United States v. Goings

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 08-15705 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JULY 7, 2009
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK

D. C. Docket No. 07-00051-CR-4-RH-WCS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RAYMOND THOMAS GOINGS, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________

(July 7, 2009)

Before BIRCH, PRYOR and FAY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:
 Raymond Thomas Goings, Jr. appeals the district court’s denial of his

motion to suppress evidence found at the time of his arrest. On appeal, he

contends that the evidence should have been suppressed because Georgia law

enforcement officers lacked authority to arrest him in Florida. For the reasons set

forth below, we affirm.

I.

A federal grand jury returned an indictment against Goings, charging him

with possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(iii), and (b)(1)(C). Goings filed a motion to suppress

evidence seized from him at the time of his arrest. He asserted that, on June 15,

2007, members of the Thomas County, Georgia – Thomasville Narcotics/Vice

Squad went to his Thomasville residence after learning that he had four

outstanding arrest warrants. Upon their arrival, they observed Goings drive away

from the residence, at which point they activated the blue lights on their vehicle

and pursued him. A high-speed chase ensued, and the officers pursued Goings

over the Florida state line. The officers ultimately arrested Goings after he crashed

his vehicle and attempted to flee, at which point they found narcotics and cash on

his person and at the scene.

Goings argued that, although Florida law allowed officers to arrest an

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individual outside of their jurisdiction when in fresh pursuit, that law was

inapplicable because there was no interstate compact between Thomas County,

Georgia, and Leon County, Florida. The government responded that the arrest was

legal under Florida law because the officers were in fresh pursuit and, contrary to

Goings’s argument, interstate compacts “only become relevant when there is no

fresh pursuit.”

Goings filed a supplemental motion to suppress, in which he asserted that

the pursuing officers had been advised by their supervisor to discontinue the chase

into Florida. As a result, Goings argued that the arrest was not permitted under the

fresh pursuit doctrine because the officers were not “duly authorized” to continue

their pursuit into Florida. The government responded that the officers were never

instructed to discontinue their pursuit.

At the suppression hearing, the district court asked defense counsel to

address the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. __,

128 S.Ct. 1598, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008). Defense counsel acknowledged that

Moore appeared to hold that it was irrelevant whether state law prohibited the

arrest, but he nonetheless expressed frustration with the logic of the decision.

Relying on Moore, and without hearing any testimony, the court issued the

following ruling:

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 The principle that the Supreme Court has adopted is that when there is
probable cause to believe that a person has committed an offense, then
arresting the person does not violate the Fourth Amendment. It may
violate other laws or regulations, but those don’t require suppression
of evidence in a federal criminal proceeding.

Alternatively, the court also found that the arrest was authorized under the fresh

pursuit doctrine. Goings subsequently pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea

agreement, preserving the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. The

court ultimately sentenced Goings to 20 years’ imprisonment, and this appeal

followed.

II.

“In reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we review the

findings of fact for clear error and the application of law to those facts de novo.”

United States v. Mercer, 541 F.3d 1070, 1073-74 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied,

129 S.Ct. 954 (2009). In Moore, the Supreme Court addressed “whether a police

officer violates the Fourth Amendment by making an arrest based on probable

cause but prohibited by state law.” 553 U.S. at __, 128 S.Ct. at 1601. In that case,

the officers arrested the defendant for driving with a suspended license, even

though state law only authorized them to issue a summons. Id. at __, 128 S.Ct.

at 1602-03. As a result, the defendant argued that the drugs found in his

possession during a search incident to that arrest should have been suppressed, but

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the Supreme Court “conclude[d] that warrantless arrests for crimes committed in

the presence of an arresting officer are reasonable under the Constitution,”

explaining “that while States are free to regulate such arrests however they desire,

state restrictions do not alter the Fourth Amendment’s protections.” Id. at __, 128

S.Ct. at 1607.

III.

In this case, Goings argues that the district court erred by denying his

suppression motion only on the ground that the arrest leading to the discovery of

the evidence violated Florida law. However, the district court correctly found that,

under the Supreme Court’s decision in Moore, it was irrelevant for purposes of the

Fourth Amendment whether Goings’s arrest violated state law, so long as it was

supported by probable cause. See id. at __, 128 S.Ct. at 1608 (“When officers have

probable cause to believe that a person has committed a crime in their presence, the

Fourth Amendment permits them to make an arrest . . . .”). In this respect, Goings

effectively concedes on appeal that his arrest was supported by probable cause, and

he does not otherwise challenge the court’s denial of his suppression motion.

Accordingly, we need not address whether the arrest violated Florida law, and we

affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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