Attorneys for Appellant
John C. DePrez, IV
Brown Linder & DePrez, P.A.
Kris Meltzer
Stubbs & Meltzer
Shelbyville, IN
Attorneys for Appellee
Jeffrey A. Modisett
Attorney General of Indiana
Arthur Thaddeus Perry
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, IN
IN THE
INDIANA SUPREME COURT
LAWRENCE W. CARTER, JR.,
Appellant (Defendant below),
v.
STATE OF INDIANA,
Appellee (Plaintiff below).
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) Supreme Court No.
) 73S00-9805-CR-312
)
)
)
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)
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APPEAL FROM THE SHELBY SUPERIOR COURT No. 2
The Honorable Russell J. Sanders, Judge
Cause No. 73D02-9703-CF-006
ON DIRECT APPEAL
May 26, 2000
SULLIVAN, Justice.
Defendant Lawrence Carter was convicted of Murder. He appeals,
arguing that his confession was improperly admitted into evidence. We find
that the trial court properly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress his
confession.
We have jurisdiction over this direct appeal because the longest
single sentence exceeds 50 years. Ind. Const. art. VII, ' 4; Ind.
Appellate Rule 4(A)(7).
Background
The facts most favorable to the verdict show that on March 15, 1997,
the victim, Dirk Eberhart, was found dead at his home in Shelbyville laying
face up on the couch with gunshot wounds to his head and neck.
Defendant was arrested by the Lawrence Police Department on April 3,
1997. Detective Don Deputy initially questioned Defendant. Deputy advised
Defendant of his Miranda rights and the advisement was taped. Deputy
noticed an odor of alcohol on Defendant and Defendant said that he had been
drinking. Deputy did not believe Defendant was intoxicated.
Next, Lieutenant William Dwenger of the Shelbyville Police department
questioned Defendant. Dwenger also advised Defendant of his Miranda rights
and Defendant said he understood them. Dwenger did notice an odor of
alcohol and discussed it with Defendant. Dwenger formed a very strong
opinion that Defendant was not intoxicated. Defendant also admitted
smoking marijuana prior to being taken into custody. In the statement
given to Dwenger, Defendant confessed to shooting the victim.
On October 14, 1997, Defendant filed a motion to suppress his
statement, arguing that a knowing and voluntary waiver of Miranda rights
did not precede his statement. On November 4, 1997, the trial court held a
hearing on Defendant’s motion to suppress. On November 26, 1997, the trial
court denied Defendant’s motion.
The State charged Defendant with Murder.[1] On February 11, 1998, a
jury found Defendant guilty. The trial court imposed a sentence of 63
years for murder and five years for the use of a firearm during the
commission of a felony.[2] Defendant appeals.
We will recite additional facts as needed.
Discussion
Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court
committed reversible error by denying his motion to suppress his statement
to the police. He argues his confession should have been suppressed
because he did not waive his Miranda rights and his confession was not made
voluntarily, intelligently, or knowingly.
The trial court required the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the Defendant voluntarily and intelligently waived his constitutional
rights and that his confession was voluntarily given before his statement
would be admitted into evidence. The trial court determined that the State
sustained that burden and denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. “The
decision whether to admit a confession is within the discretion of the
trial judge and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.”
Jones v. State, 655 N.E.2d 49, 56 (Ind. 1995), reh’g denied. When
reviewing a challenge to the trial court’s decision to admit a confession,
we do not reweigh the evidence but instead examine the record for
substantial, probative evidence of voluntariness. Id.
Judge Russell Sanders made an especially careful and complete set of
findings and conclusions. The trial court first addressed the issue of
Defendant’s waiver of Miranda rights and found that the State established
that the appropriate Miranda rights were read and Defendant knowingly and
voluntarily waived those rights. The admissibility of a confession is
controlled by determining from the totality of the circumstances whether
the confession was made voluntarily and was not induced by violence,
threats, or other improper influences that overcame the defendant=s free
will. See Wilcoxen v. State, 619 N.E.2d 574, 577 (Ind. 1993). The same
test determines whether Miranda rights were voluntarily waived. See
Gregory v. State, 540 N.E.2d 585, 592 (Ind. 1989). Thus, the voluntariness
of a defendant=s waiver of rights is judged by the totality of the
circumstances. See Allen v. State, 686 N.E.2d 760, 770 (Ind. 1997), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 1073 (1999). An express written or oral waiver of rights
is not necessary to establish a waiver of Miranda rights. See Horan v.
State, 682 N.E.2d 502, 510 (Ind. 1997), reh’g denied.
As noted by the trial court, the State established that Miranda
rights were read on at least two occasions. Defendant repeatedly said that
he understood that he did not have to speak to the police. The record
shows the police advised Defendant of his Miranda rights and Defendant
stated he understood those rights and wished to give a statement.
Defendant gave a statement to both detectives after acknowledging his
rights and his understanding of those rights. The trial court noted that
Defendant’s conversations with Dwenger regarding Miranda rights were clear
and detailed and he displayed an articulate and express understanding that
he was waiving his rights. There was no evidence of violence, threats,
promises, or improper influence. From this evidence, the trial court could
properly conclude that Defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waived his Miranda rights.
Next, the trial court looked at Defendant=s assertion that his
intoxication rendered his statement involuntary. The trial judge concluded
that the effects of alcohol, if any, did not rise to the level necessary to
prevent Defendant from giving an admissible confession. As the trail court
noted, it is “‘only when an accused is so intoxicated that he is
unconscious as to what he is saying that his confession will be
inadmissible.’” Williams v. State, 489 N.E.2d 53, 56 (Ind. 1986) (quoting
Bundy v. State, 427 N.E.2d 1077, 1079 (Ind. 1981) (citing in turn Bean v.
State, 267 Ind. 528, 532, 371 N.E.2d 713, 715 (1978))). “‘Intoxication of
a lesser degree goes only to the weight to be given to the statement and
not its admissibility.’” Id.
In this case, the trial judge noted that far from being unconscious,
Defendant displayed awareness, organized thinking, and an understanding of
what was transpiring. The trial court considered several aspects of
evidence with regard to Defendant’s intoxication. This evidence included a
reading of the statements, which Defendant gave to Deputy, Dwenger, and
other officers. The trial court also listened to the tape recordings of
those statements and determined there was little difference between
Defendant’s voice on the tape and his testimony at the hearing. It
considered the testimony given by Defendant and the arresting and
interviewing officers at the hearing. In that testimony, the arresting
officer and the three interviewing officers all testified that Defendant
was sober. The record shows that when asked if he was sober by Dwenger,
the Defendant responded, “yeh.” The trial court made extensive inquiries
into the available evidence and concluded that the evidence established
beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant understood the Miranda rights and
knowingly and intelligently waived those rights despite the fact that he
had been drinking and smoking marijuana earlier in the day.
On the basis of the foregoing, we find that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, BOEHM and RUCKER, JJ., concur.
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[1] Ind. Code ' 35-42-1-1(1) (1993).
[2] Id. ' 35-50-2-11 (1996). Defendant pled guilty to the firearm
enhancement.