[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-10290 October 18, 2004
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 03-14038-CR-KMM
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DAVID LEE WOODARD,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(October 18, 2004)
Before BIRCH, DUBINA and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
David Lee Woodard appeals his conviction for being a felon in possession
of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), and 924(e).
Woodard contends (1) the magistrate judge lacked the authority under the Federal
Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636, (FMA) to accept his guilty plea and adjudicate
him guilty of a felony; and (2) even if the FMA authorized such actions, the
delegation of these duties to a magistrate judge would violate the principles of
Article III of the United States Constitution. We join the six other circuits that
have addressed these issues and hold there was no error, statutory or
constitutional, in the magistrate judge accepting Woodard’s guilty plea and
adjudicating him guilty.
I. BACKGROUND
Woodard was charged in a one-count indictment for being a felon in
possession of a firearm on or about July 11, 2003. Woodard signed a plea
agreement, and the magistrate judge conducted a change of plea hearing, as well as
a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 colloquy. At the change of plea hearing,
the magistrate judge stated to Woodard, “You understand that I am a United States
Magistrate Judge. I am not a District Judge. Do you understand that?” After
Woodard affirmatively replied “Yes, sir, Your Honor,” the magistrate judge
further explained, “Do you understand that you do not have to consent. You can
hold off, and you have the right to have [the district judge] hear your change of
2
plea. Do you understand that?” Once more, Woodard replied, “Yes, sir, Your
Honor.”
The magistrate judge then proceeded to the change of plea colloquy. After
determining that Woodard was competent and a factual basis existed for the guilty
plea, the magistrate judge accepted Woodard’s guilty plea as follows: “The plea is,
therefore, accepted by me, and the defendant is now adjudged guilty of that
offense.”
Woodard’s sentencing hearing was conducted by the district judge. After
sentencing Woodard for the felon in possession of a firearm count, the district
judge stated: “Now that sentence has been imposed, does the Defendant or his
counsel object to the Court’s finding of fact or to the manner in which sentence
was pronounced?” Woodard neither objected to the sentence imposed nor the
prior plea colloquy conducted by the magistrate judge.
Woodard contends that even though he expressly consented to the
magistrate judge conducting the Rule 11 colloquy, the magistrate judge had no
authority to accept his guilty plea and adjudicate him guilty of a felony. Woodard
challenges the magistrate judge’s authority to perform such actions on both
statutory and constitutional grounds.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
3
Woodard neither objected to the plea proceedings conducted by the
magistrate judge nor subsequently moved to withdraw his plea at his sentencing
hearing; therefore, we review the statutory and constitutional issues raised in his
appeal for plain error. See United States v. Maragh, 174 F.3d 1202, 1204 (11th
Cir. 1999) (“Because [the defendant] made no objection to the magistrate judge’s
conducting of voir dire, we review the district court’s delegation of jury selection
to the magistrate judge only for plain error.”); see also United States v. Acevedo,
285 F.3d 1010, 1011–12 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting constitutional issues not raised
in the district court are subject to plain error review). The four-prong test to
establish plain error is: (1) there must have been an error; (2) the error must have
been plain; (3) the error must have seriously affected substantial rights; and (4) the
error must have seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
the judicial proceedings. Acevedo, 285 F.3d at 1012.
III. DISCUSSION
This Court has never addressed the issue of whether a magistrate judge has
the authority to accept a defendant’s guilty plea and adjudicate him guilty. In
addressing this issue, we will first consider whether the magistrate judge had the
statutory authority under the FMA to perform such actions. Second, we will
4
consider whether delegating these duties to a magistrate judge offends the
principles of Article III of the Constitution.
We join every circuit to have examined these issues, and hold (1) the FMA
authorizes a magistrate judge, with the defendant’s consent, to conduct Rule 11
proceedings, and (2) the statutory grant is not an impermissible usurpation of
Article III powers. See, e.g., United States v. Osborne, 345 F.3d 281, 285–90 (4th
Cir. 2003); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1118–22 (9th Cir. 2003);
United States v. Torres, 258 F.3d 791, 794–96 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Dees, 125 F.3d 261, 264–69 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Ciapponi, 77 F.3d
1247, 1249–52 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Williams, 23 F.3d 629, 632–34
(2d Cir. 1994).1
A. Statutory Challenge
The FMA regulates the authority and jurisdiction of magistrate judges. See
28 U.S.C. § 636; see also Maragh, 174 F.3d at 1204. The FMA explicitly names
certain duties and functions which magistrate judges can perform. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A)–(B). In addition to these enumerated duties, the FMA also
includes a “catchall provision” that states magistrate judges “may be assigned such
additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
1
Woodard fails to identify, and we have not found, any circuit court holding to the contrary.
5
United States.” Id. § 636(b)(3). The authority to conduct Rule 11 proceedings
and to take guilty pleas is not among the FMA’s enumerated duties; therefore,
whether magistrate judges can perform such actions must be analyzed under the
“additional duties” clause of § 636(b)(3).
Although we have not addressed this issue directly, both the United States
Supreme Court and our Court have considered the analogous issue of whether the
“additional duties” clause authorized magistrate judges to conduct voir dire in
criminal proceedings. See Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 111 S. Ct. 2661
(1991); Maragh, 174 F.3d 1202. In Peretz, the Supreme Court noted any
“additional duties performed pursuant to [§ 636(b)(3)] reasonably should bear
some relation to the specified duties that the statute assigned to magistrates.” 501
U.S. at 930, 111 S. Ct. at 2666 (internal quotation omitted). The Court found that
the defendant’s consent “makes the crucial difference” in determining whether or
not an additional duty resembles one of the FMA’s enumerated duties. Id. at 933,
111 S. Ct. at 2667. The Court explained that under the FMA, magistrate judges
can be delegated more extensive powers when the parties have consented. Id.
In addition, we have explained, “[t]he Supreme Court’s interpretation of
section 636(b)(3) establishes the presence or absence of consent as the crucial
factor in determining what duties the section encompasses.” Maragh, 174 F.3d at
6
1204; see also id. at 1205 (holding “consent is of paramount importance” in
determining the duties the district court could delegate to a magistrate judge). In
Maragh, we recognized the Supreme Court’s holding that “as long as a defendant
consented, a magistrate judge rather than an Article III judge could conduct voir
dire in a felony case under section 636(b)(3).” Id. at 1205 (citing Peretz, 501 U.S.
at 934–36, 111 S. Ct. at 2668–69).
In this case, Woodard expressly consented to the magistrate judge
conducting his plea colloquy. At the change of plea hearing, the magistrate judge
explicitly explained that he was a magistrate judge and not a district judge, and
that Woodard had the right to “hold off” and have the district judge hear his
change of plea. Woodard stated that he understood. Moreover, at the sentencing
hearing conducted by the district judge, Woodard neither objected to the sentence
imposed nor to the prior plea colloquy conducted by the magistrate judge.
Nonetheless, Woodard argues the enumerated duties in the FMA “pale in
comparison with [the] gravity and importance of accepting a guilty plea and
adjudicating an individual guilty of a felony.” Several of our sister circuits have
rejected this argument. See, e.g., Osborne, 345 F.3d at 286–88; Reyna-Tapia, 328
F.3d at 1119–21; Dees, 125 F.3d at 264–66; Williams, 23 F.3d at 632–33.
Conducting a plea colloquy “is a highly structured event that follows a familiar
7
script and is governed by the specific terms of Rule 11.” Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d at
1120. “[T]he comprehensive provisions of Rule 11 . . . carefully explain what a
court must inquire about, what it should advise a defendant and what it should
determine before accepting a plea.” Williams, 23 F.3d at 632 (citing Fed. R. Crim.
P. 11).
As our sister circuits have noted, conducting a plea colloquy, while
important, is “less complex” than several of the duties the FMA expressly
authorizes magistrate judges to perform. Williams, 23 F.3d at 632–33; see also
Osborne, 345 F.3d at 286–88; Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d at 1119–21; Dees, 125 F.3d
at 264–66. For example, the FMA permits magistrate judges to conduct entire
civil and misdemeanor trials if the parties have consented. 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(3),
(c)(1). The FMA also specifically permits magistrate judges to hear and determine
pretrial matters, to conduct evidentiary hearings, and to submit to the district court
proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition. Id.
§ 636(b)(1)(A)–(B). Determining the voluntariness of an out-of-court
statement—an evidentiary question which magistrate judges can perform—“is
remarkably similar to the inquiry into the voluntariness of a guilty plea that
underlies the Rule 11 proceeding.” Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d at 1120.
8
Like our sister circuits, we find that conducting a Rule 11 proceeding is
comparable to the FMA’s enumerated duties. Therefore, we join our sister circuits
in similarly holding that a magistrate judge has the authority under the “additional
duties” clause of FMA to conduct Rule 11 proceedings when the defendant
consents.
B. Constitutional Challenge
In Peretz, the Supreme Court explained that the defendant’s consent was
critical to the constitutional analysis as well. 501 U.S. at 932–40, 111 S. Ct. at
2667–71. The Court considered two potential constitutional constraints on the
delegation of duties to magistrate judges. First, the Court considered whether a
delegation of duty violates the defendant’s personal right to demand the presence
of an Article III judge at critical phases of the trial. Id. at 936–37, 111 S. Ct. at
2669. The Court explained that like other personal rights of criminal defendants,
this right could be waived. Id.; see also Maragh, 174 F.3d at 1206 (“In order for a
magistrate judge to conduct jury voir dire in a felony criminal proceeding, a
defendant must give consent, or in other words, a defendant must waive the right
to have an Article III judge conduct voir dire.”). In this case, Woodard explicitly
consented to the magistrate judge conducting his Rule 11 colloquy. Woodard now
9
concedes that this consent constituted a valid waiver of his right to have the
district judge perform the Rule 11 colloquy.
The second constitutional constraint considered by the Supreme Court in
Peretz was whether delegating certain duties to magistrate judges would offend
the structural protections provided by Article III. 501 U.S. at 937–39, 111 S. Ct.
at 2669–71. The Court assumed such structural protections were not subject to
waiver. Id. at 937, 111 S. Ct. at 2669. Here, Woodard bases his constitutional
challenge on this structural argument. Woodard asserts that even if we found the
magistrate judge was authorized under the FMA to accept his guilty plea and
adjudicate him guilty of a felony, the statutory grant would constitute a structural
error in violation of Article III, because the Article I Legislature, through the
FMA, would have impermissibly usurped the express powers of Article III judges.
Like the statutory challenge, every circuit to have considered this
constitutional argument has rejected it and held that the statutory grant is not an
impermissible usurpation of Article III powers. See, e.g., Osborne, 345 F.3d at
288–90; Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d at 1118–22; Torres, 258 F.3d at 794–96; Dees,
125 F.3d at 266–69; Ciapponi, 77 F.3d at 1250–52; Williams, 23 F.3d at 634.
In rejecting the structural argument, our sister circuits have relied on the
Supreme Court’s holding in Peretz. In Peretz, the Court held the structural
10
protections of Article III are not jeopardized when magistrate judges conduct voir
dire because district judges still exert ultimate control over magistrate judges. The
Court explained that because district judges have supervisory power over
magistrate judges, “there is no danger that use of the magistrate involves a
congressional attemp[t] to transfer jurisdiction [to non-Article III tribunals] for the
purpose of emasculating constitutional courts.” 501 U.S. at 937, 111 S. Ct. at
2669–70 (alteration in original) (internal quotation omitted).
The Supreme Court also noted that the availability of de novo review by
district judges removes the fear that Article III powers are being impermissibly
usurped when duties are delegated to magistrate judges. Id. at 939, 111 S. Ct. at
2670–71. District judges do not actually have to exercise de novo review of
magistrate judges’ decisions, however, unless an objection is made. The Court
explained that “to the extent de novo review is required to satisfy Article III
concerns, it need not be exercised unless requested by the parties.” Id. It is “the
availability of [de novo] review, upon request by the parties, rather than a required
performance thereof, that safeguard[s] the integrity of the federal judiciary.”
Osborne, 345 F.3d at 289 (emphasis added).
In his reply brief, Woodard tries to draw a distinction between our sister
circuits’ cases and his case by claiming that “in just about all of those cases,” the
11
magistrate judge prepared a report and recommendation to be reviewed by the
district judge and the district judge actually accepted the defendant’s guilty plea.
In Woodard’s case, on the other hand, the magistrate judge accepted his guilty
plea. We note the decisions reveal a lack of uniformity in the language used by
magistrate judges.2 However, the critical factor in all of the decisions was that a
district court, as a matter of law, retained the ability to review the Rule 11 hearing
if requested. See Osborne, 345 F.3d at 289 n.8; see also Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d at
1121 (“Neither the Constitution nor the statute requires a district judge to review,
de novo, findings and recommendations that the parties themselves accept as
correct.”); Dees, 125 F.3d at 268 n.7 (“Even though the Magistrates Act does not
expressly provide for de novo review of plea proceedings, the only constitutional
requirement is that it be available if the parties so request.”); Ciapponi, 77 F.3d at
1251 (“Absent an objection or request for review by the defendant, the district
court was not required to engage in any more formal review of the plea
proceeding.”).
2
Compare Torres, 258 F.3d at 793 (report and recommendation), and Dees, 125 F.3d at 263
(magistrate judge “recommended” district court accept the defendant’s plea), with Osborne, 345 F.3d
at 283 (magistrate judge “accept[ed]” the guilty plea but also advised defendant that district court
retained power to accept or reject guilty plea), and Ciapponi, 77 F.3d at 1249 (magistrate judge
“accepted” the guilty plea).
12
In this case, Woodard did not request that the district court review the Rule
11 hearing. During sentencing, the district court explicitly asked if there were any
objections “to the Court’s finding of fact or to the manner in which sentence was
pronounced.” Contrary to Woodard’s claims, the magistrate judge did not
appropriate the district court’s ultimate decision-making authority. Rather,
Woodard failed to either request a review of the Rule 11 hearing or object to the
magistrate judge’s actions. Like our sister circuits, we hold that delegating the
authority to conduct Rule 11 proceedings to magistrate judges does not offend the
principles of Article III.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, there was no plain error, statutory or constitutional, with the
magistrate judge accepting Woodard’s guilty plea and adjudicating him guilty.
AFFIRMED.
13