened pleading standard more stringent than the usual pleading
requirements of Rule 8 in civil rights cases alleging municipal liability under § 1983.
507 U.S. at 164, 113 S. Ct. at 1161. The Court rejected respondent’s argument that
a municipality should enjoy the same heightened pleading standard granted
government officials protected from suit by qualified immunity. The Court
acknowledged that municipalities are afforded certain protections from liability – a
municipality cannot be held liable on a respondeat superior theory but only where a
municipal policy or custom caused the constitutional injury. 507 U.S. at 166, 113 S.
Ct. at 1162. However, protection from liability does not encompass immunity from
suit. Where a § 1983 claim is asserted against a municipality, only the liberal
pleading standards of Rule 8(a)(2) apply. 507 U.S. at 168, 113 S. Ct. at 1163.
Prior to Leatherman, this circuit recognized a heightened pleading standard
broadly applicable in § 1983 actions. In Oladeinde, for example, we stated that “[i]n
pleading a section 1983 action, some factual detail is necessary . . . . [T]his
heightened Rule 8 requirement – as the law of the circuit – must be applied by the
district courts . . . .” 963 F.2d at 1485; see also Arnold v. Bd. of Educ., 880 F.2d 305,
310 (11th Cir. 1989) (“Typically, Rule 8 is applied more rigidly to allegations of
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conspiracy and absolute immunity, and to claims plead against a local government
that the challenged conduct constitutes its official policy or custom.”).
Under the prior panel rule, we are bound by the holdings of earlier panels
unless and until they are clearly overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court. United
States v. Smith, 122 F.3d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir. 1997). “While an intervening
decision of the Supreme Court can overrule the decision of a prior panel of our court,
the Supreme Court decision must be clearly on point.” Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. at
Birmingham Bd. of Tr., 344 F.3d 1288, 1292 (11th Cir. 2003); see also Fla. League
of Prof’l Lobbyists, Inc. v. Meggs, 87 F.3d 457, 462 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e are not
at liberty to disregard binding case law that is so closely on point and has been only
weakened, rather than directly overruled, by the Supreme Court.”). Thus, we have
no authority to overturn the Oladeinde and Arnold line of cases unless Leatherman
overturned them.
We now address for the fist time the impact of Leatherman on the law of this
circuit. While Oladeinde and Arnold do suggest a broad application of a heightened
pleading standard in all § 1983 cases, we agree with the Appellant that those cases
were effectively overturned by the Leatherman Court. Leatherman made it clear that
any heightened pleading requirements in § 1983 actions against entities that cannot
raise qualified immunity as a defense are improper. While municipalities are
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protected from liability to some extent, they enjoy no immunity from suit. The same
reasoning is applicable in § 1983 suits against non-governmental entities not entitled
to qualified immunity. See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167-69, 112 S. Ct. 1827,
1833-34 (11th Cir. 1992); Buckner v. Toro, 116 F.3d 450, 452 (11th Cir. 1997)
(“When a private entity . . . contracts with a county to provide medical services to
inmates, it performs a function traditionally within the exclusive prerogative of the
state. In so doing, it becomes the functional equivalent of the municipality.” (citations
omitted)). The parties agree that as a private entity, SHP is not entitled to assert a
qualified immunity defense. Therefore, under Leatherman, because SHP cannot raise
qualified immunity as a defense, the Plaintiff need not satisfy any heightened
pleading requirements when asserting § 1983 claims against it.
Appellee contends, however, that cases handed down by this court subsequent
to Leatherman have continued to recognize a heightened pleading requirement in §
1983 actions applicable in cases involving not only individual defendants, but also
entities unable to assert qualified immunity as a defense. If that were the case, we
would be bound by the prior panel rule to continue to recognize a broadly applicable
heightened pleading standard in § 1983 actions. Any such holding could only be
corrected by the en banc court or the Supreme Court. Smith, 122 F.3d at 1359. But,
the prior panel rule does not extend to dicta. Tagle v. Regan, 643 F.2d 1058, 1064
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(5th Cir. 1981); see also Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1575,
1578 (11th Cir. 1992) (dicta “is neither the law of the case nor binding precedent”).
As discussed below, we find nothing in our post-Leatherman precedent, other than
dicta, acknowledging a heightened pleading standard in a § 1983 action against a
non-immune defendant.
We recognize that some of our decisions subsequent to Leatherman were
misleading. In GJR Investments, Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359 (11th
Cir. 1998), for example, the court stated:
[T]his circuit, along with others, has tightened the application of Rule
8 with respect to § 1983 cases in an effort to weed out nonmeritorious
claims, requiring that a § 1983 plaintiff allege with some specificity the
facts which make out its claim. Some factual detail in the pleadings is
necessary to the adjudication of § 1983 claims. This is particularly true
in cases involving qualified immunity, where we must determine
whether a defendant’s actions violated a clearly established right.
132 F3d. at 1367 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). GJR involved four Escambia
County officials’ challenge of a district court order denying their motions to dismiss
the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against them on qualified immunity grounds. Id. at
1361-64. While Escambia County, an entity not entitled to qualified immunity, had
been a party in the original action in the district court, it was not a party to the appeal.
Id. at 1361 n.1. So, the effect of Leatherman on our precedent was not, and could not
have been, an issue on appeal. Though the language quoted above suggests that the
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heightened pleading standard applicable in § 1983 actions is not limited to cases
involving qualified immunity, any such suggestion was dicta. GJR only addressed
the narrow question of whether the four individual defendants were improperly
denied qualified immunity. Id. at 1365.
The other post-Leatherman decisions cited by the Appellee are similarly
limited qualified immunity decisions involving only individual defendants. See, e.g.,
Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2003) (determining whether three
individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity); Cottone v. Jenne, 326
F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2003) (determining whether six individual defendants were
entitled to qualified immunity); Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991 (11th Cir. 2003)
(determining only whether Attorney General Janet Reno was entitled to qualified
immunity). The Defendant has not called to our attention any opinion, subsequent
to Leatherman, applying a heightened pleading standard in a case involving
defendants that could not raise qualified immunity as a defense. At least two of our
post-Leatherman cases have in fact recognized that the heightened pleading standard
is only applicable in § 1983 suits against individuals to whom qualified immunity is
available. See, e.g., Laurie v. Ala. Court of Crim. Appeals, 256 F.3d 1266, 1275-76
(11th Cir. 2001) (“‘Heightened pleading is the law of this circuit’ when § 1983 claims
are asserted against government officials in their individual capacities.”) (citing GJR,
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132 F.3d at 1367-68); Kyle K. v. Chapman, 208 F.3d 940, 944 (11th Cir. 2000)
(recognizing “heightened pleading requirement applicable to section 1983 actions
against individual government officials”).
Under the circumstances, we are not bound by the prior panel rule to follow
dicta which has specifically been rejected by the Supreme Court. Leatherman
overturned our prior decisions to the extent that those cases required a heightened
pleading standard in § 1983 actions against entities that cannot raise qualified
immunity as a defense. Our post-Leatherman precedent does not require a different
result.
IV. CONCLUSION
We therefore REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND the
action so that the court may evaluate the sufficiency of the Plaintiff’s second amended
complaint without applying a heightened pleading standard.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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