Kimberly Arrington v. Bill Fuller

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-15078 February 13, 2006
________________________ THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 01-00923-CV-C-N

KIMBERLY ARRINGTON,
TAMMY CHAPMAN, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
RHONDA WARREN,
JAMIE CODD,

Intervenors-Appellants,

versus

RANDY HELMS, Director, Administrative
Office of Courts, in his official capacity,
PAGE WALLEY, Commissioner of the Alabama
Department of Human Resources, in his
official capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
_________________________

(February 13, 2006)

Before ANDERSON, BLACK and CARNES, Circuit Judges.
BLACK, Circuit Judge:

Custodial parents who receive child support payments collected, distributed,

and disbursed by the State of Alabama appeal the district court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of Page Walley, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the

Alabama Department of Human Resources (DHR), and Randy Helms, in his

official capacity as Director of the Alabama Administrative Office of Courts

(AOC).1 Appellants argue the district court erred in holding they failed as a matter

of law (1) to establish 42 U.S.C. § 657 creates individual rights, enforceable under

§ 1983, to distribution of child support payments in strict compliance with § 657;

and (2) to show a § 1983 violation of their procedural due process rights under the

standard articulated in Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2003). We

affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Overview of PRWORA and Title IV-D

This appeal involves an interlocking set of cooperative federal-state welfare

and child support programs. Seeking to standardize the states’ systems for welfare

and child support payments, Congress enacted the Personal Responsibility and

Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) under its spending

1
For simplicity’s sake, we will refer to Walley as “DHR” and Helms as “AOC.”

2
power. Among other sweeping changes, PRWORA abolished Aid to Families

with Dependent Children (AFDC), the federally-controlled entitlement program

that had long provided cash assistance to underprivileged families. In AFDC’s

place, PRWORA established Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF)

block grants. Under the TANF regime, each state receives a predetermined block

of TANF funding with which to administer its welfare program. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 601(a)(1).

Although PRWORA provides states significantly more discretion to design

and manage their own welfare systems, TANF block grants do not come without

strings. Rather, to qualify for a TANF block grant, a state’s child support

enforcement program must conform to the specifications of Title IV-D of the

Social Security Act. See § 602(a)(2). Among other requirements, Title IV-D

requires a participating state to receive approval of its program from the Secretary

of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). See § 652(a)(1),

(3). Additionally, each state’s child support enforcement program must use a

single state disbursement unit (SDU) to collect, distribute, and disburse payments.

§ 654b(a)(1).

Child support payments made to custodial parents who (1) currently receive

TANF benefits or (2) previously received TANF benefits are known as “Title IV-

3
D payments.” Under Title IV-A, current TANF recipients must assign their child

support rights to the state. § 608(a)(3). To offset the costs of providing TANF

benefits, the state may keep most of the child support payments it collects on

behalf of current TANF recipients. See § 657(a)(1). Former TANF recipients are

entitled to a portion of the payments collected, and the size of this portion varies

according to the date the parent stopped receiving TANF benefits. § 657(a)(2).

Child support payments made to custodial parents who have never received

TANF benefits are known as “non-Title-IV-D payments.” Non-TANF custodial

parents do not have to assign their child support rights to the state and are thus

entitled to receive all collected child support funds. § 657(a)(3). If a state court

issues an income withholding order in a non-TANF custodial parent’s child

support case, however, the non-custodial parent’s employer must withhold a

portion of the non-custodial parent’s income and submit it to the SDU.

§§ 666(a)(8)(B); 654b(a)(1)(B). Accordingly, in child support cases involving an

income withholding order, non-TANF custodial parents’ child support payments

must flow through the SDU.

To oversee this complex federal-state program, Congress established the

Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) within the HHS. See § 652(a). This

agency audits the states’ compliance with their federally approved plans.

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§ 652(a)(4)(c). If a state does not “substantially comply” with the requirements of

Title IV-D, the Secretary of HHS may penalize the state by reducing its TANF

grant by up to five percent. § 609(a)(8). The Secretary has interpreted

“substantial compliance” as “(a) full compliance with requirements that services

be offered statewide and that certain recipients be notified monthly of the support

collected, as well as with reporting, recordkeeping, and accounting rules; (b) 90

percent compliance with case opening and case closure criteria; and (c) 75 percent

compliance with most remaining program requirements.” Blessing v. Freestone,

520 U.S. 329, 335, 117 S. Ct. 1353, 1357 (1997) (citing 45 C.F.R. § 1305.63).

B. DHR’s and AOC’s Role in Alabama’s Child Support Payment System

DHR administers Alabama’s TANF and Title IV-D programs. Among its

various Title-IV-D-related responsibilities, DHR oversees the operation of

Alabama’s SDU and collects, distributes, and disburses all Title IV-D payments.

DHR also collects and distributes all non-Title-IV-D payments made pursuant to

income withholding orders, and disburses a portion of these payments.

AOC’s primary function is to oversee the administration of Alabama’s court

system. Under a contract with DHR, however, AOC also disburses all of the

remaining non-Title-IV-D payments. Although Title IV-D requires states to have

a single point of disbursement for all child support payments, HHS has authorized

5
DHR’s pre-PRWORA practice of disbursing a portion of its non-Title-IV-D

payments via AOC.

C. Relevant Procedural History

On December 21, 2001, eight named plaintiffs filed a Corrected Amended

Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Amended

Complaint) against DHR and AOC, alleging widespread deficiencies in Alabama’s

child support payment system. Two additional plaintiffs subsequently intervened.

On September 1, 2004, the district court granted summary judgment to DHR and

AOC on all of the ten named plaintiffs’ 12 claims for relief.2

Only nine of the named plaintiffs have appealed the district court’s

summary judgment order. Each remaining appellant falls into one of two

categories. First, Appellants Kimberly Arrington, Terralisa Casby-Jackson,

Carmelitess Felder, Tanya Jackson, Sharon Scott, Rhonda Warren, and Lakisha

Woodall (the Arrington Appellants) currently or formerly received TANF

benefits.3 Accordingly, the child support payments they receive constitute Title

2
Although the named plaintiffs sought certification of their case as a class action, the
district court ruled on the summary judgment motions before it considered the class certification
issue.
3
To be precise, some of the Arrington Appellants received benefits under the AFDC
program, which PRWORA abolished and replaced with TANF. For purposes of simplicity, we
refer to AFDC payments as TANF payments.

6
IV-D payments disbursed by DHR. Second, Appellants Tammy Chapman and

Jamie Codd (the Chapman Appellants) have never received TANF benefits, but

their child support payments are subject to income withholding orders. The child

support payments they receive constitute non-Title-IV-D payments disbursed by

AOC.

On appeal, Appellants challenge the district court’s grant of summary

judgment to DHR and AOC on their Eleventh Claim for Relief, in which they

assert § 657 provides them the right, enforceable against DHR and AOC under

§ 1983, to distribution of their payments in strict compliance with § 657.4

Additionally, the Arrington Appellants5 challenge the district court’s grant of

4
The Appellants’ Eleventh Claim for Relief provides in relevant part: “Plaintiff
custodial parents who receive [Title] IV-D services have a right under federal law to distribution
of support as specified in 42 U.S.C. § 657 and 45 C.F.R. § 302.51.” If the statute at issue does
not create rights enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, then neither do the regulations adopted
under that statute. Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1009 (11th Cir. 1997). As explained below,
we hold § 657 does not create enforceable rights under § 1983. Thus, we need not address
whether 45 C.F.R. § 302.51 creates rights enforceable under § 1983.
5
The district court held the Chapman Appellants lacked standing to bring their
procedural due process claims against AOC, and they failed to contest this holding on appeal.
“The party who invokes federal jurisdiction must establish that it has standing to assert its
claim.” Nat’l Alliance for the Mentally Ill, St. Johns Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 376 F.3d
1292, 1294 (11th Cir. 2004). In National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, the district court held the
plaintiffs-appellants failed to establish they had standing to sue. Id. Although Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 28(a)(9)(A) provides an “appellant’s brief must contain . . . appellant’s
contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on
which the appellant relies,” two of the plaintiffs-appellants neglected to cite anything in the
record establishing their standing. Id. at 1295. Accordingly, we stated:
The Court has warned litigants that “failure to comply with Rule 28(a)(9)(A) of
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure may result in waiver or abandonment of

7
summary judgment to DHR on their Fourth6 and Eighth7 Claims for Relief. Under

these two claims, they contend DHR violated their § 1983 procedural due process

issues on appeal.” Because [the plaintiffs-appellants] have not satisfied Rule
28(a)(9)(A), the Court deems them to have waived any claim concerning their
individual standing.
Id. at 1296 (citation omitted).
Similarly, the Chapman Appellants failed to satisfy Rule 28(a)(9)(A) by neither expressly
arguing they have standing nor citing a single case or record excerpt to contradict the district
court’s holding. In the “Statement of the Issues” section of their brief, the Chapman Appellants
ask whether the district court erred when it held they lacked standing to sue AOC for allegedly
violating their procedural due process rights. Instead of pursuing the standing issue in the
“Argument” section, however, they merely reiterate their substantive claims. Therefore, the
Chapman Appellants violated Rule 28(a)(9)(A) with regard to establishing their standing. Under
National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, we thus deem waived any argument the Chapman
Appellants have concerning their standing and will not address their procedural due process
claims. See also Transamerica Leasing, Inc. v. Inst. of London Underwriters, 430 F.3d 1326,
1331 n.4 (11th Cir. 2005) (deeming waived an issue raised in the appellant’s “Statement of the
Issues” but not argued in the text of its brief).
6
The Appellants’ Fourth Claim for Relief provides:
Defendants’ failure to provide Plaintiffs with accurate, timely, frequent
and meaningful notice of support collected and distributed violates Plaintiffs’
rights to procedural Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. Defendants must provide notices and explanations which will
allow a parent to understand the distribution of each child support collection and
to identify possible errors in distribution and delays in disbursement.
7
The Appellants’ Eighth Claim for Relief provides:
Defendants’ failure to provide Plaintiffs with an effective and efficient
administrative procedure to correct errors in the distribution of child support
collections and the failure to notify the Plaintiffs of this procedure and how it
would be used, violates procedural Due Process and deprives Plaintiffs of
property without Due Process of Law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.
This claim appears to contain two components: (1) DHR lacks an effective and efficient
administrative procedure to correct errors in the distribution of child support collections, and
(2) DHR fails to notify custodial parents of the administrative hearing procedure and how it
should be used. In their initial brief, however, the Arrington Appellants do not make a single
argument pertaining to the effectiveness and efficiency of DHR’s hearing procedures.
Accordingly, they have waived the first component of their Eighth Claim for Relief, and we
address only the second component.

8
rights by failing to provide them adequate notice of (1) DHR’s handling of their

payments, and (2) their right to and the procedures for requesting a hearing.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying

the same legal standards as the district court, and viewing all facts and reasonable

inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Johnson

v. Booker T. Washington Broad. Serv., Inc., 234 F.3d 501, 507 (11th Cir. 2000).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Statutory Claim: 42 U.S.C. § 6578

8
Section 657 provides in relevant part:
(a) In general
. . . . [A]n amount collected on behalf of a family as support by a State
pursuant to a plan approved under this part shall be distributed as follows:
(1) Families receiving assistance
In the case of a family receiving assistance from the State, the State
shall—
(A) pay to the Federal Government the Federal share of the
amount so collected; and
(B) retain, or distribute to the family, the State share of the amount
so collected.
In no event shall the total of the amounts paid to the Federal Government and
retained by the State exceed the total of the amounts that have been paid to the
family as assistance by the State.
(2) Families that formerly received assistance
In the case of a family that formerly received assistance
from the State:
(A) Current support payments
To the extent that the amount so collected does not exceed the
amount required to be paid to the family for the month in which collected,
the State shall distribute the amount so collected to the family.
(B) Payments of arrearages

9
 Appellants contend DHR and AOC have failed to distribute their child

support payments in accordance with the requirements set forth in § 657 of Title

IV-D.9 Seeking redress for DHR’s and AOC’s alleged mishandling of their

payments, Appellants claim § 657 gives them a private right, enforceable under

§ 1983, to distribution of their payments in strict compliance with § 657. This

issue is one of first impression in our circuit.

1. Legal Framework for Claims that Spending Clause Legislation
Creates Individual Rights Enforceable Under § 1983

To the extent the amount so collected exceeds the amount
required to be paid to the family for the month in which collected, the
State shall distribute the amount so collected as follows:
....
(3) Families that never received assistance
In the case of any other family, the State shall distribute the amount
so collected to the family.
9
Specifically, in their Eleventh Claim for Relief, Appellants assert:
Defendants’ failure to apply all amounts collected to first satisfy the
obligation for current support and to forward these amounts to custodial parents
violates Plaintiffs’ rights under federal law.
Defendants’ failure to apply all amounts collected after the obligation for
current support has been satisfied in a month to past due support or arrears owed
to a custodial parent for any period on which the custodial parent was not
receiving Family Assistance and to forward these amounts to custodial parents
violates Plaintiffs’ rights under federal law.
Defendants’ taking of amounts as arrears that exceed the total amount of
Family Assistance and AFDC provided to the custodial parent violates Plaintiffs’
rights under federal law.
Defendants’ failures to accurately allocate support collected under two or
more court orders violates Plaintiffs’ rights under federal law.
Defendants’ taking of a fee from the child support payment, rather than
from an additional amount above the amount required to satisfy the child and
spousal support ordered and owing, violates Plaintiffs’ rights under 42 U.S.C.
§ 657 and 45 C.F.R. § 302.51.

10
 In Maine v. Thiboutot, the Supreme Court established that § 1983 provides a

private cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state law,

abridges rights created by the Constitution and laws of the United States. See 448

U.S. 1, 4–5, 100 S. Ct. 2502, 2504–05 (1980); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983. One

year later, in Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, the Supreme Court

clarified that Spending Clause legislation is especially unlikely to create individual

rights enforceable under § 1983. See 451 U.S. 1, 28, 101 S. Ct. 1531, 1545

(1981). “In legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power,” the Supreme

Court reasoned, “the typical remedy for state noncompliance with federally

imposed conditions is not a private cause of action for noncompliance but rather

action by the Federal Government to terminate funds to the State.” Id.

We have previously rejected the assertion that Title IV-D, as an

undifferentiated whole, creates rights enforceable under § 1983. In Wehunt v.

Ledbetter, a group of plaintiffs claimed they possessed an individually enforceable

right to have the State of Georgia strictly comply with Title IV-D. See 875 F.2d

1558, 1562 (11th Cir. 1989). These plaintiffs did not ground their claim in a

specific provision of Title IV-D; rather, they claimed Title IV-D generally

established privately enforceable rights. See id. We held Title IV-D, in its

entirety, does not create individual rights enforceable under § 1983, because

11
Congress enacted it “to immediately lower the cost to the taxpayer as well as to

lessen the number of families enrolling in welfare in the future—benefits to

society as a whole rather than specific individuals.” Id. at 1565.

After a circuit split developed over the issue presented in Wehunt, the

Supreme Court settled the matter in Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 117

S. Ct. 1353 (1997). The Blessing plaintiffs claimed they had an enforceable

individual right to have the State of Arizona’s child support program achieve

“substantial compliance” with Title IV-D’s requirements. Id. at 332–33, 117 S.

Ct. at 1356. Without distinguishing among Title IV-D’s various provisions, the

Ninth Circuit held the plaintiffs had such a right. Id. at 339, 117 S. Ct. at

1358–59. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding Title IV-D’s

“substantial compliance” requirement “was not intended to benefit individual

children and custodial parents, and therefore it does not constitute a federal right.”

Id. at 343, 117 S. Ct. at 1361. Moreover, the Supreme Court stated the Ninth

Circuit erred in “taking a blanket approach to determining whether Title IV-D

creates rights.” Id. at 344, 117 S. Ct. at 1361. “Only when the complaint is

broken down into manageable analytic bites,” the Supreme Court asserted, “can a

court ascertain whether each separate claim satisfies the various criteria we have

12
set forth for determining whether a federal statute creates rights.” Id. at 342, 117

S. Ct. at 1360.

In reaching this holding, the Blessing Court set forth three prerequisites for

establishing that a federal statute confers rights enforceable under § 1983.

First, Congress must have intended that the provision in question
benefit the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate the right
assertedly protected by the statute is not so “vague and amorphous”
that its enforcement would strain judicial competence. Third, the
statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the
States. In other words, the provision giving rise to the asserted right
must be couched in mandatory, rather than precatory, terms.

Id. at 340–41, 117 S. Ct. at 1359 (citations omitted). However, “[e]ven if a

plaintiff demonstrates that a federal statute creates an individual right, there is only

a rebuttable presumption that the right is enforceable under § 1983.” Id. at 341,

117 S. Ct. at 1360. To rebut this presumption, the state must demonstrate

Congress intended to foreclose a remedy under § 1983 either “expressly, by

forbidding recourse to § 1983 in the statute itself, or impliedly, by creating a

comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual

enforcement under § 1983.” Id.

In Gonzaga University v. Doe, the Supreme Court clarified the first of

Blessing’s three requirements, making clear that only unambiguously conferred

rights, as distinguished from mere benefits or interests, are enforceable under

13
§ 1983. See 536 U.S. 273, 283, 122 S. Ct. 2268, 2275 (2002). Specifically, the

Supreme Court asserted if a federal statute’s text and structure “provide some

indication that Congress may have intended to create individual rights, and some

indication it may not have, that means Congress has not spoken with the requisite

‘clear voice.’ Ambiguity precludes enforceable rights.” 31 Foster Children v.

Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1270 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 280, 122

S. Ct. at 2273). To determine whether Congress intended the provisions in

question to benefit the plaintiff, a court must weigh three factors: “whether the

statute (1) contains ‘rights-creating’ language that is individually focused; (2)

addresses the needs of individual persons being satisfied instead of having a

systemwide or aggregate focus; and (3) lacks an enforcement mechanism through

which an aggrieved individual can obtain review.” Id.

Gonzaga involved a plaintiff who attempted to bring an action under § 1983

to enforce provisions of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974

(FERPA), which Congress enacted pursuant to its spending power. See Gonzaga,

536 U.S. at 276, 122 S. Ct. at 2271. FERPA provides in relevant part: “No funds

shall be made available . . . to any educational agency or institution which has a

policy or practice of permitting the release of education records . . . of students

without the written consent of their parents . . . .” 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1). Under

14
§ 1234c(a), the Secretary of Education may terminate funding only if the

educational agency or institution fails to “comply substantially” with FERPA’s

requirements.

Under the first Gonzaga factor, the Supreme Court determined FERPA does

not contain rights-creating language because it speaks only to the Secretary of

Education, directing the Secretary to deny federal funds if the prohibited release of

education records takes place. Id. at 287, 122 S. Ct. at 2277. Second, the Supreme

Court stated FERPA has an aggregate rather than individual focus, because

educational agencies and institutions remain eligible for funding so long as they

“comply substantially” with FERPA on a systemwide, rather than student-by-

student, basis. See id. at 288, 122 S. Ct. at 2278. The Supreme Court noted its

conclusion on this issue was “not unlike Blessing, which found that Title IV-D

failed to support a § 1983 suit in part because it only required ‘substantial

compliance’ with federal regulations.” Id. Third, the Supreme Court determined

FERPA’s provisions empowering the Secretary of Education to “deal with

violations” and requiring the Secretary to establish a review board constituted an

enforcement mechanism for aggrieved individuals. Id. at 289–90, 122 S. Ct. at

2278–79. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held all three factors weighed in favor

15
of finding “spending legislation drafted in terms resembling those of FERPA

can[not] confer enforceable rights.” Id. at 279, 122 S. Ct. at 2273.

We first applied Gonzaga’s analytical framework in 31 Foster Children. A

group of foster children argued §§ 675(5)(D) and (E) of Title IV-E of the Social

Security Act, which pertain to the states’ case review systems for foster children,

provided them rights enforceable under § 1983. See 31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d

at 1268. Enacted under Congress’s spending power, Title IV-E establishes a

program of federal payments to states for foster care and adoption assistance. See

id. at 1270. Pursuant to §§ 675(5)(D) and (E), “case review system” means a

procedure for ensuring (1) “a child’s health and education record . . . is reviewed

and updated, and supplied to the foster parent or foster care provider with whom

the child is placed, at the time of each placement of the child in foster care,” and,

(2) in the case of certain at-risk foster children, “the State shall file a petition to

terminate the parental rights of the child’s parents.” Id. at 1270–71.

First, even though §§ 675(5)(D) and (E) contain language requiring the state

to take certain actions relative to individual foster children (e.g., “the State shall

file a petition”), we determined “§§ 675(5)(D) and (E) do not have the kind of

focused-on-the-individual, rights-creating language required by Gonzaga.” See id.

at 1272 (“The references to individual children and their placements are made in

16
the context of describing what the procedure is supposed to ensure, and such

provisions ‘cannot make out the requisite congressional intent to confer individual

rights enforceable by § 1983.’” (quoting Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 289, 122 S. Ct. at

2278)). Second, we reasoned the “substantial conformity” requirement in Title

IV-E is “similar to FERPA’s, which the Court in Gonzaga concluded showed an

aggregate instead of an individual focus.” Id. (citing Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 288,

122 S. Ct. at 2278). Third, although we acknowledged Title IV-E does not contain

a comprehensive enforcement scheme, we determined the first two factors “point

in the other direction and prevent us from saying that Congress spoke with a clear

voice to unambiguously manifest its intent to create enforceable rights.” Id. at

1272–73. Accordingly, we held §§ 675(5)(D) and (E) failed under Gonzaga’s

three-factor analysis and, hence, did not satisfy the first Blessing requirement. Id.

at 1274.

In summary, when a plaintiff claims a statutory provision creates individual

rights enforceable under § 1983, she must establish all three requirements set forth

in Blessing. The first Blessing requirement instructs us to determine whether

Congress intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff. To decide

whether the provision satisfies this first Blessing requirement, we must weigh the

three factors set forth in Gonzaga. Specifically, we must consider whether the

17
provision (1) contains individually focused, rights-creating language; (2) has an

individual, rather than systemwide or aggregate, focus; and (3) lacks an

enforcement mechanism for aggrieved individuals. If we determine these three

Gonzaga factors weigh against a finding that Congress intended the provision to

benefit the plaintiff, then the provision does not satisfy the first Blessing

requirement and the plaintiff’s claim must fail.

2. Application of this Legal Framework to § 657

Turning to this appeal, we must weigh each of the three Gonzaga factors to

determine whether § 657 satisfies the first requirement of Blessing’s three-part

test. If § 657 does not satisfy Blessing’s first requirement, then it does not provide

Appellants with individual rights, enforceable under § 1983, to distribution of

child support payments in strict compliance with § 657.

a. Individually Focused, Rights-Creating Language

Like the provisions at issue in Gonzaga and 31 Foster Children, § 657 does

not contain individually focused, rights-creating language under the first Gonzaga

factor. In Gonzaga, the Supreme Court pointed to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 as examples of

explicit rights-creating language. See 536 U.S. at 284 n.3, 122 S. Ct. at 2276 n.3.

Titles VI and IX each provide: “No person . . . shall . . . be subjected to

18
discrimination.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). According to the

Supreme Court, “[w]here a statute does not include this sort of explicit ‘right- or

duty-creating language,’ we rarely impute to Congress an intention to create a

private right of action.” Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284 n.3, 122 S. Ct. at 2276 n.3

(citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690 n.13, 99 S. Ct. 1946, 1955

n.13 (1979); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288, 121 S. Ct. 1511, 1520–21

(2001)).

The FERPA language addressed in Gonzaga speaks only to the Secretary of

Education, instructing the Secretary to withhold funds from educational agencies

and institutions with prohibited policies and practices; it does not speak directly to

individual students. Id. at 287, 122 S. Ct. at 2277. Therefore, the Supreme Court

concluded FERPA’s language fell short of the quintessential rights-creating

language found in Titles VI and IX. Id. Similarly, § 657’s language speaks only

to the states, instructing them to distribute child support payments in a certain

fashion; it does not speak directly to individual custodial parents. Thus, the

language in both FERPA and § 657 is at least one step removed from speaking of

individually enforceable private rights, and does not evince Titles VI and IX’s

“‘unmistakable focus on the benefitted class.’” See id. at 284, 122 S. Ct. at 2275

(quoting Cannon, 441 U.S. at 691, 99 S. Ct. at 1955). In the absence of explicit

19
rights-creating language, § 657 is at best ambiguous. And as Gonzaga made clear,

“[a]mbiguity precludes enforceable rights.” 31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1270

(citing Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 280, 122 S. Ct. at 2273).

Furthermore, our conclusion comports with 31 Foster Children. Sections

675(5)(D) and (E) of Title IV-E refer to an individual foster “child” but do so only

to describe the case review procedure’s general mission. Id. at 1272. Likewise,

§ 657 repeatedly refers to the individual recipient “family,” but does so only to

explain how the state generally must distribute child support funds. Moreover,

similar to the phrase “the State shall file a petition” in § 675(5)(E), the phrase “the

State shall” permeates § 657 and prefaces the procedures by which states must

distribute child support funds they collect under Title IV-D. According to 31

Foster Children, such language gives § 657 “an aggregate or system wide focus

instead of one that indicates concern with whether the needs of any particular

[individual] are met.” Id. Under Gonzaga and 31 Foster Children, § 657

therefore does not contain rights-creating language, and the first Gonzaga factor is

not satisfied.10

10
Appellants argue Blessing “specifically recogniz[es] a provision in § 657 directing
payment of support to a custodial parent [as] exemplif[ying] rights creating language.” To
support this assertion, Appellants point to the following dicta from Blessing: “We do not
foreclose the possibility that some provisions of Title IV-D give rise to individual
rights. . . . Although § 657 may give [the plaintiff] a federal right to receive a specified portion of
the money collected on her behalf by Arizona, she did not explicitly request such relief in the

20
 b. Individual, Rather than Systemwide or Aggregate, Focus

As we discussed in Part III.A.1, the Supreme Court and our circuit have

repeatedly held “substantial compliance” provisions in Spending Clause

legislation are inconsistent with individually enforceable rights. Beginning with

Blessing, the Supreme Court addressed § 609(a)(8), Title IV-D’s substantial

compliance provision, and concluded: “Far from creating an individual

entitlement to services, the [substantial compliance] standard is simply a yardstick

for the Secretary to measure the systemwide performance of a State’s Title IV-D

program.” 520 U.S. at 343, 117 S. Ct. at 1361 (emphasis in original). Next, in

Gonzaga, the Supreme Court extended Blessing’s reasoning to hold FERPA’s

“comply substantially” provision indicated an aggregate rather than individual

focus under the second Gonzaga factor. 536 U.S. at 288, 122 S. Ct. at 2278. In 31

Foster Children, our circuit determined the “substantial conformity” requirement

at issue was “similar to FERPA’s, which the Court in Gonzaga concluded showed

an aggregate instead of an individual focus.” 329 F.3d at 1272.

complaint.” 520 U.S. at 345–46, 117 S. Ct. at 1362 (emphasis added). This quotation not only
appears in dicta, but also includes the qualifying word “may.” Thus, contrary to Appellants
assertions, Blessing does not stand for the proposition that § 657 contains rights-creating
language.

21
 This appeal brings the analysis full circle, requiring us to determine whether

Title IV-D’s “substantial compliance” provision—the same provision addressed in

Blessing—indicates § 657 has a systemwide or aggregate, rather than individual,

focus under the second Gonzaga factor. Based on the precedent set forth in

Blessing, Gonzaga, and 31 Foster Children, we conclude it does.

c. Lack of an Enforcement Mechanism for Aggrieved Individuals

As for Gonzaga’s third factor, § 657 lacks a remedial scheme sufficiently

comprehensive to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits

under § 1983. Nevertheless, the “lack of an enforcement mechanism by which an

aggrieved individual can obtain review is but one of the factors we consider.” Id.

at 1273. The other two factors counsel in favor of finding Congress did not

“[speak] with a clear voice to unambiguously manifest its intent to create

enforceable rights.” Id. Without such an unambiguous intent, Appellants cannot

satisfy the first requirement of the Blessing test. We thus hold § 657 does not

confer a private right to distribution of child support payments enforceable under

22
§ 1983.11 The district court did not err in granting DHR and AOC summary

judgment on this issue.

B. Constitutional Claims: Procedural Due Process

The Arrington Appellants, all of whom are current or former TANF

recipients, contend the notices DHR currently provides do not satisfy the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. First, they argue DHR fails to

provide adequate notice pertaining to its collection, distribution, and disbursement

of their Title IV-D child support payments. Second, they assert the publicly

available statutes, regulations, and agency policy manuals regarding DHR’s

hearing process do not provide adequate notice of their right to a hearing and the

procedures for requesting one.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides no state

“shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of

law.” U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. “Procedural due process rules are meant to

protect persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified

deprivation of life, liberty, or property.” Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259, 98 S.

11
The Eighth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Walters v. Weiss, 392 F.3d 306 (8th
Cir. 2004). Although the Eighth Circuit acknowledged Ҥ 657(a) reflects some congressional
intent to benefit custodial parents,” it determined “the right plaintiffs assert . . . is not
unambiguously imposed in § 657(a) as a binding obligation on the states.” Id. at 313 (emphasis
in original). Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit held § 657 does not create an individually
enforceable federal right. Id.

23
Ct. 1042, 1050 (1978). “In this circuit, a § 1983 claim alleging a denial of

procedural due process requires proof of three elements: (1) a deprivation of a

constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest; (2) state action; and

(3) constitutionally-inadequate process.” Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232

(11th Cir. 2003) (citing Cryder v. Oxendine, 24 F.3d 175, 177 (11th Cir. 1994)).

DHR’s involvement in collecting, distributing, and disbursing child support

payments constitutes “state action” under the second element of the Grayden test.

Thus, only the first and third elements are at issue on appeal.

1. Deprivation of a Constitutionally-Protected Property Interest

Under the first element of the Grayden test, we must consider whether the

Arrington Appellants have shown not only a constitutionally-protected property

interest, but also a governmental deprivation of that constitutionally-protected

property interest. See Grayden, 345 F.3d at 1232 (stating the plaintiff-tenants

satisfied the first element of the Grayden test because they (1) enjoyed a

constitutionally-protected property interest in continued residency at their

apartments and (2) were deprived of that interest upon eviction).12 Property

12
The Arrington Appellants contend they do not have to show a deprivation of their child
support payments to trigger the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause. Rather, they
seem to imply they have satisfied the first element of the Grayden test by showing the inherent
risk of DHR mishandling their child support payments via human or computer error. This
argument lacks merit for at least two reasons. First, it contradicts the Due Process Clause’s plain
language, which prohibits states from depriving a person of life, liberty, or property without due

24
interests stem not from the Constitution, but from such sources as statutes,

regulations, ordinances, and contracts. See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth,

408 U.S. 564, 576–77, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2708–09 (1972). Whether these sources

create a property interest must be decided by reference to state law. Id. at 577, 92

S. Ct. at 2709.

The Alabama courts have determined custodial parents possess a

constitutionally-protected property interest in child support payments. See

Morgan County Dep’t of Human Res. v. B.W.J., 723 So. 2d 689, 693 (Ala. Civ.

App. 1998) (“[A custodial parent] has a property interest in having her child

support order paid in full by [the non-custodial parent].”). Thus, we must

process of law, but says nothing about protecting a person from the mere risk of such deprivation.
Second, to the best of our knowledge, neither the Supreme Court nor our circuit has ever
held a plaintiff can succeed on the merits of his or her procedural due process claim without first
showing a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest. In each case the
Arrington Appellants cite to support their argument, the plaintiffs suffered a deprivation—not the
mere risk of a deprivation. See Carey, 435 U.S. at 248, 98 S. Ct. at 1044 (involving students
suspended from their public schools and, hence, deprived of their liberty interest in not being
disciplined by a public school); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 69–71, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 1988–89
(1972) (involving consumers deprived of their property interest in certain household goods when
a sheriff seized those goods in accordance with a state replevin statute); Mullane v. Cent.
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 311, 70 S. Ct. 652, 655–56 (1950) (involving trust
fund beneficiaries deprived of their property interest in trust funds when a trustee obtained a final
decree in state court terminating every right the beneficiaries otherwise would have had against
the trustee); Grayden, 345 F.3d at 1232 (involving apartment tenants evicted from their
apartments and, therefore, deprived of their property interest in continued residency). Thus, these
cases undermine, rather than support, the Arrington Appellants’ argument.

25
determine whether the Arrington Appellants have been deprived of this

constitutionally-protected property interest.

As the district court held, the Arrington Appellants have failed to adduce

evidence that DHR deprived them of their child support payments. In their briefs,

the Arrington Appellants do not point to any evidence in the record suggesting

they received less than their full child support payment, endured undue delay in

receiving their payments, or had identifiable errors in their payments that DHR

failed to correct. At least three times during oral argument, we asked the

Arrington Appellants’ counsel to direct our attention to such evidence in the

record, but he failed to do so. In short, after extensive discovery, the Arrington

Appellants could not produce a scintilla of evidence indicating they suffered a

deprivation of their child support payments. Thus, they present no genuine issue

of material fact regarding whether they were deprived of a constitutionally-

protected property interest, and their procedural due process claims must fail under

the first element of the Grayden test.

2. Constitutionally Inadequate Process

Even if the Arrington Appellants could show a deprivation of their child

support payments, however, their procedural due process claims would still fail

under the third element of the Grayden test. The Arrington Appellants challenge

26
the adequacy of (1) the notice DHR provides them regarding its handling of their

child support payments, and (2) the notice of their right to and the procedures for

requesting a hearing. We address each issue in turn.

a. Notice of DHR’s Handling of Child Support Payments

The Arrington Appellants argue the monthly “Notice of Child Support

Collections” and the perforated stub attached to their monthly child support

payment check do not adequately enable them to determine the timing and

accuracy of their child support payments. Specifically, they contend these

monthly notices lack vital information about their payments and “explanations

which will allow a parent to understand the distribution of each child support

collection and to identify possible errors in distribution and delays in

disbursement.” Without these details and explanations, the Arrington Appellants

argue, Title IV-D custodial parents have no way of discerning whether DHR has

erroneously deprived them of their child support payments.

To determine what type of notice is adequate to satisfy the Due Process

Clause, we apply the test set forth in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust

Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S. Ct. 652 (1950). See Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S.

27
161, 167–68, 122 S. Ct. 694, 699 (2002); Grayden, 345 F.3d at 1242.13 Under the

Mullane standard, notice must be “reasonably calculated, under all the

circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and

afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314,

70 S. Ct. at 657. Due process is a flexible concept that varies with the particular

circumstances of each case, and myriad forms of notice may satisfy the Mullane

standard. See Grayden, 345 F.3d at 1239 n.17. Our task is not to determine

13
The Arrington Appellants contend this Court should use the balancing test set forth in
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976), rather than the Mullane test, to address
whether the notice DHR currently provides is adequate under the Due Process Clause. We
disagree. The Supreme Court’s recent holding in Dusenbery sets forth the framework for
determining whether we should apply Mathews or Mullane to a procedural due process claim.
534 U.S. at 167–68, 122 S. Ct. at 699. In Grayden, we provided the following overview of this
framework:
The Mathews balancing test, which we employ to determine the “dictates of due
process,” helps us determine at what point in time notice of the opportunity to be
heard is constitutionally required. . . . But when we are called on to consider what
type of notice is adequate to meet the . . . notice requirement, we eschew the
balancing test in Mathews and adopt [the] “more straightforward” approach [set
forth in Mullane].
Grayden, 345 F.3d at 1242 (citation omitted) (citing Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 167, 122 S. Ct. at
699). The Arrington Appellants acknowledge DHR mails them the monthly Notice of Child
Support Collections and payment check stubs, and they do not challenge the timing of these
notices. Rather, they challenge the adequacy of the monthly notices. Accordingly, we must
apply the Mullane standard to their claim.
The Arrington Appellants also urge us to follow the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Barnes
v. Healey, 980 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1992). Again, we disagree. In Barnes, the Ninth Circuit
determined the Due Process Clause required the State of California to send custodial parents
notices containing detailed explanations of its handling of their child support payments. See id.
at 577–80. To reach this conclusion, however, the Ninth Circuit applied the Mathews balancing
test, rather than the Mullane test. See id. at 577. In light of the Supreme Court’s subsequent
ruling in Dusenbery, we conclude the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Barnes carries little persuasive
value.

28
whether the notice the Arrington Appellants request would be ideal under all the

circumstances, but rather whether the notice they currently receive is reasonable

under all the circumstances.

Section 654(5) of Title IV-D requires states to provide Title IV-D custodial

parents notice “on a monthly basis . . . of the amount of the support payments

collected.” Accordingly, DHR mails the monthly Notice of Child Support

Collections to Title IV-D custodial parents. These notices contain five columns

listing the (1) non-custodial parent name, (2) court order, (3) amount paid to

current, (4) amount paid to arrears, and (5) amount paid to family.

Based on this information, custodial parents can confirm DHR accurately

recorded the non-custodial parent’s child support payment amount by comparing

the dollar figure appearing on their court order14 with the dollar figure appearing

under the “amount paid to current” column. To then determine what amount (if

any) DHR withheld as reimbursement for TANF funds, they can check the dollar

figure appearing under the “amount paid to arrears” column. Finally, they can

ensure they received the amount DHR purportedly owed by comparing the amount

14
Under Title IV-D, states must send each custodial parent a copy of his or her child
support court order and all modifications of the court order. § 654(12)(B).

29
appearing on their payment check stub with the dollar amount appearing in the

“amount paid to family” column.

If custodial parents still have questions or concerns after reviewing their

monthly Notice of Child Support Collections, the payment check stub reminds

them to contact DHR’s toll-free, 24-hour automated voice response hotline or visit

DHR’s web page for additional information. DHR’s 24-hour hotline not only

provides custodial parents with updated balance information, but also gives them

the option to speak directly with a child support worker at DHR’s Customer

Service Unit (CSU). Parents may also directly call, fax, write, e-mail, or visit the

CSU during regular business hours for information and assistance. Additionally,

custodial parents may contact the CSU or visit DHR’s website to obtain a copy of

their “Court Order Payment Summary,” which provides a year-to-date summary of

their payments and includes detailed information about the timing and accuracy of

these payments.15

The monthly Notice of Child Support Collections—coupled with the

payment check stub, the 24-hour hotline, the CSU, and the Court Order Payment

15
The record indicates custodial parents utilize these additional information sources. In
Fiscal Year 2002, for example, the CSU responded to 3176 direct telephone calls, 42,374
telephone calls initiated through the 24-hour hotline, 1679 e-mails, and 980 letters. Also,
between September 2002 and February 2003, DHR’s 24-hour hotline received an average of
505,465 calls per month.

30
Summary—give Title IV-D custodial parents ample information with which to

determine whether they have received their full child support payments in a timely

manner. Considering all the circumstances, we conclude DHR’s monthly notices

are reasonably calculated to inform custodial parents of the action DHR has taken

with regard to their child support payments. Accordingly, the Arrington

Appellants’ procedural due process claim with respect to DHR’s notice fails.

b. Notice of the Right to and the Procedures for Requesting a
Hearing

The Arrington Appellants also contend the Due Process Clause requires

DHR to provide them individualized, contemporaneous notice of their right to a

hearing and the procedures for obtaining one. Specifically, they assert either the

Notice of Child Support Collections or the payment check stub should include a

statement informing Title IV-D custodial parents of not only their right to an

administrative hearing, but also the procedure for initiating such a hearing.

In response, DHR points to the public availability of Alabama statutes,

administrative rules, and agency policy manuals, which set forth the procedures

for pursuing administrative remedies. According to DHR, the Supreme Court’s

holding in City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234, 119 S. Ct. 678 (1999),

establishes these publicly available sources, standing alone, provide adequate

31
contemporaneous notice of custodial parents’ right to, and the procedures for,

requesting a hearing.

In Grayden, we applied West Covina to a procedural due process claim for

the first time. 345 F.3d at 1238–44. Grayden involved a group of tenants who

claimed the city violated their procedural due process rights when a city code

enforcement officer condemned their apartment complex and evicted them from

their apartments. Id. at 1227. The condemnation notices posted on the tenants’

doors stated they had 36 hours to vacate the premises, but did not inform them of

their right to a hearing or the procedures for requesting one. Id. at 1228.

Although the city argued a city code section provided tenants adequate

contemporaneous notice of their right to a hearing, the tenants asserted the Due

Process Clause entitled them to individualized notice. See id. at 1238.

We began by noting “[f]or one hundred years, the Supreme Court has

declared that a publicly available statute may be sufficient to provide . . . notice

because individuals are presumptively charged with knowledge of such a statute.”

Grayden, 345 F.3d at 1239 (citing Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 509, 23 S. Ct.

390, 392 (1903); N. Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276, 283, 45 S. Ct.

491, 494 (1925); Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 532, 102 S. Ct. 781, 793

(1982); Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 130–31, 105 S. Ct. 2520, 2529–30 (1985)).

32
This century-long line of cases, we asserted, culminated in the Supreme Court’s

acknowledgment in West Covina “that notice of the right to a hearing can be

provided by ‘published, generally available statutes and case law,’ ‘public

sources,’ ‘any publicly available document,’ and ‘documents accessible to the

public.’” See id. at 1241–42 (citing West Covina, 525 U.S. at 241, 242, 119 S. Ct.

at 681, 682). We read West Covina, moreover, as making “clear that . . . the

sophistication of the affected individuals and the health and safety implications of

the deprivation . . . , standing alone, are not sufficient to impose an affirmative

[notice] obligation on [government] officials.” Id. at 1241.16 Based on this

precedent, we determined the city made “a compelling argument that [the city code

section], standing alone, provides contemporaneous notice to the tenants of their

right to challenge the condemnation order and thus satisfies due process.” Id. at

1240.

16
The Arrington Appellants contend the Supreme Court’s holding in Memphis Light,
Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 98 S. Ct. 1554 (1978), requires DHR to provide custodial
parents individualized notice of administrative remedies and procedures. This argument lacks
merit, because the Supreme Court has clarified Memphis Light only mandates individualized
notice when publicly available documents do not describe the administrative procedures at issue.
West Covina, 525 U.S. at 242, 119 S. Ct. at 682 (“While Memphis Light demonstrates that notice
of the procedures for protecting one’s property interests may be required when those procedures
are arcane and not set forth in documents accessible to the public, it does not support a general
rule that notice of remedies and procedures is required.”).

33
 Yet, our analysis did not end there. “[W]hile West Covina repudiates a

general rule that the government always must provide affirmative notice of the

right to and procedures for requesting a hearing, West Covina does not stand for

the converse proposition that statutory notice is always sufficient to satisfy due

process.” Id. at 1244. Accordingly, we held the Mullane standard still required us

to consider whether, in light of all the circumstances, the city code was reasonably

calculated to inform the tenants of their procedural rights. Id. at 1243. In

conducting our Mullane analysis, we recognized “there is no presumption that all

of the citizens actually know all of the law all of the time . . . [and] citizens must

educate themselves about the law before they can wield the rights dedicated to

them under it.” Id. Considering the tenants had less than 36 hours to vacate their

homes, make alternate arrangements for shelter, work, and school, and locate and

read the city code section pertaining to hearings, we held the city code section,

standing alone, was not reasonably calculated under all the circumstances to

inform the tenants of their administrative remedies. Id.

Here, Alabama’s statutes, regulations, and publicly available agency

manuals provide custodial parents notice of their right to a hearing and the

procedures for obtaining one. First, the Alabama Administrative Procedure Act

(AAPA) “provide[s] a minimum procedural code for the operation of all state

34
agencies when they take action affecting the rights and duties of the public.” Ala.

Code § 41-22-2(a) (1975). Among the AAPA’s basic procedural protections is the

guarantee, “[i]n a contested case, that all parties shall be afforded an opportunity

for hearing after reasonable notice in writing.” § 41-22-12(a). As part of the

Alabama Code, the AAPA is publicly available at a variety of locations. See, e.g.,

§ 41-21-1.

Second, the Alabama Department of Human Resources Child Support

Division Administrative Code (the Administrative Code) sets forth the rules and

procedures governing hearings related to DHR’s administration of Title IV-D. See

Ala. Admin. Code r. 660-3-15.01 (2005). The Administrative Code stipulates a

custodial parent’s “request for a hearing must be filed in writing within 30 days

following the action (or inaction) with which he is dissatisfied or 30 days

following the claimant’s learning of said action.” Ala. Admin. Code r. 660-3-

15.02(2). It also sets forth the information custodial parents must provide and the

format they must follow in their written request for a hearing. Ala. Admin. Code

r. 660-3-15.02(3). Under the AAPA, DHR must keep a permanent register of its

administrative rules open to public inspection. Ala. Code § 41-22-6(a). Thus, the

Administrative Code is publicly available.

35
 Third, DHR has adopted a Child Support Policy and Procedures Manual

(CSPPM), which contains a section devoted to educating DHR’s employees about

the agency’s administrative hearing policy. Under Alabama law, the CSMPP is

available to the public. See § 36-12-40 (“Every citizen has a right to inspect and

take a copy of any public writing of th[e] state . . . .”). Similar to the city code

section at issue in Grayden, the relevant provisions of the AAPA, Administrative

Code, and CSPPM combine to notify Title IV-D custodial parents of their right to

a hearing and the procedures for obtaining one.

As in Grayden, however, we cannot end our analysis here. Rather, under

the Mullane standard, we must also consider the adequacy, under all the

circumstances, of this notice. Unlike the tenants in Grayden, Alabama’s custodial

parents have significantly more than 36 hours to locate the relevant public

documents and invoke their right to a hearing. From the time a custodial parent

learns DHR has erroneously deprived her of a child support payment, to the time

her right to a hearing expires, she has 30 days in which to locate and read the

statutes, regulations, and publicly available documents discussed above, and

submit a written request for a hearing. We conclude this one-month window

constitutes a reasonable amount of time under the Mullane standard.

36
 Moreover, DHR offers services to help custodial parents educate themselves

about their right to a hearing and the procedures for requesting one. When DHR

opens a child support case, for example, it sends the custodial parent a document

entitled “A Child Support Client’s Basic Rights.” Among other things, this

document alerts custodial parents to their right “[t]o request a departmental

hearing regarding actions in [their] case.” Custodial parents can also contact the

CSU to learn how to invoke this right if they suffer a deprivation of their child

support payments. Because the CSU’s social workers must provide custodial

parents “[a] written statement concerning the right to appeal, and the methods by

which these rights may be exercised . . . when requested,” Ala. Admin. Code r.

660-3-15.01(3), they can obtain the requisite information directly from DHR

without having to research Alabama’s statutes, regulations, and agency policy

manuals independently.

In summary, custodial parents (1) receive notice of their right to a hearing

upon enrolling in DHR’s child support system; (2) can learn more about this right

by calling the CSU; and (3) have 30 days after learning of a deprivation of their

child support payments in which to locate and read the statutes, regulations, and

public documents pertaining to DHR’s hearing process. Based on these

surrounding circumstances, we hold the relevant provisions of the AAPA,

37
Administrative Code, and CSPPM are reasonably calculated to provide custodial

parents contemporaneous notice of their right to and the procedures for requesting

a hearing. The Arrington Appellants’ procedural due process claim therefore also

fails on this issue, and the district court did not err in granting summary judgment

to DHR.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the district court did not err when it

granted summary judgment to DHR and AOC. When Congress enacted § 657 of

Title IV-D, it did not speak with a clear voice to unambiguously manifest an intent

to create enforceable rights. Pursuant to the precedent set forth in Blessing,

Gonzaga, and 31 Foster Children, Appellants have thus failed as a matter of law

to establish § 657 provides custodial parents individual rights, enforceable under

§ 1983, to distribution of their payments in strict compliance with § 657.

Furthermore, under the standard set forth in Grayden, the Arrington Appellants

have failed as a matter of law to show a violation of their § 1983 procedural due

process rights.

AFFIRMED.

38