Turner v. State





ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                 ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

PATRICIA CARESS MCMATH       KAREN M. FREEMAN-WILSON
Indianapolis, Indiana                   Attorney General of Indiana

                                        ARTHUR THADDEUS PERRY
                                        Deputy Attorney General
                                        Indianapolis, Indiana




                                   IN THE

                          SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA


QUAN TURNER,                            )
                                        )
      Appellant-Defendant,              )
                                        )    Supreme Court Cause Number
            v.                          )    49S00-0001-CR-37
                                        )
STATE OF INDIANA,                       )
                                        )
      Appellee-Plaintiff.                    )


                    APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
                        CRIMINAL DIVISION, ROOM THREE
                    The Honorable Cale J. Bradford, Judge
                       Cause No.  49G03-9812-CF-204921

                              ON DIRECT APPEAL

                              November 16, 2000

RUCKER, Justice


      In this direct appeal Quan Turner contends that  his  convictions  for
murder and carrying a handgun without a license should be  reversed  because
his confession was involuntary and thus erroneously admitted into  evidence.
 We disagree and therefore affirm.

                                    Facts

      The facts most favorable  to  the  verdict  show  that  Turner,  Jason
McGhee, and others were drinking at several Indianapolis clubs late  in  the
evening on December 26, 1998.  The  group  returned  to  McGhee’s  residence
early the next  morning.   Eventually,  most  members  of  the  group  left.
However, Turner stayed behind to confront McGhee about a rumor  that  McGhee
had planned to harm him.  Several hours later McGhee was found dead  from  a
gunshot wound to the head.
      Detective Jesse Beavers of  the  Indianapolis  Police  Department  was
assigned to investigate the  McGhee  shooting.   Relying  on  a  tip,  which
indicated that Turner might have been involved, the detective  went  to  the
home of Turner’s sister.  Detective Beavers found Turner asleep on a  couch.
 After he was awakened, Turner was arrested and transported  to  the  police
station.  Upon arrival, detective Beavers read Turner his Miranda rights  to
which Turner signed  a  written  waiver.   Among  other  things  the  waiver
dictated:  “No promises or threats have been made to me and no  pressure  or
coercion of any kind has been used against me.”  R.  at  201.   Turner  then
gave a statement that was recorded on audio tape in  which  Turner  admitted
that he and McGhee “got into an argument and I shot  him.   I  panicked  and
ran out of the house.”  R. at 369.   Thereafter,  Turner  was  charged  with
murder and carrying a handgun without  a  license.   He  filed  a  pre-trial
motion to suppress his statement, which the
trial court denied after a hearing.  At trial the statement  was  introduced
into evidence over Turner’s timely objection.  The jury convicted Turner  as
charged, and the court sentenced him to a  total  term  of  sixty-six  years
imprisonment.  This appeal followed.  Additional facts are set  forth  below
where relevant.

                                 Discussion

       Turner  contends  the  trial  court  erred  by  admitting  his  taped
confession into evidence.  He claims that  his  confession  was  involuntary
because it was the product of intrusive and coercive actions by the  police.
 Turner does not contest the evidence of record showing that  he  was  given
his Miranda rights  and  that  he  signed  a  written  waiver.   Rather,  he
complains  of  alleged  police  conduct  occurring  before   those   events.
Specifically, Turner claims:  (1) police had  their  guns  drawn  when  they
arrested him; and (2) after the arrest, police yelled at him, called  him  a
liar, and threatened to arrest his mother, sister, and  brother  if  he  did
not tell police what they wanted to hear.
      When a defendant challenges the admissibility of  his  statement,  the
State must prove the voluntariness of  the  statement  beyond  a  reasonable
doubt.  Carter v. State, 730 N.E.2d 155, 157 (Ind. 2000); Schmitt v.  State,
730 N.E.2d 147, 148 (Ind. 2000).  When a defendant makes such  a  challenge,
the decision to admit the statement is left to the sound discretion  of  the
trial court.  Horan v. State, 682 N.E.2d 502, 509 (Ind.  1997).   In  making
its determination, the trial court weighs the  evidence  to  ensure  that  a
confession was not obtained “through inducement, violence, threats or  other
improper influences so as to overcome the free will of the accused.”   Ellis
v. State, 707 N.E.2d 797, 801 (Ind. 1999)
(quoting Collins v. State, 509  N.E.2d  827,  830  (Ind.  1987)).   A  trial
court’s finding of voluntariness will be  upheld  if  the  record  discloses
substantial evidence of probative value  that  supports  the  trial  court’s
decision.  Kahlenbeck v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1213,  1216  (Ind.  1999).   This
Court will not reweigh the evidence,  and  conflicting  evidence  is  viewed
most favorably to the trial court’s ruling.  Haak v. State, 695 N.E.2d  944,
948 (Ind. 1998).
      Concerning Turner’s first claim, we have held  that  the  presence  of
guns at the scene of an arrest is  not  evidence  of  coercion,  but  merely
cautious police procedure.  Bluitt v. State, 269 Ind. 438, 447,  381  N.E.2d
458, 464 (1978).  As for his second claim, Detective Beavers denied  raising
his voice to Turner or calling him a liar.  R. at 237-38.   He  also  denied
mentioning  Turner’s  brother.   R.  at  237.   Detective  Beavers  was  not
questioned about alleged statements concerning any other member of  Turner’s
family.
      Even though Turner’s testimony and the testimony  of  his  sister  and
mother supported Turner’s claim that his family was  threatened,  the  trial
court was not bound to credit Turner’s testimony or  the  testimony  of  his
family members.  See Warner v. State, 579 N.E.2d  1307,  1310  (Ind.  1991).
In any event, the critical  inquiry  here  is  whether  the  alleged  police
conduct overbore Turner’s will, thus rendering  his  statement  involuntary.
Lynch v. State, 632 N.E.2d 341, 343  (Ind.  1994).   The  fact  that  Turner
signed a waiver of rights  weighs  in  favor  of  the  conclusion  that  his
statement was indeed voluntary.  See Heavrin  v.  State,  675  N.E.2d  1075,
1081 (Ind. 1996) (signing a waiver of rights form provides  some  indication
that  a  defendant’s  confession  was  made  voluntarily).   We  also   find
persuasive that both in the written waiver and audio-taped interview  Turner
acknowledged that he was neither threatened nor
coerced into giving a statement.  Turner’s contrary claim on appeal  amounts
to an invitation for this  Court  to  reweigh  the  evidence.   We  decline.
Thus, the trial court did not abuse its  discretion  by  admitting  Turner’s
statement into evidence.

                                 Conclusion

      We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, SULLIVAN and BOEHM, JJ., concur.