ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Susan D. Rayl
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Steve Carter
Attorney General of Indiana
Monika Prekopa Talbot
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
__________________________________________________________________
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
__________________________________________________________________
RONALD PIERCE, )
)
Appellant (Defendant Below), )
)
v. ) Indiana Supreme Court
) Cause No. 49S00-0011-CR-710
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee (Plaintiff Below). )
__________________________________________________________________
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Mark Renner, Magistrate
Cause No. 49G04-9907-CF-126805
__________________________________________________________________
ON DIRECT APPEAL
__________________________________________________________________
January 29, 2002
BOEHM, Justice.
Ronald Pierce was convicted of burglary, rape, criminal deviate
conduct, robbery, confinement, and being a habitual offender. In this
direct appeal, he contends that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion
in admitting his confession; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting testimony that Pierce masturbated while he confessed; and (3)
Pierce’s convictions for burglary and robbery violate the Indiana Double
Jeopardy Clause. We remand to the trial court with instructions to reduce
the robbery conviction to a Class C felony and otherwise affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
Factual and Procedural Background
On the morning of July 13, 1999, the victim was writing a note to the
UPS man with her door open when a suspicious man approached her home. She
attempted to shut the door, but the man, Pierce, had already entered her
home. The victim screamed at Pierce to leave the house and attempted to
flee. He chased her, the two scuffled, and Pierce ultimately forcibly
inserted his fingers in the victim’s vagina. Pierce then demanded money
and the victim gave him twelve dollars, which was all the money she had in
her purse. Pierce forcibly raped the victim and then requested more money.
After the victim sent Pierce upstairs, she attempted to call 911. Pierce
returned, took the phone, then became nervous and fled.
At the hospital, an examination revealed a variety of cuts and
scrapes, bruises on the victim’s shoulders, forearms, and lips, and tears
in her vaginal area. Pierce was arrested in an unrelated case[1] and,
while being questioned in that case, confessed to this crime. He was
convicted of burglary, rape, criminal deviate conduct, robbery, and
confinement, and found to be a habitual offender. Pierce was sentenced to
fifty years for burglary, enhanced by thirty years for the habitual
offender enhancement, to be served consecutively with twenty years for
robbery. Sentences on the remainder of the convictions were to be served
concurrently.
I. Pierce’s Confession
Pierce first challenges the admission of his confession, claiming that
police deception rendered it involuntary. Specifically, he contends that a
police officer, Detective Frazier, lied to him about a preliminary DNA
match in the other investigation and this caused him to confess to both
this crime and the other crime.
The decision to admit Pierce’s statement is a matter of discretion of
the trial court after considering the totality of the circumstances. Ellis
v. State, 707 N.E.2d 797, 801 (Ind. 1999). In reviewing a trial court’s
ruling as to the voluntariness of a confession, “we examine the record for
substantial, probative evidence of voluntariness; we do not reweigh the
evidence.” Horan v. State, 682 N.E.2d 502, 510 (Ind. 1997).
Pierce’s taped statement was given after an officer informed Pierce
of his Miranda rights and Pierce signed a waiver form. Pierce’s taped
interview lasted two and one-half hours. The trial court ruled:
[B]ased on the record that I have in front of me, and taking the
statements as offers to prove, I find that this court in a different
case has already ruled upon all of these issues after a thorough
hearing, and the fact that this is an effort to suppress a statement
that the alleged falsehoods did not actually pertain to, I think the
original ruling of this court was accurate, and I am again going to
deny the motion to suppress the Defendant’s statements to the
investigators during his custodial interrogation.
The determination that Pierce’s statement should be admitted is supported
by substantial evidence and is consistent with precedent.
Pierce makes substantially the same argument in this appeal as he made
in his appeal of the earlier case. His claim here is somewhat weaker
because the police deception—false claim of DNA identification—is related
to the other crimes, not these. For that reason, as well as those given in
Pierce’s other appeal, see Pierce v. State, __ N.E.2d __, __ (Ind. 2002),
we find no reversible error in the admission of his confession.
II. Evidence of Pierce’s Behavior While Giving a Statement
Pierce filed a motion in limine to exclude Detective Frazier’s
testimony that Pierce masturbated while giving his statements to police.
The trial court denied the motion, stating that the evidence “does have
some tendency to impact upon the jury’s consideration of his intent in
entering that residence, the fact that in a discussion of the incident, he
was engaged in a sexual act . . . .” Pierce claims that this testimony
violated Indiana Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b).
Evidence Rule 404(b) provides, “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident . . . .” In assessing
admissibility of 404(b) evidence the court must (1) determine that the
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is relevant to a matter at issue
other than the defendant’s propensity to commit the charged act and (2)
balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect
pursuant to Rule 403. Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 221 (Ind. 1997).
The relevance and balancing issues are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Thompson v. State, 690 N.E.2d 224, 233 (Ind. 1997).
Frazier’s testimony fails both prongs of the test. First, it does not
fall under an exception to Rule 404(b). Unlike the State’s claim, evidence
that Pierce masturbated during his confession does not establish that he
intended to rape the victim when he broke into her home. There appears to
be no reason to admit this evidence other than to establish that Pierce has
a propensity for bizarre behavior. We also agree with Pierce that the
testimony was substantially more prejudicial than probative.[2]
Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in admitting this
evidence under a 404(b) analysis.
However, Pierce’s conduct while confessing is certainly relevant to
an assessment of the confession’s reliability and voluntariness. The trial
court did not address this issue. We do not need to determine whether
those considerations are sufficient to admit this testimony because
“[e]rrors in the admission or exclusion of evidence are to be disregarded
as harmless error unless they affect the substantial rights of a party.”
Fleener v. State, 656 N.E.2d 1140, 1141 (Ind. 1995); see also Ind. Trial
Rule 61. In this case, there is significant, uncontested evidence of
Pierce’s guilt, including the victim’s testimony that Pierce broke into her
house, engaged in sexual deviate conduct, raped her, and robbed her.
Pierce confessed to all of this. In light of this evidence, we cannot
conclude that the erroneous admission of Frazier’s testimony affected
Pierce’s substantial rights. It is not grounds for reversal.
III. Double Jeopardy
Pierce finally contends that his multiple convictions violate the
Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause. Ind. Const. art. I, § 14. Specifically,
Pierce argues that he cannot be convicted of both burglary as a Class A
felony and robbery as a Class B felony when both crimes are enhanced by the
same bodily injury.[3] The Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits
multiple convictions if there is “a reasonable possibility that the
evidentiary facts used by the fact-finder to establish the essential
elements of one offense may also have been used to establish the essential
elements of a second challenged offense.” Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d
32, 53 (Ind. 1999); accord Wise v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1192, 1201 (Ind.
1999).
To convict Pierce of burglary as a Class A felony, the State must show
that: (1) Pierce broke and entered (2) the victim’s house (3) with the
intent to commit a felony therein (4) resulting in either bodily injury or
serious bodily injury. Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1 (1998). To convict Pierce
for robbery as a Class B felony, the State must show that Pierce: (1)
knowingly or intentionally (2) took money (3) from the presence of the
victim (4) by use of force or threat of force and (5) while armed with a
deadly weapon or resulting in bodily injury to the victim. Id. 35-42-5-1.
Each of these crimes includes evidence or facts not essential to the
other. The taking of money supports the robbery and the breaking and
entering supports the burglary, but neither is an element of the other
crime. Nevertheless, we have long adhered to a series of rules of
statutory construction and common law that are often described as double
jeopardy, but are not governed by the constitutional test set forth in
Richardson. See Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 55 (Sullivan, J., concurring);
id. at 57 (Boehm, J., concurring). Among these is the doctrine that where
a burglary conviction is elevated to a Class A felony based on the same
bodily injury that forms the basis of a Class B robbery conviction, the two
cannot stand. Cf. Campbell v. State, 622 N.E.2d 495, 500 (Ind. 1993)
(battery and burglary)[4]; Wolfe v. State, 549 N.E.2d 1024, 1025 (Ind.
1990) (attempted rape and robbery); McDonald v. State, 542 N.E.2d 552, 555-
56 (Ind. 1989) (two robberies). Accordingly, the robbery conviction is
reduced to a C felony.[5]
Conclusion
This case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to reduce
the robbery conviction to a Class C felony and impose a sentence of eight
years on that count to be served consecutively with the previously imposed
sentence of eighty years.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, SULLIVAN, and RUCKER, JJ., concur.
-----------------------
[1] The appeal in that case is handed down concurrently with this opinion.
Pierce v. State, __ N.E.2d __ (Ind. 2002). The two cases were tried
independently and each has a separate record. It is coincidence that the
two reached this Court within a few weeks of each other.
[2] The State argues this testimony “was certainly not more prejudicial
than [the victim’s] testimony that Pierce broke into her house, performed
sexual deviate conduct on her, robbed her, and raped her.” Although this
may be true, the State ignores the fact that this other evidence is highly
relevant, unlike the testimony in question, and clearly satisfies the 403
test.
[3] The State concedes this argument.
[4] Although Campbell was explicitly said to be superseded in the Court’s
opinion in Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 49 n.36, only Justice Dickson and the
Chief Justice appear to have taken that view. Justice Sullivan concurred
in Richardson, but authored a separate opinion that cited Campbell,
apparently with approval. 717 N.E.2d at 56. The other two Justices did
not comment on Campbell, but cited with approval other cases following the
same doctrine.
[5] The trial court imposed the maximum sentence of 100 years (fifty years
for burglary enhanced by thirty years for the habitual offender enhancement
to be served consecutively with twenty years for robbery), but as explained
in Part III, the Class B felony robbery conviction must be reduced to a
Class C felony. There is no need to remand for resentencing where it is
sufficiently clear that the trial court would impose the maximum sentence
for the Class C felony and order it served consecutively. Cutter v. State,
725 N.E.2d 401, 410 n.4 (Ind. 2000).