Attorney for Appellant
Alan K. Wilson
Muncie, IN
Attorneys for Appellee
Karen Freeman-Wilson
Attorney General of Indiana
Joseph A. Samreta
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, IN
IN THE
INDIANA SUPREME COURT
DANNY SAINTIGNON,
Appellant (Defendant below),
v.
STATE OF INDIANA,
Appellee (Plaintiff below).
)
) Supreme Court No.
) 18S02-0106-CR-00308
)
) Court of Appeals No.
) 18A02-0002-CR-00088
)
)
)
APPEAL FROM THE DELAWARE SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Richard A. Dailey, Judge
Cause No. 18D02-9903-CF-24
ON PETITION TO TRANSFER
June 27, 2001
SULLIVAN, Justice.
Defendant Danny Lee Saintignon, Jr., appeals from a three-year
sentence imposed following his guilty plea for Residential Entry. We
affirm the analysis of the Court of Appeals that the trial court adequately
explained the reasons for imposing an enhanced sentence. But we agree with
Defendant that his juvenile record did not prevent the trial court from
suspending a portion of the sentence in excess of the minimum.
Background
Defendant Danny Saintignon pled guilty to the charge of Residential
Entry, a Class D felony,[1] on October 15, 1999. The trial court sentenced
Defendant to a three-year term of imprisonment, the maximum sentence
authorized by the Legislature for a Class D felony, on January 20, 2000.[2]
Defendant appeals his sentence on two grounds. First, he contends
that the trial court failed to comply with the requirements for enhancing a
presumptive sentence because it did not sufficiently explain its reasoning
for the enhancement. The Court of Appeals rejected this contention in its
decision in this case. Saintignon v. State, 734 N.E.2d 711, 714-16 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2000). We summarily affirm the Court of Appeals opinion on this
claim. See Ind. Appellate Rule 11(B)(3).[3]
Second, Defendant contends that the trial court incorrectly concluded
that it had no authority to suspend any portion of the maximum sentence for
Residential Entry because of Defendant’s extensive juvenile record. (R. at
48-49.) The Court of Appeals agreed. See Saintignon, 734 N.E.2d at 716.
We grant transfer to address this issue.
Discussion
In this case, Defendant pled guilty in adult criminal court to the
felony of Residential Entry. Defendant had previously accumulated an
extensive juvenile record. When an adult who has a prior juvenile record
is convicted of a crime, how does that prior juvenile record affect the
trial court’s authority to suspend the sentence? That is the question
presented by this case.
The Legislature has adopted a statute, Ind. Code § 35-50-2-2, which
permits trial court judges to suspend the sentences of adult offenders. We
will refer to this statute as the “General Suspension Statute.” The
General Suspension Statute restricts a trial court’s authority to suspend a
sentence when the offender has been convicted of certain specified offenses
or has a prior adult criminal record of a specified nature. A separate
statute, Ind. Code § 35-50-2-2.1, restricts a trial court’s authority to
suspend a sentence when the offender has a prior juvenile record of a
specified nature. We will refer to this statute as the “Juvenile Record
Suspension Statute.” This case requires us to interpret the
interrelationship of the General Suspension Statute and Juvenile Record
Suspension Statute.
We set forth the text of the General Suspension Statute[4] and the
Juvenile Record Suspension Statute[5] in the accompanying footnotes. It is
clear that these two statutes are closely related. Not only do they follow
each other in the Indiana Code (as noted, one is section 2 and the other
section 2.1 of the same chapter), but the General Suspension Statute cross-
references the Juvenile Record Suspension Statute and the Juvenile Record
Suspension Statute cross-references the General Suspension Statute twice.
Our interpretation of these provisions utilizes two rules commonly
employed in construing statutes. First, “[w]here statutes address the same
subject, they are in pari materia, and we harmonize them if possible.”
United States Gypsum, Inc. v. Indiana Gas Co., 735 N.E.2d 790, 802 (Ind.
2000). See also Smith v. State, 675 N.E.2d 693, 696 (Ind. 1996). Second,
“[i]n construing a statute, effect should be given to every word and clause
therein.” Spangler vs. State, 607 N.E.2d 720, 723 (Ind. 1993). See also
In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 38 (Ind. 1991).
Starting with the General Suspension Statute, subsection (a) sets
forth the general rule that a court may suspend any part of the sentence
for a felony, subject to restrictions imposed by either the General
Suspension Statute itself or the Juvenile Record Suspension Statute.
Subsection (b) of the General Suspension Statute sets forth two categories
of restrictions.[6] The first, contained in subdivisions (1)-(3), restrict
the court’s authority to suspend a sentence where the person has a prior
adult criminal record of a specified nature. We will refer to an offender
who falls into this category as having a “disqualifying adult record.” The
second category, contained in clause (4), restrict the court’s authority to
suspend a sentence where the person has been convicted of a specific
(extremely serious) offense. We will refer to an offender who falls into
this category as having committed a “disqualifying adult offense.”
It is extremely important to understand that the consequence of being
an offender with a disqualifying adult record or who has committed a
disqualifying adult offense is that the court may suspend only that part of
the sentence that is in excess of the minimum sentence. Said differently,
even when faced with a disqualifying adult record or a disqualifying adult
offense, the court may still suspend that part of the sentence that is in
excess of the minimum sentence.
Turning to the Juvenile Record Suspension Statute, we see that its
subsection (a) is very similar to the disqualifying adult record provisions
of subdivisions (1)-(3) of subsection (b) of the General Suspension
Statute. It restricts the court’s authority to suspend a sentence where
the person has a prior juvenile record of a specified nature. We will
refer to a person in this category as having a “disqualifying juvenile
record.”
The opening sentence of subsection (a) of the Juvenile Record
Suspension Statute reads: “Except as provided in subsection (b) or section
2 of this chapter [the General Suspension Statute], the court may not
suspend a sentence for a felony for a person with a juvenile record when”
that person has a disqualifying juvenile record. Ind. Code § 33-50-2-
2.1(a) (1998). The trial court and the Court of Appeals believed that this
language precludes a trial court from suspending any portion of the
sentence of an adult offender convicted of a felony who has a disqualifying
juvenile record. Defendant argues, and we agree, that such a construction
fails to read the Juvenile Record Suspension Statute in pari materia with
the General Suspension Statute and also fails to give effect to the words
“[e]xcept as provided in ... section 2 of this chapter.”
It seems to us highly unlikely that the Legislature would authorize a
trial court to suspend that part of the sentence that is in excess of the
minimum sentence for a person convicted of, for example, Residential Entry
who has a disqualifying adult record but prohibit the trial court from
suspending that part of the sentence for that very same person if the
person had, instead of a disqualifying adult record, a disqualifying
juvenile record (like Defendant here). We think this is why the
Legislature used the language “Except as provided in [the General
Suspension Statute]” to specify that a trial court may not suspend a
sentence for a person with a disqualifying juvenile record except to the
extent that such a sentence may be suspended under the General Suspension
Statute.
We believe that reading the General Suspension Statute and Juvenile
Record Suspension Statute in pari materia and giving effect to the language
in the Juvenile Record Suspension Statute, “[e]xcept as provided in” the
General Suspension Statute, indicate that the Legislature intended that a
trial court’s authority to suspend a sentence in excess of the minimum
sentence applies to persons with disqualifying juvenile records in the same
way as to persons with disqualifying adult records.
Of course, a trial court is not required to suspend any part of a
sentence even when authorized to do so. It may very well be that even had
the trial court here understood that it had the authority to suspend a part
of Defendant’s sentence that was in excess of the minimum, it would not
have done so given its evaluation of the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. However, this is not clear from the record. To the extent
that Defendant still wishes, given the passage of time, a determination on
this issue, we remand this case to the trial court for this purpose.
Conclusion
We grant transfer, summarily affirm the opinion of the Court of
Appeals to the extent described above, and remand this case to the trial
court for further proceedings, if requested by Defendant, consistent with
this opinion.
SHEPARD, C.J., and BOEHM, and RUCKER, JJ., concur.
DICKSON, J., dissents without opinion.
-----------------------
[1] Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1.5 (1998).
[2] Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7 (1998) (“A person who commits a Class D
felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of one and one-half (1 1/2)
years, with not more than one and one-half (1 1/2) years added for
aggravating circumstances or not more than one (1) years subtracted for
mitigating circumstances.”).
[3] Now Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)(2).
[4] General Suspension Statute (Ind. Code § 35-50-2-2 (1998)):
(a) The court may suspend any part of a sentence for a felony,
except as provided in this section or in section 2.1 of this chapter.
(b) With respect to the crimes listed in this subsection, the
court may suspend only that part of the sentence that is in excess of
the minimum sentence:
(1) The crime committed was a Class A or Class B felony and the
person has a prior unrelated felony conviction.
(2) The crime committed was a Class C felony and less than seven
(7) years have elapsed between the date the person was discharged from
probation, imprisonment, or parole, whichever is later, for a prior
unrelated felony conviction and the date the person committed the
Class C felony for which the person is being sentenced.
(3) The crime committed was a Class D felony and less than three
(3) years have elapsed between the date the person was discharged from
probation, imprisonment, or parole, whichever is later, for a prior
unrelated felony conviction and the date the person committed the
Class D felony for which the person is being sentenced. However, the
court may suspend the minimum sentence for the crime only if the court
orders home detention under IC 35-38-1-21 or IC 35-38-2.5-5 instead of
the minimum sentence specified for the crime under this chapter.
(4) The felony committed was: (A) murder (IC 35-42-1-1); (B)
battery (IC 35-42-2-1) with a deadly weapon; (C) sexual battery (IC 35-
42-4-8) with a deadly weapon; (D) kidnapping (IC 35-42-3-2); (E)
confinement (IC 35-42-3-3) with a deadly weapon; (F) rape (IC 35-42-4-
1) as a Class A felony; (G) criminal deviate conduct (IC 35-42-4-2) as
a Class A felony; (H) child molesting (IC 35-42-4-3) as a Class A or
Class B felony; (I) robbery (IC 35-42-5-1) resulting in serious bodily
injury or with a deadly weapon; (J) arson (IC 35-43-1-1) for hire or
resulting in serious bodily injury; (K) burglary (IC 35-43-2-1)
resulting in serious bodily injury or with a deadly weapon; (L)
resisting law enforcement (IC 35-44-3-3) with a deadly weapon; (M)
escape (IC 35-44-3-5) with a deadly weapon; (N) rioting (IC 35-45-1-2)
with a deadly weapon; (O) dealing in cocaine or a narcotic drug (IC 35-
48-4-1) as a Class A felony; (P) dealing in a schedule I, II, or III
controlled substance (IC 35-48-4-2) if the amount of controlled
substance involved has an aggregate weight of three (3) grams or more;
(Q) an offense under IC 9-30-5 (operating a vehicle while intoxicated)
and the person who committed the offense has accumulated at least two
(2) prior unrelated convictions under IC 9-30-5; or (R) aggravated
battery (IC 35-42-2-1.5).
(c) Except as provided in subsection (e), whenever the court
suspends a sentence for a felony, it shall place the person on
probation ... for a fixed period to end not later than the date that
the maximum sentence that may be imposed for the felony will expire.
(d) The minimum sentence for a person convicted of voluntary
manslaughter may not be suspended unless the court finds at the
sentencing hearing that the crime was not committed by means of a
deadly weapon.
(e) Whenever the court suspends that part of an offender’s (as
defined in Indiana code 5-2-12-4) sentence that is suspendible under
subsection (b), the court shall place the offender on probation ...
for not more than 10 years.
(f) An additional term of imprisonment imposed under IC 35-50-2-
11 may not be suspended.
(g) A term of imprisonment imposed under IC 35-47-10-6 or IC 35-
47-10-7 may not be suspended if the commission of the offense was
knowing or intentional.
[5] Juvenile Record Suspension Statute (Ind. Code § 35-50-2-2.1 (1998)):
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) or section 2 of this
chapter, the court may not suspend a sentence for a felony for a
person with a juvenile record when:
(1) the juvenile record includes findings that the juvenile
acts, if committed by an adult would constitute:
(A) one (1) Class A or Class B felony;
(B) two (2) Class C or Class D felonies; or
(C) one (1) Class C and one (1) Class D felony; and
(2) less than three (3) years have elapsed between commission of
the juvenile acts that would be felonies if committed by an adult and
the commission of the felony for which the person is being sentenced.
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a), the court may suspend any
part of the sentence for a felony, except as provided in section 2 of
this chapter, if it finds that:
(1) the crime was the result of circumstances unlikely to
recur;
(2) the victim of the crime induced or facilitated the
offense;
(3) there are substantial grounds tending to excuse or
justify the crime, though failing to establish a defense; or
(4) the acts in the juvenile record would not be Class A
or Class B felonies if committed by an adult, and the convicted person
is to undergo home detention under IC 35-38-1-21 instead of the
minimum sentence specified for the crime under this chapter.
[6] Subsections (c) through (g) contain additional restrictions on
the authority of the trial court to suspend sentences. General Suspension
Statute, Ind. Code § 35-50-2-2 (c) through (g). For purposes of this
discussion, it is not necessary to consider them in detail. But it is
important to recognize that they may be applicable when a trial court is
considering suspending a sentence, including the sentence of a person with
a juvenile record.