Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Opinion
Chief Justice Justices
Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
FILED JUNE 9, 2004
SHEILA HARVEY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 124234
HARRY LOUIS HARVEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
PER CURIAM
In this divorce proceeding, the parties agreed that
the friend of the court would determine the custody of
their children and that the circuit court could not review
the decision. Honoring this, the circuit court entered the
friend of the court’s recommended order awarding sole
custody of the children to defendant and denied plaintiff’s
motion for a hearing to review the matter.
The Court of Appeals vacated the circuit court’s order
and remanded the case for a hearing de novo. We affirm
that opinion, but write to provide clarification.
Regardless of the type of alternative dispute resolution
that parties use, the Child Custody Act1 requires the
circuit court to determine independently what custodial
placement is in the best interests of the children.2 We
write to clarify the responsibility of the trial court in
making that determination.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Trial Court Proceedings
Two daughters were born during the parties’ marriage,
one in 1994 and the other in 1996. In February 2000,
plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce with the Family
Division of the Oakland Circuit Court. A variety of issues
were disputed, including custody of the children.
Instead of proceeding directly to trial, the parties
opted for a form of alternative dispute resolution. On May
1
MCL 722.21 et seq.
2
We recognize that parents sometimes reach agreements
regarding custody and visitation matters either informally
through direct negotiations or through mediation procedures
made available by dispute resolution organizations. Our
decision does not restrict the ability of parties to
address disputes through alternative dispute resolution
processes. We hold only that the statutory “best
interests” factors control whenever a court enters an order
affecting child custody. An initial agreement between the
parties cannot relieve the court of its statutory
responsibility to ensure that its adjudication of custody
disputes is in a child’s best interests.
Likewise, parties must understand that a child custody
determination resulting from alternative dispute resolution
processes is not enforceable absent a court order.
2
15, 2001, the circuit court entered a consent order,
approved by both parties’ counsel, for binding arbitration.
Its object was to resolve all property matters3 and provide
for an evidentiary hearing and binding decision by the
friend of the court referee regarding custody, parenting
time, and child support issues. The order stated that the
referee’s decision could not be reviewed by the circuit
court:
7. Issues of custody, parenting time and
child support shall be referred to the Oakland
County Friend of the Court for an Evidentiary
Hearing in front of a Referee.
8. The decision of the Referee, after
hearing, shall be binding on the parties and
shall not be reviewable by the trial court. The
Appellate rights to the Court of Appeals are
again preserved.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the friend of the
court submitted findings to the circuit court with a
recommended order awarding legal and physical custody of
the children solely to defendant. Plaintiff filed timely
written objections to the order.
The circuit court entered the recommended order, over
plaintiff’s objection, changing the existing custodial
arrangement. The court denied her motion for an
3
The parties subsequently signed a binding arbitration
agreement and arbitrated the marital property issues, which
are not on appeal.
3
evidentiary hearing de novo and refused to set aside the
order when defendant argued that the parties’ stipulation
restricted its authority to review the order.
B. Appellate Court Proceedings
Plaintiff appealed as of right. The Court of Appeals
vacated the custody order and remanded for a hearing de
novo in the circuit court.
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that
the Child Custody Act governs all child custody disputes
and gives the circuit court continuing jurisdiction over
custody proceedings. MCL 722.26. The Court discussed two
statutory schemes that operate concurrently with the Child
Custody Act to provide the parties with alternative methods
of dispute resolution: the domestic relations arbitration
act and the Friend of the Court Act. MCL 600.5070 et seq.
and 552.501 et seq.
The domestic relations arbitration act permits parties
to agree to binding arbitration of child custody disputes.
It contains numerous protections for them, including
mandatory prearbitration disclosures and detailed
procedural requirements. MCL 600.5072. The parties can
seek circuit court review of the arbitration award. MCL
600.5080 specifically addresses awards concerning child
custody:
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(1) Subject to subsection (2), the circuit
court shall not vacate or modify an award
concerning child support, custody, or parenting
time unless the court finds that the award is
adverse to the best interests of the child who is
the subject of the award or under the provisions
of section 5081.
(2) A review or modification of a child
support amount, child custody, or parenting time
shall be conducted and is subject to the
standards and procedures provided in other
statutes, in other applicable law, and by court
rule that are applicable to child support
amounts, child custody, or parenting time.
(3) Other standards and procedures
regarding review of arbitration awards described
in this section are governed by court rule.
A separate provision, MCL 600.5081, generally addresses the
manner in which the circuit court shall review a motion to
vacate or modify an arbitration award.
Alternatively, parties to a custody dispute can
present the issue to a friend of the court referee. If
they elect this option, the circuit court may review the
referee’s recommendation in accordance with MCL 552.507(5).
That subsection provides that the circuit court “shall hold
a de novo hearing on any matter that has been the subject
of a referee hearing” if either party requests such a
hearing within twenty-one days after receiving the
referee’s recommendation.
The Court of Appeals concluded that, under either
statute, the parties were entitled to have the circuit
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court review the custody determination. For this reason,
it held, “an agreement for a binding decision in a
domestic-relations matter with no right of review in the
court, as in this case, is without statutory support under
either scheme.” 257 Mich App 278, 289; 668 NW2d 187
(2003).
The Court then determined that the parties had not
complied with the detailed procedural requirements of the
domestic relations arbitration act. As a consequence, it
held that the parties’ agreement was governed by the Friend
of the Court Act, MCL 552.507(5). The trial court should
have addressed plaintiff’s objections by holding a hearing
de novo to review whether the custody recommendation was in
the best interests of the children. The Court of Appeals
summed up as follows:
In the absence of any review by the trial
court, as discussed above, and in the absence of
a valid agreement for binding arbitration or an
otherwise valid waiver of procedural
requirements, plaintiff was improperly denied a
hearing regarding her objections to the friend of
the court’s findings and recommendation. [257
Mich App 292.]
It vacated the custody order and remanded for a hearing de
novo in the circuit court.
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Defendant now seeks leave to appeal, asking this Court
to reinstate the custody order awarding him sole legal and
physical custody of the children.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether parties to a divorce can by stipulation
restrict the circuit court’s authority to decide a custody
issue is a question of law that we review de novo.
Cardinal Mooney High School v Michigan High School Athletic
Ass'n, 437 Mich 75, 80; 467 NW2d 21 (1991).
III. ANALYSIS
The Child Custody Act is a comprehensive statutory
scheme for resolving custody disputes. Van v Zahorik, 460
Mich 320, 327; 597 NW2d 15 (1999). With it, the
Legislature sought to “promote the best interests and
welfare of children.” Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871,
877; 526 NW2d 889 (1994). The act applies to all custody
disputes and vests the circuit court with continuing
jurisdiction. MCL 722.26.
The act makes clear that the best interests of the
child control the resolution of a custody dispute between
parents, as gauged by the factors set forth at MCL 722.23.
MCL 722.25(1). It places an affirmative obligation on the
circuit court to “declare the child’s inherent rights and
establish the rights and duties as to the child’s custody,
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support, and parenting time in accordance with this act”
whenever the court is required to adjudicate an action
“involving dispute of a minor child’s custody.” MCL
722.24(1); Van, supra at 328. Taken together, these
statutory provisions impose on the trial court the duty to
ensure that the resolution of any custody dispute is in the
best interests of the child.
Thus, we affirm the Court of Appeals decision to
remand this case to the circuit court for a hearing de
novo, but not for the reason stated by the Court of
Appeals. It is irrelevant that the parties did not have a
“valid agreement for binding arbitration or an otherwise
valid waiver of procedural requirements . . . .” 257 Mich
App 292. The Child Custody Act required the circuit court
to determine the best interests of the children before
entering an order resolving the custody dispute.
Our holding should not be interpreted, where the
parties have agreed to a custody arrangement, to require
the court to conduct a hearing or otherwise engage in
intensive fact-finding. See MCL 552.513(2) and
600.5080(1). Our requirement under such circumstances is
that the court satisfy itself concerning the best interests
of the children. When the court signs the order, it
indicates that it has done so. A judge signs an order only
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after profound deliberation and in the exercise of the
judge’s traditional broad discretion. See Greene v Greene,
357 Mich 196, 202; 98 NW2d 519 (1959).
However, the deference due parties’ negotiated
agreements does not diminish the court’s obligation to
examine the best interest factors and make the child’s best
interests paramount. MCL 722.25(1). Nothing in the Child
Custody Act gives parents or any other party the power to
exclude the legislatively mandated “best interests” factors
from the court’s deliberations once a custody dispute
reaches the court.
Furthermore, neither the Friend of the Court Act nor
the domestic relations arbitration act relieves the circuit
court of its duty to review a custody arrangement once the
issue of a child’s custody reaches the bench. The Friend
of the Court Act states that the circuit court “shall” hold
a hearing de novo to review a friend of the court
recommendation if either party objects to that
recommendation in writing within twenty-one days. MCL
552.507(5).
Likewise, MCL 600.5080 authorizes a circuit court to
modify or vacate an arbitration award that is not in the
best interests of the child. It requires the circuit court
to review the arbitration award in accordance with the
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requirements of other relevant statutes, including the
Child Custody Act. The court retains authority over
custody until the child reaches the age of majority. MCL
722.27(1)(c).
Thus, even when parties initially elect to submit a
custody dispute to an arbitrator or to the friend of the
court, they cannot waive the authority that the Child
Custody Act confers on the circuit court. As the Court of
Appeals has previously explained, parties “cannot by
agreement usurp the court’s authority to determine suitable
provisions for the child’s best interests.” Lombardo v
Lombardo, 202 Mich App 151, 160; 507 NW2d 788 (1993). See
also Napora v Napora, 159 Mich App 241, 246; 406 NW2d 197
(1986). Permitting the parties, by stipulation, to limit
the trial court’s authority to review custody
determinations would nullify the protections of the Child
Custody Act and relieve the circuit court of its
statutorily imposed responsibilities.
IV. CONCLUSION
We agree with the Court of Appeals that parties cannot
stipulate to circumvent the authority of the circuit court
in determining the custody of children. In making its
determination, the court must consider the best interests
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of the children. Child custody determinations or
agreements are not binding until entered by court order.
The Court of Appeals judgment in favor of plaintiff,
remanding this case to the Family Division of the Oakland
Circuit Court for a hearing de novo is affirmed, but for a
reason different from that stated by that Court. MCR
7.302(G)(1).
Maura D. Corrigan
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
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