ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Jay T. Hirschauer
Cass County Public Defender
Logansport, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Steve Carter
Attorney General of Indiana
Joseph A. Samreta
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
__________________________________________________________________
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
__________________________________________________________________
MICHAEL S. EDWARDS, )
)
Appellant (Defendant Below), ) Indiana Supreme Court
) Cause No. 09S02-0112-CR-649
v. )
) Indiana Court of Appeals
STATE OF INDIANA, ) Cause No. 09A02-0009-CR-608
)
Appellee (Plaintiff Below). )
__________________________________________________________________
APPEAL FROM THE CASS CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Julian L. Ridlen, Judge
Cause No. 09C01-0001-CF-00006
__________________________________________________________________
ON PETITION TO TRANSFER
__________________________________________________________________
December 18, 2001
BOEHM, Justice.
We hold that routine, warrantless strip searches of misdemeanor
arrestees, even when incident to lawful arrests, are impermissible under
the Indiana Constitution and the United States Constitution, and that
before jail officials may conduct warrantless strip searches of misdemeanor
arrestees detained awaiting the posting of bond, those officials must have
a reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is concealing weapons or
contraband.
Factual and Procedural Background
On January 29, 2000, Logansport police officers Fred Rogers and
Robert Smith stopped a maroon station wagon that was being driven
approximately ten miles per hour over the speed limit on a snow-covered
road. Smith approached the driver, Lawrence Walker, and Rogers approached
the passenger, Michael Edwards. Smith asked Walker for identification, and
Walker produced a learner’s permit with his own picture but bearing the
name Michael Edwards. Edwards in the meantime told Rogers that his name
was Michael Edwards and offered a pay stub with that name.
When the officers returned to their squad car to issue a speeding
citation, they realized that both men had given them the same name and the
same date of birth. The officers confronted the two men, patted them down,
and handcuffed them. Edwards apologized for lying, explained that the pay
stub belonged to the driver, and identified himself first as Nigel Smith,
then as Michael Smith. He also gave the officers a second date of birth,
and told them again that the driver’s name was Michael Edwards.
Because neither man had a valid driver’s license, and because the
officers could not verify the identity of either, the officers decided to
transport both to the Logansport police station. A search of the station
wagon, which was to be impounded, revealed no weapons or contraband.
Walker was subsequently arrested for forgery based on presenting the false
learner’s permit. He was taken to the Cass County jail, and when he
removed his left boot in the book-in procedure, a small plastic bag
containing .14 grams of crack cocaine was discovered. A search of the
squad car used to transport Walker to the jail revealed twenty-four
individually wrapped pieces of rock cocaine totaling 3.10 grams.
While Walker was being transported to the jail, Rogers and Detective
Michael Clark continued to interview Edwards at the police station. At
some point during that interview, Rogers placed Edwards under arrest, but
the record is silent as to the reason for the arrest. Edwards then offered
to take the officers to his house to get his birth certificate and prove
his identity. Clark agreed, as long as Edwards would allow officers to
search his home. Edwards relented, and three officers and a police canine
conducted the search. The birth certificate was recovered, but no other
contraband was found. Edwards, still under arrest, was then transported to
the Cass County jail.
Jail correctional officer Jerry Denny, who had been present when the
cocaine was discovered in Walker’s boot, conducted a strip search of
Edwards. A plastic bag containing seven rocks of crack cocaine weighing
1.12 grams was discovered between Edwards’ buttocks, and Edwards was
charged with possession of cocaine as a Class A felony. Edwards filed a
motion to suppress the cocaine, arguing that the police had neither
probable cause to arrest him nor a valid search warrant, so the jailhouse
strip search was unconstitutional. The trial court denied the motion after
a hearing. Edwards then moved to set aside the order denying his motion,
and also filed a motion to dismiss the charges because of insufficient
evidence. The trial court denied both motions and, at Edwards’ request,
certified an interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court and this Court granted transfer.
Motion to Suppress
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals characterized the strip
search of Edwards as a search incident to a lawful arrest. We agree that
the police had probable cause to arrest Edwards and did so lawfully.[1] We
also agree that a police officer may conduct a warrantless search of a
person if the search is incident to a lawful arrest. See Townsend v.
State, 460 N.E.2d 139, 141 (Ind. 1984). In such situations, the search and
the arrest must be “substantially contemporaneous,” and the search must be
confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrest. Id. The requirement of
a contemporaneous search has been interpreted liberally, however, and this
Court has validated searches that do not occur until the arrestee arrives
at a law enforcement facility, as long as the items searched are “found on
the person of an arrestee” or are “immediately associated with his person.”
Chambers v. State, 422 N.E.2d 1198, 1203 (Ind. 1981). Thus, the trial
court and the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the strip search of
Edwards could be evaluated as one incident to a lawful arrest.
Both our cases and those of the federal courts place limits on
searches incident to an arrest. The United States Supreme Court has held
that once a lawful arrest has been made, authorities may conduct a “full
search” of the arrestee for weapons or concealed evidence. United States
v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). No additional probable cause for
the search is required, and the search incident to arrest may “‘involve a
relatively extensive exploration of the person.’” Id. at 227 (quoting
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25 (1968)). Nonetheless, such a search would be
unreasonable, and therefore a violation of the Fourth Amendment standard,
if it were “extreme or patently abusive.” Id. at 236. In this case,
Edwards was strip-searched when he was processed into the Cass County jail
several hours after his arrest. At that point Edwards had not been charged
with any criminal activity, and the possible charges he faced were all for
nonviolent misdemeanor offenses. We do not believe that routine,
warrantless strip searches of misdemeanor arrestees, even when incident to
lawful arrests, are reasonable as both Article I, Section 11 of our state
constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the federal constitution require.
There may be misdemeanor charges for which a body search is appropriate
because of the reasonable likelihood of discovery of evidence, but false
informing, without more, is certainly not such a crime. Nor, as explained
below, does the possible discovery of weapons or contraband justify a
search of every incarcerated person. For these reasons, we grant transfer
to make clear we do not agree with the Court of Appeals to the extent it
implied that as a general proposition a routine, warrantless strip search
incident to a lawful misdemeanor arrest is reasonable.
We are unable to determine on this record whether the search was
justified by a concern that weapons or contraband might be introduced into
the jail. In Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1273 (7th
Cir. 1983), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that before jail
officials may conduct warrantless strip searches of misdemeanor arrestees
detained awaiting the posting of bond, those officials must have a
reasonable suspicion that the arrestees are concealing weapons or
contraband. That decision ruled on a point of federal constitutional law
and found the search to violate the Fourth Amendment’s ban on unreasonable
searches and seizures. We assume Mary Beth G. was correctly decided under
the Fourth Amendment, but reach the same conclusion under Article I,
Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. To the extent a search is
conducted on the basis of jail security, the indignity and personal
invasion necessarily accompanying a strip search is simply not reasonable
without the reasonable suspicion that weapons or contraband may be
introduced into the jail. The dissenting opinion from the Court of Appeals
would require that the reasonable suspicion be connected to the offense for
which the individual was arrested. Edwards v. State, 750 N.E.2d 377, 383
(Ind. Ct. App. 2001). We do not believe the suspicion need be based on
that offense. Some offenses inherently give rise to a reasonable suspicion
that a suspect possesses weapons or contraband. But irrespective of the
offense, the circumstances surrounding the arrest, rather than the offense
itself, may give rise to a reasonable suspicion, and if so the search is
justified.
The strip search of Edwards was appropriate if the correctional
officer who conducted it had a reasonable suspicion, based upon the
totality of the circumstances surrounding Edwards’ arrest, that Edwards was
concealing weapons or contraband. If a warrantless search or seizure is
conducted, however, the State bears the burden of proving that the search
or seizure falls within one of the well-delineated exceptions to the rule
making such searches per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Middleton v. State, 714 N.E.2d 1099, 1101 (Ind. 1999). The same applies
under Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. State v. Friedel,
714 N.E.2d 1231, 1243 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). Our review of the denial of a
motion to suppress is similar to other sufficiency matters. Goodner v.
State, 714 N.E.2d 638, 641 (Ind. 1999). The record must disclose
substantial evidence of probative value that supports the trial court’s
decision. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence and we consider conflicting
evidence most favorably to the trial court’s ruling. Id.
Here, it is clear that Denny was present when contraband was
discovered on Edwards’ cohort, Walker. However, the scant record before
this Court includes no testimony from Denny or other jail personnel, and it
is not clear whether Denny entertained a reasonable suspicion that a strip
search of Edwards would reveal more contraband, or whether he was merely
following a routine that dictated an improper, warrantless strip search of
every misdemeanor arrestee. Because the State did not carry its burden of
proving that the warrantless strip search of Edwards fell within an
exception to the warrant requirement, Edwards’ motion to suppress should
have been granted.
Conclusion
We summarily affirm the other findings of the Court of Appeals and
remand this action to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, SULLIVAN, and RUCKER, JJ., concur.
-----------------------
[1] As explained above, the record is silent as to the reason for Edwards’
arrest. Possible charges against Edwards include false informing and/or
permitting the unlawful use of his identification card by Walker, both of
which are misdemeanor offenses. See Ind. Code §§ 35-44-2-2(c) and 9-24-16-
12 (1998).