Attorney for Appellant
Robert M. Baker III
Johnson, Smith, Pence, & Heath LLP
Indianapolis, IN
Attorneys for Appellee
Edward L. Murphy, Jr.
Stefanie R. Crawford
Miller, Carson, Boxberger & Murphy LLP
Fort Wayne, IN
IN THE
INDIANA SUPREME COURT
INDIANA HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Appellant (Defendant below),
v.
JESSAH MARTIN
Appellee (Plaintiff below).
)
) Supreme Court No.
) 02S03-0106-CV-312
)
) Court of Appeals No.
) 02A03-0001-CV-29
)
)
)
APPEAL FROM THE ALLEN COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Nancy Eshcoff Boyer, Special Judge
Cause No. 02D01-9911-CP-1980
ON PETITION TO TRANSFER
April 10, 2002
SULLIVAN, Justice.
The trial judge in this case found the IHSAA in contempt of court for
seeking to enforce its "restitution rule." The restitution rule permits
the IHSAA to forfeit a school’s victories and titles won with an ineligible
student where a trial court injunction allowing the ineligible student to
play is later reversed or vacated. We upheld the validity of the
restitution rule in two decisions five years ago; the IHSAA was not in
contempt.
Background
Appellant, Indiana High School Athletic Association (IHSAA), is an
Indiana voluntary, not-for-profit corporation open to all private, public,
parochial, boarding, and institutional high schools of the State of
Indiana. Its purpose is to encourage, regulate, and give direction to
wholesome amateur interschool athletic competition between its member
schools. Membership in the IHSAA is contingent upon compliance with its
rules. Both Bishop Luers High School, a parochial school, and Bellmont
High School, a public school, are member schools.
Appellee, Jessah Martin, is an eighteen year old high school senior.
Martin lived with her parents and attended Bellmont High School for her
first three years in high school. As a result of “mental and emotional
stress,” Martin transferred to Bishop Luers High School (“Bishop Luers”),
for her senior year, where she wanted to play on the varsity girls’
basketball team. She also moved in with her former coach, Harry Miller,
and his wife. Martin’s transfer triggered IHSAA Rule 19 (“the transfer
rule”), which restricts participation in interschool athletic competition
by students who transfer from one school to another.[1] She was granted
“limited” eligibility by the IHSAA. As such, she was allowed to compete on
the junior varsity basketball team but not the varsity team for a period of
365 days from her last participation in varsity athletics.
On September 9, 1999, Martin appealed the IHSAA’s decision that she
was ineligible to compete on the Bishop Luers varsity basketball team to
the IHSAA Executive Board. She argued that she qualified to play varsity
basketball under IHSAA Rule 17-8 (“the hardship rule”). After a review of
the merits, IHSAA determined that Martin failed to demonstrate entitlement
to participate under the hardship rule.
On November 4, 1999, Martin filed a Verified Complaint for Injunctive
Relief in the Allen Superior Court. On November 29, 1999, the trial court
found that Martin was eligible to play varsity athletics under the rules of
the IHSAA and granted Martin a preliminary injunction. In relevant part,
the injunction:
“[T]emporarily ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED [IHSAA] from attempting to
enforce, implement or carry out in any manner, directly or indirectly,
the decision of the … [IHSAA] to the effect that plaintiff, Jessah
Martin, is ineligible to participate in varsity interscholastic
athletics at and on behalf of Bishop Luers High School for a period
commencing with her enrollment at Bishop Luers High School.” (R. at
263.)
Bishop Luers decided not to allow Martin to play on the varsity
basketball team. Fearing the ramifications of IHSAA Rules 3-9 and 17-6
(“restitution rule”),[2] the school was of the view that to allow Martin to
play exposed it to the risk that if the injunction were reversed or vacated
on appeal, it would have to forfeit games and awards won with Martin’s
participation.
On December 9, 1999, the IHSAA appealed the court’s order. Viewing
this filing as prohibited by the court’s injunction because the appeal
constituted the “first step to enforce the [r]estitution [r]ule,” Martin
filed a Verified Petition for Contempt of Court. On January 21, 2000, the
trial court issued its Order or Judgment of the Court (Contempt Judgment)
in which it found that the IHSAA had “willfully and contemptuously
disregarded [the trial court’s] [o]rder by forcing [Bishop Luers] to comply
with the IHSAA’s original decision that Jessah Martin is ineligible to
participate in varsity interscholastic athletics.” (R. at 301.) The trial
court assessed IHSAA $500.00 per day, from the date of the filing of its
Precipice for Appeal. The fine was to be paid directly to Jessah Martin,
for the period of time that IHSAA remains in contempt of the initial order.
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s actions as an
appropriate sanction. See Indiana High School Athletic Ass’n, Inc. v.
Martin, Inc., 741 N.E.2d 757, 772-773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), transf.
granted, 753 N.E.2d 18 (Ind. 2001)(table). Judge Vaidik dissented from the
decision of the Court of Appeals. Relying heavily on Indiana High School
Athletic Ass’n, Inc. v. Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d 222 (Ind. 1997), and Indiana
High School Athletic Ass’n, Inc. v. Reyes, 694 N.E. 2d 249 (Ind. 1997),
Judge Vaidik correctly argued that the trial court abused its discretion in
finding IHSAA in contempt and that the $500.00 per day assessment was
impermissibly punitive. See Martin, 741 N.E.2d at 773-775. We granted
transfer and now adopt Judge Vaidik’s dissent.
Discussion
I
In its appeal, the IHSAA asserts several challenges to the trial
court’s judgment, including that (1) the preliminary injunction did not
order it to waive the restitution rule, (2) it did not willfully violate
the preliminary injunction, and (3) the trial court’s finding of contempt
violated the Reyes and Carlberg decisions. [3]
In order to be held in contempt for failure to follow the court’s
order, IHSAA must have willfully disobeyed the court order. See Meyer v.
Wolvos, 707 N.E.2d 1029, 1031 (Ind. App. 1999), transf. denied. The order
must have been so clear and certain that there could be no question as to
what IHSAA must do, or not do, and so there could be no question regarding
when the order is violated. Martinal v. Lake O’ The Woods Club, Inc., 248
Ind. 252, 254, 225 N.E.2d 183, 185 (Ind. 1967); Consolidated Rail Corp. v.
Estate of Martin, 720 N.E.2d 1261, 1265 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); Meyer, 707
N.E.2d at 1031.
In this case, the trial court’s preliminary injunction enjoined and
restrained IHSAA “from attempting to enforce, implement or carry out in any
manner, directly or indirectly, … [its] decision … and ruling … to the
effect that … Martin is ineligible to participate in varsity
interscholastic athletics at and on behalf of Bishop Luers High School for
a period of one year commencing with her enrollment at Bishop Luers High
School.” (R. at 262-263.)
The trial court’s initial order made no mention of the restitution
rule. As observed by Judge Vaidik:
“[B]efore the contempt finding, the IHSAA could not have reasonably
known that the court’s order required it to waive its restitution
order. This is even more convincing when it is clear that Martin, in
her complaint, asked the court to enjoin the IHSAA from enforcement of
the restitution rule yet the court, apparently in compliance with
Carlberg did not specifically do so.”
Martin, 741 N.E.2d at 757.
Even if IHSAA’s filing its appeal of the court’s order constituted an
effort to enforce the restitution rule, which we do not believe it did, the
trial court’s preliminary injunction was simply not clear that enforcement
of the restitution rule would violate the order. Furthermore, past
experience provided no guide. This case is apparently the first time that
the restitution rule has ever been cited by a high school as a reason for
not allowing a student to participate in varsity athletics. See Martin,
741 N.E.2d at 765 (stating that this “appears to be a unique if not novel
situation”). Additionally, Martin made no effort to notify IHSAA that she
thought the restitution rule was keeping her from playing, failing to avail
herself of IHSAA’s administrative procedures for waiver of the restitution
rule.
Even had the trial court’s preliminary order been more specific,
there are insufficient grounds to support the trial court’s finding that
IHSAA “willfully and contemptuously disregarded its [o]rder by forcing
Bishop Luers High School to comply with the IHSAA’s original decision that
Jessah Martin is ineligible to participate.” (R. at 301.) Martin attempts
to support this finding on the basis that the IHSAA, through its
restitution rule, has created a situation in which “any student wrongly
denied full eligibility by the IHSAA will likely no longer receive any
relief … essentially ma[king] the preliminary injunction function of the
Indiana Courts null and void.” (Br. of Appellee In Resp. to the Br. of
Appellant at 20.)
Martin’s argument contradicts the controlling precedent stated by our
decisions in Indiana High School Athletic Ass’n, Inc. v. Carlberg and
Indiana High School Athletic Ass’n, Inc. v. Reyes. The IHSAA has an
interest in restitution and fairness to schools which and athletes who
compete against ineligible students. See Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d 222, 235
(Ind. 1997). As such, this court has held the restitution rule to be a
valid rule, enforcement of which does not impinge upon the judiciary’s
function. See Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d 222, 236 (the restitution rule “does
not purport to authorize interference with any court order during the time
it remains in effect, but authorizes restitutive penalties when a temporary
order is ultimately dissolved and the challenged eligibility remains
undisturbed in force.”)(citation omitted).
In the present case, the trial court in apparent deference to the
Carlberg decision did not direct IHSAA to waive the restitution rule but,
after finding IHSAA in contempt, it allowed IHSAA to purge itself of
contempt by waiving the rule. Judge Vaidik was correct in her analysis of
this situation. “Whether a trial court enjoins the enforcement of the
restitution rule initially or allows the IHSAA to purge itself of contempt
by waiving the restitution rule, the result is the same – the court is
ordering the IHSAA to refrain from enforcing its restitution rule.” See
Martin, 741 N.E.2d 757, 773-774. An attempt to enjoin enforcement of the
restitution rule under a contempt action is no more permissible than a
direct attack on the rule. Both were prohibited by the Reyes and Carlberg
decisions. See Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d at 235; Reyes, 694 N.E.2d 249, 258
(Ind. 1997).
Because we reverse the trial court’s finding of contempt, we vacate
the fine imposed upon the IHSAA as well.
Conclusion
Having granted transfer pursuant to Indiana Appellate Procedure Rule
58(A), thereby vacating the opinion of the Court of Appeals, we now
summarily affirm the opinion of the Court of Appeals as to the issue
discussed in footnote 3, and reverse and vacate the trial court’s order of
contempt against IHSAA and imposition of a $500 per day assessment.
SHEPARD, C.J., concurs. BOEHM, J., concurs with separate opinion.
DICKSON, J., dissents with separate opinion with which RUCKER, J., concurs.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Robert M. Baker III
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Edward L. Murphy, Jr.
Stefanie R. Crawford
Fort Wayne, Indiana
__________________________________________________________________
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
__________________________________________________________________
INDIANA HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC )
ASSOCIATION, INC., )
) Indiana Supreme Court
Appellant (Defendant Below), ) Cause No. 02S03-0106-CV-312
)
v. ) Indiana Court of Appeals
) Cause No. 02A03-0001-CV-29
JESSAH MARTIN, )
)
Appellee (Plaintiff Below). )
__________________________________________________________________
APPEAL FROM THE ALLEN SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Nancy Eshcoff Boyer, Special Judge
Cause No. 02D01-9911-CP-1980
__________________________________________________________________
ON PETITION TO TRANSFER
__________________________________________________________________
April 10, 2002
BOEHM, Justice, concurring.
I agree with the majority that the injunction issued by the trial
court did not put the IHSAA on notice that simply taking an appeal without
unilaterally abandoning its “restitution rule” would violate the order.
For that reason I agree the contempt order must be vacated.
Even if I did not concur on the foregoing ground, I would reverse the
contempt finding for a more fundamental reason. I cannot imagine
circumstances where it is appropriate for a trial court to hold a party in
contempt for pursuing a nonfrivolous appeal. The right of appeal in civil
matters is guaranteed by Article VII, Section 6 of our Constitution.
WorldCom Network Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 698 N.E.2d 1233, 1242 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1998); 24 George T. Patton, Jr., Indiana Practice § 4.11, at 69 (3d
ed. 2001). The trial court expressed understandable frustration with the
reality that the effect of its injunction could be mooted by expiration of
the basketball season before the conclusion of the IHSAA’s appeal, which
ultimately proved unsuccessful. Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Martin,
731 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. However, the remedy for
this is for the affected party to seek an expedited appeal, not for the
trial court to arrogate to itself the role of final arbiter of this dispute
by seeking to preclude appellate review of its own decision. Cf. In re
M.B., 484 N.E.2d 1154, 1157 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (“[W]here fundamental
constitutional rights are involved, we believe that the right to appeal
without being held in contempt must be deemed to exist.”).
The injunction enjoined the principal of Bishop Luers and those under
her direction from enforcing the IHSAA decision that Martin was ineligible
in the 2000 season. Despite the school’s ability to cure the situation by
allowing Martin to compete, the school chose not to permit her to join the
team. No contempt citation was sought against the school, however. Under
these circumstances, the school, not the IHSAA, refused to honor the
injunction pending appeal. We are told the school did this based on its
concern for the effect of the restitution rule. That would be a concern
only if the injunction did not hold up on appeal. The school’s remedy is
the same as that available to Martin: seeking an emergency appeal. The
odds of success in that endeavor may be small, but to the extent the courts
are embroiled in these local spats over athletic eligibility, the litigants
bear the disadvantages that resort to litigation entails for every other
citizen who seeks to draw on public judicial resources to resolve a
dispute.
These cases are competing for attention with litigants who claim the
state’s taxing structure is fatally flawed, that our disabled students are
not afforded appropriate educational opportunities, and that our prison
system is hopelessly overtaxed. Thousands of other cases—dissolutions,
injuries, lost employment, and failed businesses—are, for the parties
involved, among the most important matters in their lives. In an egregious
case, the Court of Appeals may grant emergency relief. If that doesn’t
occur, the school, like all of these other citizens, can take its chances
on an adverse outcome at the appellate level. If the school is correct and
the athlete is found eligible at the end of the day, nothing happens, and
the results of the school’s games will stand. If not, the school, like any
other litigant, bears the risk of having pursued litigation while making an
incorrect evaluation of its pending claim.
Martin, having won at the trial court level, put the school in the
position of being the party who needed to move forward. Had she lost, the
need to seek expedited relief would have fallen on her. But in neither
case can the parties or the trial court preclude a nonfrivolous appeal by
contempt or otherwise.
SHEPARD, C.J., concurs.
In The
INDIANA SUPREME COURT
)
INDIANA HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC ) Supreme Court No.
ASSOCIATION, INC., ) 02S03-0106-CV-312
Defendant-Appellant, )
)
v. ) Court of Appeals No.
) 02D01-9911-CP-1980
JESSAH MARTIN, )
Plaintiff-Appellee. )
)
________________________________________________
APPEAL FROM THE ALLEN SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Nancy Eshcoff Boyer, Special Judge
Cause No. 02D01-9911-CP-1980
________________________________________________
On Petition To Transfer
April 10, 2002
DICKSON, Justice, dissenting.
I dissent, believing that the majority opinion of the Court of
Appeals correctly decided this case. In addition, I continue to believe
that we incorrectly decided Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc. v.
Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d 222 (Ind. 1997), and Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n,
Inc. v. Reyes, 694 N.E.2d 249 (Ind. 1997), upon which today's majority
opinion rests.
It should be noted that today's decision does not address whether the
IHSAA's "hardship rule" or its "restitution rule" may be invalid or
unlawfully applied in light of the United States Supreme Court's recent
decision in Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531
U.S. 288, 121 S.Ct. 924, 148 L.Ed.2d 807 (2001), which was decided after
the decision of the Court of Appeals.
RUCKER, J., concurs.
-----------------------
[1] We discussed the transfer rule at length in Indiana High School
Athletic Ass’n, Inc. v. Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d 222, 232-234, 236-242 (Ind.
1997).
[2] The restitution rule applies when an ineligible student
participates in interscholastic athletics in accordance with a court order
that is later reversed or vacated. It allows IHSAA to take steps to
restore the integrity of athletic contests, including, but not limited to,
forfeiture of games.
[3] IHSAA also contests the trial court’s jurisdiction arguing that
Martin failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. The Court of Appeals
decided this issue adverse to IHSAA. We summarily affirm the Court of
Appeals on this issue.