Attorneys for Appellant Attorneys for Appellee
P. Stephen Miller Steve Carter
Fort Wayne, IN Attorney General of
Indiana
Justin F. Roebel
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, IN
____________________________________________________________________________
__
In the
Indiana Supreme Court
_________________________________
No. 02S04-0401-CR-30
Antwain James Hines,
Appellant (Defendant below),
v.
State Of Indiana
Appellee (Plaintiff below).
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Appeal from the Allen Superior Court,
No. 02D04-0202-FB-29
The Honorable John F. Surbeck, Jr., Judge
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On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No.02A04-0304-CR-
191 _________________________________
January 21, 2004
Sullivan, Justice.
Defendant Antwain James Hines was convicted in a single trial of
(1) Robbery[1] and (2) Unlawful Possession of a Firearm by a Serious
Violent Felon.[2] The Court of Appeals reversed the convictions on grounds
that defendant's pre-trial request for a bifurcated trial should have been
granted. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the prejudice arising
from evidence necessary to sustain the unlawful possession conviction –
evidence of a prior felony conviction – substantially outweighed its
probative value for the robbery charge. Hines v. State, 794 N.E.2d 469,
474 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
There are two aspects of the opinion of the Court of Appeals worthy of
particular mention.
In Spearman v. State, the Court of Appeals had held that a defendant
who was tried solely for the crime of Unlawful Possession of a Firearm by a
Serious Violent Felon was not entitled to have the proceedings bifurcated
in such a way that the jury would not hear of his prior felony conviction
before it determined whether he was in possession of a firearm. 744 N.E.2d
545, 547 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), transfer denied, 761 N.E.2d 413 (Ind. 2001).
This was because the evidence of the prior conviction is an essential
element of the crime. Id. at 548.
In this case, the Court of Appeals correctly distinguished Spearman:
[Defendant]'s status as a serious violent felon is not an
essential element of the Robbery offense. Indeed, such status is not
even probative of whether [Defendant] committed Robbery while armed
with a deadly weapon. Thus, unlike the situation presented in
Spearman, where bifurcation was impractical, if not impossible,
because the defendant was tried solely for the offense of Unlawful
Possession of a Firearm by a Serious Violent Felon, in the present
case, it would have been feasible for the trial court to bifurcate the
Robbery charge and the Unlawful Possession of a Firearm by a Serious
Violent Felon charge.
Hines, 794 N.E.2d at 472.
Second, Defendant offered to stipulate that he was a serious violent
felon in possession of a handgun if the jury found him guilty of robbery.
As such, acceptance of the stipulation would have eliminated the need for
the prior conviction evidence during trial on the robbery count. Here, the
State’s argument is that it was not required to accept Defendant's proposed
stipulation.
The Court of Appeals correctly analyzed the issue as follows:
While it is generally true that the State is entitled to prove
its case by evidence of its own choice, and that a criminal defendant
may not stipulate his or her way out of the full evidentiary force of
the case to be presented against him or her, the United States Supreme
Court has determined that this general rule has virtually no
applicability where the point at issue is a defendant's legal status
that is independent of criminal behavior later charged against him or
her. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 186-187 (1997).
Hines, 794 N.E.2d at 473. The principles of Old Chief were incorporated
into Indiana law in Sams v. State, 688 N.E.2d 1323, 1326 (Ind. Ct. App.
1997), transfer denied, 698 N.E.2d 1184 (Ind. 1998). We agree with the
Court of Appeals that, in light of Old Chief and Sams, the prosecutor
should have either accepted Defendant's proposed stipulation or the trial
court should have bifurcated the trial.
Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 58(A)(1), we grant transfer,
reverse Defendant's convictions, and adopt and incorporate by reference the
opinion of the Court of Appeals, Hines, 794 N.E.2d 469.
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Boehm and Rucker, JJ., concur.
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[1] Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1.
[2] Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5.