[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APRIL 20, 2005
No. 04-14376 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 03-20783-CR-WMH
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOSE MANUEL ABREU,
a.k.a. Jose S. Abreu,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(April 20, 2005)
Before DUBINA, HULL and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Jose Manuel Abreu appeals his conviction of possession with
intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, arguing that the
district court erred in affirming the magistrate judge’s order denying his motion to
preclude expert testimony regarding fingerprint evidence, because the government
failed to demonstrate that the testimony met the requirements of Rule 702 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I.
Abreu first asserts that the magistrate judge improperly denied his motion to
exclude the fingerprint evidence based on the reasoning of an unpublished report
and recommendation by a magistrate in an earlier, unrelated case, because the
unrelated case involved a different version of Rule 702 and could not have
addressed the rule’s new requirement that expert testimony be the result of reliable
principles and methods. Second, he argues that although other circuits have
determined that expert testimony regarding fingerprint evidence satisfies the
factors listed in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct.
2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), which may be used to assess the relevance and
reliability of expert testimony, the court still had a duty to determine whether the
expert testimony in this case met the requirements of Rule 702. Third, Abreu
contends that the government failed to establish that its expert’s testimony was the
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product of reliable principles and methods as required by Rule 702, and the district
court should have at least held an evidentiary hearing on the issue. Fourth, Abreu
maintains that the admission of the expert testimony was “severely prejudicial”
and was the most damaging evidence relied on by the government, since it was the
only direct evidence that placed Abreu in the storage room with the marijuana
plants.
II.
We review a district court’s decisions regarding the admissibility of expert
testimony and the reliability of an expert opinion for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1258 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. pet. filed, No. 04-
8324 (Jan. 13, 2005). “[W]hen employing an abuse-of-discretion standard, we
must affirm unless we find that the district court has made a clear error of
judgment, or has applied the wrong legal standard.” Id. at 1259. “Evidentiary
errors do not constitute grounds for reversal unless there is a reasonable likelihood
that they affected the defendant’s substantial rights; where an error had no
substantial influence on the outcome, and sufficient evidence uninfected by error
supports the verdict, reversal is not warranted.” United States v. Drury, 396 F.3d
1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
III.
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Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data,
(2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods,
and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to
the facts of the case.
In Daubert and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S. Ct. 1167,
143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999), the Supreme Court made clear that “Rule 702 compels
the district courts to perform the critical ‘gatekeeping’ function concerning the
admissibility of expert scientific [and technical] evidence.” Frazier, 387 F.3d at
1260 (emphasis omitted). “This function inherently require[s] the trial court to
conduct an exacting analysis of the foundations of expert opinions to ensure they
meet the standards for admissibility under Rule 702.” Id. (alteration in original)
(internal quotation, citation and emphasis omitted). “The objective . . . is to ensure
the reliability and relevance of [the] expert testimony.” Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152,
119 S. Ct. at 1176.
To determine the admissibility of expert testimony, trial courts must
consider if:
(1) the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters
he intends to address; (2) the methodology by which the expert
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reaches his conclusions is sufficiently reliable as determined by the
sort of inquiry mandated in Daubert; and (3) the testimony assists the
trier of fact, through the application of scientific, technical, or
specialized expertise, to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue.
Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1260. In the present case, there is no dispute as to the
qualifications of the expert or that the expert’s testimony is relevant. Abreu,
however, argues that the government failed to establish the reliability of the expert
opinion.
To assess the reliability of an expert opinion, the court considers a number
of factors, including those listed by the Supreme Court in Daubert:
(1) whether the expert’s theory can be and has been tested;
(2) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and
publication;
(3) the known or potential rate of error of the particular scientific
technique; and
(4) whether the technique is generally accepted in the scientific
community.
Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1262. The Daubert factors are only illustrative and may not
all apply in every case. Id. The district court has wide latitude in deciding how to
determine reliability. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 142, 119 S. Ct. at 1171.
This court has not published an opinion regarding the admissibility and
reliability of fingerprint evidence under Daubert. Other Circuits, however, have
found that fingerprint evidence is sufficiently reliable and meets the standards of
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Fed. R. Evid. 702. See United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 268-70 (4th Cir.
2003) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting
expert testimony regarding fingerprint evidence because fingerprint evidence
satisfies Daubert); United States v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597, 601-02 (7th Cir. 2001)
(same); United States v. Janis, 387 F.3d 682, 690 (8th Cir. 2004) (same); United
States v. Sherwood, 98 F.3d 402, 408 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding the trial court did
not plainly err in admitting fingerprint evidence).
We agree with the decisions of our sister circuits and hold that the
fingerprint evidence admitted in this case satisfied Daubert. Moreover, since
district courts are given broad latitude in deciding how to determine the reliability
of an expert opinion, we conclude from the record that the district court did not
clearly err in giving greater weight to the general acceptance factor, as did the
magistrate judge. Additionally, the magistrate judge considered information
presented by the government detailing the uniform practice through which
fingerprint examiners match fingerprints and the error rate of fingerprint
comparison. As a result, based on our review of the record, the district court
correctly found that the magistrate judge did not apply the wrong legal standard or
make a clear error of judgment. Further, because the other evidence presented
during Abreu’s trial is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict, any error committed
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by the district court in admitting the expert testimony regarding fingerprint
evidence is not reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm Abreu’s conviction.
AFFIRMED.
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