[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
December 02, 2004
Nos. 04-10979 THOMAS K. KAHN
& 04-11044 CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 02-00139-CV-6
RALPH HARRISON BENNING,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
THE STATE OF GEORGIA,
THE GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Defendants-Appellants,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Intervenor-Defendant-
Appellee.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
_________________________
(December 2, 2004)
Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, PRYOR and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PRYOR, Circuit Judge:
The issues presented in this appeal are whether Congress exceeded its
authority under the Spending Clause of the Constitution or violated either the
Establishment Clause or the Tenth Amendment in enacting section 3 of the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), which requires
state prisons that receive federal funds to refrain from burdening the religious
exercise of prisoners. Because Congress properly exercised its spending power by
unambiguously conditioning the use of federal funds for state prisons on the
related accommodation of the religious exercise of prisoners and that
accommodation does not endorse a religious viewpoint, we conclude that this
section of RLUIPA was validly enacted under the Spending Clause and does not
violate either the Establishment Clause or the Tenth Amendment.
I. BACKGROUND
Ralph Benning is an inmate in the Georgia prison system. He asserts that he
is a “Torah observant Jew” and is “compelled by [his] system of religious belief to
eat only kosher food,” “wear a yarmulke at all times,” “to observe specific holy
days,” and “perform specific rituals.” Benning asked a number of state and prison
officials to provide him with a kosher diet and permit him to wear a yarmulke.
Prison officials denied Benning’s requests. Benning also filed an internal prison
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grievance in which he specifically asserted his rights under RLUIPA. Benning’s
grievance failed.
Benning filed this lawsuit against Georgia, the Georgia Department of
Corrections (DOC), and several Georgia officials. Georgia moved to dismiss and
argued that section 3 of RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. section 2000cc-1, exceeds the
authority of Congress under the Spending and Commerce Clauses, and violates the
Tenth Amendment and the Establishment Clause. The United States intervened to
defend the constitutionality of RLUIPA.
The district court dismissed Benning’s claims against the individual
defendants, but concluded that RLUIPA does not violate the Establishment Clause
and denied the motion to dismiss with regard to Georgia and the DOC. The
district court certified its denial of the motion to dismiss for immediate appeal,
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), and alternatively certified its ruling
for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. section 1292(b). We granted the petition
by Georgia for permission to appeal under section 1292(b).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo the constitutionality of an act of Congress. Gulf Power
Co. v. United States, 187 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 1999). Georgia has the
burden to show that section 3 of RLUIPA is unconstitutional. “Proper respect for
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a co-ordinate branch of the government requires the courts of the United States to
give effect to the presumption that [C]ongress will pass no act not within its
constitutional power. This presumption should prevail unless the lack of
constitutional authority to pass an act in question is clearly demonstrated.” United
States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 635, 1 S. Ct. 601, 606 (1883). As the Supreme
Court explained in United States v. Morrison, “we invalidate a congressional
enactment only upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional
bounds.” 529 U.S. 598, 607, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2000). Because this is a
facial challenge to section 3, Georgia must also show that there is no set of
circumstances in which section 3 can be applied without violating the
Constitution:
A facial challenge, as distinguished from an as-applied challenge,
seeks to invalidate a statute or regulation itself. The general rule is that
for a facial challenge to a legislative enactment to succeed, the
challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under
which the Act would be valid. The fact that a legislative act might
operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances
is insufficient to render it wholly invalid. This heavy burden makes
such an attack the most difficult challenge to mount successfully against
an enactment.
Horton v. City of St. Augustine, 272 F.3d 1318, 1329 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
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III. DISCUSSION
Section 3 of RLUIPA applies strict scrutiny to government actions that
substantially burden the religious exercise of institutionalized persons:
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious
exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution, ... even if
the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the
government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person–
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.
...
This section applies in any case in which–
(1) the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that
receives Federal financial assistance; or
(2) the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial
burden would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the
several States, or with Indian tribes.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. Although we upheld section 2, the land use section of
RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. section 2000cc(a)(1) and (b), as constitutional in Midrash
Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2004), the
constitutionality of section 3 is an issue of first impression in this circuit.
Four of our sister circuits have considered the constitutionality of this
section, and three have upheld it. The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have concluded
that section 3 of RLUIPA is a valid exercise of the spending power of Congress
and does not violate the Establishment Clause or the Tenth Amendment. Charles
5
v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2003); Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d
1062 (9th Cir. 2002). The Fourth Circuit has also upheld section 3 under the
Establishment Clause. Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2003). Only the
Sixth Circuit has held that section 3 violates the Establishment Clause. Cutter v.
Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003).
Georgia argues that Congress, in enacting section 3 of RLUIPA, exceeded
its authority under Article I, section 8, and, alternatively, violated either the First
Amendment or the Tenth Amendment. Although both Benning and the United
States argue that Congress acted within its authority under both the Spending
Clause and the Commerce Clause, we need not address both arguments so long as
Congress validly exercised either source of authority. We address the authority of
Congress under the Spending Clause before turning to the objections Georgia
raises under both the First and Tenth Amendments.
A. Congress Properly Exercised Its Spending Power.
The Constitution empowers Congress to “lay and collect taxes, duties,
imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and
general welfare of the United States.” U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. It is well-
settled that “[i]ncident to this power, Congress may attach conditions on the
receipt of federal funds.” South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206, 107 S. Ct.
6
2793, 2795-96 (1987). This power can be exercised to achieve goals not within
the other enumerated powers of Congress in Article I, id. at 207, 107 S. Ct. at
2796, but this power is also limited.
The Supreme Court has identified four restrictions on the spending power of
Congress. First, conditions attached by Congress on the expenditure of federal
funds must promote the general welfare, and not be in the service of narrow and
private interests. Id. Second, conditions on the state receipt of federal funds must
be unambiguous, and enable “the States to exercise their choice knowingly,
cognizant of the consequences of their participation.” Id. Third, the Supreme
Court has “suggested (without significant elaboration) that conditions on federal
grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated to the federal interest in particular
national projects or programs.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). Fourth, no condition attached to receipt of federal funds may violate
other provisions of the Constitution. Id. at 208, 107 S. Ct. at 2796. Georgia does
not dispute that RLUIPA serves the general welfare, so we limit our discussion to
the three remaining issues.
1. The Conditions of RLUIPA Are Unambiguous.
Congress may condition the expenditures of federal funds on the
furtherance of federal objectives, but when the recipient of those funds is a state
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the conditions imposed by Congress must be unambiguous:
[L]egislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the
nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to
comply with federally imposed conditions. The legitimacy of Congress’
power to legislate under the spending power thus rests on whether the
State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the “contract.”
There can, of course, be no knowing acceptance if a State is unaware of
the conditions or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it.
Accordingly, if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of
federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously.
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17, 101 S. Ct. 1531, 1540
(1981) (internal citations omitted).
Georgia argues that the conditions of RLUIPA are ambiguous, contrary to
Pennhurst, in four ways: (1) RLUIPA does not put states on clear notice that, by
accepting federal funds, they waive immunity to suits brought under the act; (2)
RLUIPA does not clearly inform states that they have an option whether to accept
or reject federal funds; (3) federal grants do not mention the requirements that
RLUIPA will impose on states accepting the grants; and (4) the standard of least
restrictive means is too ambiguous to allow a state an informed choice. These
arguments fail.
Congress unambiguously required states to waive their sovereign immunity
from suits filed by prisoners to enforce RLUIPA. Section 2000cc-2(a) provides
that “[a] person may assert a violation of this chapter as a claim or defense in a
8
judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a). The statutory definition of government specifically
includes states and state agencies. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(4)(A). Georgia was on
clear notice that by accepting federal funds for its prisons, Georgia waived its
immunity from suit under RLUIPA. “Where Congress has unambiguously
conditioned the receipt of federal funds on a waiver of immunity, [our decisions
do] not leave open the possibility that a state can continue to accept federal funds
without knowingly waiving its immunity.” Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. at Birmingham
Bd. of Trs., 344 F.3d 1288, 1293 (11th Cir. 2003).
Congress need not inform the states of their self-evident ability to decline
federal funds nor include within each federal grant a list of all accompanying
conditions. It is sufficient for the text of RLUIPA to link unambiguously its
conditions to the receipt of federal funds and define those conditions clearly
enough for the states to make an informed choice. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 25, 101
S. Ct. at 1544. RLUIPA applies in any case in which “the substantial burden is
imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b)(1).
The standard of least restrictive means is far from ambiguous in informing
states of their responsibilities when they receive federal funds. RLUIPA forbids
9
the states from imposing substantial burdens on religious exercise absent a
compelling government interest accomplished by the least restrictive means
necessary to serve that interest. This standard is not new to Georgia or any state.
In Midrash, we observed that RLUIPA reanimates the strict scrutiny long applied
to the states in disputes regarding the free exercise of religion both before and
after Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1236-37. RLUIPA gives states wide latitude in applying its
provisions, but this flexibility does not make the conditions of RLUIPA opaque.
“[O]nce Congress clearly signals its intent to attach federal conditions to Spending
Clause legislation, it need not specifically identify and proscribe in advance every
conceivable state action that would be improper.” Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d
484, 495 (11th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds, Alexander v. Sandoval,
532 U.S. 275, 121 S. Ct. 1511 (2001).
The Supreme Court has explained that so long as a spending condition has a
clear and actionable prohibition of discrimination, it does not matter that the
manner of that discrimination can vary widely. In Davis v. Monroe County Board
of Education, for example, the Court upheld the prohibition of sexual harassment
in schools that receive federal funds, under Title IX, and its corresponding right of
action, even though “the level of actionable ‘harassment’ ... ‘depends on a
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constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships,’ ...
including but not limited to, the ages of the harasser and the victim and the number
of individuals involved .... ” 526 U.S. 629, 651, 119 S. Ct. 1661, 1675 (1999)
(quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 82, 118 S. Ct. 998,
1003 (1998)). The clear prohibition of discrimination in Title IX provided
adequate notice to the recipients of federal funds that severe student-on-student
harassment was actionable. Id.
Georgia erroneously relies on Pennhurst to support its argument that
RLUIPA is ambiguous. In Pennhurst, a federal suit failed when the plaintiffs
argued that a federal law that declared “a right to appropriate treatment” for certain
patients “provided in the setting that is least restrictive of the [patient’s] individual
liberty” created a substantive right against the states. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 14,
101 S. Ct. at 1538. The Court reasoned, “It is difficult to know what is meant by
providing ‘appropriate treatment’ in the ‘least restrictive’ setting, and it is unlikely
that a State would have accepted federal funds had it known it would be bound to
provide such treatment.” Id. at 24-25, 101 S. Ct. at 1543-44. “Congress fell well
short of providing clear notice to the States that they, by accepting funds under the
Act, would indeed be obligated to comply with [the treatment standards].” Id.
The federal law in Pennhurst was unclear as to whether the states incurred any
11
obligations at all by accepting federal funds, but RLUIPA is clear that states incur
an obligation when they accept federal funds, even if the method for compliance is
left to the states. Pennhurst does not require more.
Our sister circuits that have considered this question reached the same
conclusion. In Mayweathers, the Ninth Circuit stated, “Congress is not required to
list every factual instance in which a state will fail to comply with a condition.
Such specificity would prove too onerous, and, perhaps, impossible. Congress
must, however, make the existence of the condition itself–in exchange for the
receipt of federal funds–explicitly obvious.” Mayweathers, 314 F.3d at 1067. The
Seventh Circuit explained, “Congress permissibly conditioned the receipt of
federal money in such a way that each State is made aware of the condition and is
simultaneously given the freedom to tailor compliance according to its particular
penological interests and circumstances.” Charles, 348 F.3d at 608. No federal
appellate court has held to the contrary, and we decline to be the first.
2. RLUIPA is Rationally Related to a Federal Interest.
Georgia erroneously argues that the federal grants for its prisons are
unrelated to the objectives of RLUIPA. Georgia relies on the statement in Dole
that the Court has “suggested (without significant elaboration) that conditions on
federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated to the federal interest in
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particular national projects or programs.” Dole, 483 U.S. at 207, 107 S. Ct. at
2796 (internal citations omitted). The problem with this argument is that the
United States has a substantial interest in ensuring that state prisons that receive
federal funds protect the federal civil rights of prisoners.
Congress has every right to ensure that the state prisons that accept federal
funds respect the religious freedom of prisoners and promote their rehabilitation:
Congress has a strong interest in making certain that federal funds do
not subsidize conduct that infringes individual liberties, such as the free
practice of one’s religion. The federal government also has a strong
interest in monitoring the treatment of federal inmates housed in state
prisons and in contributing to their rehabilitation. Congress may
allocate federal funds freely, then, to protect the free exercise of religion
and to promote rehabilitation. If the Supreme Court has in fact imposed
a low-threshold relatedness test, RLUIPA satisfies it.
Mayweathers, 314 F.3d at 1067; see also Charles, 348 F.3d at 608-09.
The warning in Dole that Spending Clause legislation “might be
illegitimate” if it is “unrelated” to the purpose of the federal spending program,
Dole, 483 U.S. at 207, 107 S. Ct. at 2796, and the guidance in New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 167, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2423 (1992), that Spending Clause
legislation should bear “some relationship to the purpose of the federal spending,”
establish a minimal standard of rationality. RLUIPA easily satisfies this standard.
Both the protection of the religious exercise of prisoners and their rehabilitation
13
are rational goals of Congress, and those goals are related to the use of federal
funds for state prisons.
Georgia fails in its argument that highway safety, the federal interest in
Dole, was tied more closely to the funding condition that states raise their legal
drinking age to 21 than the funding of prisons is tied to the objectives of RLUIPA.
The connection between raising the drinking age and highway funds is no more
related than the connection between accommodating the religious exercise of
prisoners and correctional funds. Mayweathers, 314 F.3d at 1067; Charles, 348
F.3d at 608-09. If anything, the protection of the free exercise of religion, a civil
right guaranteed by the First Amendment, is a more substantial federal interest
than highway safety.
Georgia also wrongly argues that the extensive conditions imposed by
RLUIPA are not in proportion to the small amount of federal funds dedicated to
state correctional systems. Georgia relies on Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 111
S. Ct. 1759 (1990), and FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 104 S.
Ct. 3106 (1984), in support of this argument. Although both of those decisions
briefly discussed the Spending Clause, the holdings of the Court turned on
statutory conditions that violated the free speech rights of individual citizens.
Neither decision involved conditions imposed on the receipt of federal funds by
14
states. As the Seventh Circuit stated in Charles, both Rust and League of Women
Voters “are inapposite; they do not even concern the Spending Clause.” Charles,
348 F.3d at 601.
The Seventh Circuit also correctly explained in Charles that there is no
standard of proportionality for spending legislation:
Nothing within Spending Clause jurisprudence, or RLUIPA for that
matter, suggests that States are bound by the conditional grant of federal
money only if the State receives or derives a certain percentage ... of its
budget from federal funds. If a State wishes to receive any federal
funding, it must accept the related, unambiguous conditions in their
entirety.
Id. Likewise, Georgia cannot accept federal funds and then attempt to avoid their
accompanying conditions by arguing that the conditions are disproportionate in
scope.
B. The Proper Use of Spending Power Does Not Violate the Tenth Amendment.
Georgia next erroneously argues that the Tenth Amendment provides an
independent constitutional bar because RLUIPA interferes with a core state
function of administering prisons. If the enactment of RLUIPA is within an
enumerated power of Congress, however, the Tenth Amendment does not apply.
Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1242. Because we have already concluded that RLUIPA is
valid spending legislation, this argument fails.
15
Georgia alternatively argues that RLUIPA invades the regulatory purview of
states so extensively as to violate the Tenth Amendment, but this argument is
undermined by our recent precedent. In Midrash, this Court held that RLUIPA
does not violate the Tenth Amendment. Although RLUIPA “may preempt laws
that discriminate against or exclude religious institutions entirely, it leaves
individual states free to eliminate the discrimination in any way they choose, so
long as the discrimination is actually eliminated.” Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1242.
“RLUIPA’s core policy is not to regulate the states or compel their enforcement of
a federal regulatory program, but to protect the exercise of religion, a valid
exercise of [the power of Congress], which does not run afoul of the Tenth
Amendment’s protection of the principles of federalism.” Id. at 1243. Midrash
guides us, even though the authority for section 3 of RLUIPA is found in the
Spending Clause, and the authority for section 2, which was at issue in Midrash, is
found in Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because RLUIPA does not
compel the states to regulate in a specific manner and is a valid exercise of a
power of Congress, RLUIPA does not violate the Tenth Amendment. See also
Charles, 348 F.3d at 609; Mayweathers, 314 F.3d at 1069.
C. RLUIPA Does Not Violate the Establishment Clause.
Georgia argues that RLUIPA violates the Establishment Clause, under the
16
three-part test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S. Ct. 2105
(1971). The Lemon test requires that statutes have a secular purpose, have a
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and not entangle
excessively government with religion. Id. at 612-13, 91 S. Ct. at 2111. We have
held that section 2 of RLUIPA does not violate the Establishment Clause,
Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1240-42, and three of the four circuits to consider whether
section 3 of RLUIPA violates the Establishment Clause have upheld it.
Mayweathers, 314 F.3d at 1068-69; Charles, 348 F.3d at 610-11; Madison, 355
F.3d at 315-22; but see Cutter, 349 F.3d at 262-68 (holding section 3 of RLUIPA
violates the Establishment Clause). We consider each part of the Lemon test in
turn, and conclude that section 3 of RLUIPA does not violate the Establishment
Clause.
1. RLUIPA Has a Secular Purpose.
The first part of the Lemon inquiry is whether the law in question has a
secular purpose. The Supreme Court has explained that a secular purpose need not
be hostile or even unrelated to religion:
This does not mean that the law’s purpose must be unrelated to
religion – that would amount to a requirement that the government
show a callous indifference to religious groups, and the Establishment
Clause has never been so interpreted. Rather, Lemon’s ‘purpose’
requirement aims at preventing the relevant government
17
decisionmaker–in this case, Congress–from abandoning neutrality
and acting with the intent of promoting a particular point of view in
religious matters.
Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327, 335, 107 S. Ct. 2862, 2868 (1987) (internal citations omitted). In
Amos, the Court, for example, upheld section 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which exempts religious organizations from the prohibitions of discrimination in
employment on the basis of religion. The Court held that it was “a permissible
legislative purpose to alleviate significant governmental interference with the
ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their mission.” Id.
Like section 702 of the Civil Rights Act, RLUIPA advances the secular
purpose of “protecting the free exercise of religion from unnecessary government
interference.” 146 Cong. Rec. E1234, E1235 (daily ed. July 14, 2000) (statement
of Rep. Canady); see also Madison, 355 F.3d at 317; Mayweathers, 314 F.3d at
1068. This Court has held that “where, as [in the case of section 2 of RLUIPA], a
law’s purpose is to alleviate significant interference with the exercise of religion,
that purpose does not violate the Establishment Clause.” Midrash, 366 F.3d at
1241. As discussed above in Part III.A.2, rehabilitation of prisoners is also a
secular purpose underlying RLUIPA. Although the Sixth Circuit reached the
opposite conclusion in Cutter, it did not discuss rehabilitation as a purpose for
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RLUIPA. 349 F.3d at 263-64. In any event, our conclusion in Midrash is binding;
RLUIPA has a permissible secular purpose.
2. RLUIPA Does Not Advance or Inhibit Religion.
Georgia argues that RLUIPA violates the second part of Lemon by
impermissibly advancing religion through endorsement in two ways: first, by
providing unique advantages to religious prisoners solely on account of their
religion, and, second, by imposing improper burdens on third parties. Neither
argument is persuasive.
a. RLUIPA Does Not Improperly Provide Religion Unique Advantages.
Georgia erroneously argues that by affording heightened protection for
religious exercise relative to other fundamental rights, RLUIPA conveys an
impermissible message of preference for religion in violation of the admonition of
the Supreme Court that “government may not favor religious belief over
disbelief.” County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593, 109 S. Ct. 3086,
3101 (1989). Singling out free exercise rights for protection is not an
impermissible endorsement of religion. As the Fourth Circuit noted in Madison,
the Supreme Court has not held that “legislative protections for fundamental rights
march in lockstep.” Id. at 318. In fact, it is “reasonable for Congress to seek to
reduce the burdens on religious exercise for prisoners without simultaneously
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enhancing, say, an inmate’s First Amendment rights to access pornography.” Id.
at 319. If, as Georgia argues, protecting religious exercise rights alone reflects an
impermissible bias in favor of religion, then protecting any fundamental right
other than religion would reflect impermissible bias against religion.
Interpreting the Establishment Clause to require a rigid symmetry of
protection for all fundamental rights would cut a broad swath through a forest of
government programs and protections of religious exercise. State and federal
funds provide government chaplains for Congress and state legislatures, the armed
forces, and prisons. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 103 S. Ct. 3330
(1983). Federal statutes accommodate religious apparel in the armed forces, 10
U.S.C. section 774, and exempt members of certain religious faiths from paying
Social Security taxes, 26 U.S.C. section 1402(g). Religious organizations may be
exempted from paying generally applicable property taxes. Walz v. Tax Comm’n
of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 90 S. Ct. 1409 (1970). Public schools may
establish programs providing release time for the religious instruction of students.
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 72 S. Ct. 679 (1952). At least twelve states, by
statute or constitutional amendment, single out religious expression for special
protection, including two states that submitted a brief to this Court as amici curiae
in opposition to RLUIPA, 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 35/1-35/99; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 51,
20
section 251, and two states in this circuit, Ala. Const. amend. 622; Fla. Stat. Ann.
sections 761.01-761.04. States, including Georgia, exempt religious use of
alcoholic beverages from laws setting the legal drinking age. See, e.g., Ala. Code
§ 28-3-15; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4-244; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-13-122; Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 564.03(5); Ga. Code Ann. § 3-3-23; 235 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/6-20;
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4301.69; S.C. Code Ann. § 61-6-4070; Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. § 66.44.270; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 125.07. In Smith, after holding that the Free
Exercise Clause does not mandate exemptions from generally applicable drug laws
for the religious use of peyote, the Supreme Court affirmed the right of legislatures
to protect religious exercise beyond the reach of the First Amendment and cited
with approval state statutes exempting religious peyote use from general drug
laws. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890, 110 S. Ct. at 1606. Today, 28 state statutes and a
federal statute exempt religious peyote use. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a; H.R. Rep. No.
103-675, at 7 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2404, 2409. A sweeping
invalidation of all accommodations of religion is wholly inconsistent with the
history, traditions, and laws of our nation.
Furthermore, this kind of argument was squarely rejected by the Court in
Amos. The Court explained that, when the government exempted religious
employers from the prohibition of discrimination based on religion, the
21
government was not bound to provide a corresponding benefit to secular
employers:
[We have] never indicated that statutes that give special consideration
to religious groups are per se invalid. That would run contrary to the
teaching of our cases that there is ample room for accommodation of
religion under the Establishment Clause. Where, as here, government
acts with the purpose of lifting a regulation that burdens the exercise of
religion, we see no reason to require that the exemption come packaged
with benefits to secular entities.
Amos, 483 U.S. at 338, 107 S. Ct. at 2869.
We disagree with the Sixth Circuit, which held that the heightened
protection granted to religious exercise by RLUIPA “‘violates the basic
requirement of neutrality embodied in the Establishment Clause.’” Cutter, 349
F.3d at 266 (quoting Madison v. Riter, 240 F. Supp. 2d 566, 577 (W.D. Va. 2003),
overruled by Madison, 355 F.3d at 322). The Sixth Circuit distinguished Amos
on the ground that the exemption at issue was “arguably necessary to avoid an
Establishment Clause violation” and a “narrowly tailored solution to the potential
Establishment Clause problem.” Cutter, 349 F.3d at 268. We find no such
language or distinction in the majority opinion in Amos. On the contrary, the
language in Amos quoted above specifically rejected the neutrality argument
accepted by the Sixth Circuit. Amos, 483 U.S. at 338, 107 S. Ct. at 2869.
Georgia also attempts to distinguish Amos by arguing that, under RLUIPA,
22
the government injects itself into religion instead of withdrawing from it. This
argument ignores that state prisons, which Georgia concedes employ chaplains
and provide times and places for religious worship, are already necessarily
involved in the religious exercises of prisoners, as in all other areas of their lives.
Invalidating RLUIPA would not excise the state from the religious exercise of
prisoners.
We recognize that the prison environment poses serious challenges to
officials responsible for complying with RLUIPA, but these challenges “speak
more to the wisdom of the law and to the disincentives for states to assume their
RLUIPA obligations than to RLUIPA’s validity under the Establishment Clause.”
Madison, 355 F.3d at 319. In fact, the very nature of the prison environment
compels our conclusion that RLUIPA does not violate the Establishment Clause.
Given the necessarily strict rules that govern every aspect of prison life, the failure
of prison officials to accommodate religion, even in the absence of RLUIPA,
would not be neutral; it would be hostile to religion. As Justice Brennan explained
more than forty years ago, “hostility, not neutrality, would characterize the refusal
to provide chaplains and places of worship for prisoners and soldiers cut off by the
State from all civilian opportunities for public communion .... ” Sch. Dist. of
Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 299, 83 S. Ct. 1560, 1612 (1963)
23
(Brennan, J., concurring). The state may accommodate the religious exercise of its
prisoners without necessarily affording all other rights equal deference.
b. RLUIPA Does Not Unduly Burden Georgia.
Georgia argues that RLUIPA imposes on third parties costs and burdens that
violate the Establishment Clause. Georgia cites Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.,
472 U.S. 703, 105 S. Ct. 2914 (1985), and Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489
U.S. 1, 109 S. Ct. 890 (1989) (plurality), for the proposition that statutes
exempting religious beneficiaries from generally applicable laws are
unconstitutional when the exemptions burden third parties. In Caldor, the Court
invalidated a statute that imposed substantial economic burdens on private parties
in the process of removing privately-imposed burdens on religious exercise. 472
U.S. at 708-10, 105 S. Ct. at 2918. In Bullock, a plurality of the Court held that a
Texas tax exemption for religious literature violated the Establishment Clause
because the exemption applied only to religious literature and printers of non-
religious literature would carry an additional tax burden to offset the benefit to
religion. Bullock, 489 U.S. at 18 n.8, 109 S. Ct. at 901 n.8. Although these
decisions suggest that some religious accommodations that economically burden
third parties violate the Establishment Clause, RLUIPA does not create this sort of
involuntary economic burden.
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Georgia argues that RLUIPA will impose significant expenses on the DOC
and prevent the DOC from providing other services, but if Georgia finds
compliance with RLUIPA impractical, Georgia can refuse federal funds. The
Fourth Circuit distinguished the statute in Caldor from RLUIPA by explaining that
“Caldor concerned an unfunded mandate imposed on private employers to lift
privately-imposed burdens on the religious exercise of employees. Here [the state]
has voluntarily committed itself to lifting government-imposed burdens on the
religious exercise of publicly institutionalized persons in exchange for federal
correctional funds.” Madison, 355 F.3d at 321. Bullock was no different;
whatever burden may have fallen on non-religious taxpayers did so without their
consent. Georgia cannot complain about the costs of RLUIPA, because Georgia
consented to the costs when it accepted federal funds.
Georgia also erroneously argues that non-religious prisoners and prison
staff will suffer substantial burdens when religious accommodations exempt
certain prisoners from rules designed to serve health and safety concerns. If a
requested exemption from health or safety rules is so serious as to place members
of the prison community at risk, RLUIPA allows Georgia to deny the exemption
so long as the challenged rule serves a compelling interest, such as prison safety,
and the challenged rule is the least restrictive means of serving that interest.
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History shows that strict scrutiny does not automatically invalidate all substantial
burdens on religion, especially in prisons; under the same standard imposed by the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the predecessor to RLUIPA, only a small
percentage of prisoners’ claims were successful. See Ira C. Lupu, Why the
Congress was Wrong and the Court was Right–Reflections on City of Boerne v.
Flores, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 793, 802-03 (1998). RLUIPA does not impose
costs on states without their consent, and RLUIPA allows states to satisfy
compelling interests, such as prison safety.
3. RLUIPA Does Not Entangle Excessively Georgia With Religion.
Georgia argues that RLUIPA excessively entangles the government with
religion by requiring state prisons to “assess the validity of each religious request
no matter how trite, expensive or disruptive” and “question the centrality of
particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants’
interpretations of those creeds,” but this argument fails for at least two reasons.
First, the text of RLUIPA defeats this argument, as it defines “religious exercise”
to include “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a
system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A). The Fourth Circuit
recognized that this provision “mitigates any dangers that entanglement may result
from administrative review of good-faith religious belief.” Madison, 355 F.3d at
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320. Second, the First Amendment already requires Georgia to determine whether
the asserted belief of an inmate making a Free Exercise claim is religious and
sincerely held. See, e.g., Martinelli v. Dugger, 817 F.2d 1499, 1503 (11th Cir.
1987), abrogated on other grounds by Harris v. Chapman, 97 F.3d 499 (11th Cir.
1996); Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 250-51 (3d Cir. 2003). Even the Sixth
Circuit, the lone circuit to hold RLUIPA unconstitutional, suggested, without
deciding the issue, that RLUIPA does little to increase existing government
entanglement with religion. Cutter, 349 F.3d at 268. RLUIPA does not alter the
nature of government entanglement with religion in the prison context.
Although Georgia urges us to hold Benning’s requested kosher diet
unconstitutional, the merits of Benning’s complaint are not at issue in this
interlocutory appeal. The district court has not yet held that RLUIPA compels
Georgia to provide Benning with a kosher diet or allow him to wear a yarmulke,
and we do not so hold. This issue and all remaining issues must be determined by
the district court on remand.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because section 3 of RLUIPA was validly enacted under the Spending
Clause and does not violate either the Tenth Amendment or the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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