[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-10775 JUNE 29, 2009
________________________ THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 05-00324-CR-8-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JORGE FLORES,
a.k.a. Alfonso Medina Hernandez,
a.k.a. Juan Diaz-Jasso,
a.k.a. Shadow,
ARMANDO PRUDENTE,
a.k.a. Armando Balaco,
a.k.a. Charra,
ROBERTO SANDOVAL,
a.k.a. Charrita,
RICARDO GAMA,
a.k.a. Kiwi,
ISRAEL CRUZ,
a.k.a. Najeiza Cruz,
a.k.a. Mananitas,
Defendants-Appellants.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(June 29, 2009)
Before WILSON, KRAVITCH and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This is a criminal appeal from the convictions and sentences of five
members of the Hispanic street gang “Sureños-13” (“Sur-13”). Armando Prudente,
Roberto Sandoval, Israel Cruz, Jorge Flores, and Ricardo Gama (collectively “the
defendants”) were charged with thirteen others in a 31-count indictment for crimes
involving, inter alia, conspiracy to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., two murders, possession of
firearms, and possession of drugs with intent to distribute. The five defendants
were tried together and were convicted of various counts of the indictment. They
now appeal several aspects of their convictions and sentences.
On appeal, the defendants raise the following arguments: (1) the district
court abused its discretion by dismissing for cause a juror who suffered from
untreated attention deficit disorder; (2) the defendants were deprived of the
presumption of innocence when one potential juror, in the presence of the venire,
commented that during his employment as a corrections officer, he had “dealt”
2
with one or more of the defendants; (3) the evidence was insufficient to establish
that Flores was an accomplice in the murder of Rogelio Guzman; (4) the court
impermissibly admitted a codefendant’s hearsay statements that were not made in
furtherance of the conspiracy; (5) the district court abused its discretion by not
requiring the government to disclose the identity of a confidential informant; (6)
the district court abused its discretion by not instructing the jury on the defense of
justification; (7) the district court erred by instructing the jury that drug
distribution, by law, satisfies the interstate nexus element of a RICO conspiracy
charge; (8) Prudente’s sentence is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual, in violation
of the Eighth Amendment; (9) Sandoval’s sentence, because it was enhanced for a
crime of “juvenile delinquency,” exceeds the statutory maximum; and
(10) Sandoval’s sentence is unreasonable.
I. Facts and Background
The defendants’ trial lasted four weeks and included testimony by Sur-13
members and law enforcement officers, along with evidence obtained from
wiretaps and surveillance videos. The evidence adduced at trial established the
following:1
1
This recitation of the facts does not include evidence related to the drug crimes because
such evidence is not relevant to this appeal. Instead, we focus principally on the facts
surrounding the two murders.
3
Sur-13 is a gang with chapters in several U.S. cities, including Atlanta. The
gang is hierarchical, with a three-tiered structure that groups members based on
age and status. When Sur-13 initiates a new member, the individual is “jumped in”
through a beating by three other gang members. A member can then improve his
status within Sur-13 by “putting in work” for the gang through, among other
things, participating in drive-by shootings, robberies, burglaries, and violent
confrontations with members of rival gangs.
In 1996, Prudente was the second ranking member in Sur-13’s Atlanta
chapter, behind the chapter’s founder, “Chico.” When Chico was not present,
Prudente acted as the gang’s leader.2 In his role as leader, Prudente had discretion
to order attacks on rival gangs and to impose beatings on fellow Sur-13 members
for violations of the gang’s rules.
On April 24, 1999, Sergio Escutia, a Sur-13 member, was standing in a
parking lot outside of an apartment complex as he spoke on his cell phone with
Prudente. Escutia was approached by members of “La Gran Familia,” a coalition
of gangs that includes Sur 13’s rivals, the “Brown Side Locos.” The rival gang
members, apparently seeking a violent confrontation, made gang signs with their
hands and exposed weapons, but Escutia did not “throw back” his gang sign
2
For reasons not fully explained at trial, “[a]t some point Chico wasn’t really around”
and Prudente became the chapter’s permanent leader.
4
because children were present. Escutia left the scene and, at Prudente’s direction,
came to Prudente’s Atlanta apartment.
At Prudente’s apartment, Escutia told Prudente and some other Sur-13
members about the confrontation with La Gran Familia. Prudente left the room
and returned with two TEC-9 semi-automatic firearms, saying he was angry with
the Brown Side Locos for a drive-by shooting that they allegedly conducted the
day before, which resulted in damage to two of Prudente’s cars. Prudente
assembled a group for a “payback” mission, comprised of Flores, Sandoval,
Escutia, and an individual nicknamed “Smiley.” Prudente handed the TEC-9
firearms to Flores and Sandoval.
The group loaded into Escutia’s red Mustang, with Escutia in the driver’s
seat, Flores in the front passenger’s seat, and Sandoval and Smiley in the rear
passengers’ seats. The guns were placed underneath the backseat and Sandoval
directed Escutia to Gwinnett County, which was considered the Brown Side Locos’
turf. Once there, Sandoval directed Escutia to follow a brown Impala. The Impala
pulled into a store parking lot and the occupants spoke with the occupants of a
nearby white Monte Carlo. The Sur-13 members believed the two cars contained
members of the Brown Side Locos because the cars “fit the type of cars that we
usually would look for like with spoked rims, low rider style . . . .” After about
5
fifteen minutes, the Impala pulled out of the parking lot, followed by the Monte
Carlo. Sandoval ordered Escutia to follow the Monte Carlo and a gun was passed
to Flores from one of the occupants of the backseat. Escutia, again at Sandoval’s
direction, pulled up next to the Monte Carlo and Flores leaned out of the window
and fired at the Monte Carlo, killing the driver of the vehicle, Rogelio Guzman.
After two shots, Flores’s gun jammed and Escutia drove off.
The group returned to Prudente’s apartment, where Flores and Sandoval
bragged about the night’s events. Prudente collected the firearms and instructed
those present not to discuss the shooting with anyone else. Another gang member
heard Prudente on the telephone a day or two later trying to sell two TEC-9
firearms.
Prudente ordered Escutia to dispose of the car used in the Guzman killing;
approximately one week after the shooting, Escutia drove his car to Calhoun,
Georgia and left it with a friend. Two or three weeks later, Escutia’s mother told
him that the police were looking for him and that they were asking questions about
his car and a shooting. Escutia relayed this information to Prudente. In order to
protect his nephew, Sandoval, from going to jail, Prudente ordered Escutia to
frame two Sur-13 members, known as “Sleepy” and “Dundee,” for the Guzman
killing. Escutia thereafter told police that the passengers in the car on the night of
6
the killing were Flores, Sleepy, and Dundee. The car was recovered by police and
Sleepy and Dundee later pleaded guilty to the April 24th shooting.
The jury also heard testimony about a second Sur-13 killing. On the night of
December 12, 2003, some Sur-13 members, including Cruz, attended a party in a
clubhouse open to the public. The party’s organizers hired two security guards to
monitor the venue’s door. Sometime after midnight, members of the rival gang
“Vatos Locos” arrived at the party. Inside the clubhouse, members of the two
gangs argued and a fight broke out, which included members of the gangs
throwing beer bottles at each other. The security guards “shut the whole party
down” and “ushered everybody out” the clubhouse’s front door. Once outside,
Cruz and others stood on the steps of the building, arguing with party-goers on the
ground below and threatening to shoot them. Cruz pulled a pistol out of his jacket
pocket and fired it towards the crowd. He fatally shot Florentine Marcial, who was
not a gang member, in the back.
The jury convicted the defendants of many, but not all, of the charges in the
superceding indictment. The jury’s findings most relevant to this appeal are the
following: The jury found Prudente and Flores guilty of the Guzman murder and
Cruz guilty of the Marcial murder, both violent crimes in aid of racketeering. See
18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1). The jury issued special findings as to the RICO
7
conspiracy charges, finding that Prudente and Sandoval both committed the
Guzman murder, an overt act in furtherance of a pattern of racketeering activity.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(1), (5), 1962(c), (d). The district court sentenced Prudente,
Flores, and Cruz to life plus 120 months’ imprisonment, Sandoval to life
imprisonment, and Gama to 51 months’ imprisonment. All five defendants
appealed.
II. Discussion
After reviewing each of the defendants’ arguments on appeal and finding no
error, we affirm their convictions and sentences.
A. Juror Dismissal
At voir dire, Ms. Fisher, a potential juror, informed the court that she
suffered from attention deficit disorder (“ADD”) and was not on medication
because she did not presently have insurance. She explained that this untreated
condition could “cause [her] mind to wander.” The district court initially
responded, “Okay. Well if you get selected and you have a problem, let me know.
I didn’t mean to embarrass you.” Despite the defendants’ objections, however, the
district court subsequently excused Fisher for cause, citing “her health problems
and her [lack of] medication.”
A trial court is granted discretion in conducting its voir dire examination and
8
determining whether to excuse a juror for cause. United States v. Schlei, 122 F.3d
944, 994 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Annigoni, 96 F.3d 1132, 1139 (9th Cir.
1996) (en banc). An individual may be incapable, by reason of mental or physical
infirmity, to render satisfactory jury service. See 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(4). A trial
court may excuse a potential juror for cause due to health issues. See United States
v. Campa, 459 F.3d 1121, 1135 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc); see also United States
v. Candelaria-Silva, 166 F.3d 19, 30 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding no abuse of discretion
in dismissing two jurors for medical reasons even though one did not state that his
medical condition would interfere with his service as a juror and the other appeared
to be dismissed in part because he held a law degree).
The defendants argue that the district court abused its discretion by
dismissing Fisher for cause. The defendants concede that ADD is a medical
condition and that it could be a basis for excluding a juror, but question the
wisdom of the district court’s decision here. They contend that the district court
was required to inquire further into Fisher’s medical condition to determine the
severity of her ADD. We disagree. The trial lasted four weeks, involved multiple
different crimes and defendants, and contained a significant amount of witnesses
and exhibits. Because untreated ADD could interfere with a juror’s ability to pay
attention, particularly in such a lengthy trial, the district court acted within its
9
sound discretion when it dismissed Fisher for cause.
B. Alleged Deprivation of the Presumption of Innocence
During voir dire, the district court confirmed that Mr. Holley, a potential
juror, was a corrections officer for the city of Atlanta and asked him, “have you
dealt with any of the people on trial here?” Holley indicated that he had and
responded “yes” when the court asked if he “would have a lot of difficulty being a
fair and impartial juror.” The district court immediately excused Holley for cause.
Defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the grounds that Holley’s statements
deprived the defendants of their presumption of innocence because such statements
alerted the rest of the venire that the defendants “are all incarcerated or have been
at some time or another.”
We review the district court’s determination whether to strike an entire jury
panel for manifest abuse of discretion. United States v. Trujillo, 146 F.3d 838, 842
(11th Cir. 1998). “The presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the
Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal
justice.” Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976). The Supreme Court has
held that it is impermissible for a court to compel an accused to stand trial in
identifiable prison clothes because it creates a “constant reminder of the accused’s
condition . . . [that] may affect a juror’s judgment.” Id. at 504-05. “While use of
10
such words as ‘jail,’ ‘prison,’ [and] ‘arrest’ are, generally to be avoided, where
irrelevant, the mere utterance of the word does not, without regard to context or
circumstances, constitute reversible error per se.” United States v. Veteto, 701
F.2d 136, 139-140 (11th Cir. 1983) (quoting United States v. Barcenas, 498 F.2d
1110, 1113 (5th Cir. 1974)). Instead, the presumption of innocence is only
impaired in cases where some statement or action yields the danger of “a
continuing influence throughout the trial . . . .” Estelle, 425 U.S. at 505.
In United States v. Villabona-Garnica, 63 F.3d 1051 (11th Cir. 1995), this
court held that a witness’s brief reference to the accused’s incarceration, when
viewed in context, was “unlikely to prejudice the jury sufficiently to rise to the
level of a due process violation.” Id. at 1058. Similarly, in the instant case,
Holley’s statements were not of sufficient magnitude to constitute a deprivation of
the presumption of innocence. Holley’s statements were short and nondescript.
He did not say which defendants he met during the course of his employment or
the circumstances surrounding their confinement. Moreover, evidence was
introduced by the government, without objection from the defendants, detailing the
defendants’ arrests in connection with the instant case. There is no evidence that
Holley’s statements prejudiced the venire and created the danger of “a continuing
influence throughout the trial.” Estelle, 425 U.S. at 505. The district court
11
therefore did not abuse its discretion by declining to strike the entire jury panel.
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence that Flores Committed the Guzman Murder
Flores argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he murdered
Guzman. He contends that the government did not present any physical evidence
linking him to the Guzman murder and that most of the testimony against him
came from Sur-13 members who were inconsistent, lacked credibility, and were
hoping to curry favor with the prosecution. Flores contends that the evidence
against him was particularly insubstantial in light of the fact that two other gang
members had already pleaded guilty to this murder.
We review challenges to sufficiency of the evidence de novo, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the government and drawing all reasonable
inferences and credibility choices in the government’s favor. United States v.
Mercer, 541 F.3d 1070, 1074 (11th Cir. 2008). “[T]he question is whether
reasonable minds could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, not whether
reasonable minds must have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United
States v. Ellisor, 522 F.3d 1255, 1271 (11th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original). The
jury is free to draw between reasonable interpretations of the evidence presented at
trial. United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1253 (11th Cir. 2007). Credibility
determinations are left to the jury and the jury’s verdict will not be disturbed on
12
appeal unless the testimony is “incredible as a matter of law.” United States v.
Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314, 1325 (11th Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted). Testimony is
only “incredible” if it relates to “facts that the witness could not have possibly
observed or events that could not have occurred under the laws of nature.” Id.
(quoting United States v. Rivera, 775 F.2d 1559, 1561 (11th Cir. 1985) (editing
marks omitted)).
In the instant case, ample evidence was presented at trial regarding Flores’s
involvement in the Guzman shooting. Although witnesses’ testimonies differed as
to whether there were one or two TEC-9 firearms and to whom Prudente handed
the guns, every witness who testified about the events at Prudente’s apartment on
April 24, 1999 placed Flores in the car that left for the “payback” mission against
the Brown Side Locos. Those at Prudente’s apartment after the shooting heard
Flores bragging about shooting a Brown Side Loco. Escutia, the driver of the
automobile, testified that Flores was the shooter. Escutia admitted that he
previously lied to law enforcement and that two innocent Sur-13 members went to
jail for the Guzman killing, but explained that he did so at the direction of
Prudente. This evidence is sufficient to support Flores’s conviction for the murder.
Additionally, although many of the witnesses were criminals and gang members,
testimony is not “incredible” solely because it is proffered by “an array of
13
scoundrels, liars and brigands.” United States v. Hewitt, 663 F.2d 1381, 1385
(11th Cir. 1981). The witnesses’ criminal pasts and prior inconsistent statements
were made known to the jury, and the jury was entitled to weigh their testimonies
accordingly.
D. Hearsay Statements by a Codefendant
Isaac Alamia testified that around 1999, shortly after he joined Sur-13, he
was told by fellow gang members that Sandoval was “leaving.” Alamia did not see
Sandoval again until 2004, at which time Sandoval told him that he had been in
Acapulco, Mexico because he was “on the run for murder.” Alamia testified that
Sandoval told him details of a murder, including that Sandoval and Flores were in
Escutia’s car, that they followed another car containing rival gang members, and
that Flores “got out with like a gun, and he started shooting, and the gun had got
jammed, and that’s the only reason he didn’t let go of all of the bullets.” Alamia
testified that Sandoval told him Flores shot the rival gang member to “up the
neighborhood, to put up the gang, to gain respect.” The district court admitted
these statements as statements of a co-conspirator made in furtherance of the
conspiracy. See F ED. R. E VID. 801(d)(2)(E).
Flores argues Alamia should not have been permitted to testify about
Sandoval’s hearsay statements because the statements were not made in
14
furtherance of the conspiracy. Two Sur-13 members testified that Prudente told
the gang members not to talk about the Guzman murder. Flores therefore argues
that any statements made by Sandoval could not have been in furtherance of the
conspiracy because they were counterproductive to the gang’s purpose and in
violation of the gang leader’s direct order.
We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion
and may overturn findings of fact only if clearly erroneous. United States v.
Magluta, 418 F.3d 1166, 1177 (11th Cir. 2005). Hearsay is inadmissible unless it
meets one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. See F ED. R. E VID. 802. Under
Rule 801(d)(2)(E), statements made by a co-conspirator in furtherance of a
conspiracy are not hearsay. F ED. R. E VID. 801(d)(2)(E). For a statement to
constitute non-hearsay by a co-conspirator, the government must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that:
(1) a conspiracy existed; (2) the conspiracy included the declarant and
the defendant against whom the statement is offered; and (3) the
statement was made during the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy. In determining the admissibility of co-conspirator
statements, the trial court may consider both the co-conspirator’s
statements and independent external evidence.
United States v. Hasner, 340 F.3d 1261, 1274 (11th Cir. 2003). Flores only
challenges the third prong, arguing that the statement was not made in furtherance
of the conspiracy.
15
Whether a statement is made in furtherance of the conspiracy is a finding of
fact which may be overturned only if clearly erroneous. United States v. Posner,
764 F.2d 1535, 1537 (11th Cir. 1985). This court applies “a liberal standard in
determining whether a statement is made in furtherance of a conspiracy.” United
States v. Miles, 290 F.3d 1341, 1351 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v.
Santiago, 837 F.2d 1545, 1549 (11th Cir. 1988)). “The statement need not be
necessary to the conspiracy, but must only further the interests of the conspiracy in
some way.” Id.
Both Alamia and the witness who testified before him, Rodolfo Perez, stated
that Sur-13 members who shot rival gang members were entitled to respect and
high status in the gang. Because Sandoval’s statements to Alamia served to inform
Alamia about Flores’s reliability and stature, and thus foster cohesiveness within
the gang, these statements furthered the interests of the conspiracy. Thus, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Alamia’s testimony.
E. Identity of a Confidential Informant
At trial, Juan Pedro Morales Rumualdo (“Morales”), a Sur-13 member,
testified for the government. He explained that upon being arrested on
immigration charges in 2003, he became an informant for the government. As part
of his cooperation with the government, he wore recording devices when
16
purchasing controlled substances and firearms. On cross-examination, defense
counsel challenged Morales’s credibility by asking if he ever purchased drugs
when he was not monitored by the government or if he kept some of the purchased
drugs for his own use. Morales indicated that he had not.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Special Agent Steven Ledgerwood,
the officer who directed Morales to make the controlled purchases of drugs and
firearms, later testified. On direct examination, Ledgerwood was asked how he
knew that Morales did not buy drugs for personal use when not wearing a
recording device. Ledgerwood responded, “[I] had another informant within the
gang that would also provide me intelligence at the same time.” Gama’s counsel
objected to this statement on the ground that the government had not disclosed the
identity of this other informant. The district court conducted an in camera review
of an unredacted copy of government documents and concluded that the materials
showed no direct criminal participation by the unidentified informant, that the
informant’s probable testimony would not aid in establishing a defense against the
charges in the instant case, and that the government had a legitimate interest in
nondisclosure. The district court thus ruled that the government was not required
to disclose the informant’s identity. The next morning the district court instructed
the jury to disregard the testimony about the unidentified confidential informant.
17
Gama argues that Ledgerwood’s testimony about the unidentified informant
constituted impermissible “bolstering” of Morales’s testimony. Gama contends
that the government should have been ordered to disclose the identity of this
informant so that the defense could impeach this informant’s credibility.
We review a district court’s ruling that the government need not disclose the
identity of a confidential informant for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490 (11th Cir. 1991). The government’s privilege to
withhold the identity of a confidential informant is limited. “Where the disclosure
of an informer’s identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and
helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a
cause, the privilege must give way.” Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61
(1957). The Supreme Court requires balancing competing interests, id. at 62, and
this court has found that this inquiry principally involves consideration of three
factors: (1) “the extent of the informant’s participation in the criminal activity”;
(2) “the directness of the relationship between the defendant’s asserted defense and
the probable testimony of the informant”; and (3) “the government’s interest in
nondisclosure.” United States v. Tenorio-Angel, 756 F.2d 1505, 1509 (11th Cir.
1985). “The government’s interest may be proven by showing that disclosure
might endanger the informant or other investigations.” Id.
18
The district court identified the appropriate test and concluded that the
confidential informant did not participate in any of the criminal activities listed in
the indictment. Although the burden was on Gama to establish the relationship
between his asserted defense and the probable testimony of the informant, see
Gutierrez, 931 F.2d at 1491, he failed to do so. Finally, the government proffered
legitimate interests in nondisclosure, including the informant’s safety and the
informant’s involvement in other ongoing investigations. The district court
therefore did not abuse its discretion by declining to order the government to
disclose the confidential informant’s identity.
F. Justification Instruction
Cruz requested a jury instruction on justifiable homicide for the Marcial
murder. He submitted a proposed jury instruction, stating, “[u]nder certain
circumstances a homicide can be justified. The applicable standard is whether the
circumstances would excite the fears of a reasonable man to the point that he
would feel it necessary to use deadly force to prevent death or great bodily injury.”
The district court declined to instruct the jury on justification.
On appeal, Cruz argues that the district court erred by not charging the jury
on justification or giving related instructions.3 He contends that his theory at trial
3
Cruz’s brief argues that the district court should have also charged the jury on “fears of
a hypothetical reasonable man,” “transferred justification,” “no duty to retreat,” and
19
was that because he was surrounded by rival gang members that wished to do him
harm, “he acted reasonably under the circumstances” by firing his weapon and that
“any reasonable man would have acted the same way.”
We review a district court’s refusal to give a proposed jury charge for abuse
of discretion. United States v. Yeager, 331 F.3d 1216, 1222 (11th Cir. 2003).
“The justification defense serves only as a legal excuse for the criminal act and is
based on additional facts and circumstances that are distinct from the conduct
constituting the underlying offense.” United States v. Deleveaux, 205 F.3d 1292,
1298 (11th Cir. 2000). Because it is an affirmative defense, the burden is on the
defendant to prove justification by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 1299.
Justification requires that the defendant prove “[1] that he acted under an
immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury, [2] that he had a well-grounded
fear that the threat would be carried out, and [3] that he had no reasonable
opportunity to escape or inform [the] police.” United States v. Wattleton, 296 F.3d
1184, 1196 n.20 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Alzate, 47 F.3d 1103,
1104 (11th Cir. 1995)). This court has explained that “[t]he first prong requires
“justification even without an assault.” Cruz, however, does not cite any authority supporting
these charges or identify any facts supporting these proposed defenses. These arguments are
therefore waived. See Flanigan’s Enters. v. Fulton County, Ga,, 242 F.3d 976, 987 n.16 (11th
Cir. 2001) (A bare allegation will waive an issue on appeal if the party “fail[s] to elaborate or
provide any citation of authority in support of the . . . allegation.”).
20
nothing less than an immediate emergency.” United States v. Rice, 214 F.3d 1295,
1297 (11th Cir. 2000).4
In the present case, Cruz did not establish the elements of the justification
defense. Cruz was not under an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury
at the time he fired his weapon. The security guard testified that a fight broke out
inside the party and that bottles were thrown, but that he and his partner then
closed the party and “ushered everybody out” of the clubhouse. A witness testified
that once outside, Cruz stood with a group at the top of the steps, taunting those
below and threatening to shoot them. There is no evidence that Cruz was being
attacked at the time he fired his gun or that anyone else at the party had a weapon.
A forensic pathologist from the Fulton County Medical Examiner’s Office testified
that the bullet entered Marcial’s torso at a slightly upward trajectory, consistent
with the theory that Marcial was crouching or running away at the time he was
shot.
Cruz did not meet his burden of proving an entitlement to a justification
charge and thus the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to give
4
We cite to both justification and duress jurisprudence because the defenses are
overlapping concepts with the same analysis. See Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 399 n.5
(1990) (“[T]he doctrine of justification and excuse in our criminal law focuses solely on factors
related to the commission of the crime, such as duress, necessity, entrapment, and ignorance or
mistake.”); see also Deleveaux, 205 F.3d at 1297 (explaining the Supreme Court’s holding in
another case as “recognizing that the justification defenses of duress and necessity . . .”).
21
Cruz’s proposed charge.
G. Interstate Nexus Charge
The district court instructed the jury that in order to convict Prudente,
Sandoval, and Gama of RICO conspiracy, the defendants must have been
“associated with an enterprise that was engaged in or the activities of which
affected interstate commerce.” In explaining interstate commerce, the district court
instructed,
distribution of an illegal drug by law affects interstate commerce, therefore
you may find that the requisite effect on interstate commerce has been
proven if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the enterprise described in
the Indictment was engaged in drug distribution, even if that distribution
occurred wholly within the state of Georgia.
On appeal, Prudente argues that the district court erred in giving this
instruction because it removed the government’s burden to prove all of the
essential elements of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt, in violation
of Prudente’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.5 Prudente acknowledges that this
argument may have been rejected by this court in United States v. Bernard, 47 F.3d
1101 (11th Cir. 1995), where this court held, in light of congressional findings in
the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), 21 U.S.C. § 801, that “possession and sale
5
Flores filed a motion with this court to adopt Prudente’s argument on appeal, but Flores
was not named in the RICO conspiracy charge or any count charging drug violations.
22
of illegal drugs impacts upon interstate commerce.”6 47 F.3d at 1103. Prudente,
however, argues that Bernard has been abrogated by the Supreme Court’s
subsequent rulings in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and its
progeny.7
We review de novo allegations that the district court’s jury instructions
misstate the law. United States v. Grigsby, 111 F.3d 806, 814 (11th Cir. 1997).
One of the elements of a RICO conspiracy is that the defendant agreed to
participate in the affairs of an enterprise affecting interstate commerce. United
States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1517 (11th Cir. 1986). This court has
concluded that in the context of a RICO conspiracy, “only a slight effect on
interstate commerce is required.” United States v. Beasley, 72 F.3d 1518, 1526
(11th Cir. 1996). In Bernard, a 1995 Hobbs Act case, this court held that in light of
the findings in the CSA, “possession and sale of illegal drugs impacts upon
interstate commerce” by definition. 47 F.3d at 1103. Bernard has never been
overruled by this court.
6
In the instant case, it is evident from the district court’s exchange with the government
during the charge conference that the district court used the CSA as the basis for its conclusion
that “distribution of an illegal drug by law affects interstate commerce.”
7
In the alternative, Prudente asks this court to “reconsider its position [in Bernard],”
however, this court is bound by the decision of a prior panel unless the decision is overruled by
the Supreme Court or this court sitting en banc. United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235,
1236 (11th Cir. 2008).
23
A recent Second Circuit ruling in the Hobbs Act case of United States v.
Parkes, 497 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2007), demonstrates that the rule enunciated by this
court in Bernard has been called into question by certain Supreme Court decisions.
In Parkes, the Second Circuit held that it is improper to charge a jury that drug
distribution, by law, satisfies the interstate element of a crime. Id. at 229. The
Second Circuit noted that it had previously deemed such a charge to be proper, see
United States v. Fabian, 312 F.3d 550 (2d Cir. 2002), but that rule had been
abrogated by subsequent Supreme Court cases like United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220 (2005), which “sharpened our focus on the separate consideration of each
element that composes an offense” and emphasized the government’s duty to prove
every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Parkes, 497 F.3d at 229. It
therefore concluded that congressional findings could no longer be used to
dispense with the government’s burden to prove every element of a crime.8 Id.
For the purposes of the instant case, we need not decide whether Bernard has
been abrogated because, in any event, any alleged error was harmless.9 Numerous
8
Parkes distinguished Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), in which the Court held that
the CSA’s findings were sufficient to give Congress jurisdiction to regulate intrastate drug
cultivation and possession, noting that the CSA does not include an affect on interstate
commerce as an element of the offense. Parkes, 497 F.3d at 229.
9
A district court’s jury instructions are subject to harmless error analysis, even where the
court incorrectly instructs the jury that an element of a crime had been satisfied as a matter of
law. United States v. Drury, 396 F.3d 1303, 1314 (11th Cir. 2005).
24
pieces of evidence tied Sur-13 and its crimes to interstate commerce. Sur-13 is a
national gang, an expert witness testified that two guns at issue in this case were
manufactured in Florida and transported to Georgia, and numerous Sur-13
members, with the help of other gang members, fled to other states and countries in
order to avoid being arrested for their gang-related crimes. As such, any alleged
error in the interstate nexus charge was harmless.
H. Eighth Amendment Challenge to Prudente’s Sentence
Prudente was convicted under Count 1 for RICO conspiracy, for which the
jury issued a special finding that Prudente committed the Guzman murder, and
under Count 2 for the murder of Guzman, a violent crime in aid of racketeering
(“VICAR murder”). The district court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment for
these crimes. Prudente argues that this sentence is cruel and unusual, in violation
of the Eighth Amendment, because he merely “aided and abetted” the drive-by
shooting, but did not “order” the killing.
We review Prudente’s constitutional challenge to his sentence de novo. See
United States v. Lyons, 403 F.3d 1248, 1250 (11th Cir. 2005). A sentence only
violates the Eighth Amendment if it “is grossly disproportionate to the offense.”
United States v. Brant, 62 F.3d 367, 368 (11th Cir. 1995). “The Supreme Court has
made it clear that ‘[o]utside the context of capital punishment, successful
25
challenges to the proportionality of sentences [are] exceedingly rare.’” United
States v. Raad, 406 F.3d 1322, 1323 (11th Cir. 2005) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289-90 (1983)). “In non-capital cases, the Eighth
Amendment encompasses, at most, only a narrow proportionality principle.”
Brant, 62 F.3d at 368. Generally, when a sentence is within the limits imposed by
statute, it is neither excessive nor cruel. United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012,
1024 (11th Cir. 2005).
In this case, there is no evidence that the sentence is disproportionate to the
offense committed. Life sentences are expressly permitted for RICO conspiracy
and are required for VICAR murder. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1959(a)(1), 1963(a). Prudente
was convicted of both charges and, for the RICO charge, the jury issued a special
verdict finding that he murdered Guzman. Although Prudente did not accompany
the shooters, he organized the attack, provided the guns, collected the guns after
the offense, and ordered the gang members not to discuss the shooting. Because
Prudente cannot establish disproportionality, his sentences do not violate the
Eighth Amendment.
I. Juvenile Delinquency Act
In addition to the RICO conspiracy and drug charges, Sandoval was initially
charged with the VICAR murder of Guzman, conspiracy to commit the VICAR
26
murder, and use of a firearm during the VICAR murder. The district court
dismissed these latter charges for lack of jurisdiction because Sandoval was 16
years old at the time of the alleged murder and the government failed to get
Department of Justice Approval to prosecute him for these crimes, as required by
the Juvenile Delinquency Act (“JDA”), 18 U.S.C. § 5031, et seq. The jury
convicted Sandoval of the RICO conspiracy and drug charges and returned a
special verdict on the RICO count, indicating that Sandoval committed the
Guzman murder. The district court sentenced Sandoval to life imprisonment for
the RICO conspiracy conviction.
On appeal, Sandoval argues that the sentence of life imprisonment exceeds
the statutory maximum penalty applicable to the RICO offense. Specifically, he
argues that the district court was not authorized to impose a sentence above 20
years’ imprisonment because the racketeering act identified in the jury’s special
verdict, Sandoval’s murder of Guzman, cannot be used to enhance Sandoval’s
sentence, as it was an act of “juvenile delinquency” under the JDA.
By statute, a defendant convicted of RICO conspiracy “shall be fined . . . or
imprisoned not more than 20 years (or for life if the violation is based on a
racketeering activity for which the maximum penalty includes life imprisonment),
or both . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a). “Racketeering activity” means “any act or
27
threat involving[, inter alia,] murder, . . . which is chargeable under State law and
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). Under
Georgia law,10 “[a] person convicted of the offense of murder shall be punished by
death or by imprisonment for life . . . .” O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1(d).
The JDA places limits on when a minor may be tried. “A juvenile alleged to
have committed an act of juvenile delinquency” cannot be tried in federal court
unless the Attorney General issues a certification to the trial court. 18 U.S.C.
§ 5032. A “juvenile” is any “person who has not attained his [18th] birthday, or
for the purpose of proceedings and disposition under this chapter for an alleged act
of juvenile delinquency, a person who has not attained his [21st] birthday . . . .” 18
U.S.C. § 5031. An act of “‘juvenile delinquency’ is the violation of a law of the
United States committed by a person prior to his [18th] birthday which would have
been a crime if committed by an adult . . . .” Id. The crucial date for determining
the age of the defendant and thus the applicability of the JDA is the date on which
the government institutes proceedings by filing an indictment. In re Martin, 788
F.2d 696, 697-98 (11th Cir. 1986).
This circuit has recognized that “[u]nlike most federal offenses, conspiracy
is a continuing crime.” United States v. Cruz, 805 F.2d 1464, 1475 (11th Cir.
10
Because the murder in question was committed in Georgia, that is the relevant state’s
law for the purposes of § 1961(1).
28
1986). In Cruz, we noted, “[t]he Juvenile Delinquency Act does not, of course,
prevent an adult criminal defendant from being tried as an adult simply because he
first became embroiled in the conspiracy with which he is charged while still a
minor . . . .” Id. (quoting United States v. Spoone, 741 F.2d 680, 687 (4th Cir.
1984)). Once it has been established that a defendant’s “participation in a
conspiracy continued after his eighteenth birthday, then he may be tried as an
adult. In his trial as an adult, only the strictures imposed by the Federal Rules of
Evidence may limit the activities of the prosecutor.” Id. at 1476.
Sandoval concedes that he could be tried for conspiracy as an adult and that
evidence of crimes that were committed prior to his eighteenth birthday could be
used as evidence of his guilt, but paradoxically argues that this same evidence
could not be used to enhance his sentence. Sandoval cites no authority in support
of this argument. To the contrary, in United States v. Gibbs, 182 F.3d 408 (6th
Cir. 1999), the Sixth Circuit addressed a drug distribution case in which some of
the drugs were distributed by the defendant prior to his eighteenth birthday and
some were distributed after. The court held that “as long as the government
successfully prosecutes a defendant for a crime that occurred after the defendant
reached the age of majority, the district court may consider relevant conduct that
occurred before the defendant reached the requisite age” when sentencing, so long
29
as the prior conduct was part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or
plan. Id at 442. Similarly, we conclude that in the context of a RICO conspiracy,
if the defendant continues his participation in the activities of the conspiracy past
the age of majority, those crimes may be considered for both determining guilt and
his sentence. Sandoval continued his activities in Sur-13 past the age of majority,
and thus the district court did not err by utilizing 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) to enhance
Sandoval’s sentence based on the jury’s finding that he committed the Guzman
murder.
J. Reasonableness of Sandoval’s Sentence
When sentencing Sandoval for his role in the RICO conspiracy, the district
court gave the following explanation for its imposition of life imprisonment:
Well the Court sets the sentence because of the guidelines and finds
it’s appropriate in the case because of the defendant’s involvement. . .
the Court has considered the factors in 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a), and
believes this particular sentence meets the sentencing criteria set out
in that code section.
Sandoval argues that the sentence of life imprisonment is both procedurally
and substantively unreasonable. First, as to procedural unreasonableness,
Sandoval argues that the district court erred by treating the Guidelines as
mandatory and failing to consider the § 3553(a) mitigating factors. Second,
Sandoval argues that the sentence is substantively unreasonable because the court
30
should have taken into consideration that his offense level was increased because
of an act of “juvenile delinquency,” the disparity between his sentence and the
sentences of those who pleaded guilty to other offenses, and that he joined the gang
at a young age when many of his role models were gang members.
Procedural errors, such as treating the Guidelines as mandatory or failing to
consider §3553(a) mitigating factors, are grounds for reversal. United States v.
Beckles, 565 F.3d 832, 845 (11th Cir. 2009). If the district court did not
procedurally err, this court reviews the substantive reasonableness of the sentence
for abuse of discretion, based on the “totality of the circumstances.” Id. The party
challenging the reasonableness of a sentence “bears the burden of establishing that
the sentence is unreasonable in the light of both [the] record and the factors in
section 3553(a).” United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005). The
district court need not “explicitly articulate that it ha[s] considered the § 3553(a)
factors” and need not discuss each factor. United States v. Dorman, 488 F.3d 936,
944 (11th Cir. 2007). A lengthy discussion is not required in the typical case, so
long as the district court “set[s] forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he
has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his
own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356,
127 S. Ct. 2456, 2468 (2007). Even though a sentence is not per se reasonable by
31
virtue of residing within the Guidelines range, “there is a range of reasonable
sentences from which the district court may choose, and when the district court
imposes a sentence within the advisory Guidelines range, we ordinarily will expect
that choice to be a reasonable one.” Talley, 431 F.3d at 788.
Sandoval has failed to establish procedural or substantive unreasonableness.
The district court explicitly stated that it considered the § 3553(a) factors and did
not need to individually discuss each of these factors. See Dorman, 488 F.3d at
944. Sandoval’s sentence resides within the bounds of the Guidelines range and
reflects his culpability for the Guzman murder. Sandoval’s attempts to contrast his
sentence with sentences received by other Sur-13 members are unpersuasive
because (a) the other two defendants that the jury found committed murder also
received life sentences for those crimes; and (b) unlike Sandoval, individuals that
received lesser sentences cooperated with the government and accepted
responsibility for their crimes. The district court did not err by sentencing
Sandoval to life imprisonment.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth, the defendants’ convictions and sentences are
AFFIRMED.
32