ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
Sharon L. Stanzione Benjamen W. Murphy
Merrillville, Indiana Merrillville, Indiana
Walter J. Alvarez
Crown Point, Indiana
______________________________________________________________________________
In the
Indiana Supreme Court
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No. 46S03-0606-CV-207
PORTER COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT,
Appellant (Defendant below),
v.
RITA J. AND DOUGLAS GUZOREK,
Appellees (Plaintiffs below).
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Appeal from the LaPorte Circuit Court, No. 46C01-0405-CT-144
The Honorable Robert W. Gilmore, Jr., Judge
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On Petition for Rehearing
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March 6, 2007
Boehm, Justice.
A Porter County Sheriff Department (PCSD) vehicle driven by Officer Joseph F. Falatic
struck the vehicle of Rita J. Guzorek while Falatic was acting within the course and scope of his
employment. The Guzoreks filed suit within the applicable limitations period, naming Falatic as
the only defendant. Falatic moved for summary judgment, asserting that he had no personal
liability because the Guzoreks’ complaint failed to allege any of the conditions listed in the Tort
Claims Act that would permit an action to proceed against an employee of a government entity in
the employee’s individual capacity. While this motion was pending and after the two-year
limitations period had expired, the Guzoreks moved to leave to amend their complaint to add
PCSD as a defendant. The trial court granted Falatic’s motion for summary judgment and also
granted the Guzoreks’ motion for leave to amend the complaint. PCSD, represented by the same
counsel who had represented Falatic, then moved for summary judgment, contending that the
amended complaint did not relate back to the filing of the original complaint and was therefore
barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court denied PCSD’s motion but certified its order
for interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed, but we granted transfer and affirmed
the trial court’s denial of summary judgment. Porter County Sheriff Dep’t. v. Guzorek, 857
N.E.2d 363 (Ind. 2006). Chief Justice Shepard and Justice Sullivan dissented, agreeing with the
Court of Appeals that the amended complaint did not relate back.
The majority of our Court held that the Guzoreks’ amended complaint related back to the
original complaint under Indiana Trial Rule 15(C) and therefore the Guzoreks’ claim was not
barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Id. Under Trial Rule 15(C)(2), the test for relation
back of an amended complaint is that the added party knew or should have known that “but for a
mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against
him.” The majority in Guzorek held that a mistake as to the applicable law can qualify as a
“mistake concerning the identity of the proper party.” Guzorek, 857 N.E.2d at 371. On the facts
of this case, we held that the Guzoreks’ complaint suing an immune public employee rather than
the governmental agency was based on such a “mistake.” Id. at 372-73.
Indiana Trial Rule 15(C) is the same as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) for these
purposes. We cited Donald v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dept., 95 F.3d 548 (7th Cir. 1996) and
Woods v. IUPUI, 996 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1993) as federal cases allowing relation back where
plaintiffs had incorrectly named immune institutional entities rather than individual defendants.
In its petition for rehearing, the Porter County Sheriff Department points to Hall v. Norfolk S.
Ry. Co., 469 F.3d 590 (7th Cir. 2006) (November 9, 2006). This was an FELA case where an
injured railroad worker sued only his current employer which had bought the railroad after the
injury but did not name the former employer as a defendant. The Seventh Circuit held that an
amended complaint could not add the former employer after the statute of limitations had failed
because there was no “mistake” under FRCP 15(c)(3) that allowed the amended complaint to
relate back to the date of filing of the original complaint. The Seventh Circuit determined that
2
Donald does not apply where the plaintiff has been represented by counsel through litigation.
Hall, 469 F.3d at 597. The Seventh Circuit also expressly rejected Woods, holding that “[a]
plaintiff’s ignorance or misunderstanding about who is liable for his injury is not a ‘mistake’ as
to the defendant’s ‘identity.’” Id. at 596. It recognized Donald and Woods may be inconsistent
with its ruling but termed them “outliers.”
We recognize that Hall represents a retrenchment and disapproval of Donald. We think,
however, that the original purpose of Rule 15(c) was to permit relation back where an institution
rather than an individual public employee was initially sued because of a mistake as to the
applicable law. The Indiana Trial Rule was adopted only four years later and used the same
language as the federal rule. We recognize, however, that a recent trend in federal courts is to
adopt a narrower view of “mistake” in FRCP 15(c)(3). We adhere to the view that the “mistake”
requirement of Indiana Trial Rule 15(C) is satisfied when a plaintiff mistakenly sues an immune
party if the proper party knows of the suit and knows that an error has been made. That is one of
the prototypical situations FRCP 15(c) was initially designed to address. The Advisory
Committee’s Note of FRCP 15 (1966) makes clear that the mistake requirement in the Rule was
designed to give relief to plaintiffs who had incorrectly named the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare rather than the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. Guzorek,
857 N.E.2d at 371. There is no claim that the Department was unaware of the suit or that the
passage of time prejudiced its defense. We see no reason to impose a penalty on a plaintiff for a
mistake of law that has gained no advantage for the plaintiff and caused no disadvantage to the
defendant. This is the situation here, where the party who was not initially named (the
Department) was obligated by statute to defend and identify the party who was timely sued (the
deputy) and actually conducted the defense from the outset. Accordingly, the PCSD’s petition
for rehearing is denied.
Dickson and Rucker, JJ., concur.
Shepard, C.J., dissents with separate opinion in which Sullivan, J., concurs.
3
Shepard, Chief Justice, dissenting.
The petition for rehearing in this case further demonstrates the extent to which this
Court’s interpretation of Trial Rule 15(c)’s “mistake of identity” requirement to allow relation
back takes us outside the mainstream of authority. Appellant points us to the fact that the very
authority relied on by our majority has recently been reconsidered and rejected by the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Seventh Circuit recognized that the position taken by this Court’s dissenters
represents the weight of authority and that the majority opinion essentially eviscerates the
mistake of identity requirement. See Hall v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 469 F.3d 590, 594-98 (7th Cir.
2006); see also Porter County Sheriff Dep’t v. Guzorek, 857 N.E.2d 363 (Ind. 2006) (citing
Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim, 107 F.3d 913, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“an error of judgment about
whether an employer is liable for the act of its employee is not ‘a mistake’ within the intendment
of Rule 15(c)”)); Rebecca S. Engrav, Relation Back of Amendments Naming Previously
Unnamed Defendants Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 1549, 1587
(2001) (“When it seems likely that the plaintiff knew the additional defendant existed but failed
to name it either through carelessness or because of poor legal advice, courts are likely to deny
relation back.”).
Arguing Rule 15(c) is intended to remedy mistakes of fact and law, the majority held
relation back is permitted where a party’s lawyer possessing full knowledge of all potential
defendants “mistakenly” names an immune party (or, in other words, makes a mistake of
liability). Guzorek, 857 N.E.2d at 371. The majority cited two Seventh Circuit cases to support
this proposition: Donald v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 95 F.3d 548 (7th Cir. 1996), and
Woods v. IUPUI, 996 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1993).
The Seventh Circuit recently reconsidered the mistake of identity requirement in Hall,
and, consistent with the great weight of authority, held that “[a] plaintiff’s ignorance or
misunderstanding about who is liable for his injury is not a ‘mistake’ as to the defendant’s
‘identity.’” 1 Hall, 469 F.3d at 596 (emphasis added). In doing so, the Court explicitly rejected
Woods as an “outlier” 2 and limited the Donald holding to cases involving pro se litigants.3 Id. at
597. The Court went on to list a host of decisions from other circuits confirming the view that
mistakes of liability are not the type of “mistakes” contemplated by Rule 15(c). Id. at 596-97
(citing cases from the D.C., First, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits).
In light of the Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in Hall, and to remain consistent with the
federal courts’ interpretation of the mistake of identity requirement, this Court should grant
Porter County Sheriff’s Department’s Petition for Rehearing.
Sullivan, J., concurs.
1
Analogizing mistake of liability cases to “John Doe” cases where relation back is not permitted, the
Seventh Circuit said these mistakes are not mistakes concerning “identity,” but instead are mistakes as to
whom it is proper to sue. The Court went on to say that “[i]t is the plaintiff’s responsibility to determine
the proper party to sue and to do so before the statute of limitations expires.” Hall, 469 F.3d at 596.
2
The Court noted “recent decisions have not followed [the] reasoning [in Woods] and have instead
coalesced around the narrower view of a Rule 15(c)(3) ‘mistake.’” Hall, 469 F.3d at 597.
3
Although Donald permitted relation back based on plaintiff’s mistaken belief that by suing the sheriff’s
department he was also suing the individual deputies who injured him, the holding has limited application
“because the decision was reached in large part because of Donald’s unique impairments as a pro se
prisoner.” Hall, 469 F.3d at 597.
2