Martin v. Miller

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 94-60575
_____________________

CATHLEEN J. MARTIN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

MICHAEL MILLER,

Defendant-Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas
_________________________________________________________________
( September 18, 1995 )

Before GARWOOD, JOLLY, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:

Since the earliest days of our republic, federal law has

afforded a remedy to seamen when payment of their wages is delayed

without sufficient cause. Since 1915, the law has required the

master or owner of the vessel to pay a seaman twice his daily wage

for each day that payment is unjustifiably delayed. In this case,

seaman Cathleen Martin seeks to collect these double wage damages

in the amount of $155,828.88 from the master of the vessel, Michael

Miller, in his individual capacity. This case is complicated by

the fact that the vessel, although operated by a private concern,

is owned by the Maritime Administration ("MarAd"), an agency of the
United States. The district court dismissed this libel in personam

based on its determination that the Clarification Act, 50 U.S.C.

App. § 1291, a World War II-era shipping law that spells out the

rights of seamen employed on government vessels, allows Martin to

enforce her claim only under the Suits in Admiralty Act. The Suits

in Admiralty Act, however, generally protects the master from

individual liability. This appeal requires us to consider the

complex question whether the Suits in Admiralty Act bars this

particular libel as a matter of law. We find the answer to be yes,

and affirm the judgment of the district court.

I

A

We should establish at the outset what this particular libel

is and what it is not. This libel seeks the recovery of double

wages personally from an individual who was the master of a United

States vessel. This libel is not brought against the United

States: the United States has never been a defendant in this

libel, and has not sought to be joined or to intervene. Instead,

the master, Michael Miller, is the only defendant.

The United States appears in this suit, however, on Miller's

behalf, and asserts two reasons for dismissing this libel. First,

it contends, because Martin has not exhausted the administrative

remedies required by the Clarification Act, there is no federal

subject matter jurisdiction over this case. Second, it argues,

this case must be dismissed because, pursuant to the terms of the

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Clarification Act, Martin's sole remedy is a suit against the

United States under the Suits in Admiralty Act. Because the

arguments of the parties thrust the relatively obscure

Clarification Act into the spotlight, we should briefly digress for

a word or two on the Act, and its relation to the Suits in

Admiralty Act, before describing the facts and procedural history

of this case.

B

(1)

Enacted on March 24, 1943, the Clarification Act was a product

of the national wartime mobilization of our maritime resources.

The mobilization has been described on another occasion:

[D]uring most of the Second World War substantially our
entire merchant marine became part of a single vast
shipping pool, said to have been the largest in history,
operated and controlled by the United States through the
War Shipping Administration. So huge an enterprise
necessarily comprehended many intricate and complex
readjustments from normal, peacetime shippping
arrangements.
* * *
Eventually almost every vessel not immediately
belonging to naval and other armed forces came under the
Administration's authority. Otherwise than by direct
construction and ownership, this was accomplished by
transfer from private shipping interests to the
administration, pursuant to requisition or other
arrangement.

Hust v. McCormack Lines, 328 U.S. 707, 710 (1946), overruled by

Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783 (1949)

(footnotes omitted). Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. identified the

factors that prompted what was in effect the nationalization of our

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nation's maritime fleet: "Secrecy, speed, and efficiency of

operation were of paramount importance. Direct governmental

operation of the merchant fleet insured sovereign immunity from

regulation, taxation, and inspection, by other sovereignties both

local and foreign." 337 U.S. at 796-97.

Of course, seamen would be needed to man the vessels, and "the

industry's transfer from private to public control was achieved to

a very great extent by making use not only of private property but

also of private shipping men, both in management and for labor."

Hust, 328 U.S. at 710-11 (footnote omitted). Their status too was

an issue of paramount concern:

At the time of the wartime requisition of the privately
owned merchant fleet the government administrative
agencies gave careful study to the question of whether
the crews were to be employees of the shipping companies
or the United States. There were outstanding many
collective bargaining agreements between the private
shipping companies and the maritime unions. It was
manifestly undesirable to disturb these existing
agreements and for the government to negotiate new ones.
Yet it was essential that the masters and crews be
government employees in order to obviate strikes and work
stoppages, to insure sovereign immunity for the vessels,
and to preserve wartime secrecy by confining all
litigation concerning the operation of the vessels to the
admiralty courts where appropriate security precautions
could be observed.

Cosmopolitan Shipping Co., 337 U.S. at 798-99. To achieve these

ends, it was decided that, although general agents would procure

seamen, they would be hired by the master and subject to his orders

only; the practical consequence was that such seamen would become

employees of the United States, not of the general agent. Id. But

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despite the study and consideration given to the question of the

status of seamen in the employ of the War Shipping Administration,

confusion and uncertainty ensued concerning their rights and

remedies. The Clarification Act was designed to remove the

confusion and uncertainty. See id. at 726 n.32 (quoting the

legislative history of the Act). In relevant part, the

Clarification Act declares that

Officers or members of crews employed on United States or
foreign flag vessels as employees of the United States
through the War Shipping Administration shall, with
respect to (1) laws administered by the Public Health
Service and the Social Security Act . . . (2) deaths,
injuries, illness, maintenance and cure, loss of effects,
detention, or repatriation, or claims arising therefrom
not covered by the foregoing clause (1); and (3)
collection of wages and bonuses and making of allotments
have all of the rights, benefits, exemptions, privileges,
and liabilities, under law applicable to citizens of the
United States employed as seamen on privately owned and
operated vessels.

50 U.S.C. App. 1291(a). (We consider today whether Martin's claim

falls within the class of claims specified in clause (3).)

The Clarification Act also specifies the means by which the

rights of the seamen are to be enforced. In relevant part, the Act

provides that

Claims arising under clause (1) hereof shall be enforced
in the same manner as such claims would be enforced if
the seaman were employed on a privately owned and
operated American vessel. Any claim referred to in
clause (2) or (3) shall, if administratively disallowed
in whole or in part, be enforced pursuant to the
provisions of the Suits in Admiralty Act [46 U.S.C. App.
§ 741 et seq], notwithstanding the vessel on which the

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 seaman is employed is not a merchant vessel within the
meaning of such Act.1

Id. The parties dispute whether Martin's double wage claim is a

wage claim within class (3); if it is, the Clarification Act

requires it to be enforced pursuant to the Suits in Admiralty Act.

A word is therefore in order concerning the Suits in Admiralty Act.

(2)

We have explained that the Suits in Admiralty Act does not

itself provide any substantive rights: instead, it "merely

provides a jurisdictional hook upon which to hang a traditional

admiralty claim" against the United States. Trautman v. Buck

Steber, Inc., 693 F.2d 440, 444 (5th Cir. 1982), quoted in Williams

v. Central Gulf Lines, 874 F.2d 1058, 1059 (5th Cir. 1989). In

other words, the Suits in Admiralty Act waives the sovereign

immunity of the United States. It declares in relevant part that

"[i]n cases where if such vessel were privately owned or

operated . . . or if a private person or property were involved, a

proceeding in admiralty could be maintained, any appropriate

nonjury proceeding in personam may be brought against the United

1
This "notwithstanding" clause was necessary because, when the
Clarification Act was enacted, The Suits in Admiralty Act contained
a proviso limiting its waiver of sovereign immunity only to cases
involving vessels employed as merchant vessels and tugboats. This
proviso was deleted in 1960. The Senate Report accompanying Pub.
L. 86-770, the 1960 amendment, explained that this limitation had
"produced uncertainty and obscurity" and inconsistent results "on
essentially identical facts because of different interpretations of
the same words . . . 'employed' and 'merchant vessel.'" See Sen.
Rep. No. 1894, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3583, 3586.

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States." 46 U.S.C. § 742. In addition, the Act immunizes agents

and employees of the United States from individual liability by

excluding "any other action by reason of the same subject matter"

of a libel in personam that is brought under the Suits in Admiralty

Act, but only "where a remedy is provided by" the Act. 46 U.S.C.

§ 745. Thus, in this case, if Martin's claim is within the

Clarification Act, and a remedy is provided by the Suits in

Admiralty Act, then this libel against Miller is excluded by law

and must be dismissed.

Finally, we should also point out that, although the

legislative history of the Clarification Act is a messy affair, as

is often the case with legislative histories, the Supreme Court has

explained that it

give[s] evidence of concern that rights may have been
lost or rendered uncertain by the transfer [of the
vessels to government control], and that action should be
taken by Congress to preserve the substantive rights
intact and the remedial ones at the least by the
extension of the Suits in Admiralty Act to cover them.
The entire history will be read in vain, however,
for any clear expression of intent to take away rights,
substantive or remedial, of which the seaman had not
already been deprived, actually or possibly, by virtue of
the transfer [of the vessel from private to government
control].

Hust at 733. With this understanding of the statutory setting, we

turn to the facts and proceedings in this case.

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 II

A

MarAd is the successor of the War Shipping Administration,

referred to above in the Clarification Act. MarAd and the United

States Department of Transportation, and therefore the United

States, own the M/V CAPE FLORIDA. The vessel is operated by

International Marine Carriers, Inc., a private concern. Cathleen

Martin, a resident of Mississippi, worked aboard the M/V CAPE

FLORIDA at a daily wage of $113.91. The master of the vessel,

Michael Miller, is a resident of Texas.

During Martin's tour of duty, the M/V CAPE FLORIDA had been

tendered to the United States Military Sealift Command for service

during the Desert Shield and Desert Storm military operations.

Miller states in an affidavit that his "first and only

obligation . . . was to the United States as vessel owner," that

all of his voyage orders came from the United States through MarAd,

the Department of Defense, or the Military Sealift Command, and

that he was subject to federal criminal penalties if he failed to

obey any lawful order issued by the United States.

Martin completed her tour of duty and signed off the vessel on

December 1, 1990. When Martin signed off, Miller paid her $740 of

the $1540 she was owed as wages. Payment of the remaining $800 was

delayed for 684 days, until October 16, 1992, without explanation.

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 B

As stated earlier, federal law has long permitted seamen to

make a claim for damages when the payment of their wages has been

delayed without cause.2 In an effort to recover damages assertedly

due to her on this claim, Martin filed two libels in personam in

the federal district courts of this Circuit. The first libel,

filed in the Southern District of Mississippi (the "Mississippi

libel"), named as defendants the United States, the Department of

Transportation, MarAd, and Michael Miller, individually, as the

master of the vessel. The second libel, filed in the Southern

District of Texas (the "Texas libel"), named only Miller as a

defendant. This appeal is from the Texas district court's

dismissal of her libel.

2
See Act of June 7, 1872, ch. 322, § 35, 17 Stat. 269 (a
"master or owner who neglects or refuses to make payment . . .
without sufficient cause shall pay to the seaman a sum not
exceeding the amount of two days' pay for each of the days, not
exceeding ten days, during which the payment is delayed . . . which
sum shall be recoverable as wages in any claim made before the
court"); Act of Dec. 21, 1898, ch. 28, § 4, 30 Stat. 756 (removing
the ten-day limitation and dropping the increment to one day's
wages, thus, effectively requiring the master or owner to pay the
seaman his regular wage for each day of unjustified delay);
Seamen's Act of 1915, ch. 153, § 3, 38 Stat. 1164 (increasing the
increment to double wages). In the 1983 partial revision of Title
46, this obligation was amended to declare that "the master or
owner shall pay to the seaman 2 days' wages for each day payment is
delayed" and has been recodified at 46 U.S.C. § 10313(g)
(applicable to vessels of the United States on voyages between the
United States and foreign ports other than ports in Mexico, Canada,
or the West Indies, or between ports on the Atlantic coast and the
Pacific coast of the United States) and 46 U.S.C. § 10504(c)
(applicable to vessels of the United States on voyages between
ports of the United States that are not covered by § 10313(g)).

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 While this libel was pending, the Mississippi district court

dismissed the Mississippi libel with respect to all of the

defendants except Miller. The dismissal of the claims against the

Department and MarAd was by agreement and with prejudice. The

claim against the United States was dismissed based upon

deficiencies in the service of process; this dismissal was without

prejudice. Finally, the court did not dismiss the claim against

Miller, but ordered Martin to show within ten days that the service

of process was sufficient as against Miller.

The record before us does not indicate what additional action,

if any, was taken on the Mississippi libel. Martin's counsel

stated at oral argument that he did not appeal the dismissal, but

instead treated this pending Texas libel as a "refiling" of the

Mississippi libel.

This Texas libel before us today, which named only Miller as

a defendant, was dismissed with prejudice on August 1, 1994. The

district court determined that the Suits in Admiralty "provided a

remedy," within the meaning of 46 U.S.C. § 745, and thus a libel

against the United States was exclusive of any other action. As a

consequence, the district court dismissed Martin's libel against

Miller. The district court expressed no opinion on whether double

wages are recoverable against the United States. From the order

dismissing the Texas libel, this appeal followed.

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 II

As a member of the crew of a United States vessel employed

through MarAd as an employee of the United States, Martin is

plainly a seaman within the Clarification Act.3 As explained

above, the United States argues that this libel must be dismissed

because (A) Martin did not exhaust the administrative remedies

3
Martin raises two arguments in dispute of this fact. First,
she argues, she is not covered by the Clarification Act because her
service was not of a temporary wartime character of employment.
This argument must be based on the sentence of the Clarification
Act that declares that seamen such as she, who work for MarAd,
"because of the temporary wartime character of their employment by
the War Shipping Administration, shall not be considered as
officers or employees of the United States for the purposes of"
certain federal statutes that are not relevant here. 50 U.S.C.
App. § 1291(a) (emphasis added). This sentence of the Act simply
states that the seamen that are covered by the Clarification Act
are not considered officers or employees of the United States for
the purposes of certain other federal statutes because their
government service is temporary; it does not limit the application
of the Clarification Act. See also Doyle v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
504 F.2d 911, 912-13 (5th Cir. 1974) (rejecting a similar
argument).
Second, Martin argues that she is not covered by the
Clarification Act because she was employed by International Marine
Carriers, Inc., the private operator, not MarAd or the United
States. The form of the employer-employee relationship is not
dispositive, however, of the question whether she is a seaman
within the terms of the Clarification Act. See id. at 913-14;
River & Offshore Servs. Co., Inc. v. United States, 651 F.Supp.
276, 278 (E.D.La. 1987) (recognizing that a "long line of cases
establishes that a contract operator of a naval vessel . . . is an
agent of the United States for purposes of [the Suits in Admiralty
Act]"). Moreover, Martin's libel alleged that the vessel was
operated by MarAd and the "U.S. Navy, Military Sealift Command
and/or International Marine Carriers, Inc." An affidavit by the
procuring contract officer stated that the contract between
International Marine Carriers and MarAd provided that it was to
man, equip, and maintain the vessel subject to the master's
complete authority. In short, International Marine Carriers and
Miller are agents of the United States and Martin is a seaman
within the terms of the Clarification Act.

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provided by the Clarification Act, and (B) the exclusivity

provision of the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. § 745, bars this

libel against Miller. We consider these matters in order.

A

The United States argues first that this libel must be

dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Martin

did not exhaust her administrative remedies. The position of the

United States is that federal subject matter jurisdiction over this

libel against Miller exists, if at all, by virtue of the

Clarification Act and the waiver of sovereign immunity contained in

the Suits in Admiralty Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 1291 and 46 U.S.C. §

742, respectively. Because the Clarification Act contains an

administrative exhaustion requirement, and because the

administrative exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional, the United

States argues, Martin must present her claim to MarAd as a

prerequisite to maintaining this libel. Because she has not

presented her claim to MarAd, the United States argues, we lack

subject matter jurisdiction over this case.

We do not agree. Although we have recognized that claims

against the United States must be dismissed if administrative

remedies have not been exhausted, Fox v. Alcoa S.S. Co., 143 F.2d

667 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 788 (1944), it is clear

that the administrative exhaustion requirement is applicable only

to suits against the United States. As we have explained, Martin

makes no claim against the United States in this libel. Martin

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alleged in her pleading that we have federal subject matter

jurisdiction by virtue of diversity of citizenship of the parties,

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), or under our admiralty jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). We are satisfied that this case falls within

either provision. It is clearly within our admiralty jurisdiction.

Moreover, the matter in controversy exceeds $50,000, Martin is a

citizen of Mississippi, and Miller is a citizen of Texas. The

diversity jurisdiction statute requires no more. § 1332(a)(1). We

hold, therefore, that we have subject matter jurisdiction over this

libel notwithstanding the fact that Martin did not present her

claim to MarAd.

B

(1)

Next, the United States argues that this libel must be

dismissed as barred by the Suits in Admiralty Act. As we have

earlier noted, the Suits in Admiralty Act is made applicable to the

claims of MarAd seamen by the Clarification Act. The Suits in

Admiralty Act generally immunizes the master of a government

vessel, such as Miller, in his individual capacity: a proviso

states that

where a remedy is provided by [the Suits in Admiralty
Act] it shall hereafter be exclusive of any other action
by reason of the same subject matter against the agent or
employee of the United States or of any incorporated or
unincorporated agency thereof whose act or omission gave
rise to the claim.

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46 U.S.C. § 745. The United States argues that a "remedy is

provided" and that, as a consequence, this proviso requires

dismissal of this libel.

In Martin's view, the Clarification Act does not make her

claim subject to the Suits in Admiralty Act; this proviso therefore

does not apply. Her position is that the Clarification Act applies

only to the claims listed therein and does not apply to other

claims that are not specifically listed. Martin urges that her

claim is not within the Clarification Act; as a consequence, she

argues, the Suits in Admiralty Act and its exclusivity proviso have

no application.

The United States characterizes Martin's claim as a wage claim

that, as such, is within the Clarification Act's allowance of

claims for "collection of wages, bonuses and making of allotments,"

to be enforced under the Suits in Admiralty Act. Martin insists,

however, that her claim is not a claim for "collection of wages,"

arguing that she has already collected her wages. Instead of

seeking wages, Martin argues, she is seeking damages for the

unjustified delay in paying her wages. Because the Clarification

Act does not "specifically specify" such an allowable claim, the

Suits in Admiralty Act is not the mechanism for the enforcement of

her claim, and its exclusivity proviso does not apply and cannot

bar her claim; as a consequence, she argues, this particular libel

may proceed against the master individually under general maritime

law.

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 We do not agree that Martin's claim is outside the

Clarification Act. As an initial matter, we must point out that

the statute requires the master or owner to pay "2 days' wages" for

each day payment is delayed. 46 U.S.C. §§ 10313(g), 10504(c).

Even if Martin's claim bears other characteristics, it is

statutorily described as a claim for wages, and thus easily falls

within the Clarification Act. To be sure, when the Clarification

Act was enacted, the double wage provision (codified at 46 U.S.C.

§ 596) declared in relevant part that "Every master or owner who

refuses or neglects to make payment . . . without sufficient cause

shall pay to the seaman a sum equal to two days' pay for each and

every day during which payment is delayed . . ., which sum shall be

recoverable as wages in any claim made before the court."

(Emphasis supplied). Thus, the 1983 partial revision of Title 46

merely shortened the statute without changing the character of the

remedy Martin seeks: it is now "2 days' wages," instead of the

prior "sum equal to two days' pay . . . which sum shall be

recoverable as wages." See note 2.

In any event, however, we simply cannot accept Martin's view

that the Clarification Act is something less than a comprehensive

definition of her rights and remedies as a seaman. The language

and legislative history of the Clarification Act, as explained

above, make clear that the import of the Clarification Act was to

ensure that seamen such as Martin would enjoy the same rights as

other seamen. Indeed, the very purpose of the Clarification Act

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was to define the rights that had been called into question. The

Clarification Act comprehensively defines Martin's rights as a

MarAd seaman, and those rights are coextensive with the rights of

seamen aboard private vessels. By the terms of the Clarification

Act, she has "all of the rights, benefits, exemptions, privileges,

and liabilities, under law applicable to citizens of the United

States employed as seamen on privately owned and operated vessels."

50 U.S.C. App. §1291(a). Seen in this light, it is clear that the

Clarification Act grants Martin and other MarAd seamen the right to

pursue this claim. We hold, therefore, that Martin's claim for

double wages is within the Clarification Act.

In the light of this conclusion, it is clear from the terms of

the Clarification Act that Martin's claim must "be enforced

pursuant to the provisions of the Suits in Admiralty Act [46 U.S.C.

§ 741 et seq]." §1291(a). To determine whether this libel must be

dismissed, we turn to the Suits in Admiralty Act.

(2)

Under our cases, a "remedy is provided" within the meaning of

§ 745, and this libel must be dismissed if, one, the underlying

maritime law would permit the seaman to state the same claim

against a private party, and two, the United States has waived its

sovereign immunity with respect to that claim. Williams v. Central

Gulf Lines, 874 F.2d 1058, 1061 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493

U.S. 1045 (1990).

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 Thus, the initial question is whether Martin has a claim under

applicable maritime law against a private person in the position of

the United States. Martin's libel is, we have explained, a claim

by a seaman arising from the failure timely to pay her wages.

Under 46 U.S.C. §§ 10313(g) and 10504(c), when payment is delayed

without justification, "the master or owner shall pay to the seaman

2 days wages for each day payment is delayed." The United States

is the owner. The applicable maritime law thus would permit Martin

to state a claim for relief against a private person in the

position of the United States.

Second, we must consider whether the United States has waived

its sovereign immunity with respect to a double wage claim.

Reference to 46 U.S.C. § 742, the Act's waiver of sovereign

immunity, supplies the answer. It provides, as explained earlier,

that "if such vessel were privately owned or operated . . . or if

a private person or property were involved . . . a proceeding in

admiralty could be maintained, any appropriate nonjury proceeding

in personam may be brought against the United States." Clearly,

Martin's double wage claim is within this broad waiver of sovereign

immunity. We find, therefore, that Martin has a traditional claim

under admiralty law, and the United States has waived its sovereign

immunity with respect to a suit on her claim. Accordingly, we

conclude that the exclusivity proviso of the Suits in Admiralty Act

excludes this libel against Miller. Instead, Martin's remedy lies

in a libel in personam brought against the United States, in

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accordance with the Clarification Act and the Suits in Admiralty

Act.4

4
Of course, to say that Martin's remedy lies in a libel in
personam against the United States is not to say that the remedy is
to be the same, or that the damages are to be the same, as in a
comparable suit against a private party. It is well understood
that sovereign immunity protects the United States from suit.
E.g., F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 114 S.Ct. 996 (1994). The question
whether the United States has consented to suit is distinct from
the question whether the United States has rendered itself amenable
to a particular remedy. Compare, in the context of the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (waiving sovereign immunity)
with 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (declaring that the liability of the United
States is to be the same as the liability of an individual in like
circumstances, but that it "shall not be liable for interest prior
to judgment or punitive damages"). This case does not require us
to consider the question of remedy; we therefore leave it for
another day.
Acknowledging that the question is not before us, we should
observe that we have been unable to locate controlling authority
for the proposition that the United States cannot be held liable
for double wages. The Supreme Court once issued a writ of
certiorari in a pre-Clarification Act case to take up the questions
whether "(a) the provision for the recovery of double wages is
compensatory and not for the imposition of a penalty; and (b) even
though a penalty, it is one for which the government is liable by
virtue of the provisions of the Suits in Admiralty Act," but then
declined to decide these questions. McCrea v. United States, 294
U.S. 23, 25 (1935). The Court's characterization of the double
wage provision in subsequent cases does not resolve the issue.
Compare Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 572
(1982) (explaining that the provision "is not exclusively
compensatory" and that "although the sure purpose of the statute is
remedial, Congress has chosen to secure that purpose through the
use of potentially punitive sanctions designed to deter negligent
or arbitrary delays in payment" (emphasis added)) with Brooklyn
Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 n.20 (1945) (pointing to
the double wage provision as an example of a statutory remedy that
is "not penal in nature but constitutes compensation for the
retention of a workman's pay which might result in damages too
obscure and difficult of proof for estimate other than by
liquidated damages.") Nor does the evolution of this double wage
provision set forth in footnote 2 provide a clear answer.
Finally, we might further observe that whereas the Federal
Tort Claims Act, specifically declared that the United States will
not be liable for punitive damages, see 28 U.S.C. § 2674, the Suits

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 III

To sum up: we hold that the Clarification Act specifies that

Martin's claim must be enforced pursuant to the Suits in Admiralty

Act. Applying the two-part Williams test, we conclude that the

Suits in Admiralty Act provides a remedy for Martin's double wage

claim. Consequently, § 745 bars this libel against Miller. The

judgment of the district court dismissing this libel is

A F F I R M E D.

in Admiralty Act does not contain any similar reference to punitive
damages. Instead, it declares only that "[a]ny final judgment
rendered in an suit herein authorized . . . shall, upon the
presentation of a duly authenticated copy thereof, be paid." 46
U.S.C. § 748. On the other hand, we have previously construed the
waiver of sovereign immunity contained in the Suits in Admiralty
Act as a maritime analog of the waiver contained in the Federal
Tort Claims Act. E.g., Wiggins v. United States through Dep't of
the Army, 799 F.2d 962, 964-966 (implying the discretionary
function exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act into the Suits in
Admiralty Act).
It bears emphasis that we do not decide whether the Suits in
Admiralty Act and the Clarification Act make the United States
amenable to double wages. Instead, we merely observe that we are
not certain that Martin could not recover double wage damages in a
libel in personam brought against the United States pursuant to the
Clarification Act and the Suits in Admiralty Act.

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