[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-10474 JANUARY 6, 2006
________________________ THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 04-00166-CR-ORL-19-JGG
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RENARD L. WASHINGTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(January 6, 2006)
Before CARNES, HULL and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PRYOR, Circuit Judge:
Renard L. Washington appeals his sentence for bank robbery including an
order to make restitution to the Ormond Beach Police Department and Ormond
Heritage Condominium Association. His appeal presents two issues, the second of
which presents a question of first impression for this Circuit: (1) whether
Washington’s sentence should have been enhanced two levels for reckless
endangerment during flight under United States Sentencing Guidelines section
3C1.2; and (2) whether the Police Department and Condominium Association were
“victims” of the bank robbery under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18
U.S.C. § 3663A. We conclude that Washington’s high-speed flight by automobile
into a parking garage for a condominium association warranted an enhancement of
his sentence for reckless endangerment. We also conclude that, because the Police
Department and Condominium Association were damaged by Washington’s flight,
as a direct and proximate result of the bank robbery, both the Department and
Association were victims under the Restitution Act. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 6, 2004, Washington entered a Coquina Bank branch in Ormond
Beach, Florida, pointed a realistic toy gun at a bank employee, and demanded that
she open the vault. Washington left the bank with approximately $86,000 and
escaped in his car. Ormond Beach Police Department officers pursued
Washington, who drove into a parking garage at Ormond Heritage Condominiums
in an attempt to evade the officers. Washington’s car slipped under a security gate
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as it was closing, but the police officers did not clear the gate in time, and the
collision caused damage to both the police cars and the gate. Inside the garage,
Washington abandoned his car and fled on foot. He jumped into the Halifax River
where he was arrested.
Washington was indicted on one count of armed bank robbery. See 18
U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d). Washington pleaded guilty, and a sentencing hearing was
held on January 24, 2005. At the sentencing hearing, Washington objected to a
two-level enhancement for reckless endangerment during flight. See U.S.S.G. §
3C1.2. He did not deny the factual account contained in the presentence
investigation report, but argued that the facts were insufficient to support an
enhancement under section 3C1.2. The district court rejected Washington’s
argument, and Washington was sentenced under the advisory Sentencing
Guidelines to 96 months of imprisonment.
Washington also objected to the recommendation in the presentence report
that restitution be ordered under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act. See 18
U.S.C. § 3663A. Washington argued that the Ormond Beach Police Department
and the Ormond Heritage Condominium Association were not “victims” of the
bank robbery under the Restitution Act because their property was damaged after
the offense of armed bank robbery had been completed. The district court rejected
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this argument and held that “even though the element of the offense [of bank
robbery] doesn’t include flight, it is just a pattern of the commission of that crime
that the robbery occurs and then there is flight.” The district court awarded total
restitution of $13,771.56, which is the sum of $8,529.56 to the Police Department
and $5242 to the Condominium Association.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews factual findings for clear error and the application of the
United States Sentencing Guidelines to those facts de novo. United States v.
Trujillo, 146 F.3d 838, 847 (11th Cir. 1998). Challenges to the sufficiency of
evidence are questions of law, which we review de novo, and we consider the
evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Futrell,
209 F.3d 1286, 1288 (11th Cir. 2000). We review de novo the legality of an order
of restitution, but we review factual findings underlying a restitution order for clear
error. United States v. Hasson, 333 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir. 2003).
III. DISCUSSION
Washington raises two arguments on appeal. First, Washington argues that
the district court erroneously enhanced his sentence because there was insufficient
evidence to support a finding that he “recklessly created a substantial risk of death
or serious bodily injury.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2. Second, Washington argues that the
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district court erroneously ordered restitution to the Police Department and the
Condominium Association because neither is a “victim” of his offense of armed
bank robbery. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A. We address each argument in turn.
A. The District Court Did Not Erroneously Enhance
Washington’s Sentence under Section 3C1.2.
Washington argues that there is insufficient evidence to support a sentencing
enhancement for reckless endangerment during flight. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2.
Section 3C1.2 states, “If the defendant recklessly created a substantial risk of death
or serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing from a law
enforcement officer,” a two-level increase is warranted. Id. “Reckless” is defined
as “a situation in which the defendant was aware of the risk created by his conduct
and the risk was of such a nature and degree that to disregard that risk constituted a
gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise
in such a situation.” Id. §§ 2A1.4 cmt. 1, 3C1.2 cmt. 2.
Although “flight alone is insufficient to warrant an enhancement under
[section 3C1.2],” United States v. Wilson, 392 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004),
Washington’s conduct in fleeing constituted a “gross deviation” from the standard
of reasonable care. Unlike in Wilson, where the defendant fled on foot,
Washington drove his car at “a higher rate of speed” in an attempt to evade the
police. The district court, after viewing the surveillance video from the parking
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deck, found that “at times very close to the time the defendant entered this
underground parking garage, there were people coming into the garage. Cars were
coming in, and persons were getting on the garage elevator . . . .” Driving a car at
high speed in an area where people are likely to be found constitutes reckless
disregard for others’ safety. See United States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819, 836-37
(11th Cir. 1996). There was sufficient evidence for the district court to enhance
Washington’s sentence for reckless endangerment during flight.
B. The Police Department and Condominium
Association Were “Victims” of the Bank Robbery under
the Restitution Act.
Washington argues that the district court erroneously ordered restitution to
the Police Department and the Condominium Association under the Mandatory
Victims Restitution Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A. The Restitution Act applies to
any offense “(A) that is–(i) a crime of violence . . . or (ii) an offense against
property . . . . and (B) in which an identifiable victim or victims has [sic] suffered a
physical injury or pecuniary loss.” Id. § 3663A(c)(1). The Restitution Act
requires the district court, “when sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense
described in subsection (c),” to order “that the defendant make restitution to the
victim of the offense[.]” Id. § 3663A(a)(1). The Restitution Act defines “victim”
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as “a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of an
offense for which restitution may be ordered . . . .” Id. § 3663A(a)(2).
Washington does not dispute that the Restitution Act applies to the offense
of bank robbery, but Washington argues that the Police Department and the
Condominium Association were not “victims” of the bank robbery. Washington
argues that recovery under the Restitution Act is limited to victims who are harmed
by the offense itself, and he contends that the Police Department and the
Condominium Association were harmed as a result of his later flight, not his
offense of bank robbery. Because fleeing is not an element of bank robbery, see
Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 272, 120 S. Ct. 2159, 2170-71 (2000),
Washington argues that the victims of his flight are not entitled to restitution under
the Act. We disagree.
Washington’s argument is contrary to the plain language of the Restitution
Act, which covers harm that “directly and proximately” results from the
commission of the offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2). Although flight is not
an element of bank robbery, its harm may directly and proximately result from the
robbery. Two of our sister circuits have addressed this issue and have reached the
same conclusion. See United States v. Reichow, 416 F.3d 802, 805 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 74 U.S.L.W. 3323 (U.S. Nov. 28, 2005) (No. 05-7281); United States v.
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Donaby, 349 F.3d 1046, 1053 (7th Cir. 2003). The Seventh Circuit, for example,
affirmed an order under the Restitution Act for damage caused to a police car and a
vehicle the defendant stole during his flight from a bank robbery. Donaby, 349
F.3d at 1048. The court held, “The district court could properly conclude that
robbing the bank directly and proximately led to the high-speed chase and the
property damage that ensued.” Id. at 1053. The district court in Washington’s
case echoed this observation and found that flight “is a pattern of the commission
of [the offense of bank robbery].”
Washington argues that Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 110 S. Ct.
1979 (1990), and our precedents that interpreted Hughey support his construction
of the Restitution Act. In Hughey, the defendant pleaded guilty to the
unauthorized use of a single credit card. Id. at 413-14, 110 S. Ct. at 1981. At
sentencing, the government produced evidence that Hughey had fraudulently used
20 other credit cards and argued that restitution should be awarded based on the
losses incurred from Hughey’s use of all 21 credit cards. Id. at 414, 110 S. Ct. at
1981-82. The district court ordered Hughey to make restitution for the losses
associated with all 21 credit cards, but the Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 422, 110
S. Ct. at 1985-86. Hughey required a causal link between the offense of conviction
and the harm for which restitution is ordered. See id. at 418, 110 S. Ct. at 1984
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(stating “Congress intended restitution to be tied to the loss caused by the offense
of conviction”).
Our later cases interpreted Hughey to authorize restitution “only for the loss
caused by the specific conduct underlying the offense of conviction.” United
States v. Cobbs, 967 F.2d 1555, 1559 (11th Cir. 1992); see also United States v.
McArthur, 108 F.3d 1350, 1357 (11th Cir. 1997). In Cobbs, the defendant pleaded
guilty to the unauthorized possession of 89 American Express cards, but the
government dropped the charges of unauthorized use of the cards. 967 F.2d at
1556. The district court ordered restitution for the total loss, including those
arising from the unauthorized use of the cards, but this Court reversed. Id. at
1559. We held that “the possession count to which Cobbs pleaded guilty will not
support the district court’s order of restitution because there was no loss caused by
his mere possession of the access devices.” Id. at 1559. We rejected the
government’s argument that Hughey allowed restitution to “anyone suffering
‘injury as a result of the defendant’s actions that surrounded the commission of the
offense’ of conviction.” Id. (quoting United States v. Durham, 755 F.2d 511, 513
(6th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added in Cobbs)).
The error of Washington’s reliance on Hughey and Cobbs is that the
statutory language interpreted by the Supreme Court in Hughey and by our Court
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in Cobbs is materially different from the Restitution Act, which governs
Washington’s sentence. Hughey and Cobbs interpreted an earlier version of the
Victim and Witness Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (1996). See Hughey, 495
U.S. at 412, 110 S. Ct. at 1981; Cobbs, 967 F.2d at 1558. Although the definition
of “victim” in the current version of the Protection Act parallels that of the
Restitution Act, the earlier version of the Protection Act interpreted in Hughey and
Cobbs did not provide a definition for “victim.” Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (2005)
and 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (2005) with 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (1996); see also United
States v. Dickerson, 370 F.3d 1330, 1338 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,
125 S. Ct. 343 (2004). The standard for causation defined in Hughey—“the loss
caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction”—is
irreconcilable with the broad definition of “victim” in the Restitution Act. The
appropriate standard for causation is found in the Restitution Act itself: “directly
and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of an offense for which
restitution may be ordered . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2) (emphasis added).
Because the district court found Washington’s flight was causally related to the
bank robbery and this finding was not clearly erroneous, we affirm the order to
make restitution to the Police Department and Condominium Association.
IV. CONCLUSION
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Washington’s sentence, including the order to make restitution to the Police
Department and Condominium Association, is
AFFIRMED.
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