IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 94-40897
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
BEN D. CAMPBELL and JOHN G. CAMPBELL,
Defendants-Appellants.
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Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas
_________________________________________________________________
(September 12, 1995)
Before GARWOOD, JOLLY, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:
John and Ben Campbell, father and son, appeal their
convictions for conspiracy and bank fraud, and Ben appeals his
conviction for making a false entry in bank records, all resulting
from Ben Campbell's mortgage of property, which he did not own, to
the now-failed Flower Mound Bank. The mortgaged property was owned
by West-Butte Corporation, a small family owned company formed to
develop the property. Our opinion focuses primarily on the alleged
conspiracy to defraud the bank (now Security Bank of Flower Mound)
by depriving it of its security. The government contends that this
conspiracy to defraud the bank began only after Ben defaulted on
the loan--not when Ben mortgaged the property to the bank. Once
the bank began its attempts to foreclose on the property, John,
with Ben's help, demanded release of the property and took legal
action to reclaim it from the bank. The government argues that
these efforts amounted to a conspiracy to commit bank fraud.
Although we easily conclude that the evidence supports Ben's
conviction for fraudulently mortgaging the property by falsely
signing as president of West-Butte Corporation, we find that the
evidence does not support an illegal conspiracy to deprive the bank
of its security. Because the evidence supporting the bank fraud
count is the same as that supporting the reversed conspiracy
convictions, we also reverse these convictions. We thus affirm in
part, reverse in part, and remand.
The facts underlying the alleged conspiracy are complicated,
and the government's theory of the illegality of the conspiracy is
somewhat unsure or at least not easily grasped. To understand this
appeal, we must first set out the facts in laborious detail.
I
A
In 1978, John Campbell purchased for development as a resort
6.2 acres of land near Crested Butte, Colorado (the "Crested Butte
property" or the "property"). Daniel Thurman, a life-time friend
and business associate of John Campbell, assisted in the
development from 1978 until 1984, specifically, by attempting to
obtain water rights for the Crested Butte property. In 1984,
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Thurman, John Campbell, and Ben D. Campbell--John Campbell's son
and co-defendant-appellant--formed West-Butte Corporation ("West-
Butte") to continue with development of the Crested Butte property.
John Campbell contributed to West-Butte the Crested Butte property
by warranty deed. The Crested Butte property was West-Butte's sole
asset.
West-Butte's Articles of Incorporation listed its officers as
Dan Thurman, president; Ben Campbell, vice president; and Shirley
Thurman, secretary-treasurer. These same individuals comprised the
three-member board of directors. Finally, the Articles of
Incorporation authorized, but did not issue, 120,000 shares of
common stock. The minutes of the initial organizational meeting
for the corporation authorized and directed the president and the
secretary to issue 10,000 shares to CATV Systems, Inc. ("CATV"), a
corporation wholly-owned by Ben Campbell, and 10,000 shares to Ben
Campbell, individually. Two stock certificates were partially
completed designating CATV and Ben Campbell as the owners of the
shares, but the certificates were never signed as required by West-
Butte's bylaws.
B
In addition to his involvement with West-Butte, Ben Campbell
owned and operated several companies, including Frontier GMC. In
connection with Frontier GMC, Ben Campbell entered into a trust
agreement with GMAC for supply and payment of cars. In August
1986, however, GMAC discovered that Ben Campbell sold vehicles
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without paying GMAC, in violation of the trust agreement. As a
result, Ben Campbell owed GMAC approximately $280,000. GMAC
ultimately gave Ben Campbell until December 10, 1986, to correct
Frontier GMC's financial delinquency.
To meet GMAC's demands, Ben Campbell first turned to MBank
Fort Worth ("MBank"). He agreed to pledge as collateral the
Crested Butte property. Upon their examination, however, MBank
discovered Ben Campbell did not own the Crested Butte property; it
was owned by West-Butte. Furthermore, the warranty deed conveying
the Crested Butte property from John Campbell to West-Butte was
defective.1 Thus, John Campbell would need to reconvey the Crested
Butte property to West-Butte. Under these circumstances, MBank
denied the loan.
In late 1986, Ben Campbell turned to his own bank, Flower
Mound Bank ("FMB"), where he chaired the board of directors. He
applied for a $90,000 loan2 and again agreed to pledge the Crested
Butte property as collateral for his loan. This deal was more
complicated, however, because Ben had ten prior unsecured notes
held by FMB and executed by Ben, individually, or on behalf of one
1
The deed was defective under Colorado law because it failed
to designate the grantee, West-Butte Corporation, as a Colorado
corporation.
2
Ben Campbell testified that he told the board of directors
that the purpose of the loan was to resolve Frontier GMC's
financial problems. FMB's loan committee approval form, however,
stated that the purpose of the loan was to provide operating funds
for another of his ventures, El Centro Ranch.
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of his companies. Thus, it was agreed that the Crested Butte
property would serve as security for all of Ben's indebtedness.
Joseph Ackley, president of FMB during the time this
transaction took place, asked attorney Boyd Newman, a director of
FMB, to provide legal services with regard to Ben Campbell's loan.
Newman refused to act as FMB's attorney in this matter, but
contacted Robert Wright, a Colorado attorney, to assist in
preparing a mortgage in favor of FMB and obtaining title insurance.
After performing a title search, Wright informed Newman that West-
Butte--not Ben Campbell--owned the Crested Butte property. Newman
then advised Ackley that a corporate resolution from West-Butte was
needed in order to grant Ben Campbell the authority to encumber
West-Butte's property. Amazingly, FMB never obtained a corporate
resolution from West-Butte allowing Ben Campbell to mortgage the
Crested Butte property. Wright also informed Newman that the
warranty deed conveying the Crested Butte property from John
Campbell to West-Butte was defective. Newman asked Wright to
prepare a correction deed and a mortgage in favor of FMB.
Wright prepared a quitclaim deed from John Campbell to
West-Butte and a mortgage on the Crested Butte property from
West-Butte in favor of FMB and sent these documents to Newman. On
December 8, 1986, John executed the quitclaim deed correcting the
title problem3 and the deed was properly notarized. The quitclaim
3
At trial, Ben Campbell testified that he told John Campbell
that because of a problem with the filing of the warranty deed,
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deed was filed in Colorado and vested clear title to the Crested
Butte property in West-Butte. On December 10, 1986, Ben Campbell
executed the mortgage in favor of FMB. The mortgage was signed on
behalf of West-Butte by "Ben Campbell, as President" and his wife,
"Phyllis Campbell, as Secretary." Ben then gave Wright
authorization to affix a blank seal of West-Butte on the mortgage.
Ben next engaged in a series of actions in an effort to
provide corporate ratification for his false signature as president
of West-Butte. On December 15, 1986, Ben asked Phil Klingsmith,
West-Butte's attorney, to send him West-Butte's corporate seal and
to issue the West-Butte stock 50% to him and 50% to his wife.
Klingsmith sent the seal and unsigned stock certificates.
Furthermore, Ben Campbell testified that, additionally, on
December 15, he conducted a "special meeting" of the shareholders
and appointed himself president of West-Butte and his wife
secretary/treasurer.4 However, the annual corporate reports filed
on behalf of West-Butte from June 1986 through June 1989 reflected
no change in the officers chosen to serve at West-Butte's
John Campbell needed to reconvey the Crested Butte property to
West-Butte by quitclaim deed so that West-Butte would hold clear
title to the Crested Butte property.
4
During the investigation of this case before trial, John
Campbell told a Federal Bureau of Investigations ("FBI") agent that
he saw reorganization papers (i.e., the minutes from the "special
meeting" of shareholders) that might have given Ben Campbell the
authority to mortgage the property.
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inception--Dan Thurman as president; Ben Campbell as vice-
president; and Shirley Thurman as secretary/treasurer.
Things did not improve for Ben Campbell. On April 28, 1987,
Ben filed for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the Eastern District of Texas, individually, and on behalf of the
companies he owned, including CATV, El Centro Ranch, and Frontier
GMC. Ben advised FMB that he would not contest foreclosure on the
Crested Butte property. The Texas bankruptcy court, however,
determined that it did not have jurisdiction to resolve any claim
to the Crested Butte property because it was located in Colorado.
Ben Campbell was discharged in bankruptcy.
The bank's claim on the Crested Butte property, however,
remained unresolved. On January 31, 1989, Security Bank of Flower
Mound ("Security Bank")5 made a demand on Ben Campbell, as required
under Colorado law, for the amount of the defaulted promissory
notes secured by the mortgage on the Crested Butte property. On
February 16, Security Bank filed a complaint in Colorado state
court requesting foreclosure on the Crested Butte property. The
complaint was served on Klingsmith, the registered agent for West-
Butte. Security Bank also filed a notice of lis pendens to prevent
any conveyance of the property. Because no answer was filed on
5
On March 3, 1988, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(the "FDIC") declared FMB insolvent and sold all of its assets to
Security Bank.
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behalf of West-Butte,6 the Colorado court entered a default
judgment against the Crested Butte property on May 10, 1989.7 The
court denied West-Butte's motion to set aside the default judgment
and scheduled a sheriff's sale of the Crested Butte property for
June 30.
C
West-Butte, led by John Campbell, fought back. On June 28,
1989, to prevent sale of the Crested Butte property, the board of
directors of West-Butte, including Ben Campbell, authorized the
voluntary bankruptcy of West-Butte. On June 30--before the time of
the scheduled sheriff's sale--West-Butte filed bankruptcy in the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado through
its bankruptcy attorney David Oppenheim. The sheriff's sale of the
Crested Butte property was stayed.
West-Butte's legal battle to claim the property went forward.
On September 15, 1989, the voluntary bankruptcy petition of West-
Butte was dismissed on West-Butte's motion. Thereafter, on
September 25, 1989, at John Campbell's instruction, Brad Breslau,
West-Butte's appellate attorney, appealed the default judgment
6
Thurman testified that he received a letter from Klingsmith
on February 28, 1989, stating that he accepted service of the
summons and complaint in the foreclosure action. Thurman stated
that he instructed Klingsmith that he would take no action against
the foreclosure because he was no longer involved with the Crested
Butte property or West-Butte. He further stated, however, that
John Campbell was handling any matters concerning the property.
7
The court did not enter judgment against Ben Campbell because
he had been discharged in bankruptcy.
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entered against the Crested Butte property in the foreclosure
action. On November 21, 1990, the Colorado appellate court
reversed the default judgment entered by the lower court in the
foreclosure action.8 In the meantime, West-Butte failed to post an
appeal bond, which was a condition of the stay on the sale of the
Crested Butte property. Security Bank proceeded to purchase the
property on October 11, 1989, subject to a right of redemption.
West-Butte filed a lis pendens notice preventing further sale of
the Crested Butte property.
D
We now turn the clock back a bit to examine John Campbell's
culpability in the alleged illegal conspiracy.
John Campbell learned of Ben Campbell's unauthorized mortgage
no later than early 1987, when, after unsuccessful attempts at
development as a resort, John Campbell and Daniel Thurman listed
the Crested Butte property for sale. In early 1987, Thurman
learned through the real estate agent with whom the property was
listed that the Crested Butte property was pledged as security to
FMB by Ben Campbell. Thurman then contacted Klingsmith and both
men informed John Campbell of the mortgage. Both Thurman and
Klingsmith testified that John Campbell seemed genuinely surprised
and angered that Ben Campbell mortgaged the property when he
8
The court held that because the trial court failed to provide
West-Butte three days notice before entering the default judgment
as required under Rule 55(b) of the Colorado Rules of Civil
Procedure, the judgment was void.
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clearly did not have the authority to do so. The government, on
the other hand, argued at trial that John Campbell not only knew of
the unauthorized mortgage at the time that it was made in December
1986, but also aided and abetted Ben Campbell in deceiving the bank
with the defective mortgage. The jury, however, acquitted John of
aiding and abetting Ben in this crime.
Upon learning of Ben Campbell's unauthorized mortgage of the
Crested Butte property, John Campbell took various steps to prevent
FMB and later Security Bank from foreclosing on the Crested Butte
property. Both Thurman and John Campbell instructed Klingsmith to
inform FMB that the mortgage was invalid because Ben Campbell
lacked the authority to pledge West-Butte's property. On
February 8, 1988, Klingsmith sent a letter to Joe Ackley, the
president of FMB, stating that the mortgage executed by Ben
Campbell was invalid because it was not executed by Daniel Thurman
as president or Shirley Thurman as secretary, and demanded that the
mortgage be released. John Campbell additionally contacted Ackley
and told him that Ben Campbell did not have the authority to pledge
the Crested Butte property.
John Campbell also made several unsuccessful demands on
Security Bank for settlement of the dispute over the Crested Butte
property. Sometime during April or May 1988, John contacted Gary
Acker, the first president of the newly organized Security Bank,
and stated that Ben did not have the authority to mortgage the
Crested Butte property. John offered to settle the dispute with
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Security Bank and, when his offer was refused by Acker, John stated
that he would pursue his claim "even if he had to go to the Supreme
Court." Additionally, John told Security Bank vice president Frank
Sheer that Security Bank would have the Crested Butte property over
his dead body. Months later, John again contacted Acker. He
suggested a settlement with Security Bank and again threatened to
take his case all the way to the Supreme Court when Acker refused
his offer to settle.
Sometime after November 21, 1990, when the Colorado appellate
court reversed the default judgment, John Campbell9 and Security
Bank, through its new president, Bill Ellis, began negotiations to
settle. Ellis testified at trial that John Campbell informed him
that Ben did not have the authority in 1986 to pledge the property
to FMB. He made the decision to settle, however, after examining
Security Bank's records on this loan and realizing that FMB
actually had failed to obtain a corporate resolution. On
January 18, 1991, West-Butte's board of directors (i.e., John
Campbell, Dan Thurman, and Jo Campbell) authorized John to enter
into a settlement with Security Bank on behalf of West-Butte for
the Crested Butte property. All parties agreed upon and signed the
settlement--Ellis for the bank, John Campbell as president of West-
Butte, Ben Campbell, individually, and on behalf of both Frontier
9
On September 14, 1990, a corporate report was filed listing
John G. Campbell as president, Dan Thurman as vice-president, and
John Campbell's wife, Jo Campbell, as secretary/treasurer. These
same three individuals comprised the entire board of directors.
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GMC and CATV. The Crested Butte property was then sold for
$320,000. John Campbell, the original contributor of the property,
received $150,000 from the proceeds of the sale.10
II
Based on their actions taken to prevent foreclosure on the
Crested Butte property, John Campbell and Ben Campbell were
indicted on conspiracy to commit bank fraud in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 371 and on the substantive offense of bank fraud in
violation of 18 U.S.C § 1344. Additionally, Ben Campbell was
indicted on the charge of false entry in bank records with intent
to deceive in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1005 because of his false
signature as president of West-Butte on the mortgage to FMB and
John Campbell was charged with aiding and abetting in this offense.
Both defendants were convicted of bank fraud and conspiracy to
commit the same. Ben Campbell alone was convicted of false entry
in bank records; John was acquitted.
On appeal, both John and Ben Campbell argue that the evidence
presented at trial is insufficient to convict them of conspiracy to
commit bank fraud and of bank fraud. Ben additionally argues that
the evidence is insufficient to convict him of false entry in bank
records. Ben finally argues that the district court erred in
admitting evidence of his other financial difficulties and evidence
10
On its face, the final settlement does not appear to have
shortchanged the bank--the bank realized $150,000 plus on security
it acquired when it made a $90,000 loan.
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of his other civil banking violations. In addition to the
sufficiency of the evidence arguments, John argues that the
district court erred first in admitting evidence of Ben's civil
banking violations because this evidence deprived him of a fair
trial and also in refusing to grant his motion for severance from
Ben.
III
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we determine
whether, "viewing the evidence and the inferences that may be drawn
from it in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational jury
could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt." United States v. Rodriquez, 993 F.2d 1170, 1175
(5th Cir. 1993). A verdict must be upheld if there is substantial
evidence to support it. United States v. Kindig, 854 F.2d 703,
706-07 (5th Cir. 1988). We turn first to Ben's conviction for a
false entry in bank records.
A
To prove Ben Campbell made a false entry with intent to
deceive in violation of § 1005, the government must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that (1) the entry was false; (2) Ben Campbell
either made the entry or caused it to be made; (3) Ben Campbell
knew the entry was false when he made it; and (4) he intended that
the entry injure or deceive the bank officers. United States v.
Jackson, 671 F.2d 216, 219 (5th Cir. 1980).
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The government argued at trial that Ben Campbell made a false
entry in the records with intent to deceive the bank when he
submitted to FMB the real estate mortgage on West-Butte's property,
which he had falsely signed as president of West-Butte.11 Ben
Campbell agrees that he made a false entry in the records of FMB,
but argues that he did not intend to deceive FMB, a requirement
under § 1005. Therefore, our only task here is to determine
whether a rational juror could have concluded that Ben Campbell
intended to injure or deceive the officers of FMB when he submitted
the mortgage signed as president of West-Butte.
On December 10, 1986, when Ben Campbell signed the mortgage,
West-Butte's Articles of Incorporation had authorized, but had not
issued 120,000 shares of stock. Of these 120,000 shares, 10,000
shares were designated for Ben Campbell, individually, as owner,
11
Implicit in the government's theory that Ben intended to
defraud FMB was that he had no authority from anyone to sign on
behalf of West-Butte. If, for example, John had acknowledged that
Ben had authority to give the mortgage to the bank, and if there
had been no effort to regain the Crested Butte property, it is
certain that no criminal prosecution would have resulted from the
fact that Ben signed the mortgage as president of West-Butte when
in fact he was not. Yet the government's argument--at least before
John's acquittal on this charge--to support the illegal conspiracy
count was that John had in fact authorized Ben to mortgage the
property to the bank. The government continues to argue that
John's statement to the bank that he had not authorized Ben to make
the mortgage is a misrepresentation, suggesting that John in fact
authorized Ben to make the mortgage; it seems to us that if the
government truly believed that John authorized Ben to make the
mortgage, then it is difficult to contend at the same time that Ben
gave the mortgage with the intent to deceive the bank. To be sure,
however, the government's position on this and other related points
is fuzzy.
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and 10,000 shares were designated for CATV as owner. Ben Campbell
owned 100% of the stock of CATV. Ben therefore contends that at
the time he signed the mortgage as president of West-Butte he
thought that he owned West-Butte and its sole asset--the Crested
Butte property--because he owned 100% of the issued stock.
The government contends that Ben Campbell's rejected loan
attempt with MBank established his knowledge that the land was
owned by West-Butte. Furthermore, the government argues that his
signature on the mortgage was not a mistake because he similarly
signed a statement to Wright giving him the authority to impose the
blank corporate seal of West-Butte on his mortgage. Finally, the
government contends that Ben Campbell's motive is clear from his
unstable financial condition and need for money to support Frontier
GMC.
We agree that the evidence presented at trial is more than
sufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude that Ben Campbell
intended to deceive FMB when he falsely signed the mortgage as
president of West-Butte. In fact, with the exception of his own
self-serving testimony, the record fails to reflect any substantial
testimony that Ben did not intend to deceive FMB by signing as
president. In any event, viewing the evidence, as we must, in the
light most favorable to the jury's verdict, we affirm Ben
Campbell's conviction for false entry in bank records.
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We now turn to consider the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the defendants' convictions for conspiracy to commit
bank fraud.
B
(1)
To establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, the government
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that two or more people
agreed to pursue an unlawful objective; (2) that the defendant
voluntarily agreed to join the conspiracy; and (3) that one or more
of the members of the conspiracy committed an overt act to further
the objectives of the conspiracy. United States v. Tullos, 868
F.2d 689, 693 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1112, 109 S.Ct.
3171, 104 L.Ed.2d 1033 (1989). The government argues that the
unlawful object of the conspiracy was to defraud the bank in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 by depriving the bank of all or part
of the value of the Crested Butte property. Fraud under § 1344
involves the knowing execution of or attempt to execute a scheme or
artifice (1) to defraud a financial institution; or (2) to obtain
any property owned by, or under the custody or control of, a
financial institution, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations or promises. United States v. Barakett, 994 F.2d
1107, 1110 (5th Cir. 1993). A "scheme to defraud," under §
1344(1), includes the use of fraudulent pretenses or
representations intended to deceive to obtain something of value
from a financial institution. Barakett, 994 F.2d at 1111. Intent
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to defraud is established if the defendant acted knowingly and with
the specific intent to deceive. United States v. Saks, 964 F.2d
1514, 1518 (5th Cir. 1992). Under § 1344(2), the defendant must
make a material misrepresentation to the bank, which is defined as
one having "the natural tendency to influence, or was capable of
influencing the decision of the lending institution." United
States v. Heath, 970 F.2d 1397, 1403 (5th Cir. 1992).
(2)
As noted, the government argued to the jury that the purpose
of the conspiracy was to "prevent Security Bank from getting all or
part of the value of [the] land." The government's present theory
of the illegality of the object of the conspiracy is unclear from
the briefs and from oral argument. The indictment alleges (and the
government argued to the jury as well) that the scheme to defraud
did not actually begin until on or about May 1987. After Ben
Campbell filed bankruptcy and the need for foreclosure became
evident, the defendants devised a scheme to defraud FMB and
Security Bank of the Crested Butte property by obstructing
foreclosure and by threatening future litigation if FMB or Security
Bank refused to release a portion of the value of the Crested Butte
property. The indictment charges that John and Ben Campbell
advanced this scheme by threatening and initiating litigation from
October 1987 until January 1991, against FMB and Security Bank.
They further promoted the scheme by causing Security Bank to enter
into a settlement whereby the Crested Butte property was sold and
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John Campbell, as trustee, obtained partial value. Finally, the
indictment states that John Campbell, having known of and assisted
Ben Campbell in the fraudulent pledge, made false representations
to FMB and Security Bank that he was not aware of, and that he did
not agree to Ben Campbell's pledge of the Crested Butte property.
Thus, before the jury acquitted John of involvement in Ben's
fraudulent pledge to the bank, the government's theory of the
illegality of the conspiracy to deprive the bank of the Crested
Butte property was predicated on a contention that John was aware
of and assisted in the fraudulent pledge of the property at the
time it was given to FMB. In view of John's acquittal of the
aiding and abetting charge, the government stated at oral argument
that it does not base its theory of the illegality of the
conspiracy on the fact that John Campbell assisted in the pledge of
the Crested Butte property. The government apparently does
contend, however, that John nevertheless knew of the pledge when
given to the bank, yet said nothing until it was necessary to
regain the property.12 For purposes of our analysis, we will
12
At oral argument, the government contended at one point that
John knew of the false pledge when made on December 10, 1986, and
at another point--because of John's acquittal on the false entry
count--that he learned of the fraudulent pledge at some indefinite
time after December 10, 1986, but before the alleged conspiracy
began in May 1987. John Campbell argues that there is no evidence
that would support, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he knew of
Ben's mortgage of the property on December 10, 1986. We agree that
the evidence supporting John's knowledge on this date is thin. We
avoid, however, analyzing this evidence to determine whether it
would support the jury's verdict because for purposes of this
opinion we accept what still appears to be the government's
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therefore assume, as the government argues, that John Campbell in
fact knew of the mortgage when given. Against this backdrop, we
turn to examine the evidence supporting the government's theory of
the illegality of the conspiracy.
(3)
We begin by examining the claims of John Campbell, West-Butte,
and FMB and Security Bank to the Crested Butte property. West-
Butte, as the owner of the Crested Butte property, clearly had a
legal right to contest the bank's security because Ben Campbell at
no time had the authority to pledge the property.13 John Campbell
held at least an equitable claim to the security because he
contributed the property to West-Butte as its sole asset and had
not been compensated for it. On the other hand--a point on which
the government agrees--neither FMB nor Security Bank held a valid
lien on the Crested Butte property at any time material to this
appeal. Instead, FMB and Security Bank had, at most, some
equitable claim, which was weakened on account of the bank's
knowing failure to obtain a corporate resolution authorizing Ben
Campbell to pledge West-Butte's property. Thus, on the face of
these facts, it was hardly illegal for John Campbell or West-Butte
contention that John had knowledge of the false pledge on
December 10, 1986.
13
It is clear that West-Butte owned the Crested Butte property;
what is unclear is who owned West-Butte. As we have earlier noted,
although West-Butte initially authorized 120,000 shares of stock,
none of these shares were formally issued--20,000 were designated,
but not issued, for Ben and his company, CATV.
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to pursue legal remedies--specifically, the bankruptcy proceeding
and the appeal of the default judgment--to enforce the rights of
West-Butte against the admittedly invalid mortgage to Security
Bank.
(4)
In contending that John and Ben conspired to deprive Security
Bank of its collateral the government focuses primarily on the
conduct of John, who was the active "co-conspirator"; Ben's part
in the conspiracy, according to the government, was limited to his
approval of West-Butte's bankruptcy and execution of the settlement
agreement--essentially a passive role. Consequently, our analysis
focuses primarily on John's conduct. If John did not conspire to
commit bank fraud, obviously, Ben could not conspire with himself.
To establish the object of bank fraud, the government must
show that John Campbell conspired to deprive Security Bank of the
Crested Butte property either through some scheme of deceit or
through material misrepresentations. Thus, we begin with the
premise that, absent some scheme of deceit or material
misrepresentation, John Campbell was entitled to act as he did in
pursuing available legal remedies to regain control of the Crested
Butte property for West-Butte. Stated differently, John Campbell's
actions taken simply to deprive Security Bank of the collateral
securing the invalid mortgage, without more, do not amount to bank
fraud. It is clear that whatever deceit John may have employed, it
was not of a surreptitious or of a clandestine nature: through
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plain conversations and direct legal action, he was as open as the
sky.
Although the government argues that West-Butte's bankruptcy
proceeding and its appeal of the default judgment entered against
the Crested Butte property constituted part of the conspiratorial
scheme, the government does not demonstrate how John Campbell
deceived Security Bank through these legal proceedings into signing
the settlement agreement that deprived it of a portion of the value
of the security. In short, the government simply failed to present
adequate evidence of John Campbell's intent to deceive to transform
his lawful actions into a scheme to commit bank fraud. Thus, we
look only to whether John, in his effort to regain the property,
deceived the bank through material misrepresentations.
According to the government's argument, the misrepresentations
that John Campbell took to regain the Crested Butte property began
with his demands on FMB through Klingsmith to release the Crested
Butte property because FMB's lien was invalid. Next, John made
representations to FMB and Security Bank that Ben had no authority
to pledge the Crested Butte property. He further represented to
FMB and Security Bank that he neither knew of nor authorized Ben
Campbell's fraudulent pledge. He therefore demanded that FMB and
Security Bank settle the dispute over the Crested Butte property.
In sum, the government alleges that John Campbell made the
following misrepresentations to FMB and Security Bank: that he
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never agreed to Ben's pledge of the property; that he had not
authorized it; and that he did not know of it until much later.
As we have noted, the record contains no evidence that John
Campbell authorized Ben Campbell's false pledge; indeed, only a
corporate resolution, which the bank knowingly failed to obtain,
could have authorized Ben to pledge the property to satisfy his
personal debts.14 Moreover, the government's argument on appeal is
not premised on any culpable involvement of John in Ben's falsely
signing the mortgage as president of West-Butte. Thus, the
government's argument concerning John's misrepresentations can
assume at most that John knew of the mortgage and said nothing to
the bank until it attempted to foreclose on the property. It is in
this light that we must evaluate whether his subsequent statement
to FMB and Security Bank that he did not know of the pledge
constituted a misrepresentation. The more precise question,
however, is whether John's statements concerning his lack of
knowledge were material misrepresentations,15 i.e., that they had
14
Although the record contains ample evidence that John did
inform the bank that he did not know of the pledge and that Ben had
no authority to pledge the property, our review of the record
reveals no representation by John to the bank that he did not
authorize the pledge. In fact, John held no position to authorize
such an encumbrance on the property, as indeed the government
itself points out in support of the conspiracy count. We
nevertheless address this contention of the government.
15
As is clear from the facts above, John Campbell had no
relationship with FMB concerning this loan. It was not until he
demanded the release of the Crested Butte property that he had any
contact with the bank concerning the mortgage. Absent any
relationship other than that created by John's claim to the same
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the natural effect of influencing Security Bank's decision to
settle the controversy over the security. See Heath, 970 F.2d at
1403.
As Security Bank's president testified, Security Bank agreed
to settle the dispute only after reviewing its records and
realizing that it held an invalid lien on the security because of
FMB's failure to obtain a corporate resolution. Thus, Security
Bank recognized that it had no legal claim to the Crested Butte
property. The government clearly had the burden of proof to show
that John's simple knowledge--under whatever circumstances he may
have gained that knowledge--would have had the natural effect of
influencing the bank's decision to settle the case, a burden the
government has failed to satisfy. The government adduced no
evidence that Security Bank settled the dispute because of John's
statements concerning his lack of knowledge. In point of fact the
bank apparently disregarded such statements until the default
judgment against the property was reversed and Security Bank was
threatened with actually losing the security because of the
weakness of its legal position. We thus conclude that the evidence
fails to show that Security Bank was deprived of part of the value
property as that claimed by the bank, it is difficult to see either
what special obligation John had to distill the truth to the bank
or indeed what right the bank had to rely on any representations he
may have made. Generally speaking, one does not burden himself
with special duties as a claimant to disputed property.
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of its security because of any material misrepresentation of John
Campbell.
In sum, we find that the evidence is insufficient to support
a finding that John Campbell conspired to commit bank fraud. John
Campbell acted within the perimeters of his legal rights to assert
the claims of West-Butte against this admittedly invalid mortgage.
Moreover, in asserting the claims of West-Butte--and thereby his
own claims indirectly--he engaged in no material misrepresentation
to the bank. Our finding that John did not engage in an illegal
conspiracy necessitates vacating Ben's conviction for conspiracy as
well, as a single defendant cannot conspire with himself.
We turn now to examine the evidence supporting the defendants'
convictions for the substantive offense of bank fraud.
C
The indictment charges both defendants with committing bank
fraud, specifically, from March 1987 until June 1991. It charges
that the defendants, having devised a scheme to defraud the bank of
its security, executed this scheme by causing Security Bank to
enter into the settlement agreement depriving it of a portion of
the value of the security. The government argues that the
defendants achieved this fraud by the same manner and means as
employed in the conspiracy. Furthermore, the government relies on
the same evidence supporting the defendants' convictions for
conspiracy to support their convictions for bank fraud.
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For the same reasons we found that John Campbell did not
conspire to defraud FMB or Security Bank of the security, we hold
that he did not commit the substantive offense of bank fraud.
Accordingly, we reverse his remaining conviction for bank fraud.
As to Ben Campbell, the government in its brief summarily
states "once the conspiracy to commit bank fraud is established,
Ben Campbell is liable for his father's foreseeable violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1344 even if he did not act himself to defraud Security
Bank." Because we have held that John Campbell in fact did not
commit bank fraud and because there is no evidence that Ben
Campbell deceived Security Bank during the relevant time frame for
the charged bank fraud offense, we hold that Ben's conviction for
bank fraud must be reversed as well.
IV
In conclusion, we find insufficient evidence for a rational
juror to convict John and Ben Campbell of either conspiracy to
commit bank fraud or bank fraud as charged in the indictment.
Accordingly, we REVERSE and VACATE each defendant's conviction on
these offenses. We AFFIRM Ben Campbell's conviction on false entry
in bank records. We therefore REMAND this case to the district
court for entry of a judgment of acquittal as to John Campbell and
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resentencing as to Ben Campbell.16 The judgment of the district
court is therefore
AFFIRMED in part;
REVERSED and VACATED in part;
and REMANDED.
16
We need not address John Campbell's remaining arguments
because we find the evidence insufficient to convict him of either
conspiracy or bank fraud.
Ben Campbell additionally argues that the district court
abused its discretion in admitting evidence of his violations of
certain banking regulations, such as the regulation limiting
indebtedness to "one borrower," and in admitting evidence of his
financial difficulties with Frontier GMC. Because we find this
evidence relevant to Ben's intent to deceive in the false entry
count, the district court clearly did not abuse its discretion by
admitting this evidence. United States v. Hays, 872 F.2d 582, 587
(5th Cir. 1989) (reviewing district court's evidentiary rulings
only for abuse of discretion). In any event, because the evidence
supporting Ben's remaining conviction--false entry--is so
overwhelming, any error resulting from admission of this evidence
is harmless. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) (disregarding any error not
affecting substantial rights).
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