UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-10601
Summary Calendar
RUBEN GLORIA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
VALLEY GRAIN PRODUCTS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
January 17, 1996
Before WIENER, PARKER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
I. FACTS and PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Ruben Gloria ("Gloria") filed suit against Valley Grain
Products, Inc. ("Valley Grain"), alleging discrimination under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e. A jury found for Gloria and awarded backpay in the amount
of $33,000; however, the district court granted Valley Grain's
motion for judgment as a matter of law. On appeal, this court
reversed the district court's judgment as a matter of law and
remanded "for further proceedings in accordance with the opinion of
this court." Gloria v. Valley Grain Prod., Inc., (5th Cir. May 8,
1995).
On remand, the district court entered judgment for the $33,000
in backpay found by the jury, $21,085 in attorneys' fees, and post-
judgment interest at the rate of 5.88% per annum. Valley Grain
tendered a check in response to the judgment in the amount of
$54,145.95. Gloria accepted the check without objection.
Gloria now appeals the district court's calculation of
damages. Specifically, Gloria asserts that he is entitled to (1)
backpay from the date of trial, February 24, 1994, through the date
of final judgment entered after the first appeal, June 2, 1995; (2)
frontpay in lieu of reinstatement; and (3) prejudgment interest,
either from the date of his unlawful termination or from the date
of trial to the date of the final judgment. Valley Grain counters
these assertions on the merits and also argues that by accepting
the check without objection, Gloria is now precluded from seeking
additional damages.
II. ANALYSIS
1. Preclusion from Seeking Additional Damages:
Acceptance of payment of an unsatisfactory judgment can amount
to an accord and satisfaction precluding an appeal where
circumstances indicate an intention to finally compromise and
settle a disputed claim. United States v. Houghan, 364 U.S. 310,
312, 81 S. Ct. 13, 15-16 (1960). Valley Grain asserts that its
check was cashed without objection or without any indication that
Gloria was dissatisfied with the award or intended to appeal the
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court's judgment. Gloria counters that the check was delivered
without any form of settlement or release being signed or presented
to Gloria, and that the check was accepted because the issues in
this appeal do not involve any part of the amount paid.
"It is a generally accepted rule of law that where a judgment
is appealed on the ground that the damages awarded are inadequate,
acceptance of payment of the amount of the unsatisfactory judgment
does not, standing alone, amount to an accord and satisfaction of
the entire claim." Houghan, 81 S. Ct. at 16. Gloria is foreclosed
from appealing the damages award "only if the parties mutually
intended a final settlement of all the claims in dispute and a
termination of the litigation." McGowen v. King, 616 F.2d 745, 746
(5th Cir. 1980); see Gadsden v. Fripp, 330 F.2d 545, 548 (4th Cir.
1964) (for an appeal to be foreclosed, there must be a "mutual
manifestation of an intention to bring the litigation to a definite
conclusion upon a basis acceptable to all parties . . . not the
bare fact of payment of the judgment."). In the present case,
there was no manifestation of Gloria's intent to bring the
litigation to a definite conclusion. Therefore, because there was
no such mutual intent, an accord and satisfaction of all claims was
not reached and Gloria's appeal is not precluded.
2. Backpay through the Date of Final Judgment and Frontpay:
The district court awarded backpay for the amount requested at
trial, as determined by the jury. However, following the jury
verdict, the judgment did not become final until after appeal, 15
months later. Gloria asserts that he is entitled to backpay from
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the date of trial until the award was actually entered on remand.
Additionally, Gloria argues that he is entitled to frontpay for
approximately 30 months in order to make him "whole" in accordance
with Title VII objectives.
Because Title VII, prior to its amendment in 1991, afforded
only equitable relief, a complaining party was not as a matter of
right entitled to a trial by jury. Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597
F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979). However, the parties in this case
consented to a trial by jury. Therefore, the verdict of the jury
has the same effect as if the trial by jury had been as a matter of
right. Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(c).
The jury was asked to determine Gloria's "lost wages and
employment benefits in the past" (between the date of discharge and
the date of trial). The jury determined that $33,000 would fairly
compensate Gloria for this time period. Any damages allegedly
incurred after the date of trial were considered in a separate
question when the jury was asked to determine Gloria's "lost wages
and employment benefits reasonably probable to be lost in the
future." The jury answered this question "none." The verdict of
the jury is binding, subject to being set aside only under the
verdict deferential standard of review. Boeing v. Shipman, 411
F.2d 365, 374 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc). Gloria has failed to show
that there is a lack of substantial evidence to support the jury's
answer to this second question. Accordingly, Gloria is not
entitled to any damages calculated past the day of trial.
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3. Prejudgment Interest:
This court has stated that interest is an element that
"should" be included in backpay. Pettway v. American Cast Iron
Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 263 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 439
U.S.. 1115 (1979), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1243 (1984), and cert.
dism'd, 467 U.S. 1247 (1984); see Sellers v. Delgado Community
College, 839 F.2d 1132, 1140 (5th Cir. 1988). Furthermore, the
goal of Title VII is to restore an employee who has been
discriminated against to his or her rightful place by making the
employee financially whole again. Deloach v. Delchamps, Inc., 897
F.2d 815, 822 (5th Cir. 1990). The time value of money causes an
award of backpay to be worth less if prejudgment interest is not
included. Gloria was discharged in July 1991, and the trial was
not held until February 1994. The numerous steps necessary to
prove discrimination in employment regretfully take an extended
period of time. The employee should not be punished for this delay
if, after the legal process is completed, discrimination is found
to have occurred. This rationale leads us to conclude, as did the
Pettway court, that prejudgment interest on backpay awards should
be granted.
However, it is settled that the decision to award prejudgment
interest on a backpay award in Title VII cases rests within the
sound discretion of the district court. Hadley v. Vam PTS, 44 F.3d
372, 376 (5th Cir. 1995); Sellers, 839 F.2d at 1140; Bunch v.
Bullard, 795 F.2d 384, 399 (5th Cir. 1986). Gloria's only argument
to establish an abuse of discretion by the district court is that
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it ignores the "make whole" policies of Title VII. This contention
could be raised in every Title VII case where backpay is awarded.
A general rule that prejudgment interest on every backpay award
must be granted would obliterate the discretion of the district
court. We are unable to simply ignore the recognized discretion of
the district court in this area.
Similarly, Gloria's rationale would result in a blanket rule
requiring prejudgment interest, and this court has recently
observed that there is no per se rule that requires prejudgment
interest in every award of backpay. Hadley, 44 F.3d at 376.
Therefore, while we agree that prejudgment interest "should"
normally be included, it was not an abuse of discretion for the
district court to decline to do so here.
The judgment of the district court is therefore AFFIRMED.
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