SLIP OP. 00-73
UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
BEFORE: JAMES L. WATSON, SENIOR JUDGE
BESTFOODS (formerly known as
CPC INTERNATIONAL, INC.), )
Plaintiff, ) Court No. 95-02-00144
v. )
UNITED STATES, )
)
Defendant.
)
[This case was remanded from the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to permit
plaintiff to ”pursue any other arguments it may have as to why it should not be required to mark its
product under the applicable [marking] regulations.” Plaintiff’s new argument on remand is that the
exclusion of its finished peanut butter (and most other agricultural products) from the de minimis
exception to the tariff shift rules under 19 C.F.R. § 102.13(b) is unlawful, arbitrary, capricious, and an
abuse of discretion. The argument is sustained.]
Neville, Peterson & Williams (John M. Peterson, George W. Thompson, and Curtis W. Knauss, Esqs.)
for plaintiff.
David W. Ogden, Acting Assistant Attorney General; David M. Cohen, Director, and Jeanne E.
Davidson, Deputy Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice
(Armando O. Bonilla, Attorney); Of Counsel: David R. Hamill, Attorney, Department of the Treasury,
Office of General Counsel; Sandra L. Bell, Supervisory Attorney Advisor and Monika R. Brenner,
Attorney Advisor, United States Customs Service, Office of Regulations and Rulings, for defendant.
Decided: June 28, 2000
Court No. 95-02-00144 Page 2
OPINION
WATSON, SENIOR JUDGE:
INTRODUCTION
This action is before the court on remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit in Bestfoods (formerly known as CPC International, Inc.) v. United States, 165 F. 3d
1371 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 42 (1999). Familiarity with the prior proceedings in this case
is presumed.
Briefly, in Bestfoods, the appellate court ruled, inter alia, that the North American Free Trade
Agreement (“NAFTA”) “tariff shift” rules, 19 C.F.R. § 102.20, and Customs Regulation 19 C.F.R. §
134.35(a) and (b), are valid, and remanded the case to this court “to permit Bestfoods to pursue any
other arguments it may have as to why it should not be required to mark its product [‘Skippy’ brand
peanut butter] under the applicable regulations.” 165 F. 3d at 1376.
There is no dispute in the current proceedings that Canadian peanut slurry does not undergo a
change in tariff classification (“tariff shift”) under the specific Marking Rule under Part 102 of the
Customs Regulations (see section 102.20) applicable to peanut butter. Bestfoods, however, contends
that to the extent it will be able to demonstrate that Canadian peanut slurry used in making peanut butter
at its U.S. facilities is present in de minimis amounts, as defined under 19 C.F.R. § 102.13(a), it should
not be required to mark its finished product as a product of Canada (or other equivalent country of
origin marking designation) pursuant to the NATA Marking Rules and the Marking Statute, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1304(a).
Court No. 95-02-00144 Page 3
Specifically, Bestfoods contests the validity of 19 C.F.R. § 102.13(b), which excludes most
agricultural products, including peanut slurry, from the de minimis exception to the tariff shift rules, as
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise contrary to law. As discussed infra,
Customs seeks to justify the reasonableness of the exclusion of most agricultural products from de
minimis treatment under section 102.13(b) on the basis of health and food safety concerns.
The Customs regulation in issue, Section 102.13 (19 C.F.R. § 102.13), so far as relevant,
provides as follows:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this
section, foreign materials that do not undergo the applicable change in
tariff classification set out in Sec. 102.20 or satisfy the other applicable
requirements of that section when incorporated into a good shall be
disregarded in determining country of origin of the good if the value of
those materials is no more than 7 percent of the value of the good or 10
percent of the value of the good of Chapter 22, Harmonized System.
(b) Paragraph (a) of this section does not apply to a foreign material
incorporated in a good provided for in Chapter 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 12,
15, 17, or 20 of the Harmonized System.
PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
Bestfoods has no quarrel with the application of the de minimis exception to the tariff shift rules
under section 102.13(a), and argues that to the extent that it can demonstrate that its finished peanut
butter qualifies for such de minimis treatment, plaintiff should not be required to mark its finished
peanut butter as a product of Canada.1 Plaintiff further contends that Customs’ exclusion from de
1
Bestfoods notes that the administrative record in this case (in connection with the contested
preimportation ruling) represented to Customs that by volume, the amount of Canadian peanut slurry
that plaintiff intends to use in making its finished peanut butter will be as little as 10 percent of the total
volume of peanut slurry in the finished product. Further, Bestfoods represented that all costs of value-
Court No. 95-02-00144 Page 4
minimis treatment of certain Chapters of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule covering mostly agricultural
products, pursuant to section 102.13(b), should be declared by the court to be null and void as
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and not otherwise in accordance with law within the
purview of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 706(2).
Defendant contends, first, that the Federal Circuit remanded this case for the limited purpose of
affording Bestfoods an opportunity to challenge only the application of the Marking Rules, but not to
challenge the validity of any Rule. Hence, defendant argues, plaintiff’s challenge to the validity of section
102.13(b) is outside the scope of the Federal Circuit’s remand order. Second, defendant contends that
in any case, the NAFTA Marking Rules were correctly applied by Customs in its Headquarters Ruling
and that section 102.13(b) is within Customs’ discretionary authority.
ISSUES PRESENTED
Whether Bestfoods’ challenge to the validity of section 102.13(b) of the Customs
Regulations is within the scope of the Federal Circuit’s remand order; and if so, whether the exclusion
of peanut butter and most other agricultural products from the de minimis exception to the tariff shift
rules under 19 C.F.R. § 102.13(b) was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law, as claimed by Bestfoods.
After careful review of the post-remand submissions of the parties, and for the reasons set forth
hereinafter, the court sustains Bestfoods’ arguments.
added processing of the peanut butter are incurred in the United States. Thus, plaintiff now represents
that “even though a particular lot of finished peanut butter may contain more than 7 percent of Canadian
material by volume, the Canadian material will often account for less than 7 percent of the value of the
[finished] peanut butter.” Pltf’s Mem. at 3, n. 4 (emphasis in original).
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DISCUSSION
1.
Defendant’s Contention that Plaintiff’s Arguments Exceed the Scope of the Remand
In Bestfoods, the Federal Circuit rejected plaintiff’s challenges to the validity of the NAFTA
Marking Rules’ tariff-shift methodology, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case
broadly permitting Bestfoods to pursue “any other arguments it may have as to why it should not be
required to mark its product under the applicable regulations.” 165 F. 3d at 1376.
Plaintiff now seeks to challenge the validity of the exclusion of most agricultural products from the de
minimis exception to the tariff shift rules pursuant to section 102.13(b) on the grounds that the reasons
advanced by Customs (set forth infra) are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise
contrary to law. Defendant, however, contends that Bestfoods’ new challenge to the validity of a
regulation is outside the scope of the permissible issues plaintiff may raise on remand.
Contrary to defendant’s narrow reading of the remand order of the Federal Circuit, the court
broadly permitted Bestfoods to pursue any other arguments in may have as to why it should not be
required to mark its product under the applicable regulations, which remand order plainly does not
preclude further arguments challenging the validity of a particular NAFTA Marking Rule. The specific
issue now raised by plaintiff as to the validity of the exclusion of agricultural products under section
102.13(b) was not before the appellate court prior to remand.
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2.
The Challenged Exclusions Under Section 102.13(b)
Section 102.13 of the Customs Regulations is a so-called “de minimis” rule. The principle
of de minimis non curat lex, often shortened to de minimis, is long established in law generally, including
customs and international trade law, and is a bedrock principle of statutory construction. See Alcan
Aluminum, Inc. v. United States, 165 F.3d 898 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Alcan”) and cases cited. See also
Varsity Watch Co. v. United States, 34 CCPA 155, C.A.D. 359 (1947); Overton & Co. v. United
States, 5 Ct. Cust. Appls. 183 (1914); John S. Connor, Inc. v. United States, 54 Cust. Ct. 213, C.D.
2536 (1965); Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc. v. United States, 43 Cust. Ct. 1, C.D. 2094 (1959); and
R.W. Gresham v. United States, 3 Cust. Ct. 308, C.D. 263 (1939). The principle simply means that
the law does not concern itself with trifles, see also Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Ed. 1999, page
443, and has been applied in a variety of statutory contexts. There is no dispute that the de minimis
principle may also be applied under the Marking Statute and NAFTA tariff shift rules, and the issue
before the court arises only from Customs’ withholding of the de minimis principle from the tariff shift
rules with respect to most agricultural products.
In response to commenters that expressed concern that the de minimis rule set forth in section
102.13 was made inapplicable to certain agricultural products, Customs explained, inter alia, that due
to the nature of the products and because of health and food safety concerns, Customs exercised its
discretion not to allow a de minimis standard to apply to country of origin determinations of most
agricultural products. Continuing, Customs posited that the exclusion of most agricultural products from
de minimis treatment for purposes of country of origin determinations was consistent with Customs’
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“past practice with regard to country of origin determinations of agricultural products.” See 61 Fed.
Reg. at 28,937.
Customs’ articulated rationale is somewhat scanty, and the agency did not state that prior to
section 102.13(b) there had been a past practice of withholding de minimis treatment from tariff shift
rules, or explain how the exclusion of the de minimis exception from the tariff shift rules with respect to
agricultural products furthers the purpose of the Marking Statute or NAFTA Marking Rules, or indeed,
even explain how the requirement of a stringent application of the tariff shift rules for NAFTA
agricultural products addresses Customs’ health and food safety concerns.
Defendant’s post-remand submissions do not satisfactorily respond to the critical issues raised
by Bestfoods going the reasonableness of a regulation, but defendant merely insists that Customs
exercised its discretion and followed past practice. The court is not persuaded from defendant’s
submissions that Customs had the authority or discretion alleged to jettison the de minimis exception to
the tariff shift rules with respect to agricultural goods for reasons of health and food safety; or that the
foregoing action was consistent with past practice; or that the withholding of de minimis treatment
furthers the purpose of the Marking Statute and Marking Rules; or even that excluding the de minimis
exception from the tariff shift rules with respect to most agricultural products reasonably addresses
Customs’ health and food safety concerns.
There is nothing in NAFTA Annex 311, the NAFTA Implementation Act, or the Marking
Statute itself, to suggest that Customs has any discretion to address health and food safety concerns
with respect to most agricultural products under the Marking Rules, and certainly not by withholding de
Court No. 95-02-00144 Page 8
minimis treatment from the tariff shift rules for determining country of origin.2 The Congressional intent
and purpose of country of origin marking under section 304(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended,
is straightforward and largely self-evident from the plain language of the statute, which requires that
articles of foreign origin imported into the United States, or their containers, be permanently marked so
as to indicate to an ultimate purchaser in the United States the English name of the article’s country of
origin. While the identity of the “ultimate purchaser” of a good may be a matter of dispute, there can
be no dispute that the purpose of the statute is limited to informing an “ultimate purchaser” of an article
in the United States of the foreign articles’ country of origin lest that knowledge influence his or her
decision to purchase the article. See United States v. Friedlaender & Co., 27 CCPA 297, C.A.D. 104
(1940); Koru North America v. United States, 701 F. Supp. 229 (CIT 1988); and Globemaster, Inc.
v. United States, 68 Cust. Ct. 77 (1972). While the Marking Statute requires that the ultimate
consumer be informed by the required marking of a good’s country of origin, the statute does not, and
cannot, address the myriad of reasons or motivations for consumer’s country of origin preferences,
biases, or prejudices as to particular goods, or the goods generally of a particular country. Moreover, it
appears that the health and food safety concerns related to agricultural products that Customs sought to
address in excluding de minimis treatment from the tariff shift rules were concerns of Customs and not
2
Plaintiff further objects that denial of de minimis treatment to the application of the tariff shift
rules leads to potential results for its finished peanut butter that are absurd and anomalous. For
example, plaintiff posits that exclusion of de minimis treatment from the tariff shift rules under section
102.13(b) will result in requiring that plaintiff’s finished peanut butter that may contain Canadian peanut
slurry comprising only .000001 percent of the value of the finished peanut butter be marked as a
product of Canada.
Court No. 95-02-00144 Page 9
those of the ultimate purchasers in the United States.
Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the withholding of de minimis treatment from the NAFTA
tariff shift methodology with respect to most agricultural goods grounded on health and food safety
concerns does not further the clear, but limited, purpose of either the Marking Statute or the NAFTA
Marking Rules. Other statutory provisions and regulations administered by Customs jointly with the
Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration, and the Department of
Agriculture specifically address and regulate health and safety of food and agricultural products, and
health and food safety concerns do not fall within the purview of regulation by Customs under the
rubric of the Marking Statute or an exclusion of de minimis treatment from the NAFTA tariff shift rules
with respect to most agricultural products.3
Congress implemented NAFTA through the North American Free Trade Agreement
Implementation Act, Pub. L. 103-122, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (“NAFTA Implementation Act”). That
Act, and its accompanying Statement of Administrative Action, H.R. Doc. No. 103-159, vol. 1, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1993) (“SAA”), authorize the promulgation of such regulations “as necessary or
3
It would appear to this court that Customs and the agencies having direct responsibility for
health and food safety regarding imported agricultural products (Dept. of Agriculture and Food and
Drug Administration) could effectively address any health and food safety concerns with respect to
NAFTA agricultural imports without Customs’ exclusion of de minimis treatment from the tariff shift
rules under section 102.13(b). Essentially, that exclusion results only in the stringent application of the
tariff shift rules to agricultural products for purposes of country of origin marking, and does not address
health and food safety concerns. Simply requiring Bestfoods to mark finished peanut butter containing
de minimis Canadian peanut slurry as a product of Canada would not effectively address Customs’ (or
its cooperating agency’s) health and food safety concerns, and clearly will not inform an ultimate
consumer of the finished product concerning any health or food safety problems related to any de
minimis Canadian peanut slurry content of the finished product.
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appropriate to implement immediately applicable U.S. obligations under the NAFTA,” and those
“necessary or appropriate to carry out the actions proposed in the statement of administrative action.”
19 U.S.C. § 3314(b) (emphasis added). The foregoing “obligations” and “actions proposed” did not
address health or food safety concerns related to agricultural products. Moreover, even if the NAFTA
Implementation Act or SAA had anything to suggest that the NAFTA Marking Rules should address
health and food safety concerns with respect to NAFTA agricultural products, it would seem most
unreasonable for Customs to seek to address such concerns by withholding de minimis treatment under
the NAFTA tariff shift methodology for determining country of origin.
NAFTA Annex 311 entitled “Country of Origin Marking,” specifically authorized the Parties
to “establish by January 1, 1994, rules for determining whether a good is a good of a Party (‘Marking
Rules’) for purposes of this Annex, Annex 300-B and Annex 302.2, and for such other purposes as the
Parties may agree.” See NAFTA Annex 311, ¶¶ 1, 2 (emphasis added). Following the enactment of
the NAFTA Implementation Act, Customs promulgated regulations containing the NAFTA Marking
Rules, which rules are codified at 19 C.F.R. Part 102 and 19 C.F.R. § 134.35(b). Those regulations
correctly employ the “tariff shift” methodology for determining whether goods have undergone
“substantial transformation” following their importation, and therefore, do not need to be marked to
indicate their foreign origin.4 See Bestfoods, 165 F. 3d at 1372.
4
An article imported from a NAFTA country will be considered to have undergone a “tariff
shift” only if the processing or manufacturing steps in the United States are sufficient to change the
article’s tariff classification. See Bestfoods, 165 F. 3d at 172. Thus, in determining whether a foreign
article has undergone the requisite tariff shift under section 102.20, Customs first determines the tariff
classifications for both the foreign material and the finished article. See 59 Fed. Reg. 110, 112 (1994).
In this case, the relevant rule in section 102.20 states: “A change to subheading 2008.11 from any other
Court No. 95-02-00144 Page 11
Section 102.13 of the NAFTA Marking Rules augments the tariff shift rules under section
102.20 by a de minimis exception. The salutary purpose of the de minimis rule was addressed supra.
Nonetheless, under section 102.13(b) Customs excluded from the de minimis exception to the tariff
shift rules certain Chapters of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule, including Chapter 20, into which
plaintiff’s peanut slurry and peanut butter fall. There is no dispute that the excluded Chapters under
section 102.13(b) cover mostly agricultural products, including peanut slurry.
Citing T.D. 91-7 concerning “Tariff Treatment and Country of Origin Marking of Sets,
Mixtures and Composite Goods,” and T.D. 89-66 concerning “Country of Origin Marking of Imported
Fruit Juice Concentrate,” defendant posits that in promulgating the NAFTA Marking Rules, specifically
section 102.13, Customs formally codified Customs’ past practice, which allegedly did not provide for
de minimis treatment of most agricultural products for the reasons Customs explained in 61 Fed. Reg.
at 28,937 (viz., health and food safety). Deft’s Mem. at 8. Defendant insists that Customs’ exclusion of
de minimis treatment with respect to most agricultural goods for reasons of health and food safety
constitutes a reasonable exercise of the agency’s discretion.
Plaintiff, however, maintains that “the unique and bizarre de minimis provisions of the NAFTA
Marking Rules [with respect to agricultural products] are not the continuation of any longstanding
chapter, provided that change is not the result of mere blanching of peanuts.” See 19 C.F.R. §
102.20(d). Bestfoods does not argue that it should not be required to mark its product because a tariff
shift occurred under section 102.20. Since it is undisputed that both peanut slurry and finished peanut
butter are classified in subheading 2008.11, the specified tariff shift did not occur when the peanut
slurry was processed into peanut butter. Customs, therefore, concluded that Bestfoods was not the
“ultimate purchaser” of the Canadian peanut slurry, within the meaning of the Marking Statute, and that
therefore, Bestfoods’ finished peanut butter incorporating the imported peanut slurry had to be marked
to reflect its Canadian origin. Bestfoods, 165 F. 3d at 172.
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administrative practice. Indeed they appear to be contrary to past Customs’ practice.” Thus, plaintiff
points up Customs Headquarters Ruling 735085 of June 4, 1993, which states: “To the extent such
foreign [vegetable] materials are insignificant, or would have no influence on the purchasing decision,
Customs applies a ‘common sense’ approach to require marking only of those articles which are more
than de minimis significance.”]. Pltf’s Mem. at 9-10.
Without discussing the specific issues addressed in T.D. 91-7 and 89-66, it suffices to state that
the rulings relied on by defendant do not demonstrate the alleged past practice of excluding most
agricultural products from de minimis treatment for reasons of health or food safety. However,
irrespective of Customs’ past practice, nothing has been called to the court’s attention that remotely
suggests that Customs’ exclusion of de minimis treatment under the tariff shift Marking Rules with
respect to agricultural products for reasons of health or food safety were in response to any authority or
discretion granted in NAFTA Annex 311, the NAFTA Implementation Act, or that the exclusion of de
minimis treatment from the tariff shift rules for reasons of health and food safety under section 102.13(b)
in any way furthers the purpose of the Marking Statute or Marking Rules.
Demonstrating that Customs’ denial of de minimis treatment at odds with the purposes of the
statute being implemented is unreasonable and unlawful, plaintiff calls attention to the rationale of the
Federal Circuit in Alcan Aluminum Corp. v United States, 165 F.3d 898 (Fed. Cir. 1999). There, the
Federal Circuit addressed Customs’ absolute refusal to apply “the well-recognized doctrine of de
minimis non curat lex” to the tariff shift requirements in the context of determining whether Alcan’s
unwrought aluminum ingots originated in Canada for purposes of preferential trade treatment (a
reduced merchandise processing fee) under the United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement
Court No. 95-02-00144 Page 13
Implementation Act of 1988. Alcan asserted that the imported aluminum ingots, comprised of both
Canadian and non-Canadian materials, underwent the requisite transformation, thus constituting the
goods as “originating” in Canada, and subject to a preferential merchandise processing fee. Customs,
however, disagreed and imposed the full (nonpreferential) merchandise processing fee because a
“trivially small” amount -- comprising less than 1 percent by weight and value - - of grain refiner used in
the production of the ingots did not undergo a tariff classification shift, as required by the HTSUS.
Alcan argued that the tariff shift methodology must be applied in light of the de minimis
principle. In other words, because only a small amount of the imported goods did not perform the
required tariff shift, Alcan asked that the court hold that under the de minimis rule, the goods met the
tariff shift requirements. Defendant insisted that the de minimis principle was irrelevant.
Citing Wisconsin Department of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214, 231
(1992) (“de minimis . . . is part of the established background of legal principles against which all
enactments are adopted, and . . . which all enactments are deemed to accept”), the Federal Circuit in
Alcan stressed that the courts have recognized the principle in a wide variety of statutory contexts, and
that the great weight of authority compelled recognition of the principle under the tariff shift rules before
the Alcan court. The Federal Circuit, citing the ruling of the Supreme Court in Wisconsin Department
of Revenue establishing that the de minimis principle applies absent indication in the statute to the
contrary, see 505 U.S. at 231-32, observed that “we discern no reason why, in the absence of explicit
language [in the statute] precluding application, the normal operation of the de minimis principle should
be abandoned.” 165 F. 3d at 905.
Moreover, stressing the purpose of the governing statute in Alcan ( preserve preferential trading
Court No. 95-02-00144 Page 14
treatment for Canadian goods), the resulting harsh consequences of imposing a de facto trade barrier,
and the odd or absurd results of Customs’ absolute refusal to apply the de minimis rule, the Federal
Circuit held that Customs’ refusal was “unreasonable and contrary to law.” Id. at 903-04.
Interestingly, even the dissenting opinion by Chief Judge Mayer agreed with the majority view
recognizing the importance of the statute’s purpose when applying the de minimis principle, citing
Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, supra. Alcan, 165 F.3d at 906.
There can be no doubt that absent an explicit expression of legislative intent to the contrary, as
a matter of fundamental fairness and reasonable statutory interpretation, there is an implied recognition
of the de minimis principle under the governing statute; indeed, absent explicit expression of legislative
intent to the contrary, a very heavy burden falls on a party which insists that the purpose of the
underlying statute compels abandonment of the de minimis rule.
Defendant seeks to distinguish Alcan on the basis that the appellate court construed a different
governing statute, which leaves open the “possibility” that the rule may not need to be applied in the
current case. Deft’s Mem. at 11. While in Alcan the Federal Circuit applied the de minimis principle in
the context of a statute creating a trade preference, the decision emphasizes that the rule has a very
broad and fundamental application in a variety of contexts, that it is the normal rule for statutory
interpretation, and that in any event, the rule may not lawfully be cast aside by Customs when to do so
thwarts the purpose of the underlying statute.
While Alcan involved Customs’ refusal to apply the de minimis rule in the context of
preferential treatment of Canadian goods, the rationale in applying de minimis in Alcan is equally
compelling here in the context of effectuating the purpose of the Marking Statute and Marking Rules.
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As indicated above, the purpose of the Marking Statute and Marking Rules is fulfilled by informing the
ultimate consumer of a good of the country of origin; any health or food safety concerns of Customs
related to agricultural products, while they may be relevant to other statutes and regulations
administered by Customs cooperatively with other agencies,5 fall outside the purpose of country of
origin marking under the Marking Statute and NAFTA Marking Rules. Accordingly, the court agrees
with Bestfoods that Customs’ health and food safety concerns related to agricultural products could
not lawfully or reasonably be addressed by withholding application of the de minimis principle from the
tariff shift methodology.
Defendant further posits that the exclusion of agricultural products from the de minimis
exception to the tariff shift rules under section 102.13(b), is “essentially commensurate” with NAFTA
5
Defendant recognizes the cooperative enforcement of federal law by Customs may also
involve certain concerns for which the Federal Trade Commission bears responsibility. Deft’s Mem. at
14, n. 12. While proper country of origin marking pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a) and the NAFTA
Marking Rules is, of course, the responsibility of Customs, cooperative agency efforts concerning
health and food safety, are not properly regulated by Customs under the Marking Statute and NAFTA
Marking Rules, but rather such concerns are within the purview of the statutes and regulations for which
the Food and Drug Administration and Department of Agriculture bear prime responsibility.
Consequently, notwithstanding that Customs cooperates with other agencies in addressing health and
food safety concerns related to agricultural products, Customs overstepped its authority by seeking to
address such concerns under the Marking Statute and NAFTA Marking Rules by excluding de minimis
treatment from the tariff shift rules pursuant to section 102.13(b).
However, even assuming arguendo that Customs has the authority to address health and food
safety concerns under the Marking Statute or NAFTA Marking Rules, it is extremely dubious that
denial of de minimis treatment under the tariff shift rules for purposes of determining when a good is a
“good of a party” pursuant to NAFTA Annex 311 or a “good of the United States under the
NAFTA Marking Rules,” 19 C.F.R. §134.35(b), see also 19 C.F.R. §§ 102.11(3) and 102.20, is a
reasonable approach to addressing health and food safety concerns given the purpose of the Marking
Statute and Marking Rules.
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Chapter 4 Preference Rules, specifically Annex 405, which expressly excludes certain agricultural
products from de minimis treatment under the Chapter 4 Preference Rules of Origin. See 19 U.S.C. §
3332(e)(5)(1996). Defendant’s attempt to bootstrap section 102.13(b) of the Marking Rules
implementing NAFTA Annex 311 into the Preference Rules of Origin is unavailing. As aptly pointed out
by plaintiff, the NAFTA Preference Rules of Origin and NAFTA Marking Rules speak to different
purposes: the Chapter 4 Preference Rules of Origin were adopted to determine when goods shall be
considered as “originating” products of the country of exportation eligible for preferential treatment, and
under the terms of the Agreement the Parties to NAFTA expressly elected to adopt a stringent rule of
origin for preferential treatment on a discriminatory basis. The de minimis rule for purposes of the
Preference Rules or Origin is, therefore, totally irrelevant to Customs exclusion of de minimis treatment
under the tariff shift Marking Rules. With respect to determining when goods are the goods of party
for purposes of Marking Rules, NAFTA Annex 311 authorizes the tariff shift methodology, and does
not expressly withhold de minimis treatment under the tariff shift rules.
Significantly, too, as pointed out by plaintiff, had the NAFTA Parties intended that the de
minimis rule of Annex 405 be also applied to Annex 311, they could have easily so provided, in which
event Customs’ health and food safety rationale for excluding the de minimis exception from the tariff
shift rules would be irrelevant. On the contrary, while NAFTA Annex 311 does not specifically address
de minimis treatment under the tariff shift methodology, it does express an intent that NAFTA parties
shall “in adopting, maintaining and applying any measure relating to country of origin marking, minimize
the difficulties, costs and inconveniences that the measure may cause to the commerce and industry of
the other parties.” See NAFTA Annex 311(4). Customs’ exclusion from the de minimis exception to
Court No. 95-02-00144 Page 17
the tariff shift rules of most agricultural products pursuant to section 102.13(b), ostensibly for health and
food safety reasons, was palpably inconsistent with the express objectives of Annex 311 and the
Marking Rules and an unreasonable approach for addressing Customs’ health and food safety
concerns.
The NAFTA Marking Rules are conceded by plaintiff to be “interpretive” in nature.
Defendant urges, correctly, that judicial deference is owed to reasonable interpretive agency
regulations. Fundamentally, an agency’s reasonable interpretive regulations are entitled to deference by
the court. Haggar Apparel Co. v. United States, 526 U.S. 380 (1999), citing Chevron Corporation v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
However, judicial deference to interpretive regulations (and certain rulings) does not absolve
the court from determining the reasonableness of agency interpretation. See this court’s recent decision
in Genesco Inc. v. United States (CIT Slip Op. 00-57, 2000 WL 710 304, May 23, 2000). In United
States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 26 (1982), the Supreme Court observed that a
“[r]egulation is not a reasonable statutory interpretation unless it harmonizes with the statute’s ‘origin
and purpose’.” (Quoting National Muffler Dealers Ass’n, Inc. v. U.S., 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979).
Defendant has failed to persuade this court that exclusion of most agricultural products from the
de minimis exception to the tariff shift rules for health and food safety reasons is consistent with, or
furthers the purpose of, either the Marking statute or the NAFTA Marking Rules, or that excluding de
minimis treatment from the tariff shift rules reasonably addresses Customs’ health and food safety
Court No. 95-02-00144 Page 18
concerns related to NAFTA agricultural products. There being no other justification by defendant for
excluding most agricultural products from the de minimis exception to the tariff shift rules (other than the
cryptic references to “the nature of” the goods excluded and an alleged “past practice”of not applying
de minimis treatment to agricultural products), the court is constrained to agree with Bestfoods
argument that section 102.13(b) is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise contrary
to law. Accordingly, plaintiff should be given the opportunity to demonstrate that when its finished
peanut butter contains Canadian peanut slurry whether or not the finished product qualifies for de
minimis treatment under 19 C.F.R. § 102.13(a) and should not be subject to marking under 19 U.S.C.
§ 1304(a) to show a foreign country of origin.
CONCLUSION
This action was remanded to permit plaintiff to pursue any additional arguments as to
why it should not be required to mark its finished peanut butter under the applicable regulations.
Court No. 95-02-00144 Page 19
Contrary to defendant’s contention, plaintiff’s additional arguments are within the scope of the remand.
This court has concluded that Customs’ health and food safety concerns in connection with
most NAFTA agricultural products, while they may be relevant to and addressed by other statutes and
regulations cooperatively enforced by the Customs Service and other agencies, Customs overstepped
its authority in addressing health and food safety concerns by excluding de minimis treatment from the
tariff shift rules with respect to most agricultural products under
section 102.13(b). For all the other reasons stated above, plaintiff’s argument on remand that 19C.F.R.
§ 102.13(b) is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise contrary to law is sustained 6
A judgment will be entered accordingly.
New York, New York
June , 2000 James L. Watson, Senior Judge
6
The court observes that the issue of “severability,” see Schnitzer Steel Products Co. v. United
States, 45 Cust. Ct. 173, C.D. 2220 (1960) (where separate subdivisions of a regulation are
independent and mutually exclusive, any invalidity of one portion does not destroy the validity of the
other), has not been raised, and the court takes no position on the issue. However, under the rationale
of Alcan, even in the absence of a de minimis regulation, de minimis treatment under the tariff shift rules
should be implied.