Attorney for Appellant
Timothy J. Miller
Indianapolis, IN
Attorneys for Appellee
Jeffrey A. Modisett
Attorney General of Indiana
Priscilla J. Fossum
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, IN
IN THE
INDIANA SUPREME COURT
PAUL BRASHER,
Appellant (Defendant below),
v.
STATE OF INDIANA,
Appellee (Plaintiff below).
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) Supreme Court No.
) 49S00-9909-CR-460
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)
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)
)
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APPEAL FROM THE MARION COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Mark Renner, Judge Pro Tempore
Cause No. 49G04-9805-CF-074012
ON DIRECT APPEAL
April 24, 2001
SULLIVAN, Justice.
Defendant Paul Brasher was convicted of murder and robbery for
shooting his friend and taking his money and pager. We find that the State
presented sufficient evidence for a jury to convict the defendant of
murder.
Background
The facts most favorable to the verdict indicate that on May 6, 1998,
Defendant Paul Brasher gathered with three of his friends, Adrian Coleman,
Johnny Simpson, and the victim, Dwayne Blackmon, at Defendant’s
grandmother’s house. Defendant showed off two guns to the others.
Blackmon also had a gun. Defendant, Coleman, and Blackmon decided to go to
a nearby park to shoot the guns. At the park, Defendant shot Blackmon in
the back of the head. He then took some money and a pager out of
Blackmon’s pocket.
The State charged Defendant with Murder[1], Felony Murder[2], and
Robbery, a Class A felony.[3] A jury found Defendant guilty of all three
counts. The trial court merged the two counts of murder and sentenced
Defendant to concurrent sentences of 55 years for the murder and 40 years
for the robbery.
Discussion
Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict him
of murder. Appellant’s Br. at 7. Defendant also argues that the
conviction rested on only one eyewitness, Coleman, and that his testimony
was “incredibl[y] dubious” and “equivocal.” Id. at 10.
In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, the Court neither
reweighs the evidence nor assesses the credibility of the witnesses. See
Garland v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1236, 1238 (Ind. 1999). We look to the
evidence most favorable to the verdict and reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom. Sanders v. State, 704 N.E.2d 119, 123 (Ind. 1999). We will
affirm the conviction if there is probative evidence from which a
reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. See Brown v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1157, 1158 (Ind. 1999).
Simpson and Coleman both testified that Defendant had two guns and
Blackmon had one gun. Simpson and Coleman also testified that Defendant,
Blackmon, and Coleman were going to go to Solomon Park to shoot guns.
Coleman testified that at the park, Defendant asked Blackmon if he could
see his gun, whereupon Blackmon gave his gun to Defendant and Defendant
gave it to Coleman to hold. Coleman further testified that Defendant
pulled out his own gun and pointed it at Blackmon and told Blackmon to turn
around. According to Coleman, Defendant shot Blackmon in the back of the
head. Coleman testified that, at Defendant’s direction, he helped
Defendant put Blackmon’s body in a nearby stream.
It is well established that the testimony of a single eye witness is
sufficient to sustain a conviction. Emerson v. State, 724 N.E.2d 605, 609-
10 (Ind. 2000), rehearing denied; Anderson v. State, 469 N.E.2d 1166, 1169
(Ind. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1226 (1985). There was an eye
witness—Coleman—testifying to the shooting, and the location and physical
evidence were consistent with his story; the State presented evidence that
Blackmon was killed by a gunshot to the back of the head. Blackmon’s body
was found in the stream near the location Coleman testified that Brasher
shot Blackmon. There was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendant argues that Coleman’s testimony should be disregarded.
Defendant cites Tillman v. State, 642 N.E.2d 221, 223 (Ind. 1994), for the
proposition that the judge may “‘impinge on the jury’s responsibility to
judge the credibility of the witness’” where a “‘sole witness presents
inherently contradictory testimony which is equivocal or the result of
coercion and there is a complete lack of circumstantial evidence of the
appellant’s guilt.’” Appellant’s Br. at 10. (citing Tillman 642 N.E.2d at
223.)
Though most of the State’s case rests on the testimony of Coleman,
there is no evidence that his testimony is contradictory or equivocal.
None of Coleman’s facts conflict, and his testimony is consistent with the
story he told to other witnesses and the police.[4] As stated above, the
location of the body and the nature of the wound in the victim are
consistent with Coleman’s testimony.
Reduced to its essentials, Defendant’s argument is that Coleman’s
testimony was not credible because he had a motive to lie. However, it is
within the jury’s province to judge the credibility of the witnesses. See
Garland, 719 N.E.2d at 1238. Defendant had the opportunity to make this
argument to the jury, and did in fact question Coleman’s credibility during
the trial. Based on the testimony of Coleman, other witnesses, and the
weight of the physical evidence, the jury found Defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, BOEHM, and RUCKER, JJ., concur.
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[1] Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 (1993).
[2] Id.
[3] Id. § 35-42-5-1.
[4] Lauren Wadsworth testified that on the night of the shooting,
Coleman told her that Defendant had shot Blackmon. Wadsworth also
testified that she convinced Coleman to tell his mother and then an
attorney. Simpson testified that on the day after the shooting, Coleman
told him that Defendant shot Blackmon. Both Wadsworth and Simpson’s
account of what Coleman told each of them is consistent with Coleman’s
testimony.