[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
AUG 7, 2007
No. 04-15761 THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 03-00859-CV-ORL-19KRS
ANTHONY FERREIRA,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondents-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(August 7, 2007)
Before BLACK, PRYOR and COX, Circuit Judges.
BLACK, Circuit Judge:
Following its decision in Burton v. Stewart, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 793
(2007), the Supreme Court vacated this Court’s opinion in Ferreira v. Sec’y, Dep’t
of Corr., 183 F. App’x 885 (11th Cir. 2006), and remanded it for further
consideration in light of Burton. Previously, we held that Ferreira’s petition for a
writ of habeas corpus was time-barred. Ferreira, 183 F. App’x at 886. We
reasoned that when a petitioner who had been resentenced challenged only his
underlying conviction in a habeas petition, the one-year statute of limitations in the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) runs from the date the
conviction became final, regardless of when the petitioner’s corrected sentence
became final. Id. at 887. After a thorough consideration of Burton and
reconsideration of our relevant precedent, we now hold that AEDPA’s statute of
limitations runs from the date the judgment pursuant to which the petitioner is in
custody becomes final, which is the date both the conviction and sentence the
petitioner is serving become final.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Anthony Ferreira was tried and convicted in a Florida state court. He
appealed his conviction through the state appellate system. On September 11,
1997, the Florida Supreme Court denied his appeal. Ninety days later, on
2
December 10, 1997, his right to direct review terminated when he decided not to
file a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.
On August 18, 1998, 251 days after his right to direct review ended, Ferreira
filed a post-conviction motion in the Florida state system, tolling AEDPA’s one-
year statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The state court denied the
motion, and issued the mandate on February 8, 2002. On June 2, 2002, Ferreira’s
statute of limitations to file a federal habeas petition expired. Twenty days later,
on June 24, 2002, Ferreira filed another post-conviction motion in the state system
to correct his sentence, which the state court granted. Ferreira was resentenced,
and the mandate finalizing that judgment issued on April 14, 2003. On June 10,
2003, 57 days after Ferreira’s corrected sentence became final, he filed his federal
habeas petition, including claims concerning only his original conviction and not
his subsequent resentencing.
The district court found the petition was untimely and dismissed it. We
granted a certificate of appealability (COA) limited to the following issue:
“Whether the district court properly found that a habeas corpus petitioner who was
resentenced and who only challenged the original trial proceedings [in his habeas
petition] without raising any challenge based on resentencing procedures is not
3
entitled to the benefit of a new statute of limitations period commencing from the
date the resentencing judgment became final.” Ferreira, 183 F. App’x at 886.
Relying on Rainey v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 443 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir.
2006), we held that “[b]ecause Ferreira’s habeas petition challenged only his
judgment of conviction, without raising any challenge to his resentencing
judgment, the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations began when his judgment
of conviction became final.” Ferreira, 183 F. App’x at 886. There is no dispute
that Ferreira’s habeas petition was filed more than 365 days after his conviction
and original sentence became final on December 10, 1997. Therefore, unless the
limitations period started anew when his corrected sentence became final, his
petition would be barred by AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. Our task,
therefore, is to determine, in light of Burton, whether we measure the statute of
limitations from the date Ferreira’s conviction became final (December 10, 1997)
or when his corrected sentence became final (April 14, 2003), when the only
claims in his federal habeas application concern his original conviction.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo the district court’s determination that a petition for
federal habeas corpus relief was time-barred under AEDPA. Moore v. Crosby, 321
F.3d 1377, 1379 (11th Cir. 2003).
4
III. DISCUSSION
AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitations on petitions for writs of
habeas corpus. In particular, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) provides “[a] 1-year period of
limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” The limitation period in this
case runs from “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of
direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” Id.
§ 2244(d)(1)(A). The question in this case is what constitutes the judgment for the
statute of limitations when a petitioner has his sentence corrected.
We have examined this issue in two contexts. The first is where a petitioner
challenges his custody by bringing claims concerning both the corrected sentence
and the underlying conviction. See Walker v. Crosby, 341 F.3d 1240, 1241-42
(11th Cir. 2003). The second is where a petitioner challenges his custody by
bringing claims concerning only the underlying conviction. See Rainey v. Sec’y for
the Dep’t of Corr., 443 F.3d 1323, 1325-26 (11th Cir. 2006). In both prior cases
and the panel decision in Ferreira, this Court addressed the conviction and
sentence as separate and distinct judgments, each triggering the statute of
limitations depending on what claims the petitioner included in his habeas
application.
5
This framework is altered by the holding in Burton. In light of Burton, the
judgment reflects the sentence the petitioner is serving and the underlying
conviction. A short discussion of both precedents is necessary to understand the
issue in this case and specifically how Burton affects our analysis.
A. Walker v. Crosby
In Walker, the petitioner’s statute of limitations began to run on AEDPA’s
effective date, April 24, 1996. The district court found, and this Court presumed,
petitioner’s statute of limitations period expired on April 23, 1997.1 Walker, 341
F.3d at 1242. In October 1997, petitioner filed a motion to correct his sentence in
state court, and the state court granted his motion. Id. at 1241.
On February 4, 1998, Walker was resentenced, and he subsequently
appealed his resentencing. Id. On February 24, 1998, while the appeal was
pending, Walker filed a federal habeas petition in the district court, which included
claims only concerning his original conviction. Id. The district court dismissed
the petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust remedies in state court. Id. at
1241-42. Thereafter, the mandate finalizing Walker’s resentencing issued on
June 5, 1998. After filing a host of state court post-conviction remedies tolling
1
The limitations period would have ended on April 24, 1997, the anniversary date of the
triggering event, which was AEDPA’s effective date. Whether the limitations period expired on
April 23 or 24 makes no difference to the disposition of this case.
6
AEDPA’s statute of limitations, Walker filed his second habeas petition on
January 16, 2001. See id. at 1242 & n.3. The district court dismissed the petition
as time-barred. Id. at 1242.
This Court granted a COA on “whether individual claims within a single
habeas petition may be reviewed separately for timeliness.” Id. at 1241. This
Court interpreted the word “application” in § 2244(d)(1) to include all claims
within a single application. Id. at 1245; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (“A 1-
year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus . .
. .”) (emphasis added). Consequently, when computing the statute of limitations,
we held the district court should determine if the “application” as a whole is
timely, without looking individually at the claims comprising the application.
Walker, 341 F.3d at 1245. In Walker, petitioner’s sentencing claims, along with
his claims regarding his underlying conviction, were a part of the timely
application, therefore we held the entire application was timely. Id. at 1246. We
noted that this interpretation of § 2244(d)(1) “allows for the resurrection of what
seem to be time-barred claims tagging along on the coattails of a timely claim.” Id.
at 1247.
Walker, thus, held that so long as the petitioner challenges his custody by
bringing claims concerning both the underlying conviction and the corrected
7
sentence, the petitioner will get the benefit of the statute of limitations starting
anew on the date the corrected sentence becomes final. Id. This is true even
though both Walker’s underlying conviction and original sentence had been final
for more than one year before his sentence was corrected. Walker did not address
what would happen if a petitioner was resentenced but challenged his custody by
bringing claims only concerning his original conviction and did not include any
claims based on his corrected sentence. We addressed that very question in
Rainey.
B. Rainey v. Secretary for the Department of Corrections
In Rainey, the petitioner’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct
appeal on September 28, 1999. Rainey, 443 F.3d at 1325. Rainey’s federal statute
of limitations had expired before he filed a state motion for post-conviction relief
on February 13, 2001, asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and a
right to resentencing. Id. He was subsequently resentenced, and his corrected
sentence became final on December 13, 2002. Id. On March 27, 2003, after
validly tolling AEDPA’s statute of limitations, Rainey timely filed his federal
habeas petition. Id.
Unlike Walker, Rainey did not challenge his custody by bringing claims
concerning his corrected sentence, instead bringing only the claims of ineffective
8
assistance of counsel. Id. Nevertheless, Rainey argued that, under Walker, his
application was timely because AEDPA’s statute of limitations began to run on
December 13, 2002, the date his new sentence became final, not February 13,
2001, when his conviction became final. Id. This Court disagreed and held the
petition was untimely. Id.
We reasoned that “[o]ur case law and the plain language of the [habeas]
statute support the conclusion that when a petitioner who has been resentenced
brings an application challenging only his original judgment of conviction, the
one-year statute of limitations under the AEDPA runs from the date the original
judgment of conviction became final and not the date the resentencing judgment
became final.” Id. at 1326. We distinguished Rainey from Walker by noting that
unlike the petitioner in Walker, Rainey’s “petition contested only his original
judgment of conviction and in no way challenged his resentencing judgment. A
challenge to resentencing is essential to . . . obtaining the benefit of a later
limitations period under the AEDPA.” Id. at 1327 (footnote omitted).
We held “[t]his result is consistent with the plain language of the
AEDPA[,]” even though it could require petitioners to file successive habeas
petitions. Id. at 1328-29. We advised petitioners to preserve their rights to
challenge their judgments of convictions by filing “a federal habeas petition
9
challenging the original judgment of conviction during the initial one-year
limitations period.” Id. at 1329.
Pursuant to Rainey, a petitioner challenging the original sentence on direct
appeal or in state post-collateral proceedings would have to file a concurrent
federal habeas petition challenging the underlying conviction in order to preserve
the right to do so. If the direct appeal or state post-collateral proceeding is
unsuccessful, and the petitioner is not resentenced, he would then file a second
habeas petition to challenge his sentence in federal court. Both habeas petitions
would be based on the same conviction and sentence; therefore, the petitioner,
would need permission from the Court of Appeals to file the second.2 This is
precisely what occurred in Burton.
C. Burton v. Stewart
In Burton, the Supreme Court held the district court did not have jurisdiction
over Burton’s habeas petition because it constituted an unauthorized successive
petition. Burton, 127 S. Ct. at 796. Burton was convicted and sentenced in 1994
following his Washington jury trial. Id. at 794. After an unrelated prior conviction
was overturned, Burton filed a motion seeking resentencing, which was granted.
Id. at 795. The trial court resentenced Burton in 1996. Id. On direct review, the
2
If the petitioner was successful and resentenced, his petitions would not be successive
because they would be based on separate judgments. See Burton, 127 S. Ct. at 796.
10
state courts upheld the 1996 conviction, reciting the 1994 verdict, but remanded for
another resentencing. Id. On March 16, 1998, the trial court entered a second
amended judgment and sentence for the 1994 guilty verdicts. Id. Burton appealed
the 1998 sentence. Id.
On December 28, 1998, while direct review of his 1998 sentence was
pending in state court, Burton filed a habeas petition in the United States District
Court. Id. He sought to attack his custody by bringing claims concerning the 1994
conviction, not the 1998 sentence. The district court and the Ninth Circuit denied
relief. Id. at 795-96. Three years after the 1998 habeas petition, the Washington
courts finally rejected his sentencing claims. Id. at 796. Subsequently, Burton
filed a second federal habeas petition without permission from the Ninth Circuit.
Id. In this petition, Burton attacked his custody by bringing claims concerning the
1998 sentence, not the 1994 conviction. Id. The Supreme Court held it was an
unauthorized successive petition, and the district court lacked jurisdiction. Id.
Integral to the Court’s holding was its interpretation of AEDPA. The Court
emphasized that AEDPA sets out procedures that a prisoner “in custody pursuant
to the judgment of a State court” must follow. Id. at 796; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
The Court interpreted the judgment at issue to be based on both the conviction and
11
the sentence the petitioner is serving. In Burton’s case, the 1998 judgment and
sentence together form the basis of his habeas petition:
When Burton filed his first petition, the 1998 petition, he was being
held in custody pursuant to the 1998 judgment, which had been
entered some nine months earlier. When he filed his second petition,
the 2002 petition, he was still being held in custody pursuant to the
same 1998 judgment. In short, Burton twice brought claims
contesting the same custody imposed by the same judgment of a state
court. As a result, under AEDPA, he was required to receive
authorization from the Court of Appeals before filing his second
challenge.
Id. at 796.
Thus, when AEDPA states, “The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit
judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the
ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States,” the judgment to which AEDPA refers is the underlying
conviction and most recent sentence that authorizes the petitioner’s current
detention. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The Court implies that if, in 1996 while
incarcerated pursuant to the 1996 judgment, Burton had challenged his custody by
only bringing claims concerning his 1994 conviction, his second habeas petition
would not have been successive because it challenged his custody under a different
12
judgment, the 1998 judgment, based on the 1994 conviction and 1998 sentence.
See id. at 796, 798.
The Court rejected Burton’s argument that if he had waited to file a federal
petition until the state review of the 1998 sentence was complete, he risked losing
the opportunity to challenge his 1994 conviction in federal court due to AEDPA’s
one-year statute of limitations, an argument Rainey would have supported. Id. at
798-99. The same AEDPA language the Supreme Court interpreted when it
determined Burton filed an unauthorized successive petition, 28 U.S.C. § 2254,
appears in the statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1), 2254(a). AEDPA’s
limitations period is applicable to “a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of
a State court” and runs from “the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.”
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); see also Burton, 127 S. Ct. at 798. At the time Burton
filed both of his petitions, he was imprisoned under the 1998 judgment, which was
based on the 1996 conviction and the 1998 sentence. That judgment triggered
AEDPA’s statute of limitations, even if the habeas petition included claims
concerning the 1994 conviction. The Court stressed that “[f]inal judgment in a
criminal case means sentence. The sentence is the judgment.” Id. (quoting
Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212, 58 S. Ct. 164, 166 (1937)). In
13
Burton’s case, the “limitations period did not begin until both his conviction and
sentence became final.” Id. at 799 (emphasis in original).
The Supreme Court applied AEDPA and held that the judgment that forms
the basis of the habeas petition is the one that places the petitioner in custody. Id.
at 796. That interpretation was a logical step necessary to the Court’s holding that
Burton’s 2002 petition was successive and unauthorized. The Court’s
interpretation of AEDPA controls this case.
D. Burton’s Application to Ferreira
The main issue in Ferreira is whether the petitioner’s original conviction
triggered the running of AEDPA’s statute of limitations or whether the running of
the statute was triggered by the petitioner’s resentencing, when the habeas petition
only challenges the original 1997 conviction. 183 F. App’x at 886.
Applying the Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation in Burton, the statute
of limitations is triggered by the date the judgment, which is based on Ferreira’s
conviction and the sentence he is serving, becomes final. When Ferreira filed his
petition in the district court on June 10, 2003, he was “in custody pursuant to” the
2003 judgment, which was based on the December 10, 1997 conviction and the
April 14, 2003 sentence. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a), 2244(d). Therefore, the April 14,
2003 judgment that imprisoned Ferreira controls the statute of limitations for this
14
petition because the period begins to run when both the conviction and sentence
are final. Ferreira’s petition was timely because he filed it 57 days after the
April 14, 2003 judgment became final, well within the one-year statute of
limitations.
Burton makes clear that the writ and AEDPA, including its limitations
provisions, are specifically focused on the judgment which holds the petitioner in
confinement. What this Court has previously called the judgment of conviction
and the sentencing judgment together form the judgment that imprisons the
petitioner. Therefore, AEDPA’s statute of limitations begins to run from the date
both the conviction and the sentence the petitioner is serving at the time he files his
application become final because judgment is based on both the conviction and the
sentence.
E. Prior Precedent
The Court’s interpretation of AEDPA’s language, “a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court[,]” was necessary to its holding that
Burton’s second petition was successive. That interpretation effectively overrules
our decisions in Rainey and Ferreira where we defined the “judgment” differently.
Our incorrect interpretation directly led to our holding that their petitions were
time-barred. Therefore, the Supreme Court in Burton overruled our prior
15
precedent in Ferreira and Rainey. We now hold that AEDPA’s statute of
limitations begins to run when the judgment pursuant to which the petitioner is in
custody, which is based on both the conviction and the sentence the petitioner is
serving, is final.
IV. CONCLUSION
We REVERSE the district court because we conclude that Ferreira timely
filed his habeas petition. In addition, we overrule our prior precedent in Ferreira
v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 183 F. App’x 885 (11th Cir. 2006) and Rainey v.
Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 443 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2006), to the extent they are
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Burton v. Stewart, __ U.S. __,
127 S. Ct. 793 (2007).
16