[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-12515 MARCH 16, 2007
________________________ THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 99-01117-CV-J-32-MMH
WILLIE MATHEWS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JAMES V. CROSBY, JR.,
TIM GIEBEIG,
SGT. HALL,
SGT. CROCKETT,
C.O. YOUNG, in their individual capacities,
et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
C.O. DOBSON, et al.,
Defendants.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(March 16, 2007)
Before TJOFLAT, BARKETT, and GOODWIN,* Circuit Judges.
BARKETT, Circuit Judge:
Willie Mathews appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of James
V. Crosby, former warden at Florida State Prison (“FSP”),1 and Tim Giebeig,
former inspector at FSP, on the grounds that they were immune from suit on the
basis of qualified immunity. Mathews also appeals the district court’s order
granting costs and the amount of those costs to Crosby, Giebeig, and other FSP
employees who were voluntarily dismissed before trial.2
While Crosby was the warden of FSP, Mathews was transferred to FSP and
housed on X-wing, where inmates with the most serious disciplinary problems
were assigned. Mathews sued Crosby, Giebeig, and several other FSP employees,
alleging, inter alia, that they violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
by subjecting him to a series of attacks in which excessive and unjustified force
was used, resulting in serious injury, including a broken jaw. Mathews alleged that
prison guards repeatedly beat him, and that Crosby knew about the general
*
Honorable Alfred T. Goodwin, United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, sitting
by designation.
1
FSP is a Florida state maximum security facility.
2
Specifically, Mathews appeals the following cost judgments: $11,333.00 to Crosby and
Giebeig; $4,619.40 to James Poston; $6,780.29 to Timothy Thornton, Sgt. Sauls, C.O. Beck, and
Charles Brown; and $10,448.59 to Sgt. Hall, C.O. Riner, C.O. Dent, Sgt. Davidson, C.O. Young,
Sgt. Crockett, and Steve Dobbs.
2
propensity for violence against inmates at FSP – especially by certain corrections
officers who were involved in the beatings of Mathews – but that Crosby was
deliberately indifferent to the risk of abuse and deliberately indifferent to
Mathews’ serious medical needs. Crosby and Giebeig moved for summary
judgment, and the district court granted it, finding they could not be held liable for
their acts as supervisory officials. For the following reasons, we reverse the
district court’s order granting summary judgment to Crosby, affirm the district
court’s order granting summary judgement to Giebeig,3 affirm the district court’s
order granting costs to all defendants, except Crosby and Giebeig, and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo a district court’s ruling on summary judgment, applying
the same legal standards as the district court. Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295,
1299 (11th Cir. 2002). Summary judgment is appropriate only when the evidence
before the court demonstrates that “there is no genuine issue of material fact and
3
Mathews’ brief fails to set forth any arguments as to how, if at all, the district court
erred by granting summary judgment to Giebeig. Mathews names Giebeig in two point
headings, but does not direct any of his argument to Giebeig, and only a peripheral part of his
factual analysis to Giebeig. Accordingly, we find that he has waived his claims on appeal
against Giebeig. See Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1573 n. 6 (11th Cir.
1989) (stating that passing references to issues are insufficient to raise a claim for appeal, and
such issues are deemed abandoned (citing Tedder v. F.M.C. Corp., 590 F.2d 115, 117 (5th Cir.
1979); Davis v. Hill Engineering, Inc., 549 F.2d 314, 324 (5th Cir. 1977))).
3
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c). The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party. Skrtich, 280 F.3d at 1299 (citing Augusta Iron and Steel Works, Inc. v.
Employers Ins. of Wausau, 835 F.2d 855, 856 (11th Cir. 1988)). That is, courts
must construe the facts and draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and “when conflicts arise between the facts evidenced by the
parties, we credit the nonmoving party’s version.” Evans v. Stephens, 407 F.3d
1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 2005) (emphasis omitted). Even though the “‘facts,’ as
accepted at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings, may not be the
‘actual’ facts of the case,” Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 925 n.3
(11th Cir. 2000), our analysis for purposes of summary judgment must begin with
a description of the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Skrtich, 280
F.3d at 1299.
DISCUSSION
As we have often stated, “[q]ualified immunity offers complete protection
for government officials sued in their individual capacities as long as their conduct
violates no clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1193-94
(11th Cir. 2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In order to
4
receive the protection of qualified immunity, the government official must first
prove that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the
allegedly wrongful acts occurred. Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1248
(11th Cir. 2004) (citing Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir.
2002)).4
Once eligibility for qualified immunity is established, the burden shifts to
the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate. Lee, 284 F.3d at
1194. This step consists of a two-part inquiry, set forth in Saucier v. Katz, 533
U.S. 194 (2001). First, we ask, “do the facts alleged show the government
official’s conduct violated a constitutional right?” Id. at 201. If a constitutional
violation is established, based on the facts in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, we then must determine whether such conduct would have violated
federal law that was clearly established at the time of the incident. Garrett v.
Athens-Clarke County, 378 F.3d 1274, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Saucier,
533 U.S. at 201-02).
I. Constitutional Claims
We first address the question of whether Crosby violated Mathews’ Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. “The
4
There is no question in this case that Crosby was acting within the scope of his
discretionary authority as warden of FSP.
5
Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit
inhumane ones, and it is now settled that the treatment a prisoner receives in prison
and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the
Eighth Amendment.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (citations and
quotation marks omitted). “In its prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’
the Eighth Amendment places restraints on prison officials, who may not, for
example, use excessive physical force against prisoners.” Id. “Being violently
assaulted in prison is simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for
their offenses against society.” Id. at 833 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
We have held that supervisors can be held liable for subordinates’
constitutional violations on the basis of supervisory liability under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003). Supervisory
liability under § 1983 occurs “when the supervisor personally participates in the
alleged constitutional violation or when there is a causal connection between the
actions of the supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Id.
The question before us on appeal is whether there was a causal connection between
Crosby’s actions or inaction and the beatings suffered by Mathews.
A causal connection may be established when: 1) a “history of widespread
abuse” puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged
6
deprivation, and he or she fails to do so; 2) a supervisor’s custom or policy results
in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights; or 3) facts support an inference
that the supervisor directed subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that
subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so. Cottone
v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003).
Therefore, we next examine whether the district court erred in concluding
that insufficient facts were presented to support liability against Crosby through a
causal connection between his actions and the alleged constitutional deprivation
committed by Crosby’s subordinates.
A.
The facts, construed in the light most favorable to Mathews, the nonmoving
party, are as follows. Willie Mathews arrived at FSP on July 4, 1999, along with
four other inmates from Hamilton Correctional Institution following an incident in
which they were accused of assaulting two correctional officers. At FSP, Mathews
was placed in isolation on X-wing. On or about July 4, 5, and 10, Mathews claims
he was beaten by corrections officers because of the incident at Hamilton. He
claims that on or about July 12, 1999, his mother called warden Crosby to inform
him that she had received a letter from an officer working at the prison, stating that
her son was in danger and was being abused by prison guards. The same day,
7
Mathews was visited by Giebeig, the on-site inspector at FSP. Mathews told
Giebeig that he had been repeatedly beaten. Mathews was seen by a doctor, but no
other action was taken to protect Mathews from further beatings or to determine
the validity of the allegations.
Giebeig testified that he “had conversations with [Crosby] every day on
everything going on at FSP” and that therefore the inspector was “almost positive”
that by July 13, 1999, Crosby was aware of Mathews’ allegations that he was being
repeatedly attacked. The inspector later testified that he was “sure somewhere
between the 13th and the . . . 16th” of July 1999, he “spoke with [Crosby] . . .
concerning the Mathews allegations.”
On July 15, 1999, Mathews filed an emergency grievance stating that he was
in fear for his life and was suffering from an untreated broken jaw following
repeated assaults by prison guards on X-wing. Mathews urged authorities to send
someone to remove him from X-wing “before [he is] killed.” By July 16, 1999,
Giebeig was advised by dental staff that Mathews had a fractured jaw. Giebeig
claims he reported this information to the acting warden, A.D. Thornton. FSP had
procedures which required officers to document any use of force against inmates
on an official use of force form. Copies of the use of force forms were forwarded
to the warden. No use of force forms were completed in this case to explain the
8
cause of Mathews’ injury.
On July 17, 1999, another inmate, Frank Valdes, housed on X-wing, was
repeatedly beaten and killed by several officers, including Timothy Thornton, one
of the defendants in this case.5 Only after that incident was Mathews transferred
from FSP and surgery was performed on his fractured jaw. Based on these facts,
we are satisfied that a jury could find that guards at FSP committed a constitutional
violation and thus, we turn to the issue of whether Crosby can be held liable as a
supervisor for that constitutional violation.
B.
Construed in the light most favorable to Mathews, the nonmoving party, the
facts pertaining to whether Crosby was put on notice by a history of widespread
abuse at FSP, or whether he had established customs or policies resulting in
deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s constitutional rights, reflect the following.6
Crosby was preceded as warden of FSP by Ron McAndrew.7 Warden McAndrew
testified that when Crosby succeeded him as FSP warden, the two had several
5
See Valdes v. Crosby, No. 05-13065, ___ F.3d ___ (11th Cir. 2006).
6
We repeat many of the factual allegations set forth in Valdes, No. 05-13065, ___ F.3d
___, as the depositions we rely on in this case were also submitted in Valdes.
7
McAndrew testified that he had over twenty years of experience as an officer, sergeant,
lieutenant, investigatory, deputy warden, and warden of another Florida state facility before
becoming warden of FSP.
9
phone conversations (Crosby declined McAndrew’s invitation to meet in person).
In those conversations, McAndrew specifically warned Crosby about certain
guards, who McAndrew believed were abusive toward inmates and needed to be
kept out of high profile areas, such as X-wing, because “[t]hey were out of hand
and [McAndrew] was afraid they would kill an inmate.” McAndrew also taped a
list of these guards to the center drawer of the warden’s desk.
One of the guards that McAndrew testified he specifically warned Crosby
about was Timothy Thornton, one of the defendant officers in this case accused of
overseeing at least one of the beatings suffered by Mathews. When McAndrew left
FSP in February 1998, Timothy Thornton had recently been one of the guards
involved when a prisoner was extracted from his cell in X-wing and beaten so
severely that the prisoner had to be “airlifted by helicopter to a hospital, where he
remained for nine days and was treated for extensive injuries and spent several
months recuperating.” Skrtich, 280 F.3d at 1300. The inmate’s injuries from that
incident included “(1) left chest trauma with multiple fractures to the left ribs and
left hemopneumothorax, (2) back injury with fractured multiple transverse
processes, (3) right scalp laceration, (4) left shoulder and right knee injury, (5)
abdominal trauma, and (6) post trauma anemia” Id. The inmate’s chest “revealed
the presence of an extensive amount of injuries with multiple abrasions and
10
contusions and several markings of shoes on his back and left chest,” which
markings a doctor found “were probably made from a stomping motion as opposed
to merely holding [the inmate] down,” “consistent with physical abuse.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).8
McAndrew further testified that he moved Thornton off of X-wing and away
from areas where he thought Thornton would have opportunities to abuse inmates.
McAndrew testified that shortly after he became warden he wanted to terminate
Thornton. McAndrew described Thornton as “an extremely dangerous person. . . .
[T]his guy’s a walking hand grenade . . . and the pin’s pulled.” McAndrew
specifically told Crosby “this guy is dangerous. . . . You need to get him off the
payroll.” However, McAndrew only reprimanded Thornton based in part on the
advice of two of his subordinates, who advised McAndrew that Crosby (who at the
time was the state corrections department Director of Security and Institutional
Management), had called them to intervene on Thornton’s behalf to ask that he be
given every possible consideration. Deputy Warden A.D. Thornton, no relation to
Timothy Thornton, similarly testified that both he and McAndrew had concerns
about Timothy Thornton. Notwithstanding McAndrew’s briefing on Thornton,
after Crosby became the FSP warden, Timothy Thornton was promoted to Captain,
8
In Skrtich, we held that the officer defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity
for the alleged beating of Skrtich. Skrtich, 280 F.3d 1295.
11
was permitted to work on X-wing, and was personally selected by Crosby to
receive preferential staff housing. In his deposition, McAndrew summarized
Crosby’s approach to Thornton as “[Crosby was] told he has a potential killer on
his hands and he promotes the guy from lieutenant to captain.”
McAndrew further testified that he asked Crosby to sit with him for a “desk
audit” to review all issues and problems McAndrew was passing on to Crosby. He
wanted to have the “desk audit” with Crosby because FSP “had a notorious
reputation for the beating of inmates” and McAndrew was attempting to address
the problem. Crosby, however, said he did not have time or was not interested in
meeting for the “desk audit.”
A.D. Thornton also testified that Crosby was instrumental in bringing
Montrez Lucas to FSP from another correctional institution where he had worked
with Crosby. Lucas had been disciplined before being brought to FSP by Crosby.
Lucas bragged about how he had been suspended for using excessive force against
an inmate but had not been terminated for it. In addition, shortly after Mathews
was beaten, Lucas was investigated for teaching correctional officer trainees
improper practices in June 1999, prior to the Mathews beating. The Department of
Corrections investigation report stated that Lucas taught the following techniques:
taking “free shots” at inmates while they were handcuffed, using chemical agents
12
on inmates without the required notice and even after inmates became compliant,
reviewing medical reports before completing use-of-force forms to ensure
conformity between the two, instructing trainees about which areas of the human
body could be kicked without leaving bootprints, and bringing inmates to the
medical ward for treatment of minor injuries and then beating the inmates severely
after they had been returned to their cells.
McAndrew stated that while he was warden he hired an “assistant warden
who was aggressively helping fight the excessive use of force in the prison.”
McAndrew specifically hired this assistant warden because he believed the
assistant warden could be trusted and would actively pursue McAndrew’s goals of
reducing inmate abuse. When Crosby became warden, he “transfer[red] her out to
another prison.”
Additionally, evidence was presented that FSP, like most facilities, had
procedures for extracting inmates from their cells when they refused to submit to
being restrained by handcuffs and leg irons. On X-wing, cell extractions consisted
of four or five officers using the physical force necessary to restrain and remove an
inmate from his cell. Cell extractions and any other use of force were to be
documented by prison officials. Copies of the use-of-force forms were forwarded
to the warden.
13
Prior wardens at FSP required officials to videotape cell extractions.
Warden McAndrew testified that his predecessor at FSP suggested videotaping cell
extractions as a method to cut down on problems during uses of force. McAndrew
testified that FSP had a “notorious reputation” as an institution where guards beat
the inmates, and he continued videotaping because he felt staff were more likely to
act professionally and inmates were less likely to resist the commands of the
guards when they knew they were being videotaped. When Crosby became
warden, however, he discontinued the practice of videotaping cell extractions.
Viewing all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to Mathews, it could be
inferred that Crosby’s action in discontinuing the use of the cameras once he
became warden, despite knowledge that specific FSP officers were suspected of
unwarranted assaults upon inmates, sent a message to corrections officers that the
administration at FSP was going to permit further abuse of inmates.9
Reverend Andrew MacRae, an FSP prison chaplain from 1994 until August
1999, testified about the marked difference in the culture at FSP after Crosby
became the warden. MacRae testified that although he never witnessed an inmate
being physically abused during any warden’s administration, Crosby had a more
9
In a March 25, 1999, meeting of FSP supervisory personnel allegedly attended by
Crosby, there was a discussion about the frequency with which certain officers were being
accused of abusing inmates and what steps might be taken to remedy the situation.
14
“hands-off” approach than prior wardens had, thus permitting the “good old boys”
network of guards to mistreat inmates. MacRae testified that after Crosby became
warden, there were occasions when MacRae was prevented from seeing inmates
following uses of force – which previously had been a time that he would often
offer counsel to those inmates. MacRae was also familiar with the practice of
“touching up” an inmate, wherein an inmate would be subjected to minor injuries
during an apparently justifiable use of force and then, following corroboration of
the injuries by the medical facility, the inmate would be returned to X-wing and
beaten. MacRae testified that he believed these instances increased during
Crosby’s tenure because of Crosby’s hands-off approach.
Evidence was also provided regarding the manner in which Crosby handled
abuse-of-force complaints from inmates. FSP’s procedures relating to prisoners’
abuse-of-force complaints required inmates to report an accusation on a grievance
form that would then be forwarded to the Inspector General’s central office via an
on-site prison inspector’s report. The central office would review the reports and
respond to the on-site prison inspector regarding what further action, if any, should
be taken by the inspector. Copies of the inspector’s report to the central office and
copies of the central office’s response would be forwarded to the warden. The
central office also would receive inquiries about prison conditions from persons
15
outside the prison, such as an inmate’s family or government officials whom an
inmate or his family may have contacted. Copies of the documentation of such
inquiries and directions about what action would be taken were also forwarded to
the warden.
Evidence was submitted that despite having the abuse-of-force complaints
and use-of-force forms forwarded to him, Crosby did not read them. Rather,
Crosby delegated the responsibility of handling the complaints to his secretary,
who had no law enforcement background. In his deposition, McAndrew stated that
he had “reasons” to believe that the secretary was obstructing inmate abuse
investigations. McAndrew told Crosby about his concerns relating to the secretary.
Nonetheless, Crosby delegated the responsibility for reviewing and acting on
inmate complaints to the secretary. Nearly all of the inmate-related
correspondence set forth below regarding alleged abuse contained notations of an
“r” next to Crosby’s initials, which Crosby testified indicated that his secretary
may have handled the matter without him becoming involved or having specific
knowledge of the complaints or the secretary’s responses.
Included in the numerous complaints and inquiries sent to Crosby between
December 1998 and July 1999 were a reference to an inmate’s complaint that he
was “being maliciously harassed and threatened by staff” who “threatened to kill”
16
the inmate and that his efforts to remedy the issue at the institutional level had been
“to no avail”; an inmate’s complaint that officers were falsifying disciplinary
reports against him as a means to keep him in close management confinement; a
complaint from an inmate’s spouse stating that FSP staff had locked her husband in
a stripped cell, were depriving him of food and were “threatening to physically
abuse” him; an inmate’s letter “concerning drug dealing and physical abuse by
staff” which also notes that the Department of Corrections agreed to take steps to
ensure that the inmate’s safety would not be jeopardized because of his testimony
as a witness; an inquiry on behalf of an inmate’s family members who were
“concerned about the inmate’s safety since they allege he was beaten by [a sergeant
and] was taken to the hospital for sustained injuries” and had not had contact with
him since; an inmate who wrote “alleging fear for [his] life and wishing to file a
complaint against four officers” he stated were “trying to kill [him]”; a letter from
another inmate who complained of being “harassed and threatened by both staff
and other inmates” as a result of his status “as a witness for the State Attorney’s
Office”; an inquiry on behalf of an inmate who feared for his safety at FSP because
he had murdered a corrections officer at another Florida correctional institute more
than 15 years earlier; a letter from a death row inmate to the Florida Department of
Law Enforcement, asking it to investigate his claims that supervisory staff at FSP
17
failed to investigate allegations that prison officials assigned to death row
permitted a violent inmate to be out of his cell without restraints so that he could
threaten and intimidate other inmates; letters from several different inmates
claiming that corrections officers had threatened to kill them; and a letter on behalf
of an inmate discussing allegedly criminal acts committed by various guards, and
questioning the need for officers to continue to use force against an inmate once he
had already been restrained by handcuffs and shackles.
Mathews produced evidence from which a jury could find that Crosby
received copies of all the complaints referenced above concerning the abuse of
inmates by guards at FSP, including allegations of abuse of Mathews.
Furthermore, Crosby had been specifically warned by his predecessor about certain
guards whose abuse of inmates was so severe that the prior warden felt one of them
might kill an inmate if not stopped. Crosby, however, did not take steps to
neutralize those guards and on at least one occasion sought to give one of the
guards preferential treatment in housing. Mathews also presented evidence that
Crosby had a reputation for being a “hands-off” warden; regularly delegated
responsibility for his office’s grievance response management to his secretary; and
failed to keep guards with known records of alleged abuse away from assignments
near at-risk inmates, such as those on X-wing.
18
This evidence, when taken together, is more than adequate to entitle
Mathews to proceed to trial and show that inmate abuse at the hands of guards was
not an isolated occurrence, but rather occurred with sufficient regularity as to
demonstrate a history of widespread abuse at FSP. The facts presented, if found by
a jury, sufficiently support a conclusion that Crosby knew of the widespread abuse
and was “on notice of the need to correct or to stop” abuse by officers. Cottone,
326 F.3d at 1362.
The same evidence, again taken together and in the light most favorable to
Mathews, is sufficient to allow a jury to consider whether Crosby had established
customs and policies that resulted in deliberate indifference to constitutional
violations and whether Crosby failed to take reasonable measures to correct the
alleged deprivations. Id. at 1360; see Smith v. Brenoettsy, 158 F.3d 908, 912-13
(5th Cir. 1998) (dismissing warden’s appeal of denial of summary judgment in
light of factual disputes as to warden’s knowledge of substantial risk and
reasonableness of warden’s response where plaintiff, who was stabbed by a prison
guard, sent letters to warden complaining of verbal abuse and threats by guard, and
warden responded that sheer volume of unsubstantiated complaints made
investigation of every complaint unreasonable).10
10
Mathews also asserts that he was unconstitutionally denied adequate medical care, and
that Crosby is liable for this constitutional violation under his supervisory liability. Mathews
19
II. Clearly Established Law
Crosby argues that even if Mathews can establish a constitutional violation,
Crosby is protected by qualified immunity because Mathews has failed to show
that it was clearly established at the time of the beatings that a warden could face
liability under § 1983 predicated on his failure to take reasonable steps in the face
of a history of widespread abuse or his adoption of custom or policies which
resulted in deliberate indifference. We disagree. By 1999, it was clearly
established that a warden, the person charged with directing the governance,
discipline, and policy of the prison and enforcing its orders, rules, and regulations
would bear such liability. See, e.g., LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1539 (11th
Cir. 1993) (holding that prison warden could face liability when his failure to take
appropriate measures to improve prisoner safety created a climate that preordained
the ensuing violence); Fundiller v. City of Cooper City, 777 F.2d 1436, 1443 (11th
Cir. 1985) (holding that safety director whose responsibility included disciplining
police officers and setting police department policy could be liable for failing to
take corrective steps in the face of a pattern of excessive force engaged in by
sets forth little, if any, facts relating to a causal connection between Crosby’s actions and the
alleged constitutional deprivation in the denial of medical care. All of Mathews’ allegations
concern the beatings on X-wing and the culture of violence at FSP. Accordingly, Mathews has
failed to allege a claim for § 1983 supervisory relief against Crosby for the denial of medical
care.
20
officers); see also Skrtich, 280 F.3d at 1303 (stating that by 1998 “precedent
clearly established that government officials may not use gratuitous force against a
prisoner who has been already subdued or, as in this case, incapacitated”); Bruce v.
Wade, 537 F.2d 850, 853 (5th Cir. 1976) (a violation of § 1983 is clearly stated by
the unjustified beating of an inmate at the hands of prison officials).
III. Award of Costs
Initially, because we reverse the summary judgment as to Crosby, we vacate
any judgment of costs awarded to him. On remand, Giebeig may move for costs,
consistent with our discussion of indigency below.
As to the other costs awarded, Mathews objects: 1) to any costs, except to
those costs awarded to James Poston, because the magistrate judge improperly
“assisted” the Defendants by requesting an additional filing; and 2) to the failure of
the district court to reduce the amount of costs given that he is indigent.
We reject as meritless Mathews’ first argument that the magistrate judge
improperly “assisted” the Defendants by allowing them to submit an additional
filing to address Mathews’ indigency. Moreover, Mathews failed to file objections
to the magistrate judge’s order within the ten days required by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 72(a). Thus, Mathews failed to timely assert this claim.
As to Mathews’ second claim that the costs should be reduced based on his
21
indigence, we review a district court’s decision about whether to award costs to the
prevailing party for abuse of discretion.11 Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012,
1023-24 (11th Cir. 2000). The Defendants, having obtained from Mathews a
voluntary dismissal with prejudice, are considered prevailing parties. See also
Sequa Corp. v. Cooper, 245 F.3d 1036, 1037-38 (8th Cir. 2001) (noting that
voluntary dismissal without prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(i) does not
deprive a district court of authority to award costs) (citing Cantrell v. Int'l Bhd. of
Elec. Workers, Local 2021, 69 F.3d 456, 458 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (holding
that district courts have discretion to award costs when a party dismisses an action,
with or without prejudice)). An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial judge bases
an award or denial upon findings of fact that are clearly erroneous. Mut. Serv. Ins.
Co. v. Frit Indus., Inc., 358 F.3d 1312, 1323 (11th Cir. 2004).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) provides that “[e]xcept when
express provision therefor is made either in a statute of the United States or in
these rules, costs other than attorneys’ fees shall be allowed as of course to the
prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs . . . . ” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1).
Under Rule 54(d), there is a strong presumption that the prevailing party will be
11
There is no question that Mathews timely filed objections relating to this claim, as the
magistrate judge’s order was issued on March 10, 2005, and Mathews objected on March 21,
2005, within the ten day limitation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) (Saturdays and Sundays are
excluded from computation of time when under eleven days).
22
awarded costs. Arcadian Fertilizer, L.P. v. MPW Indus. Serv., Inc., 249 F.3d 1293,
1296 (11th Cir. 2001). Such costs, however, may not exceed those permitted by 28
U.S.C. § 1920. Maris Distrib. Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 302 F.3d 1207, 1225
(11th Cir. 2002). Costs that may be awarded under § 1920 include: “(1) fees of the
clerk and marshal; (2) fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the
stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case; (3) fees and
disbursements for printing and witnesses; [and] (4) fees for exemplification and
copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case.” 28 U.S.C. § 1920.
Here, the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation went through an
extensive analysis of each individual cost under § 1920 and whether Mathews was
entitled to a reduction of costs because of his indigence. As we explained in
Chapman, a district court needs a “sound basis” to overcome the strong
presumption that a prevailing party is entitled to costs. There was none in this
case, and the magistrate judge thoroughly considered each cost of the awards
individually. Accordingly, we affirm the costs to all parties, except to Crosby and
Giebeig as set forth above.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor
of Crosby is REVERSED, and in favor of Giebeig is AFFIRMED. The district
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court’s order awarding costs is REVERSED to Crosby and Giebeig and
AFFIRMED to all other parties.
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