Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd.

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2004 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

SPECTOR ET AL. v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 03–1388. Argued February 28, 2005—Decided June 6, 2005
Respondent NCL is a cruise line operating foreign-flag ships departing
from, and returning to, United States ports. The petitioners, dis-
abled individuals and their companions who purchased tickets for
round-trip NCL cruises from Houston, sued NCL under Title III of
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U. S. C.
§12181 et seq., which prohibits discrimination based on disability in
places of “public accommodation,” §12182(a), and in “specified public
transportation services,” §12184(a), and requires covered entities to
make “reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures”
to accommodate disabled persons, §§12182(b)(2)(A)(ii),
12184(b)(2)(A), and to remove “architectural barriers, and communi-
cation barriers that are structural in nature” where such removal is
“readily achievable,” §§12182(b)(2)(A)(iv), 12184(b)(2)(C). Though
holding Title III generally applicable, the District Court found that
the petitioners’ claims regarding physical barriers to access could not
go forward because the federal agencies charged with promulgating
ADA architectural and structural guidelines had not done so for
cruise ships. The court therefore dismissed the barrier-removal
claims, but denied NCL’s motion to dismiss the petitioners’ other
claims. The Fifth Circuit held that Title III does not apply to foreign-
flag cruise ships in U. S. waters because of a presumption, which the
court derived from, e.g., Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S. A., 353
U. S. 138, and McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Hondu-
ras, 372 U. S. 10, that absent a clear indication of congressional in-
tent, general statutes do not apply to foreign-flag ships. Emphasiz-
ing that Title III does not contain a specific provision mandating its
application to such vessels, the court sustained the dismissal of the peti-
tioners’ barrier-removal claims and reversed on their remaining claims.
2 SPECTOR v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.

Syllabus

Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.
356 F. 3d 641, reversed and remanded.
JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered an opinion concluding that except inso-
far as Title III regulates a vessel’s internal affairs, the statute is ap-
plicable to foreign-flag cruise ships in U. S. waters. Parts II–A–1 and
II–B–2 of that opinion held for the Court:
(a) Although Title III’s “public accommodation” and “specified pub-
lic transportation” definitions, §§12181(7)(A),(B)(I),(L), 12181(10), do
not expressly mention cruise ships, there is no doubt that the NCL
ships in question fall within both definitions under conventional
principles of interpretation. The Fifth Circuit nevertheless held Title
III inapplicable because the statute has no clear statement or explicit
text mandating coverage for foreign-flag ships in U. S waters. This
Court’s cases, particularly Benz and McCulloch, do hold, in some cir-
cumstances, that a general statute will not apply to certain aspects of
the internal operations of foreign vessels temporarily in U. S. waters,
absent a clear statement. The broad clear statement rule adopted by
the Court of Appeals, however, would apply to every facet of the busi-
ness and operations of foreign-flag ships. That formulation is inconsis-
tent with the Court’s case law and with sound principles of statutory in-
terpretation. Pp. 5–6.
(b) Title III defines “readily achievable” barrier removal as that
which is “easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without
much difficulty or expense,” §12181(9). The statute does not further
define “difficulty,” but the section’s use of the disjunctive indicates
that it extends to considerations in addition to cost. Furthermore, Ti-
tle III directs that the “readily achievable” determination take into
account “the impact . . . upon the [facility’s] operation,” §12181(9)(B).
A Title III barrier-removal requirement that would bring a vessel
into noncompliance with the International Convention for the Safety
of Life at Sea or any other international legal obligation would create
serious difficulties for the vessel and would have a substantial impact
on its operation, and thus would not be “readily achievable.” Con-
gress could not have intended this result. It is logical and proper to
conclude, moreover, that whether a barrier modification is “readily
achievable” must take into consideration the modification’s effect on
shipboard safety. Title III’s nondiscrimination and accommodation
requirements do not apply if disabled individuals would pose “a sig-
nificant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be elimi-
nated by a modification of policies, practices, or procedures.”
§12182(b)(3). It would be incongruous to attribute to Congress an in-
tent to require modifications threatening others’ safety simply be-
cause the threat comes not from the disabled person but from the ac-
commodation itself. Pp. 12–13.
 Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 3

Syllabus

JUSTICE KENNEDY, joined by JUSTICE STEVENS and JUSTICE SOUTER,
concluded in Parts II–A–2, II–B–1, II–B–3, and III–B:
(a) As a matter of international comity, a clear statement of con-
gressional intent is necessary before a general statutory requirement
can interfere with matters that concern a foreign-flag vessel’s inter-
nal affairs and operations. See, e.g., Wildenhus’s Case, 120 U. S. 1,
12. In Benz and McCulloch, the Court held the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA) inapplicable to labor relations between a foreign
vessel and its foreign crew not because foreign ships are generally
exempt from the NLRA, but because that particular application of
the NLRA would interfere with matters that concern only the ship’s
internal operations. These cases recognized a narrow rule, applicable
only to statutory duties that implicate the foreign vessel’s internal
order rather than the welfare of American citizens. E.g., McCulloch,
supra, at 21. In contrast, the Court later held the NLRA fully appli-
cable to labor relations between a foreign vessel and American long-
shoremen because this relationship, unlike the one between a vessel
and its own crew, does not implicate a foreign ship’s internal order
and discipline. Longshoremen v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U. S.
195, 198–201. This narrow clear statement rule is supported by
sound principles of statutory construction. It is reasonable to pre-
sume Congress intends no interference with matters that are primar-
ily of concern only to the ship and the foreign state in which it is reg-
istered. It is also reasonable, however, to presume Congress does
intend its statutes to apply to entities in U. S. territory that serve,
employ, or otherwise affect American citizens, or that affect the peace
and tranquility of the United States, even if those entities happen to
be foreign-flag ships. Cruise ships flying foreign flags of convenience
but departing from and returning to U. S. ports accommodate and
transport over 7 million U. S. residents annually, including large
numbers of disabled individuals. To hold there is no Title III protec-
tion for the disabled would be a harsh and unexpected interpretation
of a statute designed to provide broad protection for them. Pp. 6–9.
(b) Plainly, most of the Title III violations alleged below—that NCL
required disabled passengers to pay higher fares and special sur-
charges; maintained evacuation programs and equipment in locations
not accessible to them; required them, but not other passengers, to
waive any potential medical liability and to travel with companions;
reserved the right to remove them from ships if they endangered
other passengers’ comfort; and, more generally, failed to make rea-
sonable modifications necessary to ensure their full enjoyment of the
services offered—have nothing to do with a ship’s internal affairs.
However, the petitioners’ allegations concerning physical barriers to
access on board—e.g., their assertion that most of NCL’s cabins, in-
4 SPECTOR v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.

Syllabus

cluding the most attractive ones in the most desirable locations, are
not accessible to disabled passengers—would appear to involve re-
quirements that might be construed as relating to internal ship af-
fairs. The clear statement rule would most likely come into play if
Title III were read to require permanent and significant structural
modifications to foreign vessels. Pp. 9–12.
(c) Because Title III does not require structural modifications that
conflict with international legal obligations or pose any real threat to
the safety of the crew or other passengers, it may well follow that Ti-
tle III does not require any permanent and significant structural
modifications that interfere with cruise ships’ internal affairs. If so,
recourse to the internal affairs clear statement rule would not be
necessary. Cases may arise, however, where it is prudent for a court
to invoke that rule without determining whether Title III actually
imposes a particular barrier-removal requirement entailing a perma-
nent and significant structural modification interfering with a foreign
ship’s internal affairs. Conversely, where it is not obvious that a par-
ticular physical modification relates to a vessel’s basic architecture
and construction, but it is clear the modification would conflict with
an international legal obligation, the court may simply hold the modi-
fication not readily achievable, without resort to the clear statement
rule. Pp. 13–14.
(d) The holding that the clear statement rule operates only when a
ship’s internal affairs are affected does not implicate the Court’s
holding in Clark v. Martinez, 543 U. S. ___, ___, that statutory lan-
guage given a limiting construction in one context must be inter-
preted consistently in other contexts, “even though other of the stat-
ute’s applications, standing alone, would not support the same
limitation.” Martinez applied a canon for choosing among plausible
meanings of an ambiguous statute, not a clear statement rule that
implies a special substantive limit on the application of an otherwise
unambiguous statutory mandate. Pp. 16–18.
JUSTICE KENNEDY, joined by JUSTICE STEVENS, JUSTICE SOUTER, and
JUSTICE THOMAS, concluded in Part III–A that if Title III imposed a
requirement that interfered with a foreign-flag cruise ship’s internal
affairs, the clear statement rule would come into play, but that re-
quirement would still apply to domestic ships, and Title III require-
ments having nothing to do with internal affairs would continue to
apply to domestic and foreign ships alike. This application-by-
application approach is consistent with how the clear statement rule
has traditionally operated. If the rule restricts some NLRA applica-
tions to foreign ships (e.g., labor relations with foreign crews in Benz
and McCulloch), but not others (e.g., labor relations with American
longshoremen in Ariadne Shipping), it follows that its case-by-case
 Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 5

Syllabus

application is also required under Title III. The clear statement rule,
if it is invoked, would restrict some applications of Title III to foreign
ships (e.g., certain structural barrier modification requirements), but
not others (e.g., the statute’s prohibition on discriminatory ticket
pricing). The rule is an implied limitation on a statute’s otherwise
unambiguous general terms. It operates much like other implied
limitation rules, which avoid applications of otherwise unambiguous
statutes that would intrude on sensitive domains in a way that Con-
gress is unlikely to have intended had it considered the matter. See,
e.g., EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244, 260. An all-
or-nothing approach would convert the clear statement rule from a
principle of interpretive caution into a trap for an unwary Congress,
requiring nullification of the entire statute, or of some arbitrary set of
applications larger than the domain the rule protects. Pp. 14–16.
JUSTICE GINSBURG, joined by JUSTICE BREYER, agreed that Title III
of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 covers cruise ships and
allows them to resist modifications that would conflict with interna-
tional legal obligations, but would give no wider berth to the “internal
affairs” clear statement rule in determining Title III’s application to
respondent’s ships. That rule derives from, and is moored to, the
broader guide that statutes “should not be interpreted to regulate
foreign persons or conduct if that regulation would conflict with prin-
ciples of international law.” Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509
U. S. 764, 815. This noninterference principle is served here by the
Court’s interpretation of 42 U. S. C. §12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)’s “readily
achievable” language to avoid conflict with international legal obliga-
tions. The plurality’s further suggestion that the “internal affairs”
clear statement rule may block Title III-prompted structural modifi-
cations, even in the absence of conflict with international obligations,
cuts the rule loose from its foundation. Because international rela-
tions are not at risk and the United States has a strong interest in
protecting American passengers on foreign and domestic cruise ships,
there is no reason to demand a clearer congressional statement that
Title III reaches the vessels in question. Pp. 1–4.
JUSTICE THOMAS concluded that Title III of the of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, insofar as it could be read to require
structural changes, lacks a sufficiently clear statement that it applies
to the internal affairs of foreign vessels. However, the clear state-
ment rule does not render Title III entirely inapplicable to foreign
vessels; instead, Title III applies to foreign ships only to the extent to
which it does not bear on their internal affairs. Pp. 1–4.

KENNEDY, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the
opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II–A–1, and II–B–2, in
6 SPECTOR v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.

Syllabus

which STEVENS, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined, an opinion
with respect to Parts II–A–2, II–B–1, II–B–3, and III–B, in which STE-
VENS and SOUTER, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part III–
A, in which STEVENS, SOUTER, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. GINSBURG, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in
which BREYER, J., joined. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in
part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment in part.
SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and
O’CONNOR, J., joined, and in which THOMAS, J., joined with respect to
Part I–A.
 Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 1

Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 03–1388
_________________

DOUGLAS SPECTOR, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[June 6, 2005]

JUSTICE KENNEDY announced the judgment of the Court
and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to
Parts I, II–A–1, and II–B–2, an opinion with respect to
Parts II–A–2, II–B–1, II–B–3, and III–B, in which JUSTICE
STEVENS and JUSTICE SOUTER join, and an opinion with
respect to Part III–A, in which JUSTICE STEVENS, JUSTICE
SOUTER, and JUSTICE THOMAS join.
This case presents the question whether Title III of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 104 Stat.
353, 42 U. S. C. §12181 et seq., applies to foreign-flag
cruise ships in United States waters. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit held Title III did not apply
because of a presumption, which it sought to derive from
this Court’s case law, that, absent a clear indication of
congressional intent, general statutes do not apply to
foreign-flag ships. 356 F. 3d 641, 644–646 (2004). The
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, on the other
hand, has held that the ADA does apply to foreign-flag
cruise ships in United States waters. See Stevens v. Pre-
mier Cruises, Inc., 215 F. 3d 1237 (2000). We granted
certiorari to resolve the conflict. 542 U. S. ___ (2004).
2 SPECTOR v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.

Opinion of the Court

Our cases hold that a clear statement of congressional
intent is necessary before a general statutory requirement
can interfere with matters that concern a foreign-flag
vessel’s internal affairs and operations, as contrasted with
statutory requirements that concern the security and well-
being of United States citizens or territory. While the
clear statement rule could limit Title III’s application to
foreign-flag cruise ships in some instances, when it re-
quires removal of physical barriers, it would appear the
rule is inapplicable to many other duties Title III might
impose. We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit that the ADA is altogether
inapplicable to foreign vessels; and we remand for further
proceedings.
I
The respondent Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd. (NCL), a
Bermuda Corporation with a principal place of business in
Miami, Florida, operates cruise ships that depart from,
and return to, ports in the United States. The ships are
essentially floating resorts. They provide passengers with
staterooms or cabins, food, and entertainment. The cruise
ships stop at different ports of call where passengers may
disembark. Most of the passengers on these cruises are
United States residents; under the terms and conditions of
the tickets, disputes between passengers and NCL are to
be governed by United States law; and NCL relies upon
extensive advertising in the United States to promote its
cruises and increase its revenues.
Despite the fact that the cruises are operated by a com-
pany based in the United States, serve predominately
United States residents, and are in most other respects
United States-centered ventures, almost all of NCL’s
cruise ships are registered in other countries, flying so-
called flags of convenience. The two NCL cruise ships that
are the subject of the present litigation, the Norwegian
 Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 3

Opinion of the Court

Sea and the Norwegian Star, are both registered in the
Bahamas.
The petitioners are disabled individuals and their com-
panions who purchased tickets in 1998 or 1999 for round-
trip cruises on the Norwegian Sea or the Norwegian Star,
with departures from Houston, Texas. Naming NCL as
the defendant, the petitioners filed a class action in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas on behalf of all persons similarly situated. They
sought declaratory and injunctive relief under Title III of
the ADA, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of
disability. The petitioners asserted that cruise ships are
covered both by Title III’s prohibition on discrimination in
places of “public accommodation,” §12182(a), and by its
prohibition on discrimination in “specified public transpor-
tation services,” §12184(a). Both provisions require
covered entities to make “reasonable modifications in
policies, practices, or procedures” to accommodate disabled
individuals, §§12182(b)(2)(A)(ii), 12184(b)(2)(A), and re-
quire removal of “architectural barriers, and communi-
cation barriers that are structural in nature” where
such removal is “readily achievable,” §§12182(b)(2)(A)(iv),
12184(b)(2)(C).
The District Court held that, as a general matter, Title
III applies to foreign-flag cruise ships in United States
territorial waters. Civ. Action No. H–00–2649 (SD Tex.,
Sept. 10, 2002), App. to Pet. for Cert. 35a. The District
Court found, however, that the petitioners’ claims regard-
ing physical barriers to access could not go forward be-
cause the agencies charged with promulgating architec-
tural and structural guidelines for ADA compliance (the
Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance
Board, the Department of Transportation, and the De-
partment of Justice) had not done so for cruise ships. In
these circumstances, the court held, it is unclear what
structural modifications NCL would need to make. Id., at
4 SPECTOR v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.

Opinion of the Court

36a–42a. The District Court granted NCL’s motion to
dismiss the barrier-removal claims, but denied NCL’s
motion with respect to all the other claims. Id., at 47a.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in
part and reversed in part. It reasoned that our cases,
particularly Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S. A., 353
U. S. 138 (1957), and McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de
Marineros de Honduras, 372 U. S. 10 (1963), stand for the
proposition that general statutes do not apply to foreign-flag
vessels in United States territory absent a clear indication
of congressional intent. 356 F. 3d, at 644 (“[T]o apply do-
mestic law to foreign vessels entering United States waters,
there must be present the affirmative intention of the Con-
gress clearly expressed” (quoting Benz, supra, at 147 (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)); 356 F. 3d, at 646 (Benz and
McCulloch “prohibit United States courts from applying
domestic statutes to foreign-flagged ships without specific
evidence of congressional intent”). As Title III does not
contain a specific provision mandating its application to
foreign-flag vessels, the Court of Appeals sustained the
District Court’s dismissal of the petitioners’ barrier-removal
claims on this alternative ground and reversed the District
Court on the remaining Title III claims. 356 F. 3d, at 650–
651.
The action was ordered dismissed for failure to state a
claim, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6), before extensive discov-
ery. We cannot then discuss the specific allegations in much
detail but must confine our opinion to the relevant general
principles. (On November 24, 2004, the responsible agen-
cies finally did issue draft guidelines for large passenger
vessels and a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. See 69 Fed.
Reg. 69244, 69249. These developments are not disposi-
tive of the legal question on which we granted certiorari,
and we do not address how they might affect the ultimate
resolution of the petitioners’ claims.)
 Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 5

Opinion of the Court

II
A
1
Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination against
the disabled in the full and equal enjoyment of pub-
lic accommodations, 42 U. S. C. §12182(a), and public
transportation services, §12184(a). The general prohi-
bitions are supplemented by various, more specific
requirements. Entities that provide public accommo-
dations or public transportation: (1) may not impose
“eligibility criteria” that tend to screen out disabled
individuals, §§12182(b)(2)(A)(i), 12184(b)(1); (2) must
make “reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or
procedures, when such modifications are necessary” to
provide disabled individuals full and equal enjoy-
ment, §§12182(b)(2)(A)(ii), 12184(b)(2)(A); (3) must pro-
vide auxiliary aids and services to disabled individ-
uals, §§12182(b)(2)(A)(iii), 12184(b)(2)(B); and (4) must
remove architectural and structural barriers, or if barrier
removal is not readily achievable, must ensure equal
access for the disabled through alternative methods,
§§12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)–(v), 12184(b)(2)(C).
These specific requirements, in turn, are subject to
important exceptions and limitations. Eligibility criteria
that screen out disabled individuals are permitted when
“necessary for the provision” of the services or facilities
being offered, §§12182(b)(2)(A)(i), 12184(b)(1). Policies,
practices, and procedures need not be modified, and auxil-
iary aids need not be provided, if doing so would “funda-
mentally alter” the services or accommodations being
offered. §§12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)–(iii). Auxiliary aids are also
unnecessary when they would “result in an undue bur-
den,” §12182(b)(2)(A)(iii). As we have noted, moreover, the
barrier removal and alternative access requirements do
not apply when these requirements are not “readily
6 SPECTOR v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.

Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

achievable,” §§12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)–(v). Additionally, Title
III does not impose nondiscrimination or accommodation
requirements if, as a result, disabled individuals would
pose “a significant risk to the health or safety of others
that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies,
practices, or procedures or by the provision of auxiliary
aids or services,” §12182(b)(3).
Although the statutory definitions of “public accommo-
dation” and “specified public transportation” do not ex-
pressly mention cruise ships, there can be no serious
doubt that the NCL cruise ships in question fall within
both definitions under conventional principles of interpre-
tation. §§12181(7)(A)–(B),(I),(L), 12181(10). The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, nevertheless, held that Title
III does not apply to foreign-flag cruise ships in United
States waters because the statute has no clear statement
or explicit text mandating coverage for these ships. This
Court’s cases, particularly Benz and McCulloch, do hold,
in some circumstances, that a general statute will not
apply to certain aspects of the internal operations of for-
eign vessels temporarily in United States waters, absent a
clear statement. The broad clear statement rule adopted by
the Court of Appeals, however, would apply to every facet of
the business and operations of foreign-flag ships. That
formulation is inconsistent with the Court’s case law and
with sound principles of statutory interpretation.
2
This Court has long held that general statutes are pre-
sumed to apply to conduct that takes place aboard a for-
eign-flag vessel in United States territory if the interests
of the United States or its citizens, rather than interests
internal to the ship, are at stake. See Cunard S. S. Co. v.
Mellon, 262 U. S. 100, 127 (1923) (holding that the general
terms of the National Prohibition Act apply to foreign-flag
ships in United States waters because “[t]here is in the act
 Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 7

Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

no provision making it inapplicable” to such ships); Uravic
v. F. Jarka Co., 282 U. S. 234, 240 (1931) (holding that
“general words” should be “generally applied” and that
therefore there is “no reason for limiting the liability for
torts committed [aboard foreign-flag ships in United
States territory] when they go beyond the scope of disci-
pline and private matters that do not interest the territo-
rial power”). The general rule that United States statutes
apply to foreign-flag ships in United States territory is
subject only to a narrow exception. Absent a clear state-
ment of congressional intent, general statutes may not
apply to foreign-flag vessels insofar as they regulate mat-
ters that involve only the internal order and discipline of
the vessel, rather than the peace of the port. This qualifi-
cation derives from the understanding that, as a matter of
international comity, “all matters of discipline and all
things done on board which affec[t] only the vessel or
those belonging to her, and [do] not involve the peace or
dignity of the country, or the tranquility of the port,
should be left by the local government to be dealt with by
the authorities of the nation to which the vessel belonged.”
Wildenhus’s Case, 120 U. S. 1, 12 (1887). This exception to
the usual presumption, however, does not extend beyond
matters of internal order and discipline. “[I]f crimes are
committed on board [a foreign-flag vessel] of a character to
disturb the peace and tranquility of the country to which
the vessel has been brought, the offenders have never by
comity or usage been entitled to any exemption from the
operation of the local laws.” Ibid.
The two cases in recent times in which the presumption
against applying general statutes to foreign vessels’ inter-
nal affairs has been invoked, Benz and McCulloch, concern
labor relations. The Court held that the general terms of
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 49 Stat. 449, 29
U. S. C. §151 et seq., did not govern the respective rights
and duties of a foreign ship and its crew because the
8 SPECTOR v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.

Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

NLRA standards would interfere with the foreign vessel’s
internal affairs in those circumstances. These cases rec-
ognized a narrow rule, applicable only to statutory duties
that implicate the internal order of the foreign vessel
rather than the welfare of American citizens. McCulloch,
372 U. S., at 21 (holding that “the law of the flag state
ordinarily governs the internal affairs of a ship” (emphasis
added)); see also Benz, 353 U. S., at 146–147. The Court
held the NLRA inapplicable to labor relations between a
foreign vessel and its foreign crew not because foreign
ships are generally exempt from the NLRA, but because
the particular application of the NLRA would interfere
with matters that concern only the internal operations of
the ship. In contrast, the Court held that the NLRA is
fully applicable to labor relations between a foreign vessel
and American longshoremen because this relationship,
unlike the one between a vessel and its own crew, does not
implicate a foreign ship’s internal order and discipline.
Longshoremen v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U. S. 195,
198–201 (1970).
This narrow clear statement rule is supported by sound
principles of statutory construction. It is reasonable to
presume Congress intends no interference with matters
that are primarily of concern only to the ship and the
foreign state in which it is registered. It is also reason-
able, however, to presume Congress does intend its stat-
utes to apply to entities in United States territory that
serve, employ, or otherwise affect American citizens, or
that affect the peace and tranquility of the United States,
even if those entities happen to be foreign-flag ships.
Cruise ships flying foreign flags of convenience offer
public accommodations and transportation services to over
7 million United States residents annually, departing from
and returning to ports located in the United States. Large
numbers of disabled individuals, many of whom have
mobility impairments that make other kinds of vacation
 Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 9

Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

travel difficult, take advantage of these cruises or would
like to do so. To hold there is no Title III protection for
disabled persons who seek to use the amenities of foreign
cruise ships would be a harsh and unexpected interpreta-
tion of a statute designed to provide broad protection for
the disabled. §12101. The clear statement rule adopted
by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, moreover,
would imply that other general federal statutes—
including, for example, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 78 Stat. 243, 42 U. S. C. §2000a et seq.—would not
apply aboard foreign cruise ships in United States waters.
A clear statement rule with this sweeping application is
unlikely to reflect congressional intent.
The relevant category for which the Court demands a
clear congressional statement, then, consists not of all
applications of a statute to foreign-flag vessels but only
those applications that would interfere with the foreign
vessel’s internal affairs. This proposition does not mean
the clear statement rule is irrelevant to the ADA, how-
ever. If Title III by its terms does impose duties that
interfere with a foreign-flag cruise ship’s internal affairs,
the lack of a clear congressional statement can mean that
those specific applications of Title III are precluded. On
remand, the Court of Appeals may need to consider which,
if any, Title III requirements interfere with the internal
affairs of foreign-flag vessels. As we will discuss further,
however, Title III’s own limitations and qualifications may
make this inquiry unnecessary.
B
1
The precise content of the category “internal affairs” (or,
as it is variously denoted in the case law, “internal order”
or “internal operations”) is difficult to define with preci-
sion. There is, moreover, some ambiguity in our cases as
to whether the relevant category of activities is restricted
10 SPECTOR v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.

Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

to matters that affect only the internal order of the ship
when there is no effect on United States interests, or
whether the clear statement rule further comes into play if
the predominant effect of a statutory requirement is on a
foreign ship’s internal affairs but the requirement also
promotes the welfare of United States residents or terri-
tory. We need not attempt to define the relevant protected
category with precision. It suffices to observe that the
guiding principles in determining whether the clear
statement rule is triggered are the desire for international
comity and the presumed lack of interest by the territorial
sovereign in matters that bear no substantial relation to
the peace and tranquility of the port.
It is plain that Title III might impose any number of
duties on cruise ships that have nothing to do with a ship’s
internal affairs. The pleadings and briefs in this case
illustrate, but do not exhaust, the ways a cruise ship
might offend such a duty. The petitioners allege the re-
spondent charged disabled passengers higher fares and
required disabled passengers to pay special surcharges,
Plaintiffs’ First Amended Original Complaint in No. H–
00–2649 (SD Tex.), ¶32, App. 15 (hereinafter Complaint);
Brief for Petitioners 17–20; maintained evacuation pro-
grams and equipment in locations not accessible to dis-
abled individuals, Complaint ¶19, App. 12; Brief for Peti-
tioners 21; required disabled individuals, but not other
passengers, to waive any potential medical liability and to
travel with a companion, id., at 8, 17–18; and reserved the
right to remove from the ship any disabled individual
whose presence endangers the “comfort” of other passen-
gers, id., at 8, 20. The petitioners also allege more gener-
ally that respondent “failed to make reasonable modifica-
tions in policies, practices, and procedures” necessary to
ensure the petitioners’ full enjoyment of the services re-
spondent offered. Complaint ¶30, App. 15. These are bare
allegations, and their truth is not conceded. We express
 Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 11

Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

no opinion on the factual support for those claims. We can
say, however, that none of these alleged Title III violations
implicate any requirement that would interfere with the
internal affairs and management of a vessel as our cases
have employed that term.
At least one subset of the petitioners’ allegations, how-
ever, would appear to involve requirements that might be
construed as relating to the internal affairs of foreign-flag
cruise ships. These allegations concern physical barriers
to access on board. For example, according to the petition-
ers, most of the cabins on the respondent’s cruise ships,
including the most attractive cabins in the most desirable
locations, are not accessible to disabled passengers. Brief
for Petitioners 17–18; Complaint ¶16, App. 11. The peti-
tioners also allege that the ships’ coamings—the raised
edges around their doors—make many areas of the ships
inaccessible to mobility-impaired passengers who use
wheelchairs or scooters. Brief for Petitioners 24. Removal
of these and other access barriers, the petitioners suggest,
may be required by Title III’s structural barrier removal
requirement, §§12182(b)(2)(A)(iv), 12184(b)(2)(C).
Although these physical barriers affect the passengers
as well as the ship and its crew, the statutory requirement
could mandate a permanent and significant alteration of a
physical feature of the ship—that is, an element of basic
ship design and construction. If so, these applications of
the barrier removal requirement likely would interfere
with the internal affairs of foreign ships. A permanent
and significant modification to a ship’s physical structure
goes to fundamental issues of ship design and construc-
tion, and it might be impossible for a ship to comply with
all the requirements different jurisdictions might impose.
The clear statement rule would most likely come into play
if Title III were read to require permanent and significant
structural modifications to foreign vessels. It is quite a
different question, however, whether Title III would re-
12 SPECTOR v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.

Opinion of the Court

quire this. The Title III requirements that might impose
permanent and substantial changes to a ship’s architec-
ture and design, are, like all of Title III’s requirements,
subject to the statute’s own specific limitations and quali-
fications. These limitations may make resort to the clear
statement rule unnecessary.
2
Title III requires barrier removal if it is “readily achiev-
able,” §12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). The statute defines that term
as “easily accomplishable and able to be carried out with-
out much difficulty or expense,” §12181(9). Title III does
not define “difficulty” in §12181(9), but use of the disjunc-
tive—“easily accomplishable and able to be carried out
without much difficulty or expense”—indicates that it
extends to considerations in addition to cost. Further-
more, Title III directs that the “readily achievable” deter-
mination take into account “the impact . . . upon the op-
eration of the facility,” §12181(9)(B).
Surely a barrier removal requirement under Title III
that would bring a vessel into noncompliance with the
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS), Nov. 1, 1974, [1979–1980], 32 U. S. T. 47, T. I. A.
S. No. 9700, or any other international legal obligation,
would create serious difficulties for the vessel and would
have a substantial impact on its operation, and thus would
not be “readily achievable.” This understanding of the
statute, urged by the United States, is eminently reason-
able. Brief as Amicus Curiae 27–28; ADA Title III Techni-
cal Assistance Manual III–1.2000(D) (Supp. 1994), avail-
able at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/taman3up.html (as
visited May 31, 2005, and available in Clerk of Court’s
case file); 56 Fed. Reg. 45600 (1991). If, moreover, Title
III’s “readily achievable” exemption were not to take con-
flicts with international law into account, it would lead to
the anomalous result that American cruise ships are
obligated to comply with Title III even if doing so brings
 Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 13

Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

them into noncompliance with SOLAS, whereas foreign
ships—which unlike American ships have the benefit of
the internal affairs clear statement rule—would not be so
obligated. Congress could not have intended this result.
It is logical and proper to conclude, moreover, that
whether a barrier modification is “readily achievable”
under Title III must take into consideration the modifica-
tion’s effect on shipboard safety. A separate provision of
Title III mandates that the statute’s nondiscrimination
and accommodation requirements do not apply if disabled
individuals would pose “a significant risk to the health or
safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modifica-
tion of policies, practices, or procedures or by the provision
of auxiliary aids or services,” §12182(b)(3). This reference
is to a safety threat posed by a disabled individual,
whereas here the question would be whether the struc-
tural modification itself may pose the safety threat. It
would be incongruous, nevertheless, to attribute to Con-
gress an intent to require modifications that threaten
safety to others simply because the threat comes not from
the disabled person but from the accommodation itself.
The anomaly is avoided by concluding that a structural
modification is not readily achievable within the meaning
of §12181(9) if it would pose a direct threat to the health
or safety of others.
3
Because Title III does not require structural modifica-
tions that would conflict with international legal obliga-
tions or pose any real threat to the safety of the crew or
other passengers, it may well follow—though we do not
decide the question here—that Title III does not require
any permanent and significant structural modifications
that interfere with the internal affairs of any cruise ship,
foreign flag or domestic. If that is indeed the case, re-
course to the clear statement rule would not be necessary.
14 SPECTOR v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.

Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

Cases may arise, however, where it is prudent for a
court to turn first to the internal affairs clear statement
rule rather than deciding the precise scope and operation
of the statute. Suppose, for example, it is a difficult ques-
tion whether a particular Title III barrier removal re-
quirement is readily achievable, but the requirement does
entail a permanent and significant structural modifica-
tion, interfering with a foreign ship’s internal affairs. In
that case a court sensibly could invoke the clear statement
rule without determining whether Title III actually im-
poses the requirement. On the other hand, there may be
many cases where it is not obvious that a particular physi-
cal modification relates to a vessel’s basic architecture and
construction, but it is clear the modification would conflict
with SOLAS or some other international legal obligation.
In those cases, a court may deem it appropriate to hold
that the physical barrier modification in question is not
readily achievable, without resort to the clear statement
rule.
III
A
In light of the preceding analysis, it is likely that under
a proper interpretation of “readily achievable” Title III
would impose no requirements that interfere with the
internal affairs of foreign-flag cruise ships. If Title III did
impose a duty that required cruise ships to make perma-
nent and significant structural modifications that did not
conflict with international law or threaten safety, or if the
statute otherwise interfered with a foreign ship’s internal
affairs, the clear statement rule recognized in Benz and
McCulloch would come into play at that point. The Title
III requirement in question, however, would still apply to
domestic cruise ships, and Title III requirements having
nothing to do with internal affairs would continue to apply
to domestic and foreign ships alike.
 Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 15

Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

This application-by-application use of the internal af-
fairs clear statement rule is consistent with how the rule
has traditionally operated. In Benz and McCulloch, the
Court concluded that the NLRA did not apply to labor
relations between a foreign-flag ship and its foreign crew
because of interference with the foreign ships’ internal
affairs. In Ariadne Shipping, however, the Court held
that the NLRA does apply to labor relations between a
foreign-flag ship and American longshoremen. Ariadne
Shipping acknowledged the clear statement rule invoked
in Benz and McCulloch but held that the “considerations
that informed the Court’s construction of the statute in
[those cases] are clearly inapplicable” to the question
whether the statute applies to foreign ships’ labor rela-
tions with American longshoremen. 397 U. S., at 199.
Ariadne Shipping held that the longshoremen’s “short-
term, irregular and casual connection with the [foreign]
vessels plainly belied any involvement on their part with
the ships’ ‘internal discipline and order.’ ” Id., at 200.
Therefore, application of the NLRA to foreign ships’ rela-
tions with American longshoremen “would have threat-
ened no interference in the internal affairs of foreign-flag
ships.” Ibid. If the clear statement rule restricts some
applications of the NLRA to foreign ships (e.g., labor rela-
tions with the foreign crew), but not others (e.g., labor
relations with American longshoremen), it follows that the
case-by-case application is also required under Title III of
the ADA. The rule, where it is even necessary to invoke it,
would restrict some applications of Title III to foreign
ships (e.g., certain structural barrier modification re-
quirements), but not others (e.g., the prohibition on dis-
criminatory ticket pricing).
The internal affairs clear statement rule is an implied
limitation on otherwise unambiguous general terms of the
statute. It operates much like the principle that general
statutes are construed not to apply extraterritorially,
16 SPECTOR v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.

Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244, 260
(1991), or the rule that general statutes are presumed not
to impose monetary liability on nonconsenting States,
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234
(1985). Implied limitation rules avoid applications of
otherwise unambiguous statutes that would intrude on
sensitive domains in a way that Congress is unlikely to
have intended had it considered the matter. In these
instances, the absence of a clear congressional statement
is, in effect, equivalent to a statutory qualification saying,
for example, “Notwithstanding any general language of
this statute, this statute shall not apply extraterritori-
ally”; or “. . . this statute shall not abrogate the sovereign
immunity of nonconsenting States”; or “. . . this statute
does not regulate the internal affairs of foreign-flag ves-
sels.” These clear statement rules ensure Congress does
not, by broad or general language, legislate on a sensitive
topic inadvertently or without due deliberation. An all-or-
nothing approach, under which a statute is altogether
inapplicable if but one of its specific applications trenches
on the domain protected by a clear statement rule, would
convert the clear statement rule from a principle of inter-
pretive caution into a trap for an unwary Congress. If
Congress passes broad legislation that has some applica-
tions that implicate a clear statement rule—say, some
extraterritorial applications, or some applications that
would regulate foreign ships’ internal affairs—an all-or-
nothing approach would require that the entire statute, or
some arbitrary set of applications larger than the domain
protected by the clear statement rule, would be nullified.
We decline to adopt that posture.
B
Our holding that the clear statement rule operates only
when a ship’s internal affairs are affected does not impli-
cate our holding in Clark v. Martinez, 543 U. S. ___ (2005).
 Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 17

Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

Martinez held that statutory language given a limiting
construction in one context must be interpreted consis-
tently in other contexts, “even though other of the stat-
ute’s applications, standing alone, would not support the
same limitation.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 8). This was
simply a rule of consistent interpretation of the statu-
tory words, with no bearing on the implementation of a
clear statement rule addressed to particular statutory
applications.
The statute in Martinez, 8 U. S. C. §1231(a)(6), author-
ized detention of aliens pending their removal. In Zadvy-
das v. Davis, 533 U. S. 678, 696–699 (2001), the Court had
interpreted this statute to impose time limits on detention
of aliens held for certain reasons stated in the statute.
The Court held that an alternative interpretation, one
allowing indefinite detention of lawfully admitted aliens,
would raise grave constitutional doubts. Having deter-
mined the meaning of §1231(a)(6)’s text in Zadvydas, we
were obliged in Martinez to follow the same interpretation
even in a context where the constitutional concerns were
not present. Martinez, 543 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 5–9).
As already made clear, the question was one of textual
interpretation, not the scope of some implied exception.
The constitutional avoidance canon simply informed the
choice among plausible readings of §1231(a)(6)’s text: “The
canon of constitutional avoidance,” Martinez explained,
“comes into play only when, after the application of ordi-
nary textual analysis, the statute is found to be suscepti-
ble of more than one construction; and the canon functions
as a means of choosing between them.” Id., at ___ (slip
op., at 13) (emphasis deleted).
Martinez gives full respect to the distinction between
rules for resolving textual ambiguity and implied limita-
tions on otherwise unambiguous text. Indeed, Martinez
relies on the distinction to reconcile its holding with two
cases which did involve a clear statement rule, Raygor v.
18 SPECTOR v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.

Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U. S. 533 (2002), and Jinks
v. Richland County, 538 U. S. 456 (2003). Raygor had
held that the tolling provision in the supplemental juris-
diction statute, 28 U. S. C. §1367(d), does not apply to
nonconsenting States because the statute lacks the re-
quired clear statement that States are within its coverage.
Later, in Jinks, we held that the §1367(d) tolling provision
does apply to suits against counties. The counties were
not protected by a clear statement rule analogous to the
one applicable to States. See Martinez, 543 U. S., at ___
(slip op., at 11–12, and n. 6); see also id., at ___ (slip op., at
6–8) (THOMAS, J., dissenting). “This progression of deci-
sions,” we held in Martinez, “does not remotely establish
that §1367(d) has two different meanings, equivalent to
the unlimited-detention/limited-detention meanings of
§1231(a)(6) urged upon us here. They hold that the single
and unchanging disposition of §1367(d) . . . does not apply
to claims against States that have not consented to be
sued in federal court.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 12). The
distinction between Zadvydas and Martinez, on the one
hand, and Raygor and Jinks, on the other, is the distinc-
tion between a canon for choosing among plausible mean-
ings of an ambiguous statute and a clear statement rule
that implies a special substantive limit on the application
of an otherwise unambiguous mandate.
The internal affairs clear statement rule is an implied
limitation rule, not a principle for resolving textual ambi-
guity. Our cases, then, do not compel or permit the con-
clusion that if any one application of Title III might inter-
fere with a foreign-flag ship’s internal affairs, Title III is
inapplicable to foreign ships in every other instance.
* * *
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that
general statutes do not apply to foreign-flag ships in
United States waters. This Court’s cases, however, stand
 Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 19

Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

only for the proposition that general statutes are pre-
sumed not to impose requirements that would interfere
with the internal affairs of foreign-flag vessels. Except
insofar as Title III regulates a vessel’s internal affairs—a
category that is not always well defined and that may
require further judicial elaboration—the statute is appli-
cable to foreign ships in United States waters to the same
extent that it is applicable to American ships in those
waters.
Title III’s own limitations and qualifications prevent the
statute from imposing requirements that would conflict
with international obligations or threaten shipboard
safety. These limitations and qualifications, though
framed in general terms, employ a conventional vocabu-
lary for instructing courts in the interpretation and appli-
cation of the statute. If, on remand, it becomes clear that
even after these limitations are taken into account Title
III nonetheless imposes certain requirements that would
interfere with the internal affairs of foreign ships—
perhaps, for example, by requiring permanent and sub-
stantial structural modifications—the clear statement rule
would come into play. It is also open to the court on re-
mand to consider application of the clear statement rule at
the outset if, as a prudential matter, that appears to be
the more appropriate course.
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
remand the case for further proceedings.

It is so ordered.
 Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 1

Opinion of GINSBURG, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 03–1388
_________________

DOUGLAS SPECTOR, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[June 6, 2005]

JUSTICE GINSBURG, with whom JUSTICE BREYER joins,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court’s holding that Title III of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 covers cruise
ships, ante, at 6, and allows them to resist modifications
“that would conflict with international legal obligations,”
ante, at 12–13. I therefore join Parts I, II–A–1, and II–B–
2 of the Court’s opinion. I would give no wider berth,
however, to the “internal affairs” clear statement rule in
determining Title III’s application to respondent’s cruise
ships, the Norwegian Sea and Norwegian Star. But see
ante, at 14. That rule, as I understand it, derives from,
and is moored to, the broader guide that statutes “should
not be interpreted to regulate foreign persons or conduct if
that regulation would conflict with principles of interna-
tional law.” Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U. S.
764, 815 (1993) (SCALIA, J., dissenting); see also id., at 816
(describing McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de
Honduras, 372 U. S. 10 (1963), as applying this principle);
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118
(1804). Title III is properly read to avoid such conflict, but
2 SPECTOR v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.

Opinion of GINSBURG, J.

should not be hemmed in where there is no potential for
international discord.1
The first of the modern cases to address the application
of a domestic statute to a foreign-flag ship in U. S. waters,
Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S. A., 353 U. S. 138
(1957), did not resort to the tag, “internal affairs” rule, to
explain the Court’s decision.2 Benz held that the Labor
Management Relations Act did not reach relations be-
tween “a foreign employer and a foreign crew operating
under an agreement made abroad under the laws of an-
other nation.” Id., at 142. As we concluded in Benz, before
reading our law to “run interference in such a delicate
field of international relations,” “where the possibilities of
international discord are so evident and retaliative action
so certain,” the Court should await Congress’ clearly ex-
pressed instruction. Id., at 147.
Six years later, in McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de
Marineros de Honduras, 372 U. S. 10 (1963), the Court
relied on Benz to hold that the National Labor Relations Act
does not regulate the representation of alien seamen re-
cruited in Honduras to serve aboard vessels under Hondu-
ran flags. Applying our law “to the internal management
and affairs” of the vessels in question, we observed,
McCulloch, 372 U. S., at 20, would produce a “head-on
collision” with the regulatory regime installed under the
Honduran labor code, id., at 21. “[S]uch highly charged
international circumstances,” we said, called for adherence
to the venerable interpretive guide that “ ‘an act of Congress
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if
any other possible construction remains.’ ” Ibid. (quoting
——————
1 Were a clear statement rule in order, I would agree with the plural-

ity’s application-by-application approach.
2 Only in a footnote describing a National Labor Relations Board

decision did the Court make a synonymous reference to the “internal
economy of a vessel of foreign registry and ownership.” Benz, 353 U. S.,
at 143, n. 5.
 Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 3

Opinion of GINSBURG, J.

Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch, at 118). Cf. Long-
shoremen v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U. S. 195, 200 (1970)
(applying U. S. law to foreign ships’ labor relations with
longshoreworkers employed at U. S. ports is proper because
doing so “would . . . threate[n] no interference in the internal
affairs of foreign-flag ships likely to lead to conflict with
foreign or international law”).
The noninterference principle underlying the internal
affairs clear statement rule is served in this case by the
Court’s interpretation of Title III’s “readily achievable”
provision, 42 U. S. C. §12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). See ante, at 12–
13. Construing this language to allow ships to resist
modifications “that would conflict with international legal
obligations,” ante, at 13, the Court ensures that Title III
will not provoke “international discord” of the kind Benz
and McCulloch sought to avoid. I agree with this interpre-
tation, but would create no larger space for the internal
affairs rule.
The plurality, however, suggests that the clear state-
ment rule has a further office: It may block structural
modifications prompted by Title III that are “readily
achievable”—because they do not conflict with interna-
tional legal obligations—but nonetheless “interfer[e] with
a foreign ship’s internal affairs.” Ante, at 14. I disagree
with this conception of the rule. In positing an extended
application of the internal affairs rule, the plurality cuts
the rule loose from its foundation. As Benz and McCulloch
demonstrate, the clear statement rule is an interpretive
principle counseling against construction of a statute in a
manner productive of international discord. When inter-
national relations are not at risk, and there is good reason
to apply our own law, asserted internal affairs of a ship
should hold no greater sway than asserted management
prerogatives of a landlocked enterprise.3
——————
3 One could hardly anticipate that, absent conflict with international
4 SPECTOR v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.

Opinion of GINSBURG, J.

As the plurality rightly notes, Title III is a broad remedial
statute designed to protect persons with disabilities in a
variety of activities and settings. See ante, at 8–9;
§12101(b). The United States has a strong interest in en-
suring that U. S. resident cruise passengers enjoy Title III’s
protections on both domestic and foreign ships. See §12101;
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 10.4 Once conflicts
with international legal obligations are avoided, I see no
reason to demand a clearer congressional statement that
Title III reaches the vessels in question, ships that regularly
sail to and from U. S. ports and derive most of their income
from U. S. passengers. In sum, I agree that §12182(b)
(2)(A)(iv), properly read, does not require shipowners to
make modifications that would conflict with international
legal obligations. But I would attribute to the internal
affairs clear statement rule no further limitation on Title
III’s governance in this case.

——————
legal obligations, the application of Title III sought in this case would
generate a “storm of diplomatic protest.” Id., at 146 (noting “storm of
diplomatic protest” against proposal to apply U. S. law to prohibit
advance payments by a foreign vessel to foreign seamen in foreign
ports).
4 As the Court notes, the ships at issue here “are operated by a com-

pany based in the United States, serve predominantly United States
residents, and are in most other respects United States-centered
ventures.” Ante, at 2. Merchant ships sailing between U. S. and
foreign ports would present a different question.
 Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 1

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 03–1388
_________________

DOUGLAS SPECTOR, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[June 6, 2005]

JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in part, dissenting in part,
and concurring in the judgment in part.
When a law regulates the internal order of ships, Con-
gress must clearly express its intent to apply the law to
foreign-flag ships. Ante, at 6–8 (plurality opinion); post, at
1–2 (SCALIA, J., dissenting). I agree with JUSTICE SCALIA
that this rule applies to any structural changes to a ship
that Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (ADA) might require, for such changes to a ship’s
physical structure pertain to its internal affairs. Post, at
2–4 (SCALIA, J., dissenting); see ante, at 11 (plurality
opinion). I further agree with JUSTICE SCALIA that this
clear statement rule applies once the possibility, rather
than the certainty, of international discord arises; and
that the clear statement rule therefore does not require or
permit the kind of express conflicts-of-law analysis that
the plurality demands. Post, at 4–6 (SCALIA, J., dissent-
ing); ante, at 12–13 (majority opinion). Moreover, I do not
think that courts should (as the plurality permits) employ
the rule selectively, applying it when “prudent” but declin-
ing to apply it when “appropriate.” Ante, at 13–14 (plural-
ity opinion); see also post, at 10, n. 8 (SCALIA, J., dissent-
ing); Small v. United States, 544 U. S. ___, (2005) (slip op.,
at 11) (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (“Whatever the utility of
canons as guides to congressional intent, they are useless
2 SPECTOR v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

when modified in ways that Congress could never have
imagined”). For those reasons, I join part I–A of JUSTICE
SCALIA’s dissent. While I conclude that the rule applies to
certain aspects of Title III, I agree with the plurality that
it does not require an “all-or-nothing approach.” Ante, at
16. Consequently, those applications of Title III that do
not pertain to internal affairs apply to foreign-flag vessels.
For that reason, I join part IIIA of the plurality opinion.
I reach this result, however, only because I continue to
reject the “lowest common denominator” principle the
Court articulated for the first time in Clark v. Martinez,
544 U. S. ___ (2005). See id., at ___ (slip op., at 9–11)
(THOMAS, J., dissenting). The Court, by contrast, accepts
Clark. Moreover, it claims that applying Title III of the
ADA to matters that are not within the realm of a ship’s
internal order is consistent with Clark. The plurality’s
efforts to distinguish Clark are implausible.
The plurality says that today’s case differs from Clark
because it invokes a clear statement rule to interpret
unambiguous text. According to the plurality, Clark
concerned the application of a previously adopted limiting
construction of ambiguous text, which this Court imposed
to ameliorate unrelated constitutional doubts. Ante, at
16–17. As an initial matter, however, the statute at issue
in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U. S. 678 (2001) and Clark was
not ambiguous. Clark, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 16–17)
(THOMAS, J., dissenting). Even assuming for the sake of
argument that it was ambiguous, the distinction the plu-
rality draws has no basis in Clark. In Clark, this Court
addressed the period of detention 8 U. S. C. §1231(a)(6)
authorized for inadmissible aliens. This was a question
left open by Zadvydas, supra, which had addressed the
period of detention under the same statute but with re-
spect to a different class of aliens—those who had been
admitted into the country. In Zadvydas, this Court had
 Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 3

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

concluded that the possibility of indefinite detention of
admitted aliens raised significant constitutional doubts
and, in light of those doubts, it limited the Attorney Gen-
eral’s power to detain admitted aliens. 533 U. S., at 689–
690, 699. Section 1231(a)(6) does not distinguish between
the two classes of aliens. Thus, this Court in Clark con-
cluded it was compelled to apply that same construction,
which was warranted only by the specific constitutional
concerns arising for admitted aliens, to the unadmitted
aliens before it. 543 U. S., at __ (slip op., at 8). Clark’s
conclusion stemmed from the narrowing construction
adopted in Zadvydas, not the type of rule or canon that
gave rise to that construction. 543 U. S., at ___ (slip op.,
at 6–7).
The plurality’s reasoning cannot be squared with
Clark’s “lowest common denominator” principle. Under
Clark, “[t]he lowest common denominator, as it were, must
govern.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 8). Just as in Zadvydas
and Clark, this Court is called upon to interpret the same
statutory text with respect to two different classes of
cases—those that implicate the internal affairs of a vessel
and those that do not. And just like the statute at issue in
Zadvydas and Clark, Title III “applies without differentia-
tion” to the internal and external affairs of foreign-flag
vessels, as well as the internal and external affairs of
domestic-flag ships. 543 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6).
Thus, the limiting construction of Title III’s definitions
excluding foreign cruise ships from those definitions must
govern all applications of the statute, not just those appli-
cations that pertain to internal affairs. According to
Clark, the Court may not narrow Title III on a case-by-
case basis, depending on whether a particular application
of Title III interferes with a ship’s internal order. In fact,
it may not apply Title III to any ship or, for that matter,
any entity at all, because Title III does not distinguish
between any of the covered entities. This demonstrates
4 SPECTOR v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

why the principle Clark established is flawed.
Today’s decision, then, cabins the Clark principle to
apply only when the canon of constitutional avoidance is
invoked to choose among ambiguous readings of a statute.
But even here Clark will continue to make mischief. As I
explained in Clark, the lowest common denominator prin-
ciple requires courts to search out a single hypothetical
constitutionally doubtful case to limit a statute’s terms in
the wholly different case actually before the court, lest the
court fail to adopt a reading of the statute that reflects the
lowest common denominator. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 14)
(dissent). This requires a reverse-Salerno analysis that
upends our facial challenge requirements. See Clark,
supra, at ___ (slip op., at 10); see also United States v.
Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 745 (1987) (for a facial challenge to
succeed, there must be no circumstance in which the
statute is constitutional). For this and other reasons I
have explained, the Clark analysis allows much havoc to
be wrought from the canon of constitutional avoidance.
See Clark, supra, at __ (slip op., at 10–15) (dissent).
In sum, I believe that Title III of the ADA, insofar as it
requires structural changes, lacks a sufficiently clear
statement that it applies to the internal affairs of foreign
vessels. In my view the clear statement rule does not
render Title III entirely inapplicable to foreign vessels;
instead, Title III applies to foreign ships only to the extent
to which it does not bear on their internal affairs. I there-
fore would remand for consideration of those Title III
claims that do not pertain to the structure of the ship.
Accordingly, I concur in part III A of the plurality opinion,
join part I A of JUSTICE SCALIA’s dissent, and concur in the
judgment in part.
 Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 1

SCALIA, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 03–1388
_________________

DOUGLAS SPECTOR, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[June 6, 2005]

JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and
JUSTICE O’CONNOR join, and with whom JUSTICE THOMAS
joins as to Part I–A, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The plurality correctly recognizes
that Congress must clearly express its intent to apply its
laws to foreign-flag ships when those laws interfere with
the ship’s internal order. Its attempt to place Title III of
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), outside
this rule through creative statutory interpretation and
piecemeal application of its provisions is unsupported by
our case law. Title III plainly affects the internal order of
foreign-flag cruise ships, subjecting them to the possibility
of conflicting international obligations. I would hold that,
since there is no clear statement of coverage, Title III does
not apply to foreign-flag cruise ships.
I
A
As the plurality explains, where a law would interfere
with the regulation of a ship’s internal order, we require a
clear statement that Congress intended such a result. See
ante, at 6. This rule is predicated on the “rule of interna-
tional law that the law of the flag ship ordinarily governs
the internal affairs of a ship,” McCulloch v. Sociedad Na-
2 SPECTOR v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.

SCALIA, J., dissenting

cional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U. S. 10, 21 (1963),
and is designed to avoid “the possibilit[y] of international
discord,” Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S. A., 353
U. S. 138, 147 (1957); see also McCulloch, supra, at 19.
The clear-statement rule finds support not only in Benz
and McCulloch, but in cases like Cunard S. S. Co. v. Mel-
lon, 262 U. S. 100, 128–129 (1923), where we held that the
National Prohibition Act, 41 Stat. 305, forbade foreign-flag
ships from carrying or serving alcohol in United States
territorial waters. Though we did not say so expressly in
that case, prohibiting the carrying and serving of alcohol
in United States waters cannot be said to affect the “in-
ternal order” of the ship, because it does not in any way
affect the operation or functioning of the craft.1 Similarly,
in Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U. S. 571 (1953), and Hellenic
Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U. S. 306 (1970), we did not
employ a clear-statement rule in determining whether
foreign seamen injured aboard foreign-flag ships could
recover under the Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U. S. C.
App. §688. We distinguished these cases in McCulloch,
explaining that a clear statement is not required “in dif-
ferent contexts, such as the Jones Act . . . where the perva-
sive regulation of the internal order of a ship may not be
present.” 372 U. S., at 19, n. 9 (emphasis added).2
——————
1 The plurality also appears to have found that the National Prohibi-

tion Act contained a clear statement of intent to reach foreign-flag
vessels, because the Act had been amended to state that it applied to
“all territory subject to [the] jurisdiction” of the United States. Cunard
S. S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 100, 127 (1923) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
2 The plurality intimates that the clear-statement rule might be inap-

plicable in situations where, as here, the foreign-flag ships have a
number of contacts with the United States. See ante, at 8. McCulloch,
372 U. S., at 19, expressly rejected this approach, explaining that any
attempt to weigh the ship’s contacts with the United States “would
inevitably lead to embarrassment in foreign affairs and would be entirely
infeasible in actual practice.”
 Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 3

SCALIA, J., dissenting

As the plurality concedes, ante, at 10–11, the structural
modifications that Title III of the ADA requires
under its barrier-removal provisions, see 42 U. S. C.
§§12182(b)(2)(A)(iv), 12184(b)(2)(C), would plainly affect
the ship’s “internal order.” Rendering exterior cabins
handicapped-accessible, changing the levels of coamings,
and adding public restrooms—the types of modifications
petitioners request—would require alteration of core
physical aspects of the ship, some of which relate to safety.
(Safety has, under international law, traditionally been
the province of a ship’s flag state.) This is quite different
from prohibiting alcohol in United States waters or impos-
ing tort liability for injuries sustained on foreign ships in
port—the laws at issue in Cunard and the Jones Act cases.
Those restrictions affected the ship only in limited circum-
stances, and in ways ancillary to its operation at sea. A
ship’s design and construction, by contrast, are at least as
integral to the ship’s operation and functioning as the
bargaining relationship between shipowner and crew at
issue in Benz and McCulloch.
Moreover, the structural changes petitioners request
would be permanent. Whereas a ship precluded from
serving or carrying alcohol in United States waters may
certainly carry and serve alcohol on its next trip from Italy
to Greece, structural modifications made to comply with
American laws cannot readily be removed once the ship
leaves our waters and ceases to carry American passen-
gers. This is again much like the situation presented in
Benz and McCulloch, where the application of American
labor laws would have continued to govern contracts be-
tween foreign shipowners and their foreign crews well
beyond their time in our waters.
The purpose of the “internal order” clear-statement
requirement is to avoid casually subjecting oceangoing
vessels to laws that pose obvious risks of conflict with the
laws of the ship’s flag state, the laws of other nations, and
4 SPECTOR v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.

SCALIA, J., dissenting

international obligations to which the vessels are subject.
That structural modifications required under Title III
qualify as matters of “internal order” is confirmed by the
fact that they may already conflict with the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), Nov. 1,
1974, [1979–1980] 32 U. S. T. 47, T. I. A. S. No. 9700. That
treaty, which establishes the safety standards govern-
ing the design and maintenance of oceangoing ships, has
been ratified by 155 countries. See International Mari-
time Organization, Summary of Status of Conventions,
http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=
247 (all Internet materials as visited June 2, 2005, and
available in Clerk of Court’s case file). The ADA Accessi-
bility Guidelines (ADAAG) Review Advisory Committee—
the Government body Congress has charged with formulat-
ing the Title III barrier-removal guidelines—has promul-
gated rules requiring at least one accessible means of
egress to be an elevator, whereas SOLAS, which requires
at least two means of escape, does not allow elevators to be
one of them. See Passenger Vessel Access Advisory Com-
mittee, Final Report: Recommendations for Accessibility
Guidelines for Passenger Vehicles, ch. 13, pt. I (Dec. 2000),
http://www.access-board.gov/news/pvaac-rept.htm (herein-
after PVAAC Report) (explaining potential conflicts be-
tween ADAAG regulations and SOLAS). The ADAAG
rules set coaming heights for doors required to be accessi-
ble at one-half inch; SOLAS sets coaming heights for some
exterior doors at three to six inches to ensure that those
doors will be watertight. Ibid.
Similar inconsistencies may exist between Title III’s
structural requirements and the disability laws of other
countries. The United Kingdom, for example, is consider-
ing the promulgation of rules to govern handicapped ac-
cessibility to passenger vehicles, including cruise ships.
The rules being considered currently include exact specifi-
 Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 5

SCALIA, J., dissenting

cations, down to the centimeter, for the height of hand-
rails, beds and electrical switches, and the width of door
openings. See Disabled Persons Transport Advisory
Committee, The design of large passenger ships and
passenger infrastructure: Guidance on meeting the needs
of disabled people (Nov. 2000), http://www.dptac.gov.uk/
pubs/guideship/pdf/dptacbroch.pdf. Though many of
these regulations may be compatible with Title III, it is
easy to imagine conflicts arising, given the detailed na-
ture of ADAAG’s regulations. See PVAAC Report, chs. 1–
11. As we have previously noted, even this “possibility of
international discord” with regard to a seagoing vessel’s
internal order, McCulloch, 372 U. S., at 21 (emphasis
added), gives rise to the presumption of noncoverage
absent clear statement to the contrary.
The Court asserts that Title III would not produce con-
flicts with the requirements of SOLAS and would not
compromise safety concerns. This argument comes at the
expense of an expansive en passant interpretation of the
exceptions to the barrier-removal requirements of Title
III—which interpretation will likely have more significant
nationwide effects than the Court’s holding concerning
Title III’s application to foreign-flag vessels. Assuming,
however, that the argument is even correct,3 it is entirely
beside the point. It has never been a condition for applica-
tion of the foreign-flag clear-statement rule that an actual
conflict with foreign or international law be established—
——————
3 This is by no means clear. Title III defines “readily achievable” as

“easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without much diffi-
culty or expense.” §12181(9). It is, at best, ambiguous whether a
barrier removal can be rendered not “easily accomplishable” or not
“able to be carried out without much difficulty” by factors extrinsic to
the removal itself. Conflict of an easily altered structure with foreign
laws seems to me not much different from the tendency of an easily
altered structure to deter customers. That is why, as suggested in text,
the Court’s unexpected Title III holding may be the most significant
aspect of today’s foreign-flag decision.
6 SPECTOR v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.

SCALIA, J., dissenting

any more than that has been a condition for application of
the clear-statement rule regarding extraterritorial effect of
congressional enactments. The reason to apply the rule
here is that the structure of a ship pertains to the ship’s
internal order, which is a matter presumably left to the
flag state unless Congress indicates otherwise. The basis
for that presumption of congressional intent is principally
(though perhaps not exclusively) that subjecting such
matters to the commands of various jurisdictions raises
the possibility (not necessarily the certainty) of conflict
among jurisdictions and with international treaties. Even
if the Court could, by an imaginative interpretation of
Title III, demonstrate that in this particular instance
there would be no conflict with the laws of other nations or
with international treaties,4 it would remain true that a
ship’s structure is preeminently part of its internal order;
and it would remain true that subjecting ship structure to
multiple national requirements invites conflict. That is
what triggers application of the clear-statement rule.
Safety concerns—and specifically safety as related to
ship structure—are traditionally the responsibility of the
flag state. Which is to say they are regarded as part of the
ship’s internal order. And even if Title III makes ample
provision for a safety exception to the barrier-removal
requirements, what it considers necessary for safety is not
necessarily what other nations or international treaties
consider necessary.
The foregoing renders quite unnecessary the Court’s
worry that Title III might require American cruise ships
to adhere to Congress’s prescription in violation of SOLAS.
See ante, at 12. If and when that possibility presents
——————
4 The Court, of course, has not even shown that Title III is consistent

with the laws of the cruise ships’ flag state; much less has it under-
taken the Herculean task—which its theory of presumed coverage by
domestic law would require—of showing Title III consistent with the
laws of all the cruise ships’ ports of call.
 Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 7

SCALIA, J., dissenting

itself, the Court remains free to do what it does here: to
interpret Title III so as to avoid any conflict. But the
availability of such an interpretation has no bearing upon
whether the structural features of an oceangoing vessel
are part of its internal order. (I must observe, however,
that it seems much more plausible that Congress intended
to require American cruise ships to adhere to Title III
regardless of SOLAS, than that—what the Court appar-
ently believes—Congress intended Title III to be inter-
preted with an eye to SOLAS.) In any event, the applica-
tion of Title III to oceangoing vessels under American flag
is not at issue here. I would therefore hold that, because
Title III’s barrier-removal provisions clearly have the
possibility of subjecting foreign-flag ships to conflicting
international obligations, no reading of Title III—no mat-
ter how creative—can alter the presumption that Title III
does not apply to foreign-flag ships without a clear state-
ment from Congress.5
B
The plurality holds that, even “[i]f Title III did impose a
duty that required [foreign-flag] cruise ships to make per-
manent and significant structural modifications[,] or . . .
otherwise interfered with a foreign ship’s internal affairs
. . . Title III requirements having nothing to do with inter-
nal affairs would continue to apply to domestic and foreign
ships alike.” Ante, at 14. I disagree. Whether or not Title
III’s prescriptions regarding such matters implicate the
“internal order” of the ship, they still relate to the ships’
maritime operations and are part of the same Title III.6
——————
5 Of course this clear-statement rule would not apply to the onshore

operations of foreign cruise companies, which would be treated no
differently from the operations of other foreign companies on American
soil.
6 This includes the pricing and ticketing policies, which are intimately

related to the ships’ maritime operations (and perhaps to internal
8 SPECTOR v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.

SCALIA, J., dissenting

The requirements of that enactment either apply to for-
eign-flag ships or they do not. It is not within our power
to design a statute some of whose provisions apply to
foreign-flag ships and other of whose provisions do not—
any more than it is within our power to prescribe that the
statute applies to foreign-flag cruise ships 60% of whose
passengers are United States citizens and does not apply
to other foreign-flag cruise ships.
The plurality’s assertion that those portions of Title III
that do not implicate a ship’s internal order apply to for-
eign-flag ships displays a confusion between a principle of
interpretation based upon a true-to-fact presumption of
congressional intent, and a court-made rule. The plurality
seems to forget that it is a matter of determining whether
Congress in fact intended that its enactment cover foreign-
flag ships. To believe that there was any such intent
section-by-section and paragraph-by-paragraph is delu-
sional. Either Congress enacted Title III only with domes-
tic entities (and not foreign-flag ships) in mind, or it in-
tended Title III to apply across-the-board. It could not
possibly be the real congressional intent that foreign-flag
cruise ships be considered “place[s] of public accommoda-
tion” or “specified public transportation” for purposes of
certain provisions but not for others. That Congress had
separate foreign-flag intent with respect to each require-
ment—and would presumably adopt a clear statement
provision-by-provision—is utterly implausible. And far
from its being the case that this creates “a trap for an
unwary Congress,” ante, at 16, it is the plurality’s disposi-
tion that, in piecemeal fashion, applies to foreign-flag
ships provisions never enacted with foreign-flag vessels in

——————
order) because they are designed to defray the added cost and provide
the added protection that the cruise-ship companies deem necessary for
safe transport of disabled passengers.
 Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 9

SCALIA, J., dissenting

mind.7 We recently addressed a similar question in Clark
v. Martinez, 543 U. S. ___ (2005), where we explained that
a statutory provision must be interpreted consistently
from case to case. “It is not at all unusual to give a
statut[e] . . . a limiting construction called for by one of the
statute’s applications, even though other of the statute’s
applications, standing alone, would not support the same
limitation.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 8). That principle
should apply here. Since some applications of Title III
plainly affect the internal order of foreign-flag ships, the
absence of a clear statement renders the statute inappli-
cable—even though some applications of the statute, if
severed from the rest, would not require clear statement.
This does not mean that a clear statement is required
whenever a court applies Title III to any entity—only that
a clear statement is required to apply any part of Title III
to foreign-flag ships. Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn.,
534 U. S. 533 (2002), and Jinks v. Richland County, 538
U. S. 456 (2003), do not dictate otherwise. Raygor held
that 28 U. S. C. §1367(d) does not include, in its tolling of
the limitations period, claims against States, because it
contains no clear statement that States are covered. Jinks
held that §1367(d)’s tolling provision does apply to claims
against political subdivisions of States, because no clear-
——————
7 The plurality’s discussion of Longshoremen v. Ariadne Shipping Co.,

397 U. S. 195 (1970), is misleading. Although Ariadne clearly recog-
nized the existence of an internal-order rule in our case law, see id., at
200, Ariadne did not hold, similarly to what the plurality holds here,
that application of the foreign-flag clear-statement rule prevented some
provisions of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) from being
applied to foreign-flag ships but allowed others to be applied. Rather, it
held that the clear-statement rule did not apply at all to activities that
were not “within the ‘maritime operations of foreign-flag ships.’ ” Ibid.
The case is relevant only to questions the Court does not decide here—
namely, application of Title III to onshore operations of the foreign-flag
ships. It is not relevant to the question whether all maritime activities
are exempt from Title III for lack of a clear statement.
10 SPECTOR v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.

SCALIA, J., dissenting

statement requirement applies to those entities. In other
words, a clear statement is required to apply §1367(d) to
States, just as a clear statement is required to apply Title
III to foreign-flag ships. A clear statement is not required to
apply §1367(d) to political subdivisions of States, just as a
clear statement is not required to apply Title III to domestic
ships or other domestic entities. The question in each of
these cases is whether the statute at issue covers certain
entities, not whether some provisions of a statute cover a
given entity.
The fine-tuning of legislation that the plurality requires
would be better left to Congress. To attempt it through
the process of case-by-case adjudication is a recipe for
endless litigation and confusion. The plurality’s resolution
of today’s case proves the point. It requires this Title III
claimant (and every other one who brings a claim against
a foreign shipowner) to show that each particular remedy
he seeks does not implicate the internal order of the ship.
That showing, where structural modification is involved,
would not only require the district court to determine
what is “readily achievable,” ante, at 12–14, and what
would “pose ‘a significant risk to the health or safety of
others,’ ” ante, at 13 (quoting §12182(b)(3)), but would also
require it to determine the obligations imposed by foreign
law and international treaties.8 All this to establish the
——————
8 The plurality attempts to simplify this inquiry by explaining that, if

it is “a difficult question whether a particular Title III barrier removal
requirement is readily achievable, but the requirement does entail a
permanent and significant structural modification, interfering with a
foreign ship’s internal affairs[,] a court sensibly could invoke the clear
statement rule without determining whether Title III actually imposes
the requirement.” Ante, at 14. It is impossible to reconcile this with
the plurality’s rationale, which excludes the clear-statement rule when
there is no actual conflict with foreign law. On the plurality’s own
analysis, significant structural modifications are least likely to pose an
actual conflict with foreign law, since they are most likely to be re-
garded as (under the plurality’s new Title III jurisprudence) not “read-
 Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 11

SCALIA, J., dissenting

preliminary point that Title III applies and the claim can
proceed to adjudication. If Congress desires to impose this
time-consuming and intricate process, it is certainly able
to do so—though I think it would likely prefer some more
manageable solution.9 But for the plurality to impose it as
a novel consequence of the venerable clear-statement rule
seems to me unreasonable. I would therefore decline to
apply all of Title III to foreign-flag ships without a clear
statement from Congress.
II
As the Court appears to concede, neither the “public
accommodation” provision nor the “specified public trans-
portation” provision of Title III clearly covers foreign-flag
cruise ships. The former prohibits discrimination “on the
basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or ac-
commodations of any place of public accommodation by
any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a
place of public accommodation.” 42 U. S. C. §12182(a).
Though Congress gave a seemingly exhaustive list of
entities constituting “public accommodation[s]”—including
inns, hotels, restaurants, theaters, banks, zoos, and laun-
dromats—it failed to mention ships, much less foreign-flag

——————
ily achievable” and hence not required. I am at a loss to understand
what the plurality has in mind.
9 After this Court concluded, in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.,

499 U. S. 244, 260 (1991), (ARAMCO), that Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, does not protect American citizens working for American
employers in foreign countries, Congress amended Title VII. Unlike what
would have been this Court’s only available resolution of the issue had it
come to the opposite conclusion in ARAMCO—that Title VII applies to all
American employers operating abroad—Congress was able to craft a more
nuanced solution by exempting employers if compliance with Title VII
would run afoul of the law in the country where the workplace was
located. See 42 U. S. C. §2000e–1(b); cf. §12112(c)(1) (same disposition for
Title I of the ADA).
12 SPECTOR v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.

SCALIA, J., dissenting

ships. See §12181(7). Particularly where Congress has
provided such detailed specification, this is not a clear
statement that foreign-flag ships are covered. Petitioners
also claim that, because cruise ships are essentially float-
ing hotels that contain restaurants and other facilities
explicitly named in §12181(7), they should be covered.
While this may support the argument that cruise ships are
“public accommodations,” it does not support the position
that Congress intended to reach foreign-flag cruise ships.
The “specified public transportation” provision prohibits
discrimination on the basis of disability “in the full and
equal enjoyment of specified public transportation services
provided by a private entity that is primarily engaged in
the business of transporting people and whose operations
affect commerce.” §12184(a). The definition of “specified
public transportation” includes “transportation by bus,
rail, or any other conveyance (other than by aircraft) that
provides the general public with general or special service
(including charter service) on a regular and continuing
basis.” §12181(10). “[A]ny other conveyance” clearly
covers ships. But even if the statute specifically men-
tioned ships, that would not be a clear statement that
foreign-flag ships are included—any more than the refer-
ence to “employer” in the NLRA constituted a clear state-
ment that foreign-flag ship employers were covered, see
McCulloch, 372 U. S., at 19–21.
Title III of the ADA stands in contrast to other statutes
in which Congress has made clear its intent to extend its
laws to foreign ships. For example, the Maritime Drug
Law Enforcement Act, 94 Stat. 1159, 46 U. S. C. App.
§1901 et seq., which permits the inspection and apprehen-
sion of vessels suspected of possessing controlled sub-
stances, applies to “vessel[s] subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States,” §1903(a), which includes vessels “lo-
cated within the customs waters of the United States,”
§1903(c)(1)(D), and “vessels registered in a foreign nation
 Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 13

SCALIA, J., dissenting

where the flag nation has consented or waived objection”
to United States jurisdiction, §1903(c)(1)(C). Section 5 of
the Johnson Act, 64 Stat. 1135, as amended, 106 Stat. 61,
15 U. S. C. §1175(a), restricts the use of gambling devices
“on a vessel . . . documented under the laws of a foreign
country.” See also 14 U. S. C. §89(a) (Coast Guard may
engage in searches on “waters over which the United
States has jurisdiction” of “any vessel subject to the juris-
diction, or to the operation of any law, of the United
States”); 18 U. S. C. §2274 (making it unlawful for “the
owner, master or person in charge or command of any
private vessel, foreign or domestic . . . within the territo-
rial waters of the United States” willfully to cause or
permit the destruction or injury of their vessel in certain
circumstances).
That the Department of Justice and the Department of
Transportation—the Executive agencies charged with
enforcing the ADA—appear to have concluded that Con-
gress intended Title III to apply to foreign-flag cruise
ships does not change my view. We “accept only those
agency interpretations that are reasonable in light of the
principles of construction courts normally employ.”
ARAMCO, 499 U. S. 244, 260 (1991) (SCALIA, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment) (declining to adopt the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s determina-
tion that Title VII applied to employers abroad); see also id.,
at 257–258 (opinion of the Court) (same). In light of our
longstanding clear-statement rule, it is not reasonable to
apply Title III here.
I would therefore affirm the Fifth Circuit’s judgment
that Title III of the ADA does not apply to foreign-flag
cruise ships in United States territorial waters.