Attorney for Appellant
Steven C. Litz
Monrovia, IN
Attorneys for Appellee
Karen M. Freeman-Wilson
Attorney General of Indiana
Timothy W. Beam
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, IN
IN THE
INDIANA SUPREME COURT
BRADLEY D. MORGAN,
Appellant (Defendant below),
v.
STATE OF INDIANA,
Appellee (Plaintiff below).
)
) Supreme Court No.
) 34S00-0006-CR-350
)
)
)
)
)
)
APPEAL FROM THE HOWARD CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Lynn Murray, Judge
Cause No. No. 34C01-9901-CF-14
ON DIRECT APPEAL
October 5, 2001
SULLIVAN, Justice.
Defendant Bradley Morgan was convicted of murder for shooting Billy
Wiley to death at a party. Defendant has shown neither the deficient
performance nor prejudice necessary to sustain his claims that his trial
lawyer was ineffective. His claim that the trial court improperly
instructed the jury is not available for our review. And it was within the
court's discretion to allow an expert’s opinion of certain details of the
crime. For these reasons, we affirm.
Background
The facts most favorable to the judgment indicate that on the evening
of January 16, 2000, Defendant and Billy Wiley were at a party in Kokomo
and got into a minor argument where one or both of them pushed the other.
Defendant told Wiley, “I’m going to get you, I’m going to get you for
this.” Defendant then walked out of the party. About twenty minutes
later, Defendant returned; he walked out of the bathroom with a gun in his
hand and approached Wiley. Another person at the party stepped between the
two, but Defendant fired a shot at Wiley. Defendant and Wiley struggled
with each other and Defendant fired two more shots in rapid succession and
Wiley fell onto Defendant.
Wiley died as a result of a gunshot wound to the head. Defendant was
bleeding from a gunshot wound to his hand. Defendant then fled from the
party to the house of his mother who drove him to St. Vincent’s Hospital in
Indianapolis. Defendant initially told the hospital personnel that he had
fallen on some glass, but the hospital staff found fragments in his hand
and called the police. When a police officer arrived, Defendant and his
mother told him that one of Defendant’s friends had accidentally shot him
at an Indianapolis apartment complex. Defendant was charged and convicted
of Murder,[1] and Defendant was sentenced to 60 years incarceration.
I
Defendant contends that he was denied his constitutional right to the
effective assistance of counsel.[2] He argues that “his attorney failed to
object to a mandatory jury instruction; failed to object to hearsay
testimony; failed to object to the prosecutors’ statement that [Defendant]
could have come forward and spoken to the police; and failed to tender an
instruction on voluntary manslaughter.” Appellant’s Br. at 4.
To establish a valid ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
Defendant must show, first, that counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness based on prevailing professional
norms, and, second, that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.” See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984);
Lambert v. State, 743 N.E.2d 719, 730 (Ind. 2001).
We have stated in past cases that the first prong of the Strickland
test affords counsel “considerable discretion in choosing strategy and
tactics, and we will accord that decision deference. A strong presumption
arises that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant
decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Lambert,
743 N.E.2d at 730 (quoting State v. Holmes, 728 N.E.2d 164, 172 (Ind.
2000)). Regarding the second prong of the Strickland test, “[a] reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the
outcome.” Id.
A
Defendant argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to object
to two jury instructions.
Final instruction no. 3 read in pertinent part: “If the state did
prove each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the
defendant guilty of murder.” (emphasis added). Final instruction no. 16
provided:
If, after considering all of the evidence, you have reached a firm
belief in the guilt of the defendant that you feel safe to act upon
that belief, without hesitation, in a matter of the highest concern
and importance to you, then you will have reached that degree of
certainty which excludes reasonable doubt and authorizes conviction.
(R. at 142.) (emphasis added).
Defendant argues that the emphasized language of these two
instructions conflicts with the trial court’s initial instruction that the
jury was the judge of the law and the facts under Art. 1, § 19, of the
Indiana Constitution. Specifically, Defendant argues that the trial
court’s use of the words “should” and “will” in the contested instructions
was improper. He stated that “the jury was told how to think and act. In
the first instance, the trial court told the jury what it ought to do, and
in the second, it told them at what point it ought to do it.” Appellant’s
Br. at 6.
We have held in a variety of contexts that Art. I, § 19, is not
violated when the types of instructions given in this case are accompanied
by an instruction informing the jury that it is the judge of the law and
the facts. See, e.g., Parker v. State, 698 N.E.2d 737, 742 (Ind. 1998);
Loftis v. State, 256 Ind. 417, 420, 269 N.E.2d 746, 747-8 (1971); Mitchem
v. State, 503 N.E.2d 889, 891 (Ind. 1987). Defendant acknowledges that a
“law and the facts” instruction was given here.
As to instruction no. 3, we recently reiterated that a trial court
may use the word “should” in such a manner. See Wright v. State, 730
N.E.2d 713, 716 (Ind. 2000). In Wright, this court found a similar
instruction to be “instructive, and hardly offensive to any of our
fundamental precepts of criminal justice.” Id. We stated, “A trial court
may instruct the jury that if they find that all the material allegations
of the indictment or affidavit are proven beyond a reasonable doubt that
they ‘should’ convict the defendants.” Id. at 716-17 (Ind. 2000) (quoting
Loftis, 256 Ind. at 419-20, 269 N.E.2d at 747).
As to instruction no. 16, we have indicated that the use of the
analogy about what would cause one to act without hesitation on a matter of
highest personal concern and importance “is neither required nor
particularly desirable in explaining the concept of reasonable doubt.”
Winegeart v. State, 665 N.E.2d 893, 902 (Ind. 1996). But we have not
disapproved its use. Nor have we questioned it as a violation of Art. I, §
19 – the claim Defendant asserts here.
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that instructions no. 3 and no. 16
comported with the requirements Art. I, § 19. As such, we conclude that it
was within the range of reasonable attorney behavior not to object to these
instructions. And because we assume competence on the part of a lawyer at
trial, an action or omission that is within the range of reasonable
attorney behavior can only support a claim of ineffective assistance if
that presumption is overcome by specific evidence as to the performance of
the particular lawyer. Woods v. State, 701 N.E.2d 1208, 1212 (Ind. 1998).
No such evidence has been offered here.
B
Defendant argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to object
to hearsay testimony.
At trial, a security guard from St. Vincent’s Hospital testified that
Mrs. Morgan had given him a false account of how Defendant sustained the
wound to his hand. Defendant argues that the guard’s testimony was
improper hearsay evidence,[3] and should have been objected to. Defendant
argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to object.
We do not find a valid ineffective assistance of counsel claim here
because the prejudice prong of Strickland is not satisfied. The testimony
of the guard was cumulative of the admissible testimony of other witnesses.
Defendant’s mother herself testified at trial that she had told the
security guard a false story. And another witness, Deputy Salluom,
testified that Defendant himself had told him the same story. Because of
the cumulative nature of the hearsay testimony at issue here, we see no
basis for concluding that its exclusion would have produced a different
result.
C
Defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to the prosecutor’s closing argument. Appellant’s Br. at 7. In his
closing argument, the prosecutor stated:
Well, after that, as [Defendant’s trial counsel] well knows, and
you’re represented by an attorney, the police can’t go and speak to
you. If Bradley Morgan wanted to provide his version of these events
to the police all he had to do was tell Mr. Ryan, ‘Pick up the phone,
call the detectives, set up an appointment for me to give a
statement.’ That’s all that had to be done.
(R. at 1460.)
A person in custody who is questioned by the police has the right to
remain silent, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966), and, in
general, a criminal defendant may not be penalized at trial for invoking
the right to remain silent. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 620 (1976).
Using a defendant’s post-Miranda silence to impeach a defendant at trial
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Doyle,
426 U.S. at 619;[4] Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445.
Although evidence of a defendant’s post-Miranda silence is generally
not admissible, the defendant may open the door to its admission. The
Doyle Court acknowledged this in its decision, stating “[I]t goes almost
without saying that the fact of post-arrest silence could be used by the
prosecution to contradict a defendant who testifies to an exculpatory
version of events and claims to have told the police the same version upon
arrest.” Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619. As we explained in Willsey v. State:
[T]he central constitutional inquiry is the ‘particular use to which
the post-arrest silence is being put… . Doyle does not impose a prima
facie bar against any mention whatsoever of a defendant’s right to
request counsel, but instead guards against the exploitation of that
constitutional right by the prosecutor.’
698 N.E.2d 784, 793 (Ind. 1998) (quoting Lindgren v. Lane, 925 F.2d 198,
202 (7th Cir. 1991)).
It follows that the prosecutor may comment on a defendant’s post-
Miranda silence in limited circumstances as long as it is not used to
exploit a defendant’s constitutional rights. See Vitek v. State, 750
N.E.2d 346, 350 (Ind. 2001). We find that this case falls within those
limited circumstances. During Defendant’s case in chief, he testified that
when he went to the police station the police never asked him for his
version of events. During closing argument, defense counsel reiterated
this: “Rev. Woodard picks up Bradley and they go to the police department.
Bradley indicates no one asked him at the time what was his version. No
one asked him to give a statement. ... no one asked him at the station what
his version was....”
Defendant’s testimony and closing argument could reasonably have been
understood to suggest to the jury that the police were not interested in
hearing Defendant’s version of events. The prosecutor’s statement was in
response to Defendant’s testimony and closing argument. Defendant’s own
statements and his closing argument opened the door to the prosecutor’s
comments. There was no Doyle violation and Defendant’s counsel was
therefore not ineffective for not objecting.
D
Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to
tender an instruction on voluntary manslaughter. Instruction no. 3 defined
murder and also instructed the jury that they could find Defendant guilty
of the lesser-included offense of reckless homicide. (R. at 126.)
Defendant argues that his counsel should have tendered an instruction for
voluntary manslaughter. The record suggests that counsel's omission of
such an instruction may have been strategic.
Defendant’s justification for the shooting was that he acted in self-
defense by striking Wiley in the head with a gun and that the gun
discharged. Then, according to Defendant’s testimony, the gun discharged
accidentally a second and third time as he and Wiley fell to the ground.
He argues that at the time of the final confrontation, Wiley grabbed him
while his hands were in his pockets and that Defendant took his hands out
of his pockets and started hitting him. Defendant testified that he didn’t
know at the time that the weapon was in his hand and he maintained that he
never intentionally shot Wiley. In fact, Defendant testified that he was
not even angry at Wiley after their first confrontation.[5]
A voluntary manslaughter instruction would likely have conflicted
with this theory of the case. A person commits voluntary manslaughter by
knowingly or intentionally killing another human being “while acting under
sudden heat.” Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3. Defendant’s defense was that he
didn’t intentionally kill Wiley. It would have been a reasonable strategic
decision for defense counsel to conclude that a voluntary manslaughter
instruction would have been inconsistent with Defendant’s testimony, which
invoked a self-defense argument and adamantly insisted that there was no
intent. As discussed supra, because we assume competence on the part of a
lawyer at trial, an action or omission that is within the range of
reasonable attorney behavior can only support a claim of ineffective
assistance if that presumption is overcome by specific evidence as to the
performance of the particular lawyer. Woods, 701 N.E.2d at 1212. Again,
such evidence has been offered in respect of this claim.
II
Defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error by
improperly instructing the jury on Defendant’s intent. Appellant’s Br. at
12. Over Defendant’s objection, the court accepted the following
instruction that was tendered by the state: “The intent to kill can be
found from the acts, declarations, and conduct of the Defendant at or just
prior to the commission of the offense, from the character of the weapon
used, and from the part of the body on which the wound was inflicted.”
Defendant objected, stating:
[T]he court should instruct the [j]ury as to the proper way to address
inferences in one fashion or another, that being that if there are two
inferences, one consistent with guilt and one consistent with
innocence, the [j]ury would be required and should be instructed that
they should accept the inference that is consistent with innocence.
(R. at 1383.)
Defendant now argues on appeal that the instruction was improper
because it invaded the province of the jury. Appellant’s Br. at 12. See
Turner v. State, 280 N.E.2d 621 (Ind. 1972). Defendant, citing Wilson v.
State, 635 N.E.2d 1109 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), also claims, incorrectly, that
the Court of Appeals deemed the above instruction to be “imperfect.”[6]
Defendant’s argument on appeal is different than his argument at trial, and
his objection is therefore waived. See Small v. State, 736 N.E.2d 742, 747
(Ind. 2000) (“A defendant may not raise one ground for objection at trial
and argue a different ground on appeal.”); Lehman v. State, 730 N.E.2d 701,
703 (Ind. 2000) (“When ... a defendant presents one argument at trial and a
different argument on appeal, the claims are forfeited.”).
III
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in allowing the
pathologist to provide expert testimony on ballistics. Appellant’s Br. at
10.
At trial, Dr. Hawley, a forensic pathologist, testified regarding the
position that Defendant and the victim were in when the gun discharged.
Dr. Hawley testified that he was a forensic pathologist with nearly 20
years of experience. In his field, he “[examines] the human body after
death through the surgical performance of an autopsy to determine the cause
and the manner of death and [he is] particularly interested in cases where
death has been sudden, unusual, unexpected, and ... violent.”
Defendant objected to Dr. Hawley providing a “scenario” in which both
wounds were inflicted. The trial court sustained the objection, but
allowed Dr. Hawley to testify regarding the relative positions that he
believed Wiley and Defendant were in when the shots were fired.
Dr. Hawley testified that he determined that Wiley died of a gunshot
wound to the head. The entrance wound was located on the left side of
Wiley’s head, and the gunshot tracked across Wiley’s head from left to
right before exiting the right side of Wiley’s head. The nature of the
wounds indicated to Dr. Hawley that the muzzle of the gun was against
Wiley’s head when it was discharged. Dr. Hawley also testified that he
believed that Defendant was shot through the hand, with the bullet entering
the back of the hand and exiting through the outside edge of the hand.
Given the circumstances of the wounds and the fact that witnesses indicated
that the shots were fired in rapid succession, Dr. Hawley gave his opinion
as to the relative position of Defendant and Wiley:
[Prosecutor]: And for the shot which entered Mr. Wiley’s skull, in
your opinion what would be the relative positions of the bodies of Mr.
Morgan and Mr. Wiley?
[Dr. Hawley]: Well, the weapon is actually touching the skin of the
side of the head on the left side which places, in your hypothetical
presentation, the shooter’s right hand at the top of the victim’s left
shoulder with the gun up against the left side of the victim’s head.
[Prosecutor]: How about the second or the additional shot when Mr.
Morgan’s injuries was [sic] sustained?
[Dr. Hawley]: For the injury the shooter’s left hand must be palm
down, very close to the muzzle of the gun at the time the shot is
fired and no more than a few inches from the barrel of the gun.
(R. at 1035.)
Generally, an expert’s opinion is admissible if the expert’s
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge assists the trier of
fact in understanding the evidence. Ind. Evidence Rule 702(a). Decisions
regarding the admissibility of expert testimony are within the broad
discretion of the trial court. See Williams v. State, 706 N.E.2d 149, 163
(Ind. 1999). We will only reverse the trial court’s judgment upon a
showing of abuse of discretion. Id.
We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing
Dr. Hawley to testify regarding the relative positions of Defendant and
Wiley at the time of the shooting. Dr. Hawley’s conclusions were based on
his expert analysis of the trajectory and location of the wounds. While
providing a scenario or narrative would have pushed the limits of
admissibility, it was within the trial court’s discretion to allow Dr.
Hawley, based on his examination, to offer an opinion of how the wounds
were inflicted.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, BOEHM, and RUCKER, JJ., concur.
-----------------------
[1] Ind. Code § 25-42-1-1 (1998).
[2] Defendant has raised his claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel in this direct appeal. "[A] postconviction hearing is normally the
preferred forum to adjudicate an ineffectiveness claim," Woods v. State,
701 N.E.2d 1208, 1219 (Ind. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 861. (In the
exceptional case, a Davis proceeding provides an alternative forum. Id. at
1219-20 (citing Davis v. State, 368 N.E.2d 1149 (1977).) We have held that
raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal
precludes their review in subsequent post-conviction proceedings. See
Allen v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1158, 1166 (Ind. 2001) (citing Sawyer Search
Term End v. State, 679 N.E.2d 1328, 1329 (Ind.1997); Morris v. State, 466
N.E.2d 13, 14 (Ind.1984).
[3] Hearsay is “a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted.” See Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c). Hearsay is
generally not admissible. See Ind. Evidence Rule 802.
[4] “The point of the Doyle holding is that it is fundamentally
unfair to promise an arrested person that his silence will not be used
against him and thereafter to breach that promise by using the silence to
impeach his trial testimony.” Lynch v. State, 632 N.E.2d 341, 342 (1994).
[5] Defendant stated that he did not know that his gun was in his
coat pocket. He testified that he swung at Wiley in self-defense but
didn’t know that the gun was in his hand.
The following exchange regarding Defendant’s state of mind took place
during cross examination:
[Prosecutor]: Isn’t it true, [Defendant], that [Wiley] pissed you off
when he pushed you?
[Defendant]: No, sir.
[Prosecutor]: You weren’t pissed off?
[Defendant]: No, sir.
(R. at 1350-51.)
[6] In Wilson v. State, the court of appeals considered the above
instruction in conjunction with another instruction regarding attempted
murder. The trial court in Wilson had instructed the jury that attempted
murder required knowing or intentionally engaging in conduct that
constituted a substantial step toward killing another person. The Court of
Appeals concluded that the instructions regarding intent taken together
were “imperfect” because attempted murder requires specific intent; a
person may be convicted of murder for knowingly or intentionally killing,
but attempted murder requires intent to kill. See Wilson, at 1113. The
Court of Appeals did not indicate that the instruction standing alone was
imperfect. Wilson, at 1115. Furthermore, in Taylor v. State, we stated
that a similar instruction correctly stated the law in Indiana. 620 Ind.
264, 280, 295 N.E.2d 600, 610 (1973.)