Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
____________________________________________________________________________________________
C hief Justice Justices
Maura D. Cor rigan Michael F. Cavanagh
O pinion
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
FILED SEPTEMBER 25, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
ex rel WAYNE COUNTY PROSECUTOR,
Plaintiff,
v No. 117689
$176,598.00 UNITED STATES
CURRENCY, MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS,
THREE (3) FIREARMS, ONE (1) SAFE,
AND MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS OF JEWELRY,
Defendants,
and
NATHANIEL WILSON,
Claimant-Appellee,
v
CITY OF DETROIT,
Appellant.
________________________________
PER CURIAM
The issue raised in this appeal is whether statutory
interest under MCL 600.6013 is owed when money that was the
subject of a forfeiture proceeding under the controlled
substances laws is ordered returned to the owner. The Court
of Appeals held that statutory interest must be paid.
We conclude that money ordered returned to its owner
under the forfeiture procedure does not constitute a “money
judgment recovered in a civil action,” and thus statutory
interest is not payable.
I
In December 1986, Detroit police officers responded to a
residential security alarm and entered the home of Nathaniel
Wilson on Corbett Street on the suspicion that a burglary was
in progress. The officers found no intruders, but they did
find $167,480 in cash. Circumstances suggested that the money
may have been related to drug trafficking. It was taken to
the police station, and dogs trained to detect controlled
substances indicated the presence of such scent on the
currency.
The Wayne County Prosecutor brought a civil forfeiture
action for the funds, as well as for $9,118 in cash that had
been seized earlier from another house (on Chalmers Street)
occupied by Wilson. Wilson defended and asked that the money
be returned to him.
A bench trial followed, and the circuit court ordered the
forfeiture. However, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding
that the search of the house on Corbett had been illegal, and
2
that forfeiture proceedings regarding the property seized from
the house on Chalmers had not been properly instituted.1
However, we granted the prosecutor’s application for leave to
appeal, and reversed, holding that the entry and search of the
Corbett residence without a warrant2 was lawful because it was
supported by probable cause and occurred under exigent
circumstances.3 We remanded to the Court of Appeals for
further proceedings.
On remand, the Court of Appeals again reversed the order
of forfeiture, holding that the police had exceeded the scope
of their authority by searching a trunk where most of the
money was found.4 We denied leave to appeal.5
Having prevailed in the forfeiture proceeding, Wilson
brought a motion for return of the money, and asked for an
award of statutory judgment interest. There was some delay
because of liens filed by the United States government and the
Michigan Department of Treasury.6 Following a hearing, the
1
Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued November 7, 1991
(Docket No. 101884).
2
The prosecutor had not appealed the Court of Appeals
ruling regarding the $9,118 seized from the house on Chalmers.
3
443 Mich 261; 505 NW2d 201 (1993).
4
(On Remand), unpublished opinion per curiam, issued
May 23, 1994 (Docket No. 168073).
5
447 Mich 980; 525 NW2d 451 (1994).
6
Wilson had been sentenced to federal prison on a 1991
drug conviction. The United States lien was filed to recover
3
Wayne Circuit Court entered an order on February 25, 1997,
requiring the city of Detroit to return the money involved in
the forfeiture action, but denying Wilson’s claim for
statutory judgment interest.
Wilson filed a delayed application for leave to appeal,
which the Court of Appeals granted. It then reversed, holding
that the decree directing return of the funds was a money
judgment in a civil action, entitling Wilson to interest under
§ 6013(1). It directed the circuit court to calculate the
amount of interest, explaining that interest should not be
awarded for those periods of delay in the forfeiture
proceeding that were not attributable to the city.7
The city of Detroit has filed an application for leave to
appeal to this Court.
II
Whether RJA § 6013 applies in the circumstances of this
case is a question of statutory interpretation, which we
review de novo. Brown v Michigan Health Care Corp, 463 Mich
368, 374; 617 NW2d 301 (2000); Sands Appliance Services, Inc
v Wilson, 463 Mich 231, 238; 615 NW2d 241 (2000).
the costs of his incarceration. Eventually, $102,911.21 of
the money was paid to the U.S. government. The Michigan
Department of Treasury’s lien concerned Wilson’s lawyer. The
Treasury sought a portion of the attorney fee to help satisfy
a tax judgment against him, and $5,000 from the fund was paid
to the state on that judgment.
7
242 Mich App 342; 618 NW2d 922 (2000).
4
III
RJA § 6013(1) provides that “[i]nterest shall be allowed
on a money judgment recovered in a civil action,” as provided
in that section.8 For the purpose of the judgment interest
statute, a money judgment is one that orders the payment of a
sum of money, as distinguished from an order directing an act
to be done or property to be restored or transferred. Stewart
v Isbell, 155 Mich App 65, 80; 399 NW2d 440 (1986); Moore v
Carney, 84 Mich App 399, 404; 269 NW2d 614 (1978).9
The forfeiture statute itself is silent on the issue of
interest. However, its provisions make clear that an order
returning seized currency following a drug forfeiture trial is
not a money judgment, but rather an order for the return of
specific personal property.10 For example, MCL 333.7521(1)(f)
8
The remaining subsections specify the interest rates
applicable to various periods, cover the effect of offers of
settlement on entitlement to interest, and include specific
provisions applicable to medical malpractice cases.
9
This distinction reflects the purpose of § 6013, which
is “to compensate the prevailing party for the expenses
incurred in bringing an action and for the delay in receiving
money damages.” Phinney v Perlmutter, 222 Mich App 513, 541;
564 NW2d 532 (1997).
10
The Michigan drug forfeiture statute is drawn from the
model of the federal drug laws, which treat seized currency in
the same manner as other seized personal property. In re
Forfeiture of $11,800 US Currency, 174 Mich App 727, 729; 436
NW2d 449 (1989). Under the federal statute, forfeiture
proceedings are in rem actions against the property. United
States v One 1985 Mercedes, 917 F2d 415, 419 (CA 9, 1990);
United States v Real Property Located at Incline Village, 47
F3d 1511, 1519 (CA 9, 1995), rev’d on other grounds Degen v
5
states:
The following property is subject to forfeiture:
Any thing of value that is furnished or
intended to be furnished in exchange for a
controlled substance . . . including, but not
limited to, money, negotiable instruments, or
securities. . . . Any money that is found in close
proximity to any property that is subject to
forfeiture under subdivision (a), (b), (c), (d) or
(e) shall be presumed to be subject to forfeiture
under this subdivision. This presumption may be
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.
[Emphasis added.]
Likewise, MCL 333.7523(1) decrees that “forfeiture
proceedings shall be instituted promptly” and sets forth the
“procedure (that) shall be used” where “property is seized
pursuant to section 7522.” (Emphasis added.)
Section 7523(1)(c) instructs an owner of seized property how
to seek recovery of the “property” in forfeiture proceedings.
Perhaps most significant is MCL 333.7523(2), which equates the
statutory recovery of anything seized as part of a drug
forfeiture with a civil action to recover “personal property”:
Property taken or detained under this article
or pursuant to section 17766a shall not be subject
to an action to recover personal property, but is
deemed to be in the custody of the seizing agency
subject only to this section or an order and
judgment of the court having jurisdiction over the
forfeiture proceedings. . . . [Emphasis added.]
United States, 517 US 820; 116 S Ct 1777; 135 L Ed 2d 102
(1996). The return of seized property is treated as an act of
restoration, rather than as an award of monetary compensation
for damages suffered by a party. See, e.g., United States v
One 1979 Cadillac, 833 F2d 994, 998 (CA Fed, 1987).
6
In addition, the language of § 6013 itself indicates that
the proceeding here does not constitute a “civil action” for
the purpose of that rule. Subsections (2) through (6) suggest
that a complaint must be filed with the court by the person
who has recovered the money judgment. Each subsection begins
with the phrase, “for complaints filed,” or contains other
language referencing the filing of a “complaint.” Wilson did
not file any such complaint in this proceeding. Therefore,
rather than being the prevailing claimant in a civil action,
Wilson was merely the owner of property that the prosecutor
unsuccessfully sought to seize in a forfeiture action
initiated by the latter. The trial court’s order was not an
adjudication of an action for money damages, but rather one
for the delivery of property that had been the subject of a
forfeiture action.11
In other contexts, the case law has denied interest under
§ 6013 in proceedings that, like drug forfeitures, are not
typical civil actions preceding an award of a money judgment.
See, e.g., Reigle v Reigle, 189 Mich App 386, 392-393; 474
NW2d 297 (1991) (the statute does not apply to money awards in
divorce judgments); Oliver v State Police, 132 Mich App 558,
11
If Wilson thought that the police had behaved
unlawfully here (as opposed merely to having not prevailed),
he was free to bring a civil action for damages.
Alternatively, he had the option of suing in federal court
under 42 USC 1983.
7
572-577; 349 NW2d 211 (1984) (no statutory interest on an
award of back pay in a circuit court review of an employee
discharge under civil service laws); In re Cole Estate, 120
Mich App 539, 548-551; 328 NW2d 76 (1982) (an order awarding
a forced share in an estate is not a “money judgment recovered
in a civil action” entitling a spouse to an award of judgment
interest).12
The Court of Appeals decision also creates the danger of
what the trial court called “imposing a penalty on the seizing
agency.” Michigan law prohibits law enforcement agencies from
depositing currency seized pursuant to a warrant into an
interest bearing bank account until the currency no longer is
needed as evidence in any trial. See MCL 780.655; In re
Forfeiture of $25,505 US Currency, 220 Mich App 572, 577; 560
NW2d 341 (1996). The decision of the Court of Appeals could
result in police departments being compelled to pay judgment
interest on money that they were statutorily prohibited from
depositing into an interest bearing account.
12
There are some cases that award the prevailing party
the interest which the seizing governmental unit actually
earned on the property while it was in the governmental unit’s
possession. See, e.g., United States v $515,060.42 in US
Currency, 152 F3d 491, 504-506 (CA 6, 1998); In re Forfeiture
of $30,632.41, 184 Mich App 677, 678-680; 459 NW2d 99 (1990).
Those awards are based on the court’s traditional equity
powers to avoid a windfall to the governmental agency from its
possession of property. In this case, the funds were
deposited in an interest-bearing account for part of the time
they were in the city’s possession, and this interest earned
was, in fact, paid to Wilson under the circuit court’s order.
8
We conclude that the order directing return of the seized
funds to Wilson was not a money judgment in a civil action
under § 6013. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeals and reinstate the Wayne Circuit Court’s
February 25, 1997, order denying interest.
CORRIGAN , C.J., and CAVANAGH , WEAVER , KELLY , TAYLOR , YOUNG , and
MARKMAN , JJ., concurred.
9