ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Paul T. Fulkerson
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jeffrey A. Modisett
Attorney General of Indiana
Janet L. Parsanko
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
__________________________________________________________________
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
__________________________________________________________________
CARLOS O. OWENS, )
)
Appellant (Defendant Below), )
)
v. ) Indiana Supreme Court
) Cause No. 49S00-9908-CR-420
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee (Plaintiff Below). )
__________________________________________________________________
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Mark F. Renner, Magistrate
Cause No. 49G04-9701-CF-005601
__________________________________________________________________
ON DIRECT APPEAL
__________________________________________________________________
June 30, 2000
BOEHM, Justice.
Carlos O. Owens was convicted of murder and rape as a Class A felony.
He was sentenced to fifty-five years for murder to be served consecutively
with thirty years for rape. In this direct appeal he contends that the
trial court erred in admitting his confession because (1) there was not
sufficient corpus delicti of rape, and (2) the confession occurred after he
requested an attorney and an attorney was en route to or waiting at the
police station to see him. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Factual and Procedural History
Shortly after 11:00 a.m. on January 7, 1997, Bessie Boynton answered
her phone and heard a male voice, which she later recognized as Owens’,
say, “Your daughter is dead, bitch. You better go over there and see about
her.” Bessie called her daughter Brenda. When no one answered, she asked
her husband Arthur to go to Brenda’s house. Arthur found his daughter dead
in her house. Brenda had been stabbed thirty-seven times on the head,
neck, shoulders, chest, abdomen, and arms. She died as a result of
“[m]ultiple cutting and stabbing wounds.”
Brenda’s sister told Detective Mark Prater that Owens had recently
seen Brenda. Prater made an appointment with Owens, who arrived at the
police station at approximately 8:00 a.m. on January 9. Owens was
accompanied by his mother and sister. Owens voluntarily provided
fingerprints and then submitted to questioning by Prater. This questioning
concluded at approximately 1:00 p.m. Owens denied any involvement in the
killing. In the course of the interview, Owens agreed to submit to a
polygraph, but before the polygraph began he requested an attorney. Prater
ceased questioning and left the room. When Prater reentered the interview
room, Owens inquired about his mother. Prater informed Owens that she had
left but would be returning, and Prater remained in the interview room.
Owens then asked Prater, “What could happen to somebody that did this?”
Prater responded that it would depend on the circumstances and that it was
not his position as a detective to determine. Owens then said, “I did it.”
Prater left the room, retrieved his notepad, and returned to the interview
room at 2:51 p.m., when he advised Owens of his Miranda rights.
Owens told Prater that he had called Brenda on the morning of January
7, told her he had lost his job, and then had gone over to her apartment.
Brenda let him in and he followed her to the back bedroom where she was
wrapping presents for her son’s birthday. After telling Brenda that he
wanted to “make love” to her, Owens retrieved a knife from the kitchen and
instructed her to remove her panties. After intercourse, Brenda said,
“Leave now and I won’t tell anybody.” Owens then “clicked,” and stabbed
Brenda in the chest. She went to the bathroom, saw she was bleeding, and
ran to the living room. Owens ran after her, pushed her down, stabbed her
in the back, and sliced the back of her neck. He then called her parents’
house and told her mother, “Bitch, you better come check on your daughter.”
After this unrecorded confession, Prater told Owens that he wanted to
take a tape-recorded statement and went to another room to get a tape
recorder. Soon after the tape-recorded statement began, Owens requested an
attorney. Prater ceased questioning and placed Owens under arrest. The
time of the aborted taped statement is 3:50 p.m.
Owens’ uncle called Indianapolis attorney Richard Bucheri at
approximately 3:30 p.m. Bucheri testified that he then called the
Indianapolis Police Department and told Detective Prater that he had been
retained to speak with Owens. Bucheri was told to go to the homicide
office and arrived at approximately 4:00 p.m.
Owens was charged with murder, felony murder, and rape as a Class A
felony. He filed a pretrial motion to suppress his statement to police,
which was denied after two separate hearings. A jury convicted him of
murder and rape, and found him not guilty of felony murder. The trial
court sentenced him to fifty-five years for murder to be served
consecutively with thirty years for rape.
I. Corpus Delicti
Owens contends that the trial court erred in admitting his confession
to rape because there is insufficient corpus delicti to support it. Owens
is correct that in Indiana a crime may not be proven based solely on a
confession but must be supported by “some independent evidence of the crime
including evidence of the specific kind of injury and evidence that the
injury was caused by criminal conduct.” Workman v. State, 716 N.E.2d 445,
447 (Ind. 1999). However, “where a defendant confesses to several crimes
of varying severity within a single criminal episode, strict and separate
application of the corpus delicti rule to each offense adds little to the
ultimate reliability of the confession once independent evidence of the
principal crime is introduced.” Willoughby v. State, 552 N.E.2d 462, 467
(Ind. 1990). Under these circumstances, a confession to other crimes in
the same episode is admissible if there is independent evidence of the
principal offense. Workman, 716 N.E.2d at 448.
Here, Owens confessed to both murder and rape. He does not contest
the corpus delicti to support his murder confession. Indeed, Brenda was
stabbed thirty-seven times and died as a result of multiple stab wounds.
Because there is ample independent evidence of murder, Owens’ confession to
rape is admissible without independent evidence of that crime. See id.;
Willoughby, 552 N.E.2d at 467-68.[1]
II. Admissibility of Confession
Owens contends that his confession should have been suppressed
because it occurred after he had requested an attorney and an attorney was
either en route or waiting to meet with him. He does not explicitly state
the basis of his claim, but cites Fourteenth Amendment cases.[2] Neither
the facts nor the cases cited support this argument. Bucheri did not
arrive at the police station until approximately 4:00 p.m., and Owens’
confession had concluded before 3:50 p.m. Defense counsel acknowledged
this at the conclusion of the suppression hearing, stating “it looks like
Mr. Bucheri came late by a few minutes.” Moreover, even had Bucheri been
en route to or waiting at the police station during Owens’ confession,
neither the Fifth nor the Fourteenth Amendment requires suppression of a
confession obtained after an attorney, unknown to the suspect,
unsuccessfully seeks to intervene in an interrogation. See Ajabu v. State,
693 N.E.2d 921, 927 (Ind. 1998) (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412
(1986)). “Events occurring outside of the presence of the suspect and
entirely unknown to him surely can have no bearing on the capacity to
comprehend and knowingly relinquish a constitutional right.” Burbine, 475
U.S. at 422.
Nor was suppression required based on Owens’ initial request for
counsel. Prater stopped questioning Owens when he requested an attorney at
the beginning of the polygraph interview. In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.
477, 484-85 (1981), the United States Supreme Court held that an accused,
“having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel,
is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel
has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates
further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” More
recently, the Court reiterated that “Edwards does not foreclose finding a
waiver of Fifth Amendment protections after counsel has been requested,
provided the accused has initiated the conversation or discussions with the
authorities.” Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 156 (1990). Owens
initiated further communication by inquiring about his mother and the
possible consequences for Brenda’s murder. Owens then volunteered that he
“did it,” and Prater advised him of his Miranda rights before taking the
full confession. The trial court did not err in admitting Owens’
confession.
Conclusion
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, SULLIVAN and RUCKER, JJ., concur.
-----------------------
[1] Owens suggests that Willoughby should not apply to his case because
"there was absolutely no evidence of forced intercourse or that the victim
had intercourse at all." Rather, he asserts that there is "substantial
evidence that the crime did not occur." He notes that no sperm was found
on the items tested from Brenda's home (including a condom), his
fingerprints were not found on the condom wrapper, no foreign hairs were
found in pubic combings of Brenda, and there was no evidence of forced
intercourse. However, as the State points out, the crime of rape does not
require ejaculation, see Ind. Code § 35-42-4-1 (1998), and a crime lab
chemist testified at trial that it was typical in a rape case not to find
foreign hairs capable of comparison.
[2] Owens also mentions the Sixth Amendment as a basis for suppression of
his statement. However, the Sixth Amendment right to a lawyer does not
attach until "the formal initiation of adversary judicial proceedings."
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 432 (1986); accord Ajabu v. State, 693
N.E.2d 921, 927 & n.3 (Ind. 1998). It does not apply here.