Oliver v. Piatt

44 U.S. 333 (1845) 3 How. 333

WILLIAM OLIVER AND MICAJAH T. WILLIAMS AND OTHERS, APPELLANTS,
v.
ROBERT PIATT.

Supreme Court of United States.

Stanberry and Ewing, for the appellants.

Pirtle and Scott, for the appellees.

Mr. Justice STORY delivered the opinion of the court.

This is the case of an appeal from the decree of the Circuit Court of the district of Ohio, sitting in equity, — rendered in favour of the original plaintiff, and it is brought to this court by the original defendants, who are now the appellants. The record is exceedingly voluminous, and the facts and proceedings complicated and perplexed by a variety of details. A general outline of the leading facts is given in the printed opinion of the court below, with which we have been favoured; and those facts cannot be more succinctly stated than they are in that summary — we shall therefore avail ourselves of it upon the present occasion. It is as follows: "In the summer of 1817, the complainant, in connection with John H. Piatt, William M. Worthington, and Gorham A. Worth, formed an association to purchase lands of the United States, at a public sale, which was shortly to take place at Wooster, in this state — and the complainant was appointed the agent of the company, to attend the sale for that purpose.

"Another association consisting of Martin Baum, Jesse Hunt, Jacob Burnet, William C. Schenck, William Barr, William Oliver, and Andrew Mack, was formed for the same object — and William Oliver and William C. Schenck were appointed its agents to attend the sale.

"Before the sale took place, it was discovered that both companies were desirous of purchasing the same tracts of land, and the agents agreed that they would purchase tracts 1, 2, 3, and 4, at, and including the mouth of Swan creek, in the United States reserve, at the foot of the rapids of the Miami; and also Nos. 86 and 87 on the other side of the river, opposite the mouth of Swan creek, for the joint benefit of both companies; each company to have one-half of the lands purchased, and to pay at the same rate. Nos. 86 and 87 were bid off by Oliver, and the certificates of purchase issued to him. The other tracts were bid off by the complainant, and the certificates of purchase were issued in the names of the association represented by him.

"At the same sale, the complainant, in behalf of his company, purchased the north-west quarter of section 2, township 3, the south-west quarter of the same section, the north-west quarter of section 3, township 3, and also the south-east and south-west quarters of the same section, in said reserve; and one-fourth of the purchase money on each tract being paid, certificates of purchase were made out in the names of the company. And the other agents purchased for their company, at the same sale, other tracts of land.

"On the return of the agents to Cincinnati, their acts were ratified by both companies. One company was designated the Piatt Company, the other the Baum Company; and the union of both, in regard to the lands jointly purchased, was called the Port Lawrence Company. The joint, or Port Lawrence Company, having made their purchase with the view of laying out a town, to be called Port Lawrence, appointed Baum a trustee, and authorized him to sell lots, and do other things in relation to his agency, for the benefit of the company.

"On the 14th August, 1817, Baum appointed Oliver his attorney, to sell lots in the town to be laid out, receive the money, and give certificates of sale, in the nature of title-bonds, to the purchasers; and he, in association with William C. Schenk, was authorized to lay out the town. Baum, and also the proprietors, gave to Oliver a letter of instructions in relation to the plan of the town, the sale of the lots, &c. By the conditions of sale, one-fourth of the purchase money was to be paid down, and the residue in three equal annual payments.

"At the sale of lots, the sum of $855 33 was received by Schenck, for which he was to be accountable to Baum.

"At the sale, Oliver purchased lots 223 and 224, an undivided half of which he afterwards conveyed to Baum, and they erected a warehouse and other improvements on them.

"In August, 1818, he sold one-half of his interest in the Port Lawrence Company to William Steele and William Lytle; and in March, 1819, he sold the residue of his interest to Micajah T. Williams, one of the defendants, and his partner Embre.

"By the reduction of the price of the public lands, and the pressure of the times, the Port Lawrence Company were under the necessity of relinquishing to the United States tracts 1 and 2, having agreed to pay for the same about $20,000; and of appropriating the money paid on them to the payment in full of the residue of the tracts purchased by them, and by the Baum and Piatt Companies respectively. In pursuance of this object, the five quarter-sections purchased by the Piatt Company were assigned to Baum, the 17th September, 1821; and on the same day, tracts numbered 1, 2, 86, and 87, purchased in the name of the Piatt Company for the Port Lawrence Company; and also tracts 3 and 4, purchased by Oliver for the same company, were assigned to Baum. It is alleged that these tracts had been previously assigned to Baum, of which there is no evidence.

"On the 27th September, 1821, Baum, through his agent, Micajah T. Williams, one of the defendants, relinquished, to the United States, tracts 1 and 2. On these tracts there had been paid the sum of $4817 55. $1372 34 of this sum were applied to complete the payments on tracts 3, 4, 86, and 87, the residue of the tracts purchased at the sale by the Port Lawrence Company. From the relinquished tracts, there still remained $3445 21. Of this sum, one-half belonged to the Piatt Company. $1248 were applied to complete the payment on the five quarter-sections, which left a balance of $474 60 still due to the Piatt Company; but which was applied in payment of lands held by the Baum Company.

"After the relinquishment of the tracts on which the town had been laid out, the purchasers of town lots claimed a return of the money paid by them, with interest, and also damages for their improvements.

"On the 10th September, 1822, Baum gave to Oliver a certificate, which stated there was due him, by the Port Lawrence Company, the sum of $213 02, which he refunded to purchasers of lots, by the request of the company, `it being the amount due on the shares originally owned by John H. Piatt, Robert Piatt, G.A. Worth, and William M. Worthington.'

"And on the 27th August, 1823, Oliver having made out an account against the Port Lawrence Company, for money paid by him to purchasers of lots, and services rendered as agent, Baum admitted his account, amounting to the sum of $1835 47; to secure the payment of which, Baum executed to him a mortgage on tracts 3, 4, 86, and 87. The payment was to be made, with interest, on or before the 1st of January, 1824.

"The 7th October, 1825 Oliver caused an attachment to be issued by the clerk of Monroe county, in the Michigan Territory, against Baum and the members of the Piatt Company, on the certificate of indebtment given by Baum. This attachment was levied on four of the five quarter-sections owned by the Piatt Company, and such proceedings were had on the attachment, as to obtain an order of sale of the property attached; three of the quarters were sold, by the auditors appointed, for the sum of $241 60, to Noble, the agent of Oliver. Noble, shortly afterwards, conveyed these tracts to his principal.

"A bill to foreclose the mortgage given to Oliver was filed by him in the Supreme Court of Michigan, the 13th of October, 1825. And a final decree having been obtained, the mortgaged premises were sold, by the assistant register of the chancery court, to Oliver, the 1st September, 1828, for $618 56.

"By the act of 20th May, 1826, the secretary of the Treasury was authorized to select, for the benefit of the University of the Michigan Territory, a certain number of acres of the public lands within the territory, and he selected tracts 1 and 2, which had been relinquished.

"In the summer of 1828, as appears from the report of the committee of the trustees of the university, Oliver, as the agent of Baum and others, proposed to exchange certain lands owned by Baum, in the vicinity of Port Lawrence, or any of the public lands subject to entry, for tracts 1 and 2, on which the town of Port Lawrence had been laid out.

"A law of Congress was passed, authorizing the exchange, the 13th January, 1830. Previous to this, Baum assigned to Oliver the final certificates for the tracts he purchased under the attachment, and also under the decree of foreclosure; and one of the quarter-sections levied on by the attachment, but not sold under it, in payment of the balance of the judgment on the attachment, which enabled Oliver to obtain patents for the same in his own name. And on his conveying to the university tracts numbered 3 and 4, except ten acres reserved of number 3, and the north-west quarter of section 2, township 3, and also the north-west and south-west quarters of section 3, township 3, he received an assignment from the university of their right to tracts 1 and 2, for which patents were issued in the name of Oliver.

"After the exchange was effected, Baum, and the defendant Williams, each purchased an interest of one-third in tracts 1 and 2, 86 and 87. After Baum's death, in 1832, Oliver purchased his interest from his heirs. And the 1st December, 1832, Oliver conveyed to Williams an undivided half of the ten acres reserved in number 3. On the 23d May, 1834, he conveyed to him an undivided half of tracts 86 and 87, except sixty acres which had been sold to Prentiss and Tromley; and on the ____ day of November, he conveyed to him `one undivided half of lots 1 and 2, on which Port Lawrence was laid out, 'together `with a like interest in all sales and improvements thereunto belonging.'

"Oliver, Baum, and Williams, agreed to lay out the town of Toledo on the site of Port Lawrence, and to make titles to the Port Lawrence purchasers of lots, on their complying with their contracts.

"Some years after this, Oliver purchased from the Michigar University the tracts of land he conveyed to it in exchange for tracts 1 and 2.

"Of the Piatt Company, John H. Piatt is deceased, and his administrators and heirs are made parties to this suit. William M. Worthington assigned one-half his interest in the Port Lawrence Company, and it is claimed and represented by John E. Worthington. The interest of Worth has been assigned to the defendant Ewing, who also claims the entire interest of Baum, Mack, Barr, Burnet, and half the interest of the complainant.

"Of the Baum Company, Martin Baum, Jesse Hunt, William C. Schenck, and William Barr, are deceased."

Such is a general outline of the leading facts. There are others which may be required to be adverted to in the progress of this opinion; but there are many details which must necessarily be passed over in silence, as they would tend to embarrass the discussion of the main questions in the cause, and obscure rather than illustrate the merits thereof.

The object of the bill is to subject the tracts No. 1 and No. 2, now constituting the site of the town of Toledo, formerly known as Port Lawrence, to the rights of the Port Lawrence Company, composed, as we have seen, of the Piatt Company and the Baum Company, and those who claim under them, now in the possession of Oliver and Williams, under a title derived from the grant of the Michigan University, upon the ground that a trust has attached to those tracts in favour of the Piatt and Port Lawrence Companies, under the circumstances which will be presently stated. These circumstances are, that the lands given in exchange to the Michigan University, for tracts No. 1 and No. 2, under the negotiation with the university, were, at the time, the property of the Piatt and Port Lawrence Companies, as cestuis que trust thereof; that the facts were at the time well known to Baum, and Oliver, and Williams, and consequently that the trust by operation of law attached thereto in the hands of those parties. To this conclusion several objections have been taken by the counsel for the appellants. In the first place, that no such trust attached to the lands so given in exchange to the Michigan University, at the time of the transfer, and consequently none to tracts Nos. 1 and 2, taken in the exchange. In the second place, that if it did, as Oliver afterwards repurchased the exchanged lands from the university, and Oliver and Williams under him now hold some parts thereof, the trust is revived, and has reattached to these lands, and thus has displaced any supposed trust upon tracts No. 1 and No. 2, at least pro tanto. In the next place, that Oliver and Williams are purchasers without notice of the trust, or of any misapplication of the trust property by the trustee.

Before proceeding to the considerations applicable to the first and third points, it may be well to dispose of that which grows out of the second point, as it involves a most important principle in equity jurisprudence. It is a clearly established principle in that jurisprudence, that whenever the trustee has been guilty of a breach of the trust, and has transferred the property, by sale or otherwise, to any third person, the cestui que trust has a full right to follow such property into the hands of such third person, unless he stands in the predicament of a bona fide purchaser, for a valuable consideration, without notice. And if the trustee has invested the trust property, or its proceeds, in any other property into which it can be distinctly traced, the cestui que trust has his election either to follow the same into the new investment, or to hold the trustee personally liable for the breach of the trust. This right or option of the cestui que trust is one which positively and exclusively belongs to him, and it is not in the power of the trustee to deprive him of it by any subsequent repurchase of the trust property, although in the latter case the cestui que trust may, if he pleases, avail himself of his own right, and take back and hold the trust property upon the original trust; but he is not compellable so to do. The reason is, that this would enable the trustee to avail himself of his own wrong; and if he had made a profitable investment of the trust fund, to appropriate the profit to his own benefit, and by a repurchase of the trust fund to charge the loss or deterioration in value, if any such there had been, in the mean time, to the account of the cestui que trust — whereas the rule in equity is, that all the gain made by the trustee, by a wrongful appropriation of the trust fund, shall go to the cestui que trust, and all the losses shall be borne by the trustee himself. The option, in such case, to take the new or the original fund is, therefore, (as has been already suggested,) exclusively given to the cestui que trust, and is given to him for the wisest purposes and upon the soundest public policy. It is to aid in the maintenance of right and in the suppression of meditated wrong. Many cases on this subject will be found collected in the elementary writers. (See 2 Sugden on Vendors, chap. 14, sect. 3, p. 148, &c., 9th edit.; 2 Story Eq. Jurisp. sect. 1258 to sect. 1265, 3d edit.; Com. Dig. Chancery, 4 W. 25, to 4 W. 28;) and the rule will be found fully discussed and recognised in Ryall v. Ryall, 1 Atk. 59; Lane v. Dighton, Ambler, 409; Lench v. Lench, 10 Ves. 511; and Docker v. Somes, 2 Mylne & Keen, 655; in many of its important bearings. Lord Ellenborough, in the case of Taylor v. Plumer, 3 Maule & Selw. 562, examined and confirmed the doctrine in its application to cases at law, and cited and approved the decisions in equity; so that it is plain upon authority, and the same would be equally true upon principle, that if the tracts Nos and 2 were purchased with the trust fund belonging to the Piatt a Port Lawrence Companies, the latter are at full liberty to follow the same into the hands of any persons not being bona fide purchasers for a valuable consideration without notice, and the circumstance that there has since been a repurchase of the original trust property by Oliver, does not in any manner affect, or control, or vary, the right or option of the cestuis que trust. The case is not like that put at the bar, where a part of the funds of the cestuis que trust have been mixed up with other funds exclusively belonging to the trustee in the new purchase or investment. In such a case there may be ground to hold the trust funds in charge pro tanto therein. Here, the whole consideration of the purchase was a fund wholly and exclusively belonging to the cestuis que trust, if they have made out any title at all, which we shall hereafter consider.

Let us then proceed to the consideration of the other questions above stated. And the first is, whether at the time of the exchange with the Michigan University, the lands given in exchange for tracts Nos. 1 and 2, were, in the hands of the party or parties making that exchange, affected with any trust such as has been already suggested? And this leads us to the consideration of the antecedent state of facts between the parties to this record.

We have seen that the original purchase of tracts Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4, and Nos. 86 and 87, was made for the account and benefit of the Port Lawrence Company; and the object of the purchase was to lay out a town thereon, and to sell the lots to purchasers. Baum was appointed a trustee and agent for this purpose, and he was to make sale of the lots and conduct the other affairs of the agency. With the consent of the company, in August, 1817, he employed Oliver as a sub-agent, who received instructions from the company in relation to the plan of the town (which he was to lay out in conjunction with Wm. C. Schenck) and the sale of the lots. This agency of Oliver, under Baum, was originally (as it should seem) limited to one year, but it was certainly continued, if not for all, at least for some purposes, to a much later period. In August, 1818, Oliver sold one-half of his interest in the Port Lawrence Company to Steele and Lytle, and in March, 1819, he sold the residue to the defendant Williams, and his partner Embre. And these facts are most important to be borne in mind, since they clearly establish that Oliver, as an original proprietor, and Williams, as a derivative proprietor, under Oliver, in the Port Lawrence Company, had full and complete notice of the nature and objects of the original purchase by that company, and of the trust and agency of Baum in accomplishing those objects. In truth, the laying out of a town on those tracts and the sale of the lots, seems to have been an enterprise always cherished by some of the company with uncommon solicitude and sanguine expectations of profit.

In consequence of the reduction of the price of the public lands by Congress, and the pressure of the times, the Port Lawrence Company found themselves compelled, in 1821, to relinquish a part of their tracts to the government. For this purpose they assigned all the four tracts to Baum, in September, 1821; and the Piatt Company at the same time assigned to Baum their five quarter-sections; and he, through the defendant, Williams, thereupon relinquished tracts Nos. 1 and 2, to the United States, and the return purchase money was applied pro tanto to complete the payments due on the other tracts, (Nos. 3 and 4, and Nos. 86 and 87,) and the residue was applied partly to pay the balance due on the five quarter-sections, purchased by the Piatt Company, and partly to pay a balance due on other lands purchased by the Baum Company.

Pausing here, for a moment, it is apparent that the original trust created in tracts Nos. 1 and 2, under the agency and assignment to Baum, for the benefit of the Port Lawrence Company, was, by this relinquishment to the government, entirely displaced and extinguished. These tracts afterwards, in the summer of 1828, under the act of 20th of May, 1826, were selected by the secretary of the Treasury for the Michigan University, and certainly came into the possession of the latter discharged of the trust. Still, however, it is obvious from the papers in the cause, that in the intermediate time between the relinquishment of these tracts and the grant thereof to the university, the original plan of establishing a town on the site, remained a favorite project of Baum as agent of the Port Lawrence Company, and he made strenuous efforts by applications to Congress, and to the General Land-office, to reacquire the title thereof, not for himself alone, but, as his applications and letters show, on behalf of himself and his associates. He constantly held himself out as acting for the benefit of the concern; and there is every reason to suppose, that some, if not all, of his associates were lulled into security, and contemplated, if he should be successful, to resume the original plan. This may serve in some measure to explain their inactivity, and to show that they continued to place unlimited confidence in Baum, that all his proceedings would be for their benefit, and not for his own sole advantage. Baum petitioned Congress on the subject as early as January, 1822, and in his letter to Mr. Brown, (a senator in Congress,) of the 25th of December, 1822, enclosing a duplicate of his petition, he says: "Enclosed is the petition signed by myself only, still others have an interest in it;" and he names in the letter, and its postscript, Williams, Piatt, and others. In another letter to the same senator, dated the 6th of February, 1823, he says: "The tracts purchased by myself and associates in that quarter; those retained and relinquished can be ascertained in the Land-office." In another letter addressed to the commissioner of the General Land-office, as late as the 27th of July, 1827, he says: "In consequence of the President's proclamation, announcing the sales of lands, I attended, at Delaware, on the 9th instant, but was much disappointed to find there instructions of the General Land-office, to withhold from sale all lands situate north of the line which divided the state of Ohio and the Michigan Territory, for I went there for the express purpose of repurchasing tracts Nos. 1 and 2, in the Maumee reservation, which I formerly owned and which I have relinquished." He adds: "These lands, though bought in sundry persons' names, were afterwards transferred to me as agent for the purpose of managing and conveying them in case of sales." In the same letter he protests against the trustees of the Michigan University having a grant of these tracts, as they have no claim to the same, and that he has a strong claim upon the government.

To repel the inferences deducible from these facts, it is said, that the testimony of Carneal establishes that Piatt attended that very sale at Delaware for the purpose of buying these tracts, not for the Port Lawrence Company, but for another company consisting of Colston, Carneal, and himself; and that Baum also attended on his own account, and not for the Port Lawrence Company. Of transactions of this nature, after such a lapse of time, it is perhaps not easy to ascertain all the facts which then regulated the conduct of the parties, when they depend upon the frail recollections of witnesses. It is quite possible that the circumstances might have been explained, and nothing have been intended by either party really injurious to the interests of the Port Lawrence Company. But as no sale took place of these tracts upon that occasion, the only effect which can be properly attributed to the testimony, admitting it in its fullest latitude, is, that it weakens our confidence in Piatt's own conduct, and diminishes the force of the inference as to Baum's then acting as an agent for the Port Lawrence Company. But the written statements of Baum in the letters above cited are evidence of his intentions and acts, of a far higher character, which the lapse of time has not obscured or varied, and those letters are, as to himself, most conclusive to show, that he did not deem himself as acting for his own interest alone, but for that of his associates also, in his whole proceedings to re-acquire those tracts.

As soon as the Michigan University had obtained a title to tracts Nos. 1 and 2, (in the summer of 1828,) Oliver, avowedly on behalf of Baum, made an application to the trustees of that university for an exchange of those tracts for other tracts in the vicinity. These negotiations were begun as early as the 12th of August, 1828, and various propositions were made and negotiations were had by the trustees and Oliver, as agent of Baum, between that time and the 4th of January, 1831, when the consent of Congress having been obtained for the exchange, by an act approved on the 13th of January, 1830, the university agreed to make the exchange; and accordingly, by their deed, dated the 7th day of February, 1830, did convey their right and title to tracts Nos. 1 and 2 to Oliver in fee-simple, in consideration of receiving a deed from Oliver of certain tracts, containing seven hundred and sixty-seven and a half acres, viz.: the whole of tracts Nos. 3 and 4, the south-west quarter of section 2, and the west half of section 3; the tracts being part of the purchase of the Port Lawrence Company, and the quarter and half sections being part of the purchase of the Piatt Company, in 1817. We thus trace the trust property home to the Michigan University, as obtained by a conveyance from and under Baum and Oliver in pursuance of a negotiation, avowedly made by Oliver on behalf and as agent of Baum, as the sole consideration of the grant of Nos. 1 and 2 to Oliver by the university.

And this conducts us to the consideration of that which is the main hinge on which the present case turns; that is, whether the tracts, so conveyed by Oliver to the university, were at the time affected with the trust in favour of the Piatt and Port Lawrence Companies, with which they were originally chargeable in the hands of Baum. This necessarily involves a review of the title of Oliver to the tracts (the three quarter-sections) belonging to the Piatt Company under the attachment proceedings in Michigan, and also of his title under the mortgage of tracts Nos. 3 and 4, and Nos. 86 and 87, belonging to the Port Lawrence Company, and the foreclosure thereof, — in connection with the subsequent acts of Baum and Oliver in the premises. Unless the title thus derived is beyond all legal exception (omni exceptione major) as an adverse and unimpeachable title, it is plain, that the original trust attached at the time of the exchange to the tracts so conveyed, and consequently (as has been already suggested) it was, at the option of the cestuis que trust, transferable and transferred to tracts Nos. 1 and 2. For it is in our judgment beyond all question, that Oliver at the time of the exchange had full notice of the trust and title originally invested in Baum, and that his acts in making the exchange are to be deemed the acts of Baum, and affected by the same considerations as if personally transacted by Baum himself, and were designed by mutual consent to promote the contemplated objects and interests of both.

And, first, let us review the proceedings under the attachment. In September, 1822, Baum gave a certificate to Oliver, stating that a debt of $213 02 was due to him from the Port Lawrence Company for money refunded to purchasers of lots at the request of the company "it being the amount due on the shares originally owned by John H. Piatt, Robert Piatt, G.A. Worth, and Wm. M. Worthington." These persons constituted the Piatt Company; and consequently the claim thus asserted was a sub-division of a debt confessedly due from the Port Lawrence Company, in which the Piatt Company had a moiety of the interest only. Whether Baum had, in virtue of his general agency, the right to give such a certificate, thus severing a joint debt, so as to be binding upon the Piatt Company alone, without their consent, and whether this certificate was bona fide given under justifiable circumstances, it is unnecessary to consider, although the transaction is certainly open to some observation in point of authority as well as propriety in the then unliquidated concerns of the Port Lawrence Company. Assuming, however, the transaction to have been perfectly correct and binding in all respects, let us examine the subsequent proceedings consequent thereon. Upon this certificate Oliver, in October, 1823, instituted a suit by attachment in Monroe county, in the territory of Michigan, against Baum, Robert Piatt, G.A. Worth, and William Worthington, (John H. Piatt being then deceased,) alleging them to be joint partners and survivors, and all residing out of the territory — upon which four of the quarter-sections of land owned by the Piatt Company in that county were attached. At the October term, 1826, of the same court, judgment was obtained by default against all the defendants, no appearance having been entered for them; and upon the execution issuing thereon, three of the four sections (those which were afterwards conveyed to the Michigan University) were sold, and bid off by an agent of Oliver, and were afterwards conveyed by him to Oliver. Of this suit there is no pretence to say, that any of the defendants, except Baum, had any notice, if indeed he had any, although some of them resided in the same state where Oliver resided, and one of them in a neighbouring state, at no great distance, who was known to be a man of large property. The other members of the Port Lawrence Company were not made parties to the suit. It was brought in a distant territory, almost then a wilderness, more than two hundred miles from the residence of the defendants; and if it had been the design of Oliver to procure a judgment against the parties, without any notice to them, which should be obligatory upon them, and to give Oliver a good title to the lands at a comparatively trivial price, better means could scarcely have been devised to accomplish the purpose. For the institution and consummation of this suit behind the backs and without the knowledge of the parties in interest, no better excuse can now be found than that Oliver did not choose to institute a suit against them at home, as it might give them offence and break up some former ties of acquaintance. How far such an excuse is admissible we do not stop to inquire. It rather tends to cast a shade upon the transaction than to vindicate it. But what was the title thus acquired, supposing all the proceedings to be bona fide? It was a mere naked title in equity to the tracts, the title to which still remained in the United States; and the legal title could not be consummated, unless the certificates of the purchase and payments for the tracts were first surrendered to the United States. Those certificates were then in the hands of Baum, as trustee of the Piatt Company; and he had no right under the circumstances to assign or surrender those certificates to Oliver to enable him to make his title available at law, without the express consent of the Piatt Company. If he had refused, Oliver could not have obtained them, unless upon a bill in equity to which all the proprietors should be made parties, and in which they would have been at full liberty to examine into the validity and merits of the original claim of Oliver, on which his attachment was founded, and also into the regularity and bona fides of the transactions in and under the suit. Yet Baum, in December, 1828, assigned and surrendered up these certificates to Oliver, and thus enabled him to consummate his title and reduce it to a legal title, by obtaining a patent, without any such consent; and in so doing he was guilty of a manifest breach of trust, of which Oliver cannot now be permitted to pretend ignorance. It is also a fact of no small significance, that the surrender of these certificates was contemporaneous with the surrender to Oliver of the certificates of tracts Nos. 3 and 4; and subsequently, in December, 1829, a like surrender of Nos. 86 and 87, belonging to the Port Lawrence Company, under the foreclosure of the mortgage, which we shall have occasion to review; and that all this was done pending the negotiations with the Michigan University by Oliver on behalf of Baum for the exchange.

This view of the matter releases us from no small doubt and difficulty in relation to an argument pressed at the bar with great earnestness; and that is, whether such an equity was attachable and vendible under the attachment law of Michigan. There is great difficulty in maintaining the affirmative, for the reasons stated in the opinion of the learned judge in the court below; and especially if, as has been suggested, the act is but a transcript of an act of New Jersey, and the courts of that state have, as has been asserted at the bar, held no such equity attachable.

Then, as to the mortgage and the proceedings under it. The mortgage was given upon tracts Nos. 3 and 4, and Nos. 86 and 87, by Baum to Oliver, in August, 1823, upon an account then adjusted between him and Oliver against the Port Lawrence Company (and which does not appear ever to have been examined or sanctioned by the company itself) for a balance of $1835 47, then supposed to be due to him for money paid and services rendered by him as agent of the company. In October, 1825, a bill was filed in the Supreme Court of Michigan (within which these tracts were situate) to foreclose the mortgage; and such proceedings were had upon this suit, that, in September, 1828, the tracts were sold, and at the sale bought by Oliver for the sum of $618 56, and a deed of conveyance thereof was accordingly made to him. To this suit Baum alone was made a party; none of the other proprietors of the Port Lawrence Company being made parties, although Oliver knew perfectly well who they were, and that Baum was merely their trustee, and that they were the cestuis que trust, possessing the beneficial interest in the premises. Under such circumstances, to allow the foreclosure to stand, so as to conclude the rights of the cestuis que trust, would be a violation of all the doctrines of courts of equity upon this subject. The decree must be treated, as to them, as wholly inoperative and void.

But there is another view of the matter, which is conclusive. The mortgage was of a mere equity, the legal title being still outstanding in the United States; and supposing that this equity could have been foreclosed in such a suit, (which, considering the defect of the real parties in interest, it clearly could not,) still it was a naked equity, which could be made available to obtain a legal title from the United States, only by an assignment and surrender of the certificates of the purchase and payments, then held by Baum for the benefit and use of the Port Lawrence Company. And here, again, the same considerations apply, which have been already suggested. Oliver could not obtain an assignment and surrender of those certificates, except by a bill in equity against Baum, to which the other proprietors in the Port Lawrence Company must have been made parties, as they were necessary parties; and thus the whole merit of the mortgage and foreclosure must have been brought directly before the court for adjudication. Yet Baum, without any consultation with or assent of those proprietors, assigned and surrendered the certificates of those tracts also to Oliver, and thus enabled him to obtain a patent therefor from the United States, in subversion of their rights and his duty. This was a gross breach of trust, and was done (let it be repeated) in December, 1828 and 1829, pending the negotiations with the Michigan University, obviously for the purpose of enabling Oliver in his, Baum's, name, and on his behalf, to consummate the exchange. And, finally, when the negotiation was consummated by means of these very certificates, Oliver, with the consent of Baum, was enabled to obtain a patent therefor, on the 4th of March, 1831.

Very soon after the patent was so obtained, viz., on the 16th of May, 1831, we find that Baum, Oliver, and Williams, entered into a written agreement, by which Oliver purported to sell, in fee-simple, to Baum and Williams, each one-third part of the tracts Nos. 1 and 2, and Nos. 86 and 87, with the exception of sixty acres out of No. 86; and they were to receive a quit-claim deed therefor from him accordingly, for the sum of $1555 for each third part. The parties farther agreed to lay out a town upon the old site, with some change of the plan, and to bring the lots into the market for sale; and they were to contribute to the charges and expenses according to their respective interests. After the death of Baum, Oliver purchased his share of the tracts from his heirs; and by certain deeds of quit-claim, executed in December, 1832, in May, 1834, and in November, 1834, Oliver conveyed one-half of the premises to Williams.

Now, looking at these transactions together, it seems almost impossible to escape from the conclusion, that Baum and Oliver had a mutual interest in the negotiation with the Michigan University; that it was not only carried on in the name of Baum, and apparently for his account but that Oliver acted as his agent throughout; that the deed from the University was made directly to Oliver, with the consent of Baum; that the assignment and surrender of all the certificates by Baum, to Oliver, was for the express purpose of enabling Oliver to complete the bargain with the university; and that the agreement between Baum, Oliver, and Williams, which followed almost immediately upon the grant of the patent, was made in pursuance of a prior understanding between all the parties, and was but a consummation of the objects originally contemplated by Baum and Oliver, from the period of their first negotiation with the University down to the time of the execution of that agreement. And all this was done by Baum and Oliver, without the knowledge, or consent, or approbation, of the Piatt and Port Lawrence Companies, and was never sanctioned by them. Under such circumstances, what is the true duty of a court of equity? It is, to hold the parties engaged in these transactions, with full notice of the title and the trust in Baum, bound by that trust, and to enforce that trust against the tracts Nos. 1 and 2, so far as they remain in their hands unaffected by the rights of purchasers under them, bona fide for a valuable consideration, without notice. In our judgment, no reasoning can make the proposition more clear than a simple recital of the facts, and the statement of the general doctrine of equity jurisprudence that the cestuis que trust have an option to follow their property, or its proceeds, into any other property into which it has been converted by a breach of the trust, subject only to the rights of such purchasers as have been just referred to. Indeed, the question, as against Baum and Oliver, seems absolutely closed by the state of the evidence; and their intimate knowledge of the whole concern requires neither illustration nor commentary.

Let us, then, proceed to the consideration of the case as to Williams. It is said that he stands in the predicament of a bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration, without notice; and if he does, he is certainly entitled to protection. Williams, in his answer, asserts himself to be such a purchaser, but it is difficult to maintain that averment in its just legal sense, looking to all the circumstances of the case. In 1819, he became a purchaser of one-half of the interest of Oliver in the Port Lawrence Company, and, as such, he could not fail to know that tracts Nos. 1 and 2, 3 and 4, and Nos. 86 and 87, belonged to that company; and he has never ceased to be a member of that company. In 1821, he was employed by Baum, the acknowledged trustee and agent of the company, to surrender tracts Nos. 1 and 2 to the government of the United States; and through him the relinquishment took place. He says that he did not know of the negotiation between Oliver and the University, for an exchange of the lands, until after its consummation, and never heard of the details of said negotiations, nor what lands were given in exchange, except parts of tracts Nos. 3 and 4. Now, these very tracts belonged to the Port Lawrence Company, so that he was necessarily put upon the inquiry by what means Baum had parted with them, and Oliver had become possessed of them. Besides, in his negotiation and surrender of tracts Nos. 1 and 2 to the government, and the apportionment of the funds arising from the relinquished lands, first to the remaining lands of the Port Lawrence Company, and then to the lands respectively purchased by the Piatt and Baum Companies, he necessarily became acquainted with the relative interests of all these companies therein. The origin and title of the Michigan University to the tracts Nos. 1 and 2, and the exchange thereof with Oliver, were matters of public notoriety, and proclaimed in the acts of Congress under which the exchange was made. The deed from the University to Oliver recited the material facts respecting the lands given in exchange, and referred to the records of the antecedent negotiations; and the patent itself, from the government, of tracts Nos. 1 and 2, referred to the deed of Oliver to the University, of the lands given in exchange; so that it is most manifest that Williams, as a proprietor in the Port Lawrence Company, and as agent thereof in the relinquishment above referred to, and as a purchaser under Oliver, not only had the most ample means of knowing the nature and character and extent of the title of Oliver to the lands under consideration, but he was positively put upon inquiry in relation to the whole matter. If, under such circumstances, he chose to remain in indolent ignorance or indifference to the title, it was a voluntary ignorance and indifference, which ought not to be permitted to avail him against the rights of the cestuis que trust. If we add to this the fact that within two months after the patent was obtained by Oliver, he and Baum united in an agreement with Oliver, by which each was to take a third part in the tracts Nos. 1 and 2, and Nos. 86 and 87, (these tracts never having been relinquished by the Port Lawrence Company to the government,) to be laid out as a town, and the lots sold on joint account, it would seem almost incredible that he should not have made some inquiries on the subject. And the only reasonable conclusion seems to be, that he was in as full possession of all the facts as were his partners Oliver and Baum. Another significant circumstance is, that this very agreement contained a stipulation that Oliver should give a quit-claim deed only for the tracts; and the subsequent deeds given by Oliver to him accordingly were drawn up without any covenants of warranty, except against persons claiming under Oliver, or his heirs and assigns. In legal effect, therefore, they did convey no more than Oliver's right, title, and interest, in the property; and under such circumstances, it is difficult to conceive how he can claim protection as a bona fide purchaser, for a valuable consideration, without notice, against any title paramount to that of Oliver, which attached itself as an unextinguished trust to the tracts.

And here, in our judgment, the merits of the case would seem to be brought to a close. But certain objections have been made to the right of the plaintiff to maintain the bill upon other collateral grounds. In the court below an objection was taken, by way of plea, that the original agreement of the Piatt and Baum companies, in regard to the purchases of these tracts at the public sale in 1817, was an illegal combination in fraud of the rights of the United States, and therefore it makes the whole purchase an utter nullity. This objection was fully answered in the opinion of the Circuit Court, in which, on this point, we fully concur. It has been abandoned by the learned counsel here; and, indeed, in our opinion, properly abandoned, as unmaintainable in point of fact as well as law.

Another objection is to the lapse of time. The mere lapse of time constitutes of itself no bar to the enforcement of a subsisting trust; and time begins to run against a trust only from the time when it is openly disavowed by the trustee, who insists upon an adverse right and interest, which is fully and unequivocally made known to the cestui que trust. Now, until 1831, no final overt act was done by Baum in violation of his duty as trustee; and the first and great breach of that duty, on his part, was the surrender of the certificates of the tracts to Oliver at different periods between 1828 and 1831. At what particular period the subsequent acts of Baum, Oliver, and Williams, became first known to the plaintiff and the other proprietors of the Piatt and Port Lawrence companies having the same interest, does not distinctly appear; but the facts could not have been fully known or understood until within a few years before the filing of the bill, and at most probably not exceeding eight or ten. That period, upon admitted principles, is far too short to interpose any positive bar to relief in equity. There may have been an unjustifiable delay, and gross inattention on the part of some of the proprietors. But as against persons perfectly conusant of the trust it can furnish no ground for any denial of the relief which the case otherwise requires.

Another objection urged at the argument is, that the bill is multifarious in uniting the trust property owned by the Piatt Company and the Port Lawrence Company in one bill, as the interests of each are separate and distinct in the tracts conveyed by Oliver to the Michigan University. We are of opinion that the bill is in no just sense multifarious. It is true that it embraces the claims of both the companies; but their interests are so mixed up in all these transactions, that entire justice could scarcely be done, at least not conveniently done, without a union of the proprietors of both companies; and if they had not been joined, the bill would have been open to the opposite objection that all the proper parties were not before the court, so as to enable it to make a final and conclusive decree touching all their interests, several as well as joint. It was well observed by Lord Cottenham in Campbell v. Mackay, 1 Mylne & Craig, 603, and the same doctrine was affirmed in this court in Gaines and wife v. Relf and Chew, 2 How. 619, 642, that it is impracticable to lay down any rule, as to what constitutes multifariousness, as an abstract proposition; that each case must depend upon its own circumstances; and much must necessarily be left, where the authorities leave it, to the sound discretion of the court.^[(a)] But, if the objection were tenable, (as we are of opinion it is not,) it would be quite too late to insist upon it. The objection of multifariousness cannot, as a matter of right, be taken by the parties, except by demurrer, or plea or answer; and if not so taken, it is deemed to be waived. It cannot be insisted upon by the parties even at the hearing in the court below, although it may at any time be taken by the court sua sponte, wherever it is deemed by the court to be necessary or proper to assist it in the due administration of justice. And at so late a period as the hearing, so reluctant is the court to countenance the objection, that, if it can get on in the cause to a final decree without serious embarrassment, it will do so, disregarding the fault or error, when it has been acquiesced in by the parties up to that time. A fortiori an appellate court would scarcely entertain the objection, if it was not forced upon it by a moral necessity. There is no pretence to say, that such is the predicament of the present cause in this court.

Another objection taken at the argument is, that Baum's heirs cannot insist upon any title to the property in question, because they are bound by the warranty of their ancestor in the conveyance thereof to Oliver. But this objection has no foundation whatsoever in law, whether the warranty be lineal or collateral; for the heirs here do not claim any title to the property by descent, but simply by purchase; and it is only to cases of descent that the doctrine of warranty applies. For this it is sufficient to cite Litt. sect. 735; Co. Litt. 365; Com. Dig. Guaranty, I. 2, and Bac. Abridgment, Warranty, G, H, I, L. The fact, therefore, that assets descended upon Mary P. Ewing, one of the children and heirs of Baum, can have no influence upon the right of her husband or herself to enter the land in controversy by purchase, however it might repel their right to take it by descent.

Another objection suggested at the argument was the difficulty of apportioning the respective interests of the cestuis que trust in the tracts Nos. 1 and 2. But this difficulty has been overcome; and it constitutes no matter of difference between the Piatt and the Port Lawrence Companies, so far as their own interests are concerned, as distinguished from that of Oliver and Williams.

As to the report of the master and the exceptions thereto in the court below, although those exceptions were not formally overruled or allowed; yet it is plain that in the final decree they were all disposed of, some being allowed and others disallowed; and no argument has been addressed to us upon the present occasion, which points out any specific errors, which require correction beyond those which have been already incidentally hinted at.

We pass over some other objections, which were suggested at the argument, without remark, as this opinion has already been protracted to an unusual length. We need only say, that we see nothing in those objections which requires us to reform the decree of the court below.

Upon the whole, the decree of the Circuit Court is affirmed, with costs.

NOTES

[(a)] See also Story Eq. Plead. sect. 530 to sect. 540, and the authorities there cited. Attorney-General v. Cradock, 3 Mylne & Craig, 85.