[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
September 30, 2005
No. 05-10629
THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 02-00172-CV-RWS-2
JUSTICE COMETH, LTD., as trustee, et al.,
Plaintiffs-
Counter-Defendants,
CHERYL B. LAMKINS,
Plaintiff-Counter-
Defendant- Appellant,
versus
JAMES V. LAMBERT, WYLENE LAMBERT,
MARTIN KROLL, THOMAS OPRANDI,
CLIFFORD S. LANCEY,
WILLIAM HERBERT NEAL,
HARRY B. WHITE, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
DAVID WATKINS, et al.,
Defendants-
Counter-Claimants.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(September 30, 2005)
Before TJOFLAT, DUBINA and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Cheryl B. Lamkins appeals the district court’s order dismissing, for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, her claim against Clifford Lancey, David Watkins,
Eddie Watkins and Watkins Lumber & Supply Co. (“Lancey Group”), pursuant to
11 U.S.C. § 362(h), for damages caused by their violation of the automatic stay in
her bankruptcy proceeding.1 She argues that both 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1334
provide the district court jurisdiction over her claim. We review questions of
subject matter jurisdiction de novo. See Milan Express, Inc. v. Averitt Express,
Inc., 208 F.3d 975, 978 (11th Cir. 2000).
The filing of a bankruptcy petition pursuant to Title 11 operates to
1
According to her complaint, Lamkins filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding on June 4,
2002. She alleges that the Lancey Group was served notice of the automatic stay that same day,
and violated the stay by selling real property subject to the stay to itself at a foreclosure sale that
it conducted on that same day. Subsequently, Lancey Group demanded a payment of $31,000
and a release of claims against the individuals and corporations involved, in exchange for
returning the property to Lamkins. Lamkins paid the sum and executed the release. Lamkins’
bankruptcy case was subsequently dismissed, before she filed the present action. However, her
claim arises from acts alleged to have occurred while the automatic stay was in place.
2
automatically stay creditors from pursuing certain specified collection actions
against the debtor or estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). An individual who is injured
by a willful violation of the stay may recover damages. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(h)
(“An individual injured by any willful violation of a stay provided by this section
shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, and, in
appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages.”).
District courts have original jurisdiction of “all civil actions arising under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Further, the district courts have original jurisdiction over all cases under Title 11,
as explicitly stated by 28 U.S.C. § 1334:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district courts
shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11.
(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction
on a court or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall
have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising
under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11.
...
Unquestionably, the district courts may “provide that any or all cases under
title 11 and any or all proceedings arising under title 11” be referred to the
bankruptcy court for that district. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a). However, the explicit §
1334 grant of original jurisdiction over Title 11 cases clearly forecloses a
conclusion that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this case.
3
See Price v. Rochford, 947 F2d 829, 832 n.1 (7th Cir. 1991).2 We therefore
REVERSE the district court’s order dismissing Lamkins’ claim for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and REMAND for further proceedings in accordance with this
opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
2
We acknowledge that the Second Circuit has held to the contrary. See Eastern Equip. & Servs.
Corp. v. Factory Point Nat’l Bank, 236 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that § 362(h) claim
“must be brought in the bankruptcy court, rather than in the district court, which only has
appellate jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases”). However, Eastern Equipment makes no mention
of the grant of original jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1334, and provides no explanation as to why §
1334 would not apply. Because we find that statutory provision controlling, we consider the
Seventh Circuit’s Price decision more persuasive, and join in finding that the district courts have
subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate § 362(h) claims.
4