ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Steve Carter Joseph W. Hammes
Attorney General of Indiana Tabbert, Hahn, Earnest & Weddle, LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana
Frances H. Barrow
Deputy Attorney General
Elizabeth Rogers
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
______________________________________________________________________________
In the
Indiana Supreme Court FILED
Feb 21 2008 3:20 pm
_________________________________
CLERK
No. 49S05-0707-CV-290 of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
STATE OF INDIANA, Appellant,
v.
UNIVERSAL OUTDOOR, INC., Appellee.
_________________________________
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, No. 49D03-0408-PL-1466
The Honorable Patrick McCarty, Special Judge
_________________________________
On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A05-0609-CV-536
_________________________________
February 21, 2008
Dickson, Justice.
In this eminent domain proceeding initiated by the State of Indiana against Universal
Outdoor, Inc., owner of a billboard leasehold interest, the trial court entered an order of appro-
priation, and the appointed appraisers concluded that Universal sustained damages of $243,800
from the appropriation. The trial court, finding that neither party filed exceptions during the
statutory exceptions period, granted judgment for Universal in the amount of the appraisers'
award. The State appeals, asserting that its exceptions were timely filed. The Court of Appeals
reversed. State v. Universal Outdoor, Inc., 864 N.E.2d 403 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). We granted
transfer.
The parties dispute the proper application of conflicting statutory provisions. Pursuant to
Indiana Code § 32-24-1-11, after the appraisers file their report, either party may file exceptions
to the appraisal. But the provisions prescribing the time limitations for filing these exceptions
appear to be inconsistent:
(a) Any party to an action under this chapter aggrieved by the assessment of benefits
or damages may file written exceptions to the assessment in the office of the cir-
cuit court clerk. Exceptions to the assessment must be filed not later than twenty
(20) days after the filing of the report.
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(c) Notice of filing of the appraisers' report shall be given by the circuit court clerk to
all known parties to the action and their attorneys of record by certified mail. The
period of exceptions shall run from and after the date of mailing. Either party
may appeal a judgment as to benefits or damages as in civil actions.
Ind. Code § 32-24-1-11 (2004) (emphasis added). Clarification defining the precise exception
period is crucial because the failure to file exceptions within the articulated time frame deprives
the trial court of jurisdiction to hear the issue of damages. Lehnen v. State, 693 N.E.2d 580, 582
(Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied, 706 N.E.2d 169 (Ind. 1998). If no exceptions are timely
filed, the appraisers' award in the filed report becomes final. Id.
On February 3, 2006, the three appointed appraisers submitted their report to the court.
Universal filed its exceptions on February 13, and the State filed its exceptions on February 16.
Then, on March 9, after both parties had filed their exceptions, the clerk sent the certified mail
notice required by subsection (c) that the appraisers' report had been filed. Finding that the pe-
riod of time within which to file exceptions did not begin to run until March 9, 2006, when the
clerk's notice was sent by certified mail, the trial court concluded that both parties' exceptions
were premature and thus untimely. The Court of Appeals disagreed, ruling that "exceptions are
timely if filed within twenty days of the filing of the appraisers' report but no later than twenty
days after the clerk sends notice of the appraisers' report to the parties" and it reversed and re-
manded for consideration of both parties' exceptions. Universal Outdoor, 864 N.E.2d at 407.
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We agree with the reversal and remand, but granted transfer to revisit and clarify the window of
time during which a party may file exceptions to the appraisers' report.
Both the State and Universal support their positions with established rules of statutory
interpretation. Universal asserts that the trial court properly found that exceptions must be filed
only within the twenty-day period after the clerk mails notice that the report was filed. Universal
emphasizes the rule that, where two statutes are repugnant in any of their provisions, the later
enacted statute controls and serves to repeal the earlier provision in conflict. Bd. of Trs. of Ind.
Pub. Employees' Ret. Fund v. Grannan, 578 N.E.2d 371, 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), trans. denied,
citing Southwest Forest Indus. v. Firth, 435 N.E.2d 295, 297 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982), trans. not
sought.
Prior to 1973, the statutory exception period was "within ten (10) days after the filing" of
the appraisers' report.1 In 1973, the statute was amended to change ten days to twenty days, to
add a requirement that the court clerk sent certified mail notices of the filing of the appraisers'
report to all parties, and to add a sentence declaring:"The period of exceptions shall run from and
after the date of mailing."2 This amended statute was repealed in 2002, and reenacted in its pre-
sent form as Ind. Code § 32-24-1-11,3 which included the "twenty days after filing" language as
subsection (a) and the "run from and after the date of mailing" language as subsection (c).
While the language of subsection (c) was enacted later than that of subsection (a), we find
an ambiguity in subsection (c)'s phrase "run from and after." Was this language intended to cre-
ate a new starting point for the exception period or was it added merely to extend the prior ex-
ception period to assure that each party had at least twenty days after the clerk notified the par-
ties of the filing of the appraisers' report? Helpful insight is found in Southern Ind. Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Decker, 261 Ind. 527, 307 N.E.2d 51 (1974), a condemnation action brought by a public
utility to acquire an easement for electrical transmission lines. In August of 1969, six days after
the filing of the appraisers' report, the landowner obtained a ten-day extension of time in which
1
Ind. Code § 32-1-11-8 (1971).
2
Ind. Code § 32-11-1-8 (Supp. 1973); 1973 Ind. Acts 80-1.
3
2002 Ind. Acts 307; P.L. 2-2002, Sec. 9.
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to file objections to the appraisers' report, on grounds that the landowner had not been given any
notice of the filing of the report. From the resulting jury verdict awarding damages almost three
times the amount in the appraisers' report, the utility initiated an appeal to this Court in 1971.
During the twenty-three months that the case was pending in this court, the Indiana General As-
sembly enacted the statutory changes that added the "run from and after" language now found in
subsection (c). When the opinion was finally issued in February, 1974, it reversed the trial
court's extension of time, noting consistent existing precedent that, unless exceptions are filed
within the statutory period, there is no jurisdiction to try the issue of damages. Due to the timing
and circumstances of Decker, we believe that its facts and circumstances likely played a signifi-
cant role in influencing the Indiana General Assembly to amend the statute so as to require
county clerks to provide formal notice to each party of the filing of appraisers' reports, and to
extend the time for filing exceptions to twenty days after the mailing of such notice.
Such an understanding of the two subsections is consistent with the rules guiding statu-
tory construction. A court's first task in statutory interpretation is to attempt to harmonize two
conflicting statutes. Grannan, 578 N.E.2d at 375. "So long as two statutes can be read in har-
mony with one another, we presume that the Legislature intended for them both to have effect."
Burd Mgmt., LLC v. State, 831 N.E.2d 104, 108 (Ind. 2005). And, while the latter of two repug-
nant statutes will control and operate to repeal the earlier to the extent of the repugnancy, such
implied repeal should be recognized "only when a later act is so repugnant to an earlier one as to
render them irreconcilable, and a construction which will permit both laws to stand will be
adopted if at all possible." Grannan, 578 N.E.2d at 375, quoting Northern Ind. Publ. Serv. Co. v.
Citizens Action Coalition of Ind., Inc., 548 N.E.2d 153, 159 (Ind. 1989). Where possible, if
conflicting portions of a statute can be reconciled with the remainder of the statute, every word
in the statute must be given effect and meaning, with no part being held meaningless. Noble
County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Fahlsing, 714 N.E.2d 1134, 1136 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied,
735 N.E.2d 225 (Ind. 2000).
Subsection (a), in prescribing that the exception period expires twenty days after the fil-
ing of the appraisers' report, rather than after the clerk's mailing a notice of such filing, amounts
to a clear inconsistency with subsection (c). This repugnancy as to the end of the exception pe-
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riod cannot be harmonized in such a way as to give the unambiguous words of each subsection
their intended meaning. Thus, as to the end of the exception period, we hold that subsection (c),
the later enactment, must prevail. As to the commencement of the exception period, however,
both subsections (a) and (c) can be construed in harmony. As noted above, the "run from and
after the date of mailing" language now found in subsection (c) is ambiguous and may reasona-
bly be understood not to alter the beginning of the exception period stated in subsection (a).
Further, the parties provide no persuasive rationale for prohibiting the filing of exceptions
between the time of the appraisers' report is filed and the date of the clerk's certified mail notifi-
cation to the parties of such filing. To the contrary, it appears that filing before the clerk sends
notice will not prejudice any party, and prompt filing of exceptions will promote efficient judi-
cial administration.
For these reasons, we hold that the exception filing period commences with the filing of
the appraisers' report, in accordance with subsection (a), and ends twenty days after the court
clerk's mailing of notice of filing of the report to the parties, as prescribed in subsection (c).
We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings on the par-
ties' filed exceptions.
Shepard, C.J., and Sullivan, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.
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