[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
July 16, 2007
No. 07-12364 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 06-01032-CV-WKW
DARRELL GRAYSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
RICHARD ALLEN, Commissioner,
Alabama Department of Corrections,
in his individual and official
capacities,
GRANTT CULLIVER, Warden,
Holman Correctional Facility, in
his individual and official
capacities,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
_________________________
(July 16, 2007)
Before ANDERSON, BIRCH and HULL, Circuit Judges.
HULL, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff Darrell Grayson, an Alabama death row inmate scheduled for
execution on July 26, 2007, appeals the district court’s order dismissing his 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action challenging Alabama’s lethal injection protocol and its
administration. After review, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that Grayson unreasonably delayed the filing of this § 1983
action and thus affirm the dismissal.
I. BACKGROUND
A. 4 December 1980–30 June 2002
The details of Grayson’s crimes are set forth in our 2001 opinion affirming
the district court’s denial of Grayson’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. See
Grayson v. Thompson, 257 F.3d 1194, 1197-98 (11th Cir. 2001). Briefly, on
December 24, 1980 (Christmas Eve), Grayson and a co-defendant raped, beat, and
brutally murdered eighty-six year old Mrs. Annie Laura Orr during their burglary
of her home. See id. Grayson’s co-defendant, Victor Kennedy, was executed on
August 6, 1999.
In June 1982, a jury convicted Grayson of capital murder during a burglary
of an inhabited dwelling, pursuant to Ala. Code § 13A-5-31(A)(4) (1975)
2
(repealed).1 See Grayson v. State, 479 So. 2d 69, 71 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984). At
sentencing, the jury recommended a death sentence, and the trial court sentenced
Grayson to death. See id. The Alabama appeals courts upheld Grayson’s
conviction and death sentence on direct appeal. See id. at 76; Ex parte Grayson,
479 So. 2d 76, 82 (Ala.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865, 106 S. Ct. 189 (1985).
In 1986, Grayson sought post-conviction habeas relief in Alabama’s state
courts based, inter alia, on his counsel’s alleged failure to present evidence of
Grayson’s alcoholism and abusive, impoverished upbringing. See Grayson v.
Thompson, 257 F.3d at 1208-09. After an evidentiary hearing was held in April
1992, the state habeas court denied Grayson’s petition for post-conviction relief.
See id. at 1214. In December 1995, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed the denial of Grayson’s state habeas petition. Grayson v. State, 675 So.
2d 516, 531 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 934, 117 S. Ct. 309
(1996).
In April 1996, Grayson filed a § 2254 petition in federal district court,
contending, inter alia, that he was denied effective assistance of counsel, that the
admission of allegedly involuntary statements to law enforcement violated his
Fifth Amendment rights, and that his due process rights were violated. Grayson v.
1
Capital offenses are now set forth in Alabama Code § 13A-5-40.
3
Thompson, 257 F.3d at 1215 & n.8. The district court denied Grayson’s § 2254
petition but granted his motion for a Certificate of Appealability on five issues.
Id. at 1214-15. In July 2001, this Court affirmed the denial of Grayson’s § 2254
petition. Id. at 1232. The Supreme Court denied Grayson’s petition for certiorari
in June 2002. Grayson v. Thompson, 536 U.S. 964, 122 S. Ct. 2674 (2002).
B. Grayson’s first § 1983 action: 15 November 2002–18 August 2006
On July 1, 2002, the State of Alabama changed its primary method of
execution from electrocution to lethal injection and gave death row inmates thirty
days from the Alabama Supreme Court’s affirmance of their death sentences to
elect electrocution instead. See Ala. Code § 15-18-82.1. Grayson did not elect
electrocution and thus challenges only his execution by lethal injection.
On August 12, 2002, the State first requested an execution date from the
Alabama Supreme Court. On September 23, 2002, Grayson filed a motion in the
state trial court to obtain the biological evidence presented at trial so that he could
conduct DNA testing on the evidence. See Grayson v. King, 460 F.3d 1328, 1335
(11th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 1005 (2007). On October 10,
2002, the state trial court denied Grayson’s motion for lack of jurisdiction. See id.
On November 15, 2002, three months after the State first requested an
execution date, Grayson filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim in federal district court
4
seeking access to the biological evidence used at trial. Id. Grayson waited until
March 27, 2003 to respond to the State’s request for an execution date, asking the
Alabama Supreme Court to withhold action until the resolution of his § 1983 suit.
On May 22, 2003, the Alabama Supreme Court, over three dissents, declined to set
an execution date pending a ruling on the § 1983 action about biological evidence.
In September 2005, the district court dismissed Grayson’s § 1983 action for
failure to state a claim, and we affirmed the district court’s order in August 2006.
Id. at 1336, 1343. This Court noted that “Grayson thrice confessed to the crime,
testified at trial admitting his role in the crime, and still does not affirmatively
assert that he is actually innocent, but only that he does not remember the details
of the night of the crime.” Id. at 1341-42. The Supreme Court denied Grayson’s
petition for certiorari as to his first § 1983 action in January 2007. Grayson v.
King, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 1005 (2007).
C. Grayson’s second § 1983 action: 17 November 2006
On November 17, 2006, twenty-four years after his conviction for capital
murder, four years after Alabama adopted lethal injection for death row inmates,
and four years after filing his first § 1983 action about biological evidence,
Grayson filed this second § 1983 action, this time challenging the State’s lethal
injection method and procedure.
5
In his second § 1983 action, Grayson contends that Alabama’s lethal
injection protocol violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and seeks to
enjoin the State from executing him with its current protocol. In January 2007, the
State again petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court to set an execution date for
Grayson. On April 23, 2007, the Alabama Supreme Court set an execution date of
July 26, 2007, and Grayson filed a motion to stay his execution on April 30, 2007.
On May 17, 2007, the district court granted the State’s motion to dismiss
Grayson’s § 1983 lethal injection claim and denied Grayson’s motion to stay his
execution. On May 23, 2007, Grayson appealed the district court’s order
dismissing his § 1983 action. Because Grayson’s execution is scheduled for July
26, 2007, this Court expedited the briefing schedule, with Grayson’s brief due on
June 4, 2007, the State’s brief due on June 18, 2007, and Grayson’s reply brief due
on June 25, 2007.
II. DISCUSSION
Grayson’s now second § 1983 action challenges Alabama’s three-drug
lethal injection protocol and seeks injunctive relief. The district court dismissed
Grayson’s § 1983 lawsuit based on its finding that Grayson delayed unnecessarily
in bringing his lethal injection claim and that this inexcusable delay caused undue
6
prejudice to the State.2 Accordingly, the district court determined that Grayson
was not entitled to injunctive relief and dismissed Grayson’s claim under the
doctrine of laches.
Injunctive relief is an equitable remedy that is not available as a matter of
right. In the § 1983 suit by a death row inmate in Hill v. McDonough, __ U.S. __,
126 S. Ct. 2096 (2006), the Supreme Court noted that a number of federal courts
“have invoked their equitable powers to dismiss [§ 1983] suits they saw as
speculative or filed too late in the day.” Id. at __, 126 S. Ct. at 2104 (citing Hicks
v. Taft, 431 F.3d 916 (6th Cir. 2005); White v. Johnson, 429 F.3d 572 (5th Cir.
2005); Boyd v. Beck, 404 F. Supp. 2d 879 (E.D.N.C. 2005)); see also Rutherford
v. Crosby (Rutherford I), 438 F.3d 1087, 1091-92 (11th Cir.) (per curiam)
(collecting cases) , rev’d on other grounds, Rutherford v. McDonough, __ U.S. __,
126 S. Ct. 2915 (2006). While the Supreme Court did not pass judgment on these
§ 1983 cases, it recognized the “significant” problem created by such delay and
stated that “federal courts can and should protect States from dilatory or
2
We review the district court’s denial of equitable relief for abuse of discretion. See SEC
v. Ginsburg, 362 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 2004). We review any factual findings made by the
district court in support of its denial of an injunction for clear error and underlying questions of
law de novo. See Preferred Sites, LLC v. Troup County, 296 F.3d 1210, 1220 (11th Cir. 2002).
Therefore, in this case, we review the district court’s dismissal of a § 1983 method-of-execution
challenge because of inexcusable delay for abuse of discretion. See Rutherford v. Crosby, 438
F.3d 1087, 1089-90 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), rev’d on other grounds, Rutherford v. McDonough,
__ U.S. __, 126 S. Ct. 2915 (2006).
7
speculative suits . . . .” Hill, __U.S. at __, 126 S. Ct. at 2104.
Additionally, the equitable principles at issue when inmates facing
imminent execution delay in raising their § 1983 method-of-execution challenges
are equally applicable to requests for both stays and injunctive relief. See
Rutherford v. McDonough (Rutherford II), 466 F.3d 970, 976 (11th Cir.)
(affirming dismissal of § 1983 suit challenging lethal injection based on
petitioner’s unnecessary delay in filing suit), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct.
465 (2006); Rutherford I, 438 F.3d at 1092 (“[W]here petitioner’s scheduled
execution is imminent, there is no practical difference between denying a stay on
equitable grounds and denying injunctive relief on equitable grounds in a § 1983
lawsuit.”). Accordingly, courts considering dismissal of a dilatory § 1983 suit
seeking injunctive relief should recognize the “‘strong equitable presumption
against the grant of a stay where a claim could have been brought at such a time as
to allow consideration of the merits without requiring entry of a stay.’”
Rutherford II, 466 F.3d at 974 (quoting Hill, __ U.S. at __, 126 S. Ct. at 2104
(quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S.
637, 649-50, 124 S. Ct. 2117, 2126 (2004) (requiring district courts to consider
whether an inmate unnecessarily delayed in bringing the claim before granting a
stay “[g]iven the State’s significant interest in enforcing its criminal judgments”);
8
Gomez v. U. S. Dist. Ct. for N. Dist. of Cal., 503 U.S. 653, 654, 112 S. Ct. 1652,
1653 (1992) (per curiam) (noting that “last-minute attempts to manipulate the
judicial process” may be a ground for denying a stay).
On appeal, Grayson contends that the district court clearly erred in its fact-
finding that he unreasonably delayed in filing his § 1983 challenge to Alabama’s
lethal injection protocol. We disagree for several reasons.
First, Grayson argues that the district court wrongly faulted him for failing
to file a second or successive habeas petition or his § 1983 action prior to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Hill because such § 1983 claims were unavailable to
him under circuit precedent overruled in Hill. However, this argument ignores
that nothing precluded Grayson from filing a § 1983 action before the Supreme
Court’s decision in Hill. Although our circuit precedent prior to Hill called for
litigants raising method-of-execution challenges to bring them in second or
successive habeas petitions instead of § 1983 actions, see Rutherford I, 438 F.3d at
1089, a death row inmate could have filed a § 1983 suit to challenge this
precedent, as the death row plaintiff in Hill did in December 2005 in this same
circuit, see Hill, __ U.S. at __, 126 S. Ct. at 2100. Although the death row inmate
in Hill did not have the benefit of a favorable Supreme Court decision when he
filed his § 1983 action in this circuit, the plaintiff inmate sought to vindicate his
9
rights nearly a year before Grayson raised a similar § 1983 challenge. See
Rutherford I, 438 F.3d at 1092 (“Hill did not have the benefit of the certiorari
grant in Hill when Hill filed his lawsuit. Yet Hill filed the lawsuit without any
grant of certiorari on the issue.”). Other circuits likewise have concluded that
unfavorable circuit precedent does not foreclose all avenues for relief or excuse
delay in raising § 1983 lethal injection claims. See Cooey v. Strickland, 479 F.3d
412, 422 (6th Cir. 2007); Harris v. Johnson, 376 F.3d 414, 418-19 (5th Cir. 2004).
Accordingly, the district court in Grayson’s case properly found that “Hill seized
the opportunity [to file a § 1983 challenge] first, but the opportunity was open to
all, including Grayson.”
Moreover, Grayson did not file his § 1983 challenge to Alabama’s lethal
injection protocol until eleven months after death row petitioner Hill in this circuit
filed his similar § 1983 action and nearly ten months after the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Hill. See Hill, __ U.S. at __, 126 S. Ct. at 2100-01. Even
after the Supreme Court recognized in Hill that inmates could file § 1983 method-
of-execution challenges, Grayson delayed another five months after Hill before
filing his § 1983 action.
Second, contrary to Grayson’s arguments, the confidentiality of Alabama’s
lethal injection protocol did not impede Grayson from filing this claim earlier. As
10
this Court noted in dismissing a similar argument in Jones v. Allen, 485 F.3d 635
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 2160 (2007):
[t]he crux of [such] challenge[s] to the lethal injection
protocol–despite other general allegations about the training of the
prison staff, etc.–is that the first of the three drugs (sodium
thiopental) . . . will not induce a sufficiently deep plane of anesthesia
[before] . . . the third, excruciatingly painful and death-inducing drug
(potassium chloride) is administered. Regardless of the
confidentiality of the State’s protocol, [plaintiff Aaron Lee] Jones
cannot assert that he was unaware of the fact that [Alabama] (like
almost every other state that carries out executions using lethal
injection) employs this three-drug cocktail. Any such assertion is
belied by his complaint, which alleges “upon information and belief”
that the State uses “Thiopental, Pavulon, and Potassium Chloride . . .
to achieve first anesthesia, then paralysis, and finally . . . cardiac
arrest.” Thus, Jones knew of the basis of his claim before he filed his
complaint.
Id. at 640 n.3. Grayson’s second § 1983 complaint is nearly identical to Aaron
Lee Jones’s first § 1983 complaint in his challenge to Alabama’s lethal injection
protocol.3 Just as in Jones, Grayson’s assertion that he was unaware of Alabama’s
three-drug protocol is belied by the specific allegations in his own complaint.
Grayson claims that he had no knowledge about the execution team’s
training and the procedure for preparing the drugs and syringes, administering the
3
Specifically, Grayson asserted “upon information and belief that Alabama uses drugs to
achieve first anesthesia, then paralysis, and finally execution by cardiac arrest. The chemicals
used include Thiopental, Pavulon, and potassium chloride.”
11
drugs, and monitoring the execution. However, Grayson makes no claim that he
had any such knowledge when he filed his second § 1983 complaint in November
2006. If Grayson was ignorant about these facts yet was able to file a second
§ 1983 complaint in November 2006 alleging improper training and procedures,
there is no reason why Grayson could not have filed a similar § 1983 complaint
based “upon information and belief” months, if not years, earlier. In fact, there is
no reason why Grayson could not have added a lethal injection claim when he
filed his first § 1983 suit on November 15, 2002, which was nearly six months
after Alabama had adopted lethal injection and three months after Alabama had
first requested an execution date.
Furthermore, as the district court noted, Grayson’s “technical knowledge of
lethal injection matters is based upon the expert opinion of Dr. Mark Heath.” This
circuit noted recently in Jones that death row inmate Jones should have known
about substantially similar lethal injection challenges because “the expert upon
whom Jones relies . . . has been opining on the alleged risks associated with this
particular three-drug cocktail since at least 2003.” Jones, 485 F.3d at 640 n.3.
Similarly, Dr. Heath has been opining upon the alleged risks of lethal injection in
numerous challenges across the country since at least 2002. Grayson thus should
have been aware of the basis of his claim well before November 2006. See id.
12
Additionally, Grayson’s counsel Stephen Bright, who has ably represented
Grayson through more than fifteen years of state and federal post-conviction
proceedings, see Grayson v. King, 460 F.3d at 1335, also served as counsel in
2002 in a § 1983 suit challenging Georgia’s lethal injection protocol, see Fugate v.
Dep’t of Corr., 301 F.3d 1287, 1288 (11th Cir. 2002). Attached to the initial
complaint in Fugate was a declaration from Dr. Heath questioning this same three-
drug cocktail. See Fugate v. Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:02-CV-2219-CC, Docket Entry
No. 1 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 12, 2002). Because Grayson’s counsel was apparently
aware of Dr. Heath’s opinion on the alleged risks associated with this three-drug
cocktail and had filed a similar § 1983 complaint relying on Dr. Heath’s opinion in
2002, Grayson has shown no justification in the instant record for his waiting
more than four years after Fugate to file a nearly identical § 1983 action.
Finally, Grayson’s claim that the factual and legal landscape surrounding
lethal injection has changed recently is meritless. The district court correctly
noted that Alabama’s lethal injection protocol had been in place for over four
years when Grayson filed his second § 1983 complaint in 2006 and had been used
in twelve executions and that no change in the protocol prompted the timing of
Grayson’s suit. Indeed, Grayson makes no claim that Alabama’s lethal injection
protocol has been modified since its inception in 2002. Cf. Rutherford I, 438 F.3d
13
at 1092 (“There has been no suggestion that the lethal injection chemicals or
procedures used by Florida have changed in the last six years, and Rutherford’s
complaint assumes that they have not.”) Grayson’s allegation about profound
changes in the legal landscape is equally unavailing in light of the plethora of
lethal injection challenges that have been raised in multiple states even years
before Alabama adopted lethal injection as its primary method of execution. See
Sims v. State, 754 So. 2d 657, 668 n.20 (Fla. 2000) (citing cases addressing
constitutional challenges to lethal injection). Grayson argues that he only had
notice of a potentially meritorious challenge to Alabama’s lethal injection protocol
after a district court first raised questions about the constitutionality of a similar
lethal injection protocol in Morales v. Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1046 (N.D.
Cal. 2006). Yet Grayson tellingly provides no explanation for why he delayed
another nine months after Morales was decided in February 2006 to file his own
§ 1983 action in November 2006.
For all the foregoing reasons, the district court did not clearly err in finding
that Grayson’s delay in raising his § 1983 challenge to Alabama’s lethal injection
protocol was unnecessary and inexcusable. Grayson filed his present second
§ 1983 action (1) twenty-four years after a jury convicted him of the brutal murder
of Mrs. Orr during a burglary and recommended a death sentence, see Grayson v.
14
Thompson, 257 F.3d at 1207; (2) five years after this Court affirmed the denial of
Grayson’s § 2254 petition in 2001, see id. at 1232; and (3) nearly five years after
the Supreme Court’s subsequent denial of his petition for certiorari “eliminate[d]
the last possible obstacle to execution,” Jones, 485 F.3d at 639 n.2 (concluding
that because Alabama typically seeks an execution date shortly after the Supreme
Court denies certiorari review of an inmate’s § 2254 petition, the inmate “should
have foreseen that the execution date would likely be set promptly upon
completion of collateral review”). Indeed, upon conclusion of Grayson’s § 2254
proceedings, the State of Alabama promptly sought an execution date for Grayson
in 2002, but Grayson’s filing of his first § 1983 action thwarted the State’s attempt
to execute him in 2002. Even more indicative of delay, Grayson did not file this
second § 1983 challenge in 2006 until four years after he filed his first post-
conviction § 1983 action in 2002. See Grayson v. King, 460 F.3d at 1335.
Furthermore, given that Grayson has unreasonably delayed in filing this
second § 1983 action, we conclude that this Court’s decision in Rutherford II
affirming a dismissal of a death row inmate’s § 1983 suit for unnecessary delay
guides our decision to affirm the district court’s dismissal of Grayson’s § 1983
action in this case. In Rutherford II, a death row inmate (Arthur Rutherford)
delayed filing his method-of-execution challenge until his execution was
15
imminent, even though Florida had enacted its lethal injection option six years
prior to the suit and the Lancet research letter upon which he based his action was
published nine months before he filed his suit. Rutherford II, 466 F.3d at 975,
cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 465. Accordingly, this Court affirmed the
district court’s alternative finding that Rutherford delayed unnecessarily in
bringing the § 1983 action and did not leave sufficient time for full adjudication
on the merits. Id. at 974. This Court thus concluded that the district court did not
err in dismissing Rutherford’s § 1983 challenge to Florida’s lethal injection
protocol. Id. at 978.
This reasoning applies with equal force to Grayson. Here, Grayson delayed
filing his method-of-execution § 1983 suit until his execution was once again
imminent. We say once again because, as noted earlier, this is not the first time
that Grayson’s execution was imminent. The first time Grayson’s execution was
imminent was in 2002, when his § 2254 post-conviction proceedings were
completed. See Jones, 485 F.3d at 639 n.2 (“It is common practice in Alabama for
the State to seek an execution date soon after the Supreme Court denies certiorari
review of an inmate’s federal habeas petition.”). Although the State attempted to
set an execution date in 2002, Grayson’s first § 1983 action delayed that imminent
execution until the conclusion of that suit in 2006. Specifically, in August 2006,
16
this Court affirmed the dismissal of his first § 1983 action. Therefore, in August
2006, Grayson’s execution once again became imminent. See id. (concluding that
even though the death row inmate’s execution had not been set when he filed his
§ 1983 action, “given the extremely small chance of securing certiorari review in
the Supreme Court, it was all but guaranteed that Jones would die by lethal
injection” as soon as this circuit denied post-conviction relief).
Furthermore, as in Rutherford II, Alabama had adopted lethal injection as its
primary method of execution many years before Grayson filed his second § 1983
complaint. Just as the Lancet research letter upon which Rutherford based his
claim was published nine months before he filed his § 1983 suit, Dr. Heath’s
opinions on the three-drug cocktail used by Alabama, upon which Grayson based
his claim, have been known to Grayson’s counsel since at least 2002. Based on
Rutherford II, Grayson’s unnecessary delay was a proper ground to dismiss his
present § 1983 action. See Rutherford II, 466 F.3d at 978, cert. denied, __ U.S.
__, 127 S. Ct. 465.
As emphasized earlier, Grayson did not file this second § 1983 action until
he again faced the clear possibility that the Alabama Supreme Court would
imminently set his execution date. See Jones, 485 F.3d at 639-40. If Grayson
truly had intended to challenge Alabama’s lethal injection protocol, he would not
17
have deliberately waited to file suit until a decision on the merits would be
impossible without entry of a stay or an expedited litigation schedule.4 See
Rutherford II, 466 F.3d at 974. We thus conclude that the district court properly
found that Grayson offered no justification for why he could not have brought this
§ 1983 action earlier, and that Grayson’s dilatory filing of this suit “‘leaves little
doubt that the real purpose behind his claim is to seek a delay of his execution, not
merely to effect an alteration of the manner in which it is carried out.’” Jones, 485
F.3d at 640 (citation omitted).
The Supreme Court has recognized that “‘[b]oth the State and the victims of
crime have an important interest in the timely enforcement of a sentence,’” and
that federal courts considering equitable relief “must be ‘sensitive to the State’s
strong interest in enforcing its criminal judgments without undue interference from
the federal courts.’” Rutherford II, 466 F.3d at 974 (quoting Hill, __ U.S. at __,
126 S. Ct. at 2104). Both the State and Mrs. Orr’s family have strong interests in
4
Given that Grayson’s execution became imminent again in August 2006, we also reject
Grayson’s argument that the district court clearly erred in finding that the late filing of his § 1983
suit necessitated a stay or a burdensome litigation schedule. Grayson’s first § 1983 action, filed
in 2002, took over four years to proceed from the district court through the Supreme Court’s
denial of certiorari review. Even leaving aside the potential months or even years added to this
second § 1983 litigation from appeals, Grayson has not established that the district court clearly
erred in its factual finding that a trial on the merits would have taken much more than three
months. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding that
Grayson’s second § 1983 suit was not filed in sufficient time to allow full adjudication on the
merits without entry of a stay. See Jones, 466 F.3d at 639 n.2.
18
seeing Grayson’s punishment carried out after waiting twenty-five years since
Grayson received a death sentence. After a quarter century of delay, Grayson is
not entitled to another reprieve. See Thompson v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1495,
1506 (11th Cir. 1983) (“Each delay, for its span, is a commutation of a death
sentence to one of imprisonment.”). Given the strong presumption against the
grant of dilatory equitable relief, we conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in dismissing Grayson’s § 1983 action due to his unnecessary delay.5
AFFIRMED.
5
Because we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Grayson’s § 1983 complaint on
equitable grounds, we need not address the State’s alternative arguments that Grayson’s suit is
barred by the statute of limitations and res judicata.
19