Williams v. Tharp

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Arend J. Abel KELLY EUGENE THARP PAPA JOHN’S U.S.A., INC.
Kelley J. Johnson Julia Blackwell Gelinas John B. Drummy
Cohen & Malad, LLP John M. T. Chavis, II Eric D. Johnson
Indianapolis, Indiana Lucy R. Dollens Jeffrey D. Hawkins
Frost Brown Todd LLC Kightlinger & Gray, LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
___________________________________________________________________________________________

In the
Indiana Supreme Court
FILED
Oct 13 2009, 3:10 pm
_________________________________
CLERK
of the supreme court,
No. 29S02-0901-CV-40 court of appeals and
tax court

THOMAS WILLIAMS AND SANFORD KELSEY, Appellants (Plaintiffs below),

v.

KELLY EUGENE THARP AND
PAPA JOHN’S U.S.A., INC., Appellees (Defendants below).
_________________________________

Appeal from the Hamilton Circuit Court, No. 29C01-0510-CT-1146
The Honorable Judith S. Proffitt, Judge
_________________________________

On Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 29A02-0707-CV-625
_________________________________

October 13, 2009

Dickson, Justice.

This appeal challenges the trial court's grant of summary judgment which found privi-
leged a restaurant employee's statements to a passerby and a police officer that a customer had
"pulled a gun" inside the store. The plaintiffs, Sanford Kelsey and Thomas Williams, respective-
ly, the suspected gun carrier and his companion (neither of whom actually had a gun), sued the
restaurant operator, Papa John's U.S.A., Inc., and its employee, Kelly Tharp, for a variety of torts
(defamation per se, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent hir-
ing, and negligence) seeking damages, including punitive damages. The Court of Appeals re-
versed and remanded for trial. Williams v. Tharp, 889 N.E.2d 870 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). We
granted transfer and now affirm the trial court's judgment.

On February 19, 2005, around 9:30 p.m., the plaintiffs drove to a Papa John’s restaurant
to pick up an order. Kelsey wore a full-length tan coat and at the front of his waist a rectangular
black fanny pack with silver reflective material. Williams planned to pick up the tab, but inside
the restaurant Kelsey contributed by handing cash to Williams, which Kelsey removed from his
brown leather bi-fold wallet inside the fanny pack. Williams accepted the money and paid the
bill by credit card. The men left the store and drove directly home.

Tharp worked that night as a delivery driver. He had never met and did not know the
plaintiffs. While the plaintiffs were paying, Tharp had come to the front of the store and, accord-
ing to his deposition testimony, "saw a guy at the counter, and he was looking down . . . , and he
pulled out what I thought was a gun." Tharp said the man "looked up . . . . He didn't move his
head, he moved his eyes, and he saw me looking at him, and he stuck his hand back in his coat."
Tharp "went out the door, and whoever was there, the first person it was . . . I said, we need to
watch that guy because I think he had a gun. He pulled out a gun, and he stuck it back in when
he thought – when he saw me looking at him." The passerby called police. Meanwhile, Tharp
returned inside and told another restaurant employee, Christian Martin, that one of the customers
had a gun. Martin walked to the front of the store and noticed Kelsey's fanny pack but did not
see a gun.

The Westfield, Indiana, Police Department dispatched Officer Jeff Frolick to Papa John's
"on a report of a person carrying a weapon." The officer happened to be across the street at the
time, so he arrived quickly, but the plaintiffs had already left. After parking, Officer Frolick
spoke with two men in the parking lot—one was Tharp, who falsely identified himself as "Arthur
Tharp"; the other was the passerby. Tharp told the officer that "two black males came into Papa
John's Restaurant, one was wearing a long tan coat and he pulled a hand gun out of his waistband
or a holster and then put it back into some type of holder." Tharp gave Officer Frolick the li-
cense plate number, which he had written down, and a description of Williams's car. Frolick re-
layed this information to dispatch. Tharp described the weapon as a medium-sized silver gun

2
with a brown wooden handle with two small silver circles. He told Officer Frolick that he had
been standing behind the clerk at the register when he saw the gun. (Later in his deposition
Tharp recalled the gun as having a black grip with small silver circles on the handle.) It is undis-
puted that Tharp never claimed that either plaintiff committed a robbery, made threats, de-
manded money, or pointed a gun at anyone.

Officer Frolick told Tharp to stay by the police car while he went inside to speak with
other employees. None of the three other employees reported that the store had been robbed or
that anyone had made threats with a gun or demanded money. Frolick went behind the counter
to where he understood Tharp to say he had been standing, but the officer did not think someone
standing in that location could see a customer's waist and believed that Tharp, who is shorter
than Frolick, could not have seen what he claimed. When Officer Frolick returned outside,
Tharp was gone. Tharp explained at his deposition that he fled because he had outstanding war-
rants and feared arrest once his identity was discovered and that "what I saw was the only moti-
vation. I didn't – I didn't really want to talk to police that night."

After Williams and Kelsey made the short drive to Williams's home and parked, police
ordered them out of the car at gunpoint, ordered them to their knees, and handcuffed them, the-
reafter detaining the men for over an hour while family and neighbors looked on. Police told the
men they were investigating a report of someone "flashing a gun around at the Papa John's loca-
tion" or "pulling a gun out." No officer said they were investigating a robbery. Police found no
gun, and the men were released.

Tharp had worked for Papa John's elsewhere twice before. The first stint ended with a
firing and a later conviction for theft. He used a false name for his second period of employ-
ment, which ended because of his incarceration for fraud stemming from events unrelated to his
employment. When hired the third time, he used his father's name, social security number, and
driver's license number. After he left the scene on February 19, Tharp did not return to work at
Papa John's (he later learned that he was fired). Tharp later returned money to Papa John's that
was in his car when he left and penned a letter, maintaining, "I don't care what that Black guy
says – he was getting ready to rob the store. Why else put his hand on his gun & start to pull it

3
out[?]"
The plaintiffs sued Papa John's and Tharp, seeking compensatory and punitive damages,
alleging that Tharp's statement constituted defamation per se, that the plaintiffs were falsely im-
prisoned as a result, that Tharp intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon them, and that
Tharp's actions were negligent. Papa John’s was alleged to be liable under the doctrine of res-
pondeat superior as well as for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision. Papa John's moved
for summary judgment, and Tharp joined that motion. Papa John's also moved to strike certain
items of evidence that the plaintiffs designated in their opposition to summary judgment, includ-
ing paragraph 9 of Officer Frolick's affidavit (stating his belief that Tharp could not see a cus-
tomer's waist from behind the counter) and paragraph 10 (his testimony based on reviewing Papa
John's surveillance video), as well as in-car video from Frolick's vehicle and a transcript of that
video.

The trial court granted summary judgment on all counts. The court held that a qualified
privilege protected Tharp's statements, compelling summary judgment for defamation, as well as
for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, punitive damages, and, with no under-
lying tort, negligent hiring. The court also granted summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claim of
false imprisonment, concluding that a false report to police was insufficient to create liability.
The trial court granted in part and denied in part Papa John's motion to strike. The court struck
the video taken from Officer Frolick's car at the scene as well as paragraph 10 of his affidavit,
but declined to strike paragraph 9.1 The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded on each count.
We granted transfer.

A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. U.S. Steel
Corp., 907 N.E.2d 1012, 1018 (Ind. 2009). Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Wil-
liams and Kelsey, the non-moving parties, summary judgment is appropriate "if the designated
evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the mov-

1
The defendants briefly argue that the "trial court erred in failing to strike this statement from Officer
Frolick's declaration/affidavit" because his statement "constitutes an impermissible speculative opinion or
conclusion about what someone else observed." Appellee Tharp's Br. at 17 n.4; Appellee Papa John's Br.
at 17 n.5. We decline to find that the trial court abused its discretion in this regard.

4
ing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). A fact is "material"
if its resolution would affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is "genuine" if a trier of fact is
required to resolve the parties' differing accounts of the truth, Gaboury v. Ireland Road Grace
Brethren, Inc., 446 N.E.2d 1310, 1313 (Ind. 1983), or if the undisputed material facts support
conflicting reasonable inferences, Bochnowski v. Peoples Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 571 N.E.2d
282, 285 (Ind. 1991). If Tharp and Papa John's have "demonstrate[d] the absence of any genuine
issue of fact as to a determinative issue," they are entitled to summary judgment unless the plain-
tiffs "come forward with contrary evidence" showing a triable issue for the trier of fact. Jarboe
v. Landmark Cmty. Newspapers of Ind., Inc., 644 N.E.2d 118, 123 (Ind. 1994).

Furthermore, the trial court's judgment arrives on appeal "clothed with a presumption of
validity," and the challenging party "bears the burden of proving that the trial court erred in de-
termining that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party was entitled
to judgment as a matter of law." Rosi v. Bus. Furniture Corp., 615 N.E.2d 431, 434 (Ind. 1993)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiffs, the challenging parties in this appeal, present
various arguments to support their contention that the trial court erroneously granted summary
judgment in favor of Papa John's and Tharp. Reorganized and restated, these contentions assert:
(1) the designated evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Tharp abused
the qualified privilege, precluding summary judgment based on qualified privilege for the plain-
tiffs' claims of defamation, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negli-
gence, negligent hiring, and punitive damages; (2) the trial court erred in striking the in-car video
and Officer Frolick's observations of the security video, which, if admitted, more clearly demon-
strate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact; and (3) the language of the complaint was
sufficient to allege the plaintiffs' defamation claim.

1. Abuse of Qualified Privilege

The trial court believed that a qualified privilege protected Tharp's statements, and accor-
dingly granted summary judgment in the defendants' favor on the plaintiffs' defamation claim.
We agree.

5
 A qualified privilege "applies to communications made in good faith on any subject mat-
ter in which the party making the communication has an interest or in reference to which he had
a duty, either public or private, either legal, moral, or social, if made to a person having a corres-
ponding interest or duty." Bals v. Verduzco, 600 N.E.2d 1353, 1356 (Ind. 1992) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). As a defense to defamation, the qualified privilege operates not to "change
the actionable quality of the words published, but merely [to] rebut[] the inference of malice that
is [otherwise] imputed." Holcomb v. Walter's Dimmick Petroleum, Inc., 858 N.E.2d 103, 106
(Ind. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). To merit its protection, "[t]he burden is upon the
defendant in the first instance to establish the existence of a privileged occasion for the publica-
tion, by proof of a recognized public or private interest which would justify the utterance of the
words." Bals, 600 N.E.2d at 1356. Then "the plaintiff . . . has the burden of overcoming that
privilege by showing that it has been abused." Id. When speaking of abuse, "the essence of the
concept is not the speaker's spite but his abuse of the privileged occasion by going beyond the
scope of the purposes for which privilege exists." Holcomb, 858 N.E.2d at 106-07 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). And "[u]nless only one conclusion can be drawn from the evidence, the
question of whether the privilege has been abused is for the jury." Kelley v. Tanoos, 865 N.E.2d
593, 601 (Ind. 2007).

The privileged occasion implicated in this case relates to the public interest in "encou-
rag[ing] private citizens and victims not only to report crime, but also to assist law enforcement
with investigating and apprehending individuals who engage in criminal activity." Id. The chief
benefit is "enhanced public safety by facilitating the investigation of suspected criminal activity."
Holcomb, 858 N.E.2d at 108. Such responsible citizen conduct is also encouraged by law en-
forcement agencies. The Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department, for example, instructs
the general public as follows:
If you detect any suspicious activity in your neighborhood or anywhere, call IMPD 911.
Do not worry about being embarrassed if your suspicions prove to be unfounded. It is
better to think of what could happen if you didn't act.
Indianapolis Metro. Police Dep't, Neighborhood Crime Watch TOOL KIT: A Guide to Starting,
Organizing & Maintaining Your Neighborhood Crime Watch 11 (2007). Similarly, a division of
the Indiana Department of Homeland Security provides a toll-free phone number, mailing ad-
dress, and e-mail address to encourage citizens "[t]o report suspicious activity/behavior," and

6
instructs them to include "[a] description of the activity with as much detail as possible," "[t]he
location, date, and time of the activity," and "[a] description of the person(s) involved in the ac-
tivity." Ind. Intelligence Fusion Ctr. Brochure 1 (2009). The brochure declares, "By remaining
observant and vigilant, Hoosiers can help further safeguard their communities. Remember to
document suspicious behavior and contact the IIFC immediately!" Id. at 2. These materials ex-
emplify the desirable public interest served by citizens' awareness and prompt reporting of sus-
pected criminal activity, even when uncertain.

On the other hand, a reporting citizen may, out of an excess of caution or even for a nefa-
rious purpose, make false accusations, and our citizens' equally valid interest in having reputa-
tions untarnished by false imputations of criminal misconduct has been a cornerstone of defama-
tion law for hundreds of years. See State ex rel. Lopez v. Killigrew, 202 Ind. 397, 401-02, 174
N.E. 808, 810 (1931).2 Because of the compelling public interest in encouraging citizens to re-
port suspected wrongdoing, however, the law recognizes a limited defense to civil liability pre-
mised on erroneous reports of criminal conduct to police: "[I]t is well established that in Indiana,
communications made to law enforcement to report criminal activity are qualifiedly privileged."
Kelley, 865 N.E.2d at 600; see id. at 599-601 (collecting cases).3 This Court has also noted pro-
tection for communications to private citizens that further the same end: enhancing public safety
by facilitating the reporting of crime. Id. at 600-01. But the privilege is not without limits: a
statement "may lose its privileged character upon a showing of abuse wherein: (1) the communi-
cator was primarily motivated by ill will in making the statement; (2) there was excessive publi-
cation of the defamatory statements; or (3) the statement was made without belief or grounds for
belief in its truth." Bals, 600 N.E.2d at 1356.
2
The right of a person to have remedy by due course of law for injury to reputation is also expressly
noted in Article 1, Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution.
3
Some courts hold that statements to law enforcement are absolutely privileged, reasoning that a com-
plaint to police is the first step in a judicial proceeding. See Ledvina v. Cerasani, 146 P.3d 70, 74-75
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) (collecting cases), rev. denied. In Hartman v. Keri, this Court assessed situations in
which a qualified or absolute privilege is appropriate. There, this Court found that an absolute privilege
should apply to communications to school authorities raising complaints against educators. Hartman v.
Keri, 883 N.E.2d 774, 777 (Ind. 2008). In reaffirming that citizens "reporting suspected criminal activity
to law enforcement enjoy only a qualified privilege, which subjects them to the risk of retaliatory civil
litigation for malicious or unfounded charges," we distinguished the two situations, citing "a diminished
need to deter false reporting and a greater need to encourage reporting than exists outside the educational
environment." Id. at 778.

7
 Against this backdrop, the plaintiffs on appeal do not question that Tharp's statements fell
within the privileged occasion mentioned above, but argue that they came forward with evidence
which creates genuine issues of material fact as to whether the privilege was abused. Specifical-
ly, the plaintiffs do not argue that Tharp was primarily motivated by ill will (he had never met
the plaintiffs before), or was guilty of excessive publication (he told only a few people at the res-
taurant and responded to Officer Frolick's investigation), but argue that they designated evidence
to create a genuine issue about whether Tharp made his statement "without belief or grounds for
belief in its truth." This leads to two questions: (1) What does it mean to make a statement
"without belief or grounds for belief in its truth," and (2) would the designated evidence permit a
reasonable jury to conclude that Tharp made the statement "without belief or grounds for belief
in its truth"? Id.

The parties and the two courts below have disagreed on the answer to the first question.
The plaintiffs in their brief define "without belief or grounds for belief" by arguing both that "the
evidence shows that Tharp had either lied or had no grounds to believe his accusations are true,"
and that "there is ample evidence of a deliberate lie, or recklessness." Appellants' Br. at 9, 14.
Papa John's, however, maintains that a recklessness standard is foreclosed by this Court's deci-
sion in Bals, arguing that Bals "indicates that it is necessary to show something beyond reckless-
ness." Appellee Papa John's Br. at 10 n.3. The trial court, relying on this Courts' decision in
Holcomb, applied a recklessness standard but found that "a reckless disregard for the truth is not
a reasonable conclusion given the detailed information provided by Tharp." Appellants' App'x at
138. The Court of Appeals, citing an earlier Court of Appeals decision, agreed that "[m]aking
statements without belief or grounds for belief has been equated to reckless disregard for the
truth or falsity of a statement," but found "ample evidence that gives rise to a genuine issue of
fact as to whether Tharp acted with reckless disregard for the truth or was honestly mistaken."
889 N.E.2d at 877 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The confusion is understandable because our own precedents have applied inconsistent
standards. Bals is the logical starting point. Before Bals, at least two Court of Appeals opinions
had recited the "made without belief or grounds for belief" standard but then found that the plain-

8
tiff failed even to demonstrate a "reckless disregard for the truth." Bals, 600 N.E.2d at 1356 n.4
(citing Olsson v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 571 N.E.2d 585, 588 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), trans.
denied; Ernst v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 475 N.E.2d 351 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)). This was also the
standard suggested by the "Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 600, that abuse occurs when one (a)
knows the matter to be false, or (b) acts in reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity." Id. (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). In Bals, however, this Court interpreted "made without belief or
grounds for belief" by "depart[ing] from the standard suggested in [the] Restatement" and ap-
proving instead "a broader latitude to be given by the qualified privilege." Id. Bals itself thus
provides strong support for the idea that making a statement "without belief or grounds for be-
lief" requires knowledge that the privileged material was false, a standard this Court appeared to
apply as recently as Kelley v. Tanoos, when we rejected the plaintiff's argument that the defen-
dant "did not believe the alleged defamatory statements." 865 N.E.2d at 601-02. On the other
hand, this Court and the Court of Appeals have since Bals occasionally utilized a reckless disre-
gard for the truth standard. In May v. Frauhiger, for example, the Court of Appeals, citing one of
the Court of Appeals opinions disapproved of in Bals, stated that "[t]he act of making statements
'without belief or grounds for belief' has been equated to reckless disregard for the truth or falsity
of a statement." 716 N.E.2d 591, 595 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). And in Holcomb, we found a defen-
dant's mistaken report to police to be qualifiedly privileged partly on the conclusion that the de-
fendant's actions could not be "attribute[d] to recklessness." 858 N.E.2d at 108.

The scope of the qualified privilege is not amenable to a fixed or precise definition and
must adapt to current societal interests and particular situations. We embrace the "broader lati-
tude" described in Bals as to the qualified privilege applicable to communications made to law
enforcement, finding that a recklessness standard is ill-suited to this aim. A reckless-disregard
state of mind would subject a person reporting criminal conduct to liability not only when the
speaker actually knew the statement was false but also when if it could be shown that the speaker
should have known the statement was false.

This higher degree of caution in applying the qualified privilege defense would substan-
tially impair the public good served by fostering citizens to be vigilant and promptly to report
suspected criminal activity. A qualified privilege defense to defamation will shield the reporting

9
citizen from liability for a false report unless the speaker has abused the privilege by exceeding
"the scope of the purposes for which the privilege exists." Elliot v. Roach, 409 N.E.2d 661, 673
(Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here the law seeks to "encourage pri-
vate citizens and victims not only to report crime, but also to assist law enforcement with inves-
tigating and apprehending individuals who engage in criminal activity." Kelley, 865 N.E.2d at
601. If this purpose is to be met, the privilege must offer a robust defense against liability. Pro-
tecting unverified and even speculative reports of suspected wrongdoing to law enforcement is,
in our view, supported by ample reasons of social advantage. It is important that citizens not opt
for inaction, chilled from communicating with police in all but the most certain of situations.
"[P]ersons who suspect criminal activity," this Court has said, should not be "reluctant to provide
specific (or even speculative) information to law enforcement because of the risk of exposing
themselves to civil liability." Holcomb, 858 N.E.2d at 108 (emphasis added). Moreover, requir-
ing citizens to evade civil liability only by first verifying their suspicions with certitude before
reporting them to police raises other significant concerns, including vigilante justice and personal
safety, in addition to the risk that leads will grow stale by the time citizens have sufficiently veri-
fied what they thought they saw. The better rule, it seems to us, is one that fosters open commu-
nication between citizens and law enforcement, leaving the task of investigating that information,
and of deciding upon the appropriate response, to trained professionals. The "broader latitude"
identified in Bals supports rejecting a "reckless disregard" as sufficient to show that a statement
was made "without belief or grounds for belief in its truth."

On the other hand, "there is no social advantage to the publication of a deliberate lie."
Weenig v. Wood, 169 Ind. App. 413, 438, 349 N.E.2d 235, 250 (1976) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Indeed, a deliberate lie in this context imposes significant costs and plainly exceeds
"the scope of the purposes for which the privilege exists." Elliot, 409 N.E.2d at 673. A citizen
who reports wrongdoing to police knowing that the information is faulty fails to earn protection
against a later civil action. But merely arguing about what the speaker should have known is in-
sufficient to show that the speaker made a statement "without belief . . . . in its truth." Bals, 600
N.E.2d at 1356. As for applying the "no grounds for belief" language to this situation, Bals is
best understood as implicitly recognizing that the absence of any discernable basis for the truth
of the matter—that something is so obviously mistaken—can serve as circumstantial evidence of

10
a reporting citizen's actual knowledge of falsity.

This leads to the second question: would or could the designated evidence, or the reason-
able inferences drawn therefrom, create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Tharp
made the statement knowing it to be false? The plaintiffs label this "a quintessential issue of
fact," Appellants' Br. at 11, and we realize that a defendant's state of mind is ordinarily a ques-
tion for the jury. See, e.g., Best Homes, Inc. v. Rainwater, 714 N.E.2d 702, 707 (Ind. Ct. App.
1999). Although the facts of this case present a closer question than in Holcomb, we find that
the plaintiffs have not designated sufficient evidence to give rise to a genuine issue about wheth-
er Tharp made the statement knowing it to be false. Nor was he so obviously mistaken as to
support a reasonable inference that he had lied.

In Holcomb, a gas station employee erroneously reported to police that a customer had
driven off without paying for his gas. 858 N.E.2d at 105. The employee said the vehicle was a
green Jeep and relayed the license plate number. Upon that information, the driver of that ve-
hicle was arrested and charged with theft. Id. After the charges were dismissed, the driver sued
the employee and the employer for false arrest, false imprisonment, defamation, and abuse of
process. Id. at 105-06. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants,
holding that the employee's statements were protected by a qualified privilege. Id. at 106. On
appeal, the plaintiff argued that the employee abused the privilege because her statement to po-
lice was made without belief or grounds for belief in its truth. Id. at 107. We disagreed, finding
that the attendant did nothing more than detail her version of the facts to police and ask for assis-
tance, leaving it to the officer to determine the appropriate response. Id. Evidence that the plain-
tiff was wrongly identified was insufficient, for "[i]f that were enough, it would swallow the pri-
vilege because it is always possible that a defendant intentionally and maliciously targeted a ran-
domly selected victim for false reporting." Holcomb, 858 N.E.2d at 108. And despite evidence
contradicting the attendant's claim that she recognized the plaintiff as a regular customer, indicat-
ing that the allegedly stolen gas was not pumped until an hour after the plaintiff drove away, and
showing that the attendant did not contact police until an hour after the alleged theft, id. at 108-
09, this Court found that, "[a]lthough there are logical possibilities, we do not think they are sup-
ported by the record," id. at 108.

11
 In this case, the plaintiffs rely on several items of evidence which they contend gave rise
to a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Tharp made his accusations without belief
or grounds for belief in their truth: (1) Officer Frolick's testimony that it was not possible to see
what Tharp claimed he saw from where he had been standing; (2) none of the other three em-
ployees saw a gun (one of whom explained that Tharp, after having left the store, returned inside
while the plaintiffs were still present and reported that he thought Kelsey had a gun); (3) Tharp's
admitted record of misconduct, his providing a false name to police, and his flight from the
scene; and (4) Tharp's inconsistent descriptions of the gun. Further, the plaintiffs contend that
the evidence excluded on the motion to strike would further establish "the fact that Tharp was
not merely mistaken, but mendacious." Appellants' Br. at 15.

That no other employee thought Kelsey had a gun fails to defeat the privilege. It bears
stating the obvious—in a qualified privilege action, the reporting citizen is necessarily mistaken
about what he thought he saw. Inasmuch as liability for defamation does not exist where state-
ments are true, the privilege exists to protect tipsters from liability for making inaccurate reports.
Thus, "the issue is not the factual accuracy of the statements." Kelley, 865 N.E.2d at 602. This
evidence, at most, shows that other people disagreed with Tharp's belief that Kelsey had a gun,
and a person's subjective state of mind is not ordinarily established by majority vote. See Bals,
600 N.E.2d at 1357. The plaintiffs cannot show that the privilege was abused by pointing to the
fact that other people disagreed with Tharp's belief or that Tharp's belief turned out to be mista-
ken, especially where as here one coworker reported, "I did notice the grey and black fanny pack
on the one gentleman, but as I said before there was no gun vis[i]ble." Appellants' App'x at 197.
As in Bals, this evidence does not support a reasonable inference that Tharp actually lacked be-
lief in the truth of his statement that Kelsey had pulled out a gun. "By simply denying the factual
content of [the defendant's] reports, or by referring to other evidence disputing such content, [the
plaintiff] does not present substantial evidence that [the defendant] had no grounds for belief in
the truth of [his] statement." Bals, 600 N.E.2d at 1357. In other words, although others may
have disagreed and reached a different conclusion, "[t]he election to make one of two reasonable
interpretations does not demonstrate" a knowing disregard for the truth. Burns v. Rice, 813
N.E.2d 25, 36 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004), appeal denied.

12
 The plaintiffs add that evidence that Tharp left the store and told the passerby about the
gun, then went back into the store and told a coworker about the gun, belies any notion that
Tharp truly believed the store was about to be robbed. Although this argument was not made
below, it similarly misses the point. It is undisputed that Tharp told Officer Frolick only that
Kelsey had pulled out a gun and put it back and that he never claimed that either plaintiff com-
mitted a robbery, made threats, demanded money, or pointed a gun at anyone (although he ex-
pressed a belief in his later letter that he thought the plaintiffs were about to rob the store).

The plaintiffs' argument that Tharp's inconsistent descriptions of the gun proves he had
no belief in his statements also fails to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether
Tharp stated that Kelsey pulled out a gun knowing the statement was false. Appellants' Br. at 12.
During his deposition, Tharp described the gun as having "little silver circles on it" and a grip
that he thought was black. Appellants' App'x at 191. According to Officer Frolick, Tharp "de-
scribed the weapon in detail as a medium-sized silver gun with a brown wooden handle and with
two small circles on the handle." Id. at 195. The slight difference in descriptions does not create
a genuine issue for a jury to decide whether Tharp was lying about believing he saw a gun. If the
question was whether Tharp lied about whether the gun he thought he saw had a brown or black
handle, the plaintiffs' point may have some traction. But with respect to whether Tharp was ly-
ing about his belief that Kelsey had a gun, this discrepancy, at best, shows that his recollection
was not perfect. A lapse of memory, however, does not equate to knowledge of falsity; Tharp
consistently maintained his belief that Kelsey had a gun, and his consistent description was of a
silver gun with a dark handle. Nor was this description so far afield from the items Kelsey was
actually wearing to allow a fact finder to conclude that Tharp completely lacked grounds for his
belief. Tharp's description of the gun was consistent with the description of the fanny pack and
wallet Kelsey actually possessed (and with the exemplar photos in the appendix and parties'
briefs), indicating that Tharp not only had grounds for his belief but in fact believed that Kelsey
had a gun.

The plaintiffs also argue that Tharp's criminal record supports an inference that his ac-
tions were the result of a deliberate lie, Appellants' Br. at 12, but we believe that such use of his

13
record to prove he acted in conformity with his criminal past by lying to police constitutes im-
proper propensity evidence. It is true that the designated evidence establishes that Tharp did
falsely identify himself as "Arthur" and did flee the scene after detailing his version of events.
However, the same uncontradicted designated evidence establishes that Tharp provided a false
name because he had applied to this Papa John's using the name "Arthur," knew that he had out-
standing warrants, and fled to avoid arrest. Appellants' App'x at 184. While correct, as the
plaintiffs suggest, that "evidence of flight is relevant as circumstantial evidence of Defendant's
consciousness of guilt," Appellants' Br. at 12 (quoting Maxey v. State, 730 N.E.2d 158, 162 (Ind.
2000)), the undisputed proof here—Tharp's deposition testimony—indicates that Tharp's use of a
false name and flight evidenced consciousness of outstanding warrants, not of a deliberate lie
regarding his observations of Kelsey. It is not reasonable to infer that he dodged police because
he knew he had lied about Kelsey having a gun. What is significant is that Tharp was willing to
speak at all, and by doing so, he placed himself at risk for arrest.

The plaintiffs' most compelling piece of evidence that Tharp abused the privilege is Of-
ficer Frolick's observation that Tharp could not have seen what he claimed from where he was
standing. When taken as true, the officer's statement supports an inference—however slight—
that Tharp fabricated his account. On the other hand, it is undisputed that Kelsey was wearing a
black and silver fanny pack at his waist containing a brown leather wallet and, while inside the
store and while Tharp was working at the front of the store, retrieved money from his wallet.
Furthermore, another employee testified to seeing the fanny pack. It is also undisputed that
Tharp said Kelsey had an object on or near his waist which was silver and black or brown. As
the trial court observed, "[t]he description of the alleged gun fits the characteristics of the fanny
pack and the location of the fanny pack is the exact location where Tharp said the gun would be."
Tharp otherwise accurately described Kelsey's appearance and apparel, as well as Williams's car
and license plate number. As in Holcomb, "[a]lthough there are logical possibilities," all of these
factors are too great a coincidence to support a reasonable inference that Tharp invented his de-
tailed and mostly accurate report. See Holcomb, 858 N.E.2d at 107-08. We find that no genuine
issue of material fact exists. Whether Tharp's misperception was speculative, negligent, or even
reckless, it was not so obviously mistaken to permit a reasonable inference that he lied. The trial
court did not err in finding a qualified privilege established as a matter of law, thereby preclud-

14
ing the plaintiffs' claim for defamation.

The plaintiffs also contend that the "same misconduct that prevents the Defendants from
relying on qualified privilege also subjects them to liability for False Arrest." Appellants' Br. at
20. But Holcomb teaches that the qualified privilege defense to defamation applies as well to the
plaintiffs' claim for false imprisonment. 858 N.E.2d at 106-08. Similarly, as regards the plain-
tiffs' remaining claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress,4 negligence,5 and punitive
damages,6 we find that the qualified privilege applicable to citizen reports of suspected criminal
activity prevents, as a matter of sound judicial and public policy, a claimant from succeeding on
these claims if the privilege applies. Here it applies.

With no underlying tort, the plaintiffs' claim against Papa John's for negligent hiring nec-
essarily fails. See Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion County v. Gaither, 272 Ind. 251, 260, 397
N.E.2d 589, 595 (1979) (noting "a judgment in favor of an employee requires judgment in favor
of his employer when the employer's liability is predicated solely upon the acts of said em-
ployee").

Because no genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to the defendants' claim of
qualified privilege and the privilege is here established as a matter of law, we conclude that the
defendants were entitled to summary judgment as to all of their theories of liability.

4
This Court recognized the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in Cullison v. Medley, 570
N.E.2d 27 (Ind. 1991), which we defined as occurring when "one who by extreme and outrageous con-
duct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another." Id. at 31 (quoting Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965)).
5
Generally speaking, "[t]o prevail on a claim of negligence, a plaintiff is required to prove: (1) a duty
owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty by the defendant; and (3) an injury to the
plaintiff proximately caused by the breach." Ford Motor Co. v. Rushford, 868 N.E.2d 806, 810 (Ind.
2007).
6
Punitive damages are available only if clear and convincing evidence shows that the defendant "acted
with malice, fraud, gross negligence or oppressiveness which was not the result of a mistake of fact or
law, honest error of judgment, overzealousness, mere negligence, or other human failing." Bud Wolf
Chevrolet, Inc. v. Robertson, 519 N.E.2d 135, 137 (Ind. 1988).

15
 2. Motion to Strike

The plaintiffs challenge the trial court's exclusion of evidence in ruling on the defendants'
motion to strike, contending that this evidence would give rise to a genuine issue of material fact,
precluding summary judgment. Appellants' Br. at 15. A trial court's order on a motion to strike
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Davidson v. Perron, 756 N.E.2d 1007, 1012 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2001).

Specifically, the trial court struck in-car video from Officer Frolick's police vehicle and a
transcript of that video, as well as Officer Frolick's testimony based on his review of Papa John's
in-store surveillance video. After reviewing the security tape, Officer Frolick stated that "Mr.
Kelsey's wallet is easily identifiable as a wallet and could not honestly have been mistaken for a
handgun." Appellants' App'x at 196. The excluded facts from the in-car video include Tharp's
description of the gun, his statements of where the gun would be found, and statements made by
Officer Frolick and other Papa John's employees. Id. at 210-12; Appellants' Br. at 26. The de-
fendants had challenged the in-car video as inadmissible hearsay and Officer Frolick's testimony
based on his review of the surveillance video as speculation.

The plaintiffs contend that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding paragraph 10
of Officer Frolick's affidavit, his statement based on reviewing the in-store video. Appellants'
Br. at 27. Although we find that the trial court acted within its discretion in striking this testimo-
ny, Ind. Univ. Hosps. V. Carter, 456 N.E.2d 1051, 1057 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) ("Assertions in an
affidavit of conclusions of law or opinions will not suffice."), we also fail to see how this evi-
dence, if considered, does anything other than dispute the factual content of Tharp's belief. Bals,
600 N.E.2d at 1357.

As for the in-car video, the plaintiffs argue that a videotape is admissible if it is of "such
clarity that it does not lead to jury speculation as to its contents," that a video itself does not con-
stitute hearsay so long as its contents are otherwise admissible, and that the video here does not
constitute hearsay because the statements on the tape constitute statements by a party-opponent
under Ind. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D). Appellants' Br. at 26 (citing Sharp v. State, 534 N.E.2d 708,

16
712 (Ind. 1989); Pritchard v. State, 810 N.E.2d 758, 760-61 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)). Although the
defendants now argue that the plaintiffs failed to lay an adequate foundation for this video, see
Holcomb, 858 N.E.2d at 106 n.2 (affirming the trial court's exercise of discretion in striking a
video because the plaintiff failed to lay a foundation), in the trial court they relied exclusively on
the hearsay argument. But even were we to find that the statements made by Tharp and other
Papa John's workers on the tape constitute admissions of a party-opponent, while Officer Fro-
lick's testimony would not be an admission of a party-opponent and could be properly ignored,
we can resolve this issue more cleanly. The plaintiffs have not demonstrated how this stricken
in-car video gives rise to a genuine issue of material fact. Indeed, the transcript of the material
only confirms the undisputed facts, which support a finding of qualified privilege: Tharp be-
lieved that Kelsey, who he described as "very tall," with a "brown long jacket on," had a gun
with "brown wood on the handle and two little silver pieces of metal on the handle" that he had
"either pull[ed] out of his waistband or a holster," but that he "didn't threaten me." Appellants'
App'x at 210-11.

3. Sufficiency of Complaint to Allege Defamation Claim

The plaintiffs also challenge summary judgment on grounds that the trial court erred in
finding that the allegations of the complaint were insufficient to raise a claim for defamation.
This contention need not be addressed because our resolution of the other issues is independently
dispositive.

Conclusion

We affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.7

7
On March 27, 2009, the plaintiffs filed an application for leave to file a Trial Rule 60(B) motion for re-
lief from judgment in the trial court, asserting that the trial court's judgment should be set aside because
on June 2, 2008, Tharp pleaded guilty to False Reporting, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Ind.
Code § 35-44-2-2(d)(1). Inasmuch as there is no apparent justification for the plaintiffs waiting until
three weeks after oral argument to file the present application, we reject the application and affirm the
trial court's judgment. The plaintiffs are free to seek relief from the trial court's final judgment under Tri-
al Rule 60(B)(8), and the trial court may consider whether such a motion is "filed within a reasonable
time" and should be granted.

17
Shepard, C.J., and Sullivan, J., concur. Boehm, J., dissents with separate opinion. Rucker, J.,
dissents with separate opinion.

18
Boehm, Justice, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Although I believe the majority adopts the correct legal standard, I
disagree with the majority’s view of the facts reasonably inferrable from the designated evi-
dence. Specifically, I agree with the majority that Indiana law confers a broader qualified privi-
lege than some jurisdictions, and requires more than reckless disregard of the truth to support a
claim of defamation or false imprisonment based on an inaccurate report to a law enforcement
agency of potentially criminal activity. Moreover, for the reasons the majority gives, I agree that
it is appropriate to protect citizens from the expense and risks of litigation based on an incorrect
report, even if the citizen should have known of the falsity of the report. But here, I believe the
facts in the aggregate support the conclusion that Mr. Tharp first recklessly or knowingly made
false statements to a private citizen and then knowingly repeated false allegations to law en-
forcement officers. The statements to the passerby were not subject to any privilege, and their
later repetition to the police was privileged only if the statements were not made with knowledge
that they were false. Without a qualified privilege, summary judgment as to the claims for defa-
mation and false imprisonment was wrongly granted, and I believe the designated evidence prec-
ludes summary judgment on those issues.
The majority separately examines each fact the plaintiffs advance and concludes that
none of them is sufficient to overcome the privilege. I believe the majority overlooks some sa-
lient facts and the reasonable inferences from the aggregation of these facts. It is not insignifi-
cant that Tharp exited the store and told a passerby that one of the plaintiffs had ―pulled out a
gun,‖ then returned to the store and repeated his claim to a fellow employee, but made no effort
to contact the police. The passerby, having no reason to question Tharp’s claim, called the po-
lice. When an officer arrived in response to the passerby’s report, the passerby was still present.
If the statements to the passerby were not true, Tharp either had to retract his story or repeat it to
the officer. Tharp then misrepresented his name and repeated his allegations to the officer.
While the officer was in the store interviewing other employees, only to find that none of them
had perceived any problem, Tharp fled.
As the majority observes, it is a jury question whether the privilege has been abused
where more than one inference can be drawn from the evidence. Kelley v. Tanoos, 865 N.E.2d
593, 601 (2007). Although Tharp’s conduct allows an inference that Tharp was merely mista-
ken, it supports the inference that Tharp knowingly repeated false accusations. We frequently
note that flight is admissible evidence of guilt in a criminal case. Dill v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1230,
1232 (Ind. 2001). Tharp had already offered inconsistent descriptions of the alleged gun. Tharp
now explains he fled because he had outstanding warrants, but his explanation does not preclude
an inference that he was concerned his statements might be exposed by further questioning.
In Holcomb v. Walter’s Dimmick Petroleum, Inc., we held that the fact that the report of
a store clerk turned out to be false was not sufficient to overcome the privilege. 858 N.E.2d 103,
108 (Ind. 2006). The plaintiffs here point to much more than the simple fact that the plaintiffs
were found with no weapon, and support their claim that Tharp knowingly lied with an array of
other evidence. They point to Tharp’s flight as a tacit recognition of his misstatements, and add
to it Tharp’s inconsistent descriptions of the alleged gun, his inability to see a gun from where he
was standing, his misrepresentation of his identity, and the lack of corroboration for his story.
Although any one of these facts in isolation may be insufficient to establish that Tharp knowing-
ly made false allegations, I think it is a fair inference from these facts, taken in the aggregate,
that Tharp first recklessly or knowingly defamed the plaintiff by his statement to the passerby
that the plaintiffs had taken a step towards an armed robbery, then compounded the problem by
repeating the charge to the officer with knowledge that it was false. I reach this conclusion on
the basis of the evidence before the trial court, and not on the basis of the plaintiffs’ motion after
oral argument in this court discussed in footnote 7 of the majority opinion.
I agree with the Court of Appeals that summary judgment in favor of the defendants
should be reversed, and this case should be remanded for trial.

2
Rucker, J., dissenting.

I agree with Justice Boehm that ―the facts in the aggregate support the conclusion that
Mr. Tharp first recklessly or knowingly made false statements to a private citizen and then kno-
wingly repeated false allegations to law enforcement officers.‖ Slip op. at 1, (Boehm, J., dissent-
ing). And I do so largely for the reasons Justice Boehm articulates. I write separately however
to underscore events occurring after the trial court entered summary judgment in this case and
after the plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal that seem to undermine completely Tharp’s claim
of qualified privilege. On June 2, 2008, Tharp pleaded guilty to three offenses arising out of his
employment at Papa John’s, one of which was the offense of false reporting. The following ex-
cerpts from Tharp’s guilty plea hearing are instructive:
Q. [Trial Court] Count 2 is false crime reporting. And it
states in Count 2 that on or about, February 19th, Kelly Eugene
Tharp, did give a false report of the commission of a crime, to-wit:
male with gun inside of Papa John’s Pizza knowing the report to be
false. Do you understand the allegations contained in those
charging information[s], Sir?

A. [Tharp] I do, Judge.

Tr. at 8. (emphasis added)

* * *

Q. [Trial Court] Do you understand that when you enter a
plea of guilty, you are admitting the material facts that I just read
to you?

A. [Tharp] Yes, Sir.

Tr. at 9.

* * *

Q. [Trial Court] How do you plead to Count 2, false
[reporting] of B Misdemeanor.

A. [Tharp] I plead guilty.

Tr. at 15.
 The majority certainly has acted within its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ petition for
leave to file a Trial Rule 60(B) motion for relief from judgment, see slip op. at 17 n.7, which
would effectively end this appeal. See Logal v. Cruse, 267 Ind. 83, 368 N.E.2d 235, 237 (1977)
(holding that during the pendency of an appeal a party seeking to file a T.R. 60(B) motion must
file a verified petition with the appellate court seeking leave to file the motion. ―If the appellate
court determines that the motion has sufficient merit, . . . it will remand the entire case to the trial
court for plenary consideration of the 60(B) grounds. Such remand order will terminate the ap-
peal . . . .‖). Nonetheless, despite the procedural irregularity of plaintiffs waiting until after oral
argument to seek leave to file their petition, this Court should not, in effect, turn a blind eye to
evidence that stands at the very heart of this litigation, namely whether Tharp’s statements were
made without belief or grounds for belief in their truth. His admissions by way of a guilty plea
certainly seem to put the matter to rest. At an absolute minimum Tharp’s admissions raise a ge-
nuine issue of material fact on the issue. In light of what fairly may be characterized as newly
discovered evidence surfacing after the trial court entered summary judgment in Tharp’s favor,
this Court at the very least should reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this cause for
further proceedings. For this additional reason I respectfully dissent.

2