ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Jennifer L. Graham Allison Wells Gritton
Indianapolis, Indiana Office of Corporation Counsel
Indianapolis, Indiana
______________________________________________________________________________
In the
Indiana Supreme Court
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No. 29S02-0507-CV-320
ROBERT B. KEENE,
Appellant (Plaintiff below),
v.
MARION COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT,
Appellee (Defendant below).
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Appeal from the Hamilton Circuit Court, No. 29C01-0011-CP-000938
The Honorable Judith S. Proffitt, Judge
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On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 29A02-0408-CV-644
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June 30, 2006
Sullivan, Justice.
Robert Keene was employed as a commissioner by the Marion Superior Court (“Superior
Court”). On August 25, 1998, the Superior Court notified Keene that because he had violated
state statutes while performing his duties, his employment would be terminated on September
25, 1998. Keene, who was 64 years old at the time, was replaced by a 40-year-old employee.
On September 25, 2000, exactly two years after his last day of work, Keene filed a complaint
against the Superior Court, alleging wrongful termination based on age discrimination in viola-
tion of the Indiana Age Discrimination Act (“IADA”), Indiana Code Section 22-9-2-1, et seq.
The Superior Court filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, contending, among other
things, that Keene’s claim was untimely.
The trial court, finding that Keene’s claim was time barred by the applicable statute of
limitations, granted the Superior Court’s motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals
affirmed, holding that Keene’s cause of action accrued and the applicable two-year statute of
limitations commenced to run on the date Keene received notice of his termination, thereby mak-
ing his complaint time barred. Keene v. Marion County Superior Court, 823 N.E.2d 1216, 1218
(Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Keene petitioned to, and we granted, transfer. No. 29S02-0507-CV-320,
2005 Ind. LEXIS 603 (Ind. July 13, 2005).
Subsequent to our granting transfer and holding oral arguments in this case, we decided
Montgomery v. Bd. of Trs. of Purdue Univ., No. 79S05-0508-CV-354, ___ N.E.2d ____, (Ind.
June 29, 2006), which held that Purdue University was not subject to the IADA because the
IADA specifically excluded from its definition of “employer” any “person or governmental en-
tity which is subject to the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act [(“ADEA”)].” Ind.
Code § 22-9-2-1 (1998). As was the case with Purdue, the employer here is also subject to the
ADEA. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b). See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 68 (2000) (“In
1974, Congress extended application of the ADEA’s substantive requirements to the States. . . .
Congress accomplished that expansion in scope by a simple amendment to the definition of “em-
ployer” contained in 29 U.S.C. § 630(b): ‘The term [employer] also means . . . a State or political
subdivision of a State and any agency or instrumentality of a State or a political subdivision of a
State . . . .’”). Because the employer here is not subject to the IADA (because it is subject to the
federal ADEA), the trial court correctly dismissed Keene’s claims.
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson and Boehm, JJ., concur. Rucker, J., dissents.
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Rucker, J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent for the reasons expressed in my dissenting opinion in Montgomery
v. Bd. of Trs. of Purdue Univ., No. 79S05-0508-CV-354, ___ N.E.2d ____, (Ind. June 29, 2006).
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