State v. Villalobos

SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
En Banc

STATE OF ARIZONA, ) Arizona Supreme Court
) No. CR-08-0098-AP
Appellee, )
) Maricopa County
v. ) Superior Court
) No. CR2004-005523-001
JOSHUA IDLEFONSO VILLALOBOS, )
)
Appellant. )
) O P I N I O N
__________________________________)

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
The Honorable Raymond P. Lee, Judge

AFFIRMED
________________________________________________________________

TERRY GODDARD, ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL Phoenix
By Kent E. Cattani, Chief Counsel,
Criminal Appeals/Capital Litigation Section
Jonathan Bass, Assistant Attorney General Tucson
Attorneys for State of Arizona

DROBAN & COMPANY, PC Anthem
By Kerrie M. Droban
Attorney for Joshua Idlefonso Villalobos
________________________________________________________________

H U R W I T Z, Vice Chief Justice

¶1 Joshua Idlefonso Villalobos was convicted of first

degree murder and child abuse and sentenced to death for the

murder. We have jurisdiction over this automatic appeal

pursuant to Article 6, Section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution

and A.R.S. §§ 13-4031 and 13-4033(A)(1) (2010).
 I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

¶2 Villalobos lived with Annette Verdugo, five-year-old

Ashley Molina (Verdugo’s daughter), and the couple’s two-year-

old daughter. On January 3, 2004, Villalobos and the children

picked Verdugo up at work and took her to dinner. Ashley did

not eat and complained about stomach pains. Villalobos and the

children again picked Verdugo up from work after her shift ended

in the early morning of January 4. When Verdugo noted an odd

smell, Villalobos claimed he had vomited in the car.

¶3 When they arrived home, Villalobos carried Ashley

upstairs and put her to bed. At approximately 7 a.m.,

Villalobos told Verdugo that Ashley was unresponsive. Ashley’s

body was cold and hard. Villalobos told Verdugo “they’re going

to think it’s me, I was the only one with her.”

¶4 After some delay, Villalobos and Verdugo took Ashley

to the hospital. The emergency room physician recognized

immediately that Ashley was dead; she found “somewhere between

150 to 200 bruises” on Ashley’s body. After Villalobos told the

physician that the bruises were from a fall in the shower,

Phoenix police were summoned.

1
The facts are viewed in the light most favorable to
sustaining the guilty verdicts. State v. Garza, 216 Ariz. 56,
61 n.1, 163 P.3d 1006, 1011 n.1 (2007).

2
¶5 Villalobos was taken to the police station and given

Miranda warnings. Villalobos denied hitting Ashley, and a

detective asked him to take a polygraph examination. Villalobos

agreed. During the examination, Villalobos initially denied

injuring Ashley. When the polygrapher accused him of lying,

Villalobos admitted that he had punched Ashley.

¶6 After the polygraph, a second detective resumed the

interrogation. Villalobos admitted that, before Verdugo’s

dinner break, he had grabbed Ashley by the arm and hit her

several times with a closed fist. Villalobos also said that

Ashley had passed out in the car and then vomited on him while

he was picking Verdugo up from work.

¶7 The medical examiner who conducted the autopsy later

concluded that Ashley had died of blunt force trauma to the

abdomen. He opined that Ashley could have survived for no more

than four hours after the fatal injuries and had died between

five and eight hours before being taken to the hospital. The

autopsy also revealed other internal injuries that predated the

fatal injuries.

¶8 A grand jury indicted Villalobos for child abuse and

first degree murder. Verdugo was indicted for second degree

murder and child abuse. She later pleaded guilty to attempted

child abuse and testified at Villalobos’s trial.

3
¶9 A superior court jury found Villalobos guilty on both

counts. During the aggravation phase of the trial, the jury

found three aggravating circumstances: the offense was

committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner,

A.R.S. § 13-751(F)(6) (2010);2 Villalobos committed the offense

while on release from the state department of corrections,

A.R.S. § 13-751(F)(7)(a); and the victim was a child under the

age of fifteen, A.R.S. § 13-751(F)(9). After the penalty phase,

the jury concluded that any mitigating circumstances were not

sufficiently substantial to call for leniency and death was the

appropriate sentence.

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

A. GUILT PHASE

1. Motion to Suppress Statements Made to Police and the
Polygrapher

¶10 Villalobos argues that the trial court erred in

refusing to suppress his statements to the detectives and the

polygrapher. We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to

suppress a confession for “clear and manifest error,” the

equivalent of abuse of discretion. State v. Newell, 212 Ariz.

389, 396 ¶ 22 & n.6, 132 P.3d 833, 840 & n.6 (2006).

2
We cite the current version of statutes in the absence of
any relevant material changes since the date of the offenses.
4
 a. Miranda Warnings

¶11 After receiving Miranda warnings, Villalobos

acknowledged that he understood his rights and answered all

questions posed to him. The trial court therefore did not abuse

its discretion in concluding that the State proved that

Villalobos knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda

rights. See State v. Tapia, 159 Ariz. 284, 286-87, 767 P.2d 5,

7-8 (1988).

¶12 Villalobos argues, however, that Miranda warnings

should have been reissued before his subsequent encounters with

the polygrapher and the second detective. Repeated Miranda

warnings are required in “circumstances suggesting that a

suspect is not fully aware of his rights.” State v. Trostle,

191 Ariz. 4, 14, 951 P.2d 869, 879 (1997). But this is not such

a case. Villalobos not only received the required warnings

before the initial interrogation, but also reviewed and signed a

consent form reiterating his Miranda rights just before the

polygraph examination began. Only three hours elapsed between

the beginning of the interview and its conclusion, and

Villalobos was aware at all times that he was speaking with

police department employees. See id. (holding repeated warnings

unnecessary for an interrogation that lasted over seven hours at

three separate locations); State v. Gilreath, 107 Ariz. 318,

5
319, 487 P.2d 385, 386 (1971) (same regarding one twelve-hour

gap and one thirty-six-hour gap between warnings).

b. Voluntariness

¶13 Villalobos also argues that his statements were

involuntary. The State must prove that a confession was “freely

and voluntarily made and was not the product of coercion.”

State v. Boggs, 218 Ariz. 325, 335 ¶ 44, 185 P.3d 111, 121

(2008). The superior court did not abuse its discretion in

concluding that the State met that burden here. The

interviewing detectives and polygrapher each testified that they

did not threaten, coerce, or make any promises, and the record

supports that testimony.

¶14 Villalobos contends the polygrapher coerced him into

making inculpatory statements by telling him that an autopsy and

DNA evidence could prove his guilt. These predictions, however,

were accurate and, even if false, would not have rendered the

confession involuntary. See, e.g., Trostle, 191 Ariz. at 15,

951 P.2d at 880 (holding that a deliberate falsehood by

interrogators did not render a confession involuntary). The

polygrapher’s request that Villalobos tell the truth to “get out

of this hole” was also permissible. See, e.g., State v. Amaya-

Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 165, 800 P.2d 1260, 1273 (1990) (noting

that police requests for a suspect to tell the truth without

threat or promise are not inherently coercive).

6
¶15 When talking to the second detective, Villalobos

worried that he would be imprisoned for life for killing Ashley.

The detective responded: “Not necessarily, not necessarily,

there’s going to come a day when you have a relationship with

[your daughter].” The detective also told Villalobos that

“telling me the truth, and that’s being, I didn’t plan this,

that makes it a lot better for you.” After this exchange,

Villalobos admitted he had hit Ashley with a closed fist before

Verdugo’s dinner break, and he later admitted to striking Ashley

repeatedly.

¶16 Villalobos argues that the phrases “not necessarily”

and “that makes it a lot better for you” were implied promises

for leniency. Villalobos, however, had already admitted to

striking Ashley before the detective made these statements. See

State v. Lopez, 174 Ariz. 131, 138, 847 P.2d 1078, 1085 (1992)

(finding alleged inducement irrelevant when incriminating

statement occurred beforehand).3 More importantly, the detective

did not promise leniency. See Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. at 165, 800

P.2d at 1273 (“Mere advice from the police that it would be

better for the accused to tell the truth when unaccompanied by

3
Villalobos also cites a later statement by the second
detective that “people get out of prison, nobody goes to jail
for the rest of their life anymore especially when it’s not
something they plan.” Whatever the propriety of these remarks,
however, Villalobos made no subsequent incriminating statements.
See Lopez, 174 Ariz. at 138, 847 P.2d at 1085.
7
either a threat or a promise does not render a subsequent

confession involuntary.”); State v. Walton, 159 Ariz. 571, 579,

769 P.2d 1017, 1025 (1989) (finding statements by detective that

defendant needed to tell the truth to “give yourself a chance”

not coercive).

2. Other Acts Evidence

¶17 Villalobos argues the trial court erred in admitting

the following evidence: (1) testimony that he had violently

shaken Ashley in October 2003; (2) his admission that he had

bruised Ashley’s face and buttocks in November 2003; (3) his

admission that he had bruised Ashley’s face in December 2003;

and (4) his admissions to Verdugo that he had bruised Ashley’s

arms in the weeks before her death.

¶18 Evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not

admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show

action in conformity therewith.” Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b). Such

evidence may, however, be admitted “for other purposes, such as

proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Id.

We review the superior court’s decision to admit other acts

evidence for abuse of discretion. State v. Andriano, 215 Ariz.

497, 502 ¶ 17, 161 P.3d 540, 545 (2007).

¶19 The child abuse charge required proof that Villalobos

“intentionally or knowingly” injured Ashley. See A.R.S. § 13-

8
3623(A)(2) (2001). The prior abuse evidence was relevant to

establish Villalobos’s mental state. See State v. Smith, 130

Ariz. 74, 76, 634 P.2d 1, 3 (App. 1981) (admitting evidence of

prior abuse to establish defendant’s mental state). This

evidence also rebutted Villalobos’s claim that he did not intend

to hurt Ashley and hit her as a “reflex,” as well as his

contention that Verdugo could have caused the fatal injuries.

¶20 In light of Villalobos’s defenses, the superior court

did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the probative

value of the other acts evidence was not substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Ariz. R.

Evid. 403; see also State v. Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, 212 ¶ 59, 141

P.3d 368, 387 (2006) (reviewing Rule 403 ruling for abuse of

discretion). The prior abuse occurred in October, November, and

December of 2003, shortly before the fatal attack. Any

prejudice from the admission of this evidence was appropriately

mitigated by the instruction given at Villalobos’s request,

which reminded the jury of the limited purposes for which it

could consider the other acts evidence. See Ariz. R. Evid. 105

(requiring that, upon request, a trial court give a limiting

instruction when evidence is admissible for one purpose but not

another); State v. Hyde, 186 Ariz. 252, 276-77, 921 P.2d 655,

679-80 (1996) (stating that an offer to issue limiting

9
instruction “afforded the defendant adequate protection against

unfair prejudice”).

3. Autopsy Photographs

¶21 Villalobos claims the trial court erred in admitting

four autopsy photographs depicting various internal injuries.

Autopsy photographs are admissible to “show the nature and

location of the fatal injury, to help determine the degree or

atrociousness of the crime, to corroborate state witnesses, to

illustrate or explain testimony, and to corroborate the state’s

theory of how and why the homicide was committed.” State v.

Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 288, 660 P.2d 1208, 1215 (1983). We

review the trial court’s admission of photographic evidence for

abuse of discretion. State v. Cañez, 202 Ariz. 133, 154 ¶ 65,

42 P.3d 564, 585 (2002).

¶22 The autopsy photographs were relevant to prove the

cause of death and the extent of the abuse. See id. at ¶ 66

(finding photographs relevant in proving murder); Lopez, 174

Ariz. at 138-39, 847 P.2d at 1085-86 (finding photographs

relevant in proving abuse). Each photograph illustrated a

different aspect of the medical examiner’s testimony. This

evidence was also relevant to rebut Villalobos’s argument that

Ashley seemed fine after the beating and his suggestion that she

died because of lack of prompt medical attention.

10
¶23 Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in

concluding the risk of unfair prejudice from these photographs

did not substantially outweigh their probative value. See Ariz.

R. Evid. 403. “[T]here is nothing sanitary about murder, and

there is nothing in Rule 403, Ariz. R. Evid., that requires a

trial judge to make it so.” State v. Anderson, 210 Ariz. 327,

340 ¶ 40, 111 P.3d 369, 382 (2005) (quoting State v. Reinhardt,

190 Ariz. 579, 584, 951 P.2d 454, 459 (1997)) (internal

quotation marks omitted). The autopsy photographs depicted only

internal injuries and were unlikely to cause undue prejudice

when the underlying charges involved the beating death of a

young child. See Lopez, 174 Ariz. at 139, 847 P.2d at 1078

(finding photographs of child autopsy not unduly prejudicial

because “the crime committed was so atrocious that photographs

could add little to the repugnance felt by anyone who heard the

testimony” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

B. AGGRAVATION PHASE

1. Expert Testimony on the Victim’s Suffering

¶24 The medical examiner testified during the aggravation

phase that Ashley had suffered “excruciating” pain. Villalobos

does not dispute that this testimony was relevant to prove the

murder was especially cruel under A.R.S. § 13-751(F)(6). See

State v. Morris, 215 Ariz. 324, 338 ¶ 61, 160 P.3d 203, 217

(2007) (holding that the (F)(6) cruelty aggravator requires

11
proof that the victim was “conscious and suffered physical pain

or mental anguish during . . . some portion of the crime and

that the defendant knew or should have known the victim would

suffer”). Instead, he argues that the medical examiner was not

qualified to testify on this subject because he was certified

only in pathology and had not ascertained a patient’s pain level

for ten years.

¶25 Expert testimony is appropriate “if scientific,

technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier

of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in

issue.” Ariz. R. Evid. 702. A witness can qualify as an expert

through requisite “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or

education.” Id. We review the admission of expert testimony

for abuse of discretion. State v. Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, 210

¶ 69, 84 P.3d 456, 475 (2004).

¶26 The superior court did not abuse its discretion in

allowing the medical examiner to testify about the victim’s

pain. The medical examiner had extensive medical training and

experience in China, had completed two fellowships and a

pathology residence in the United States, and, in addition to

conducting autopsies, had treated live patients during his

fellowships.

¶27 The medical examiner’s specialization in pathology did

not disqualify him from giving expert testimony on pain. See

12
Morris, 215 Ariz. at 338 ¶ 61, 160 P.3d at 217 (involving

pathologist testimony of pain levels); State v. Sansing, 206

Ariz. 232, 236 ¶ 12, 77 P.3d 30, 34 (2003) (same); State v.

Maturana, 180 Ariz. 126, 132, 882 P.2d 933, 939 (1994) (same).

Instead, the physician’s certification went only to the weight

of his testimony. See Davolt, 207 Ariz. at 210 ¶ 70, 84 P.3d at

475.

2. Double Counting of Victim’s Age

¶28 Villalobos contends that the prosecutor’s description

of Ashley as “tiny,” “32 pound[s],” a “child,” and “five years

old” in his closing argument improperly encouraged the jury to

weigh her age twice in finding the (F)(6) and (F)(9)

aggravators. A jury may use one fact to find multiple

aggravators, but it may not weigh the same fact twice when

assessing aggravation and mitigation. State v. Velazquez, 216

Ariz. 300, 307 ¶ 22, 166 P.3d 91, 98 (2007).

¶29 Villalobos has not demonstrated impermissible double

counting. The prosecutor’s comments regarding Ashley’s age,

size, weight, and references to her as a child appropriately

encouraged the jury to consider whether she was helpless at the

time of the murder. See State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 310

n.6, 896 P.2d 830, 850 n.6 (1995) (evaluating child’s

defenselessness as part of (F)(6) aggravator). The prosecutor

expressly told the jury that it could consider physical size as

13
evidence of helplessness, but emphasized that he was “talking

about her size, not her chronological age.” This Court has

found similar comments appropriate in cases involving both the

(F)(6) and (F)(9) aggravators. See Velazquez, 216 Ariz. at 307

¶ 23, 166 P.3d at 98; State v. Medina, 193 Ariz. 504, 512 ¶ 26,

975 P.2d 94, 102 (1999). Moreover, the jury was expressly

instructed not to consider age when determining whether the

crime was especially heinous, cruel or depraved. See Velazquez,

216 Ariz. at 307 ¶ 24, 166 P.3d at 98 (citing such an

instruction in rejecting double-counting argument).

3. Narrowing Instructions

¶30 Arizona’s (F)(6) “especially heinous, cruel or

depraved” aggravator is unconstitutionally vague. Walton v.

Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 654 (1990), overruled on other grounds by

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002). However, this

vagueness is remedied when “jury instructions provide adequate

specificity in accordance with appellate courts’ narrowing

constructions.” Anderson, 210 Ariz. at 353 ¶ 114, 111 P.3d at

395.

¶31 Villalobos did not object to the aggravation phase

(F)(6) instruction and concedes on appeal that it accurately

stated Arizona law.4 But, he argues, the instruction does not

4
The aggravation phase jury instructions described the
especially cruel prong of the (F)(6) aggravator as follows:
14
cure the vagueness of the (F)(6) aggravator because the term

“especially” was not properly defined. We have repeatedly

rejected similar arguments, holding that jury instructions

materially identical to those here sufficiently narrowed the

“especially cruel” aggravator. See State v. McCray, 218 Ariz.

252, 258-59 ¶¶ 25-26 & n.3, 183 P.3d 503, 509-10 & n.3 (2008);

Velazquez, 216 Ariz. at 308 ¶¶ 28-29, 166 P.3d at 99; State v.

Cromwell, 211 Ariz. 181, 189-90 ¶¶ 42-45, 119 P.3d 448, 456-57

(2005); Anderson, 210 Ariz. at 353 ¶ 114 & n.19, 111 P.3d at 395

& n.19.

C. PENALTY PHASE

1. Refusal to Pose Juror Question

¶32 After redirect of the State’s mental health expert in

the sentencing phase, a juror submitted the following question

to the trial judge: “Given what you know about Mr. Villalobos,

is it likely that he could be significantly reformed with the

help of medications and or therapy?” Over Villalobos’s

_______________________________ 

The term “cruel” focuses on the victim’s pain and
suffering. To find that the murder was committed in
an “especially cruel” manner you must find that the
victim consciously suffered physical or mental pain,
distress or anguish prior to death. The Defendant
must know or should have known that the victim would
suffer.

The jury was further instructed that the State had to prove that
the cruelty in this murder was “unusually great or significant”
to make it “especially cruel.”
15
objection, the judge refused to ask the expert that question

because “talking about [a] speculative theoretical future

environment . . . doesn’t seem to fall within the realm of what

mitigation is about.”

¶33 A trial judge may “for good cause . . . prohibit or

limit the submission of [juror] questions to witnesses.” Ariz.

R. Crim. P. 18.6(e). We review the trial court’s decision to

exclude evidence for abuse of discretion. See State v. Ellison,

213 Ariz. 116, 129 ¶ 42, 140 P.3d 899, 912 (2006); Davolt, 207

Ariz. at 210 ¶ 69, 84 P.3d at 475.

¶34 A penalty phase jury may not be precluded from

considering relevant mitigating evidence. See Tennard v.

Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 287 (2004); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.

104, 114-15 (1982). Our statutes broadly define “mitigating

circumstances” as including “any aspect of the defendant’s

character, propensities or record.” A.R.S. § 13-751(G). A

defendant’s potential for future rehabilitation falls squarely

within this definition. State v. King, 180 Ariz. 268, 283, 883

P.2d 1024, 1039 (1994). The trial judge therefore incorrectly

concluded that future dangerousness and potential for

rehabilitation were not mitigating circumstances.

¶35 Nonetheless, we cannot conclude that the trial judge

committed reversible error in declining to pose the juror’s

question to the State’s expert. The witness had testified only

16
as to the results of a personality test and Villalobos’s I.Q.

score; he did not diagnose the defendant for treatment, nor was

his expertise on the effects of medication or therapy

established.

¶36 More importantly, Villalobos made no offer of proof as

to what the expert would have said if allowed to answer the

question. A finding of error “may not be predicated upon a

ruling which . . . excludes evidence unless . . . the substance

of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was

apparent from the context.” Ariz. R. Evid. 103(a)(2); see State

v. Towery, 186 Ariz. 168, 179, 920 P.2d 290, 301 (1996)

(requiring, “[a]t a minimum, an offer of proof stating with

reasonable specificity what the evidence would have shown”).

Unlike cases in which no offer of proof is necessary because the

content of the excluded evidence is obvious, e.g., State v.

Kaiser, 109 Ariz. 244, 246, 508 P.2d 74, 76 (1973), nothing in

this record hints at what the expert’s response to the juror’s

question would have been. We therefore cannot conclude the

judge’s ruling was erroneous.

2. Comments Regarding Causal Nexus

¶37 During his penalty phase closing argument, the

prosecutor stated:

[T]he bottom line on that abuse [Villalobos suffered],
if it happened, is what does it have to do with the
murder of Ashley Molina? What does it have to do with

17
 repeatedly punching her in the stomach? What does it
have to do with letting her die those slow two to four
hours? The bottom line question is what about his
childhood reduces his moral[] culpability or
blameworthiness for all the decisions he made on
January 3, 2004?

. . . .

[T]he defense team asserts that his borderline IQ is
mitigating . . . . [H]e did have learning disability
in reading and mathematics, but what does this have to
do with the murder of Ashley Molina?

. . . .

This is the fabric of who he is. And I submit to you
there is absolutely nothing mitigating about who he is
in light of what you’ve seen him do, what you’ve seen
demonstrated in this case.

Villalobos argues that these comments improperly suggested that

a “causal nexus” was required between the crime and any

mitigating evidence.

¶38 A jury cannot be precluded from hearing mitigation

evidence because it lacks a causal nexus to the murder.

Tennard, 542 U.S. at 284-87. However, “there is no

constitutional prohibition against the State arguing that

evidence is not particularly relevant or that it is entitled to

little weight.” Anderson, 210 Ariz. at 350 ¶ 97, 111 P.3d at

392; see also State v. Pandeli, 215 Ariz. 514, 525-26 ¶¶ 31-32,

161 P.3d 557, 568-69 (2007). The jury may thus appropriately

consider a lack of causal nexus when “assessing the quality and

18
strength of mitigation.” Newell, 212 Ariz. at 405 ¶ 82, 132

P.3d at 849.

¶39 Villalobos does not claim that the trial court

excluded any evidence for lack of a causal nexus. Rather, he

objects to the prosecutor’s comments. We have repeatedly held,

however, that the state may fairly argue that the lack of a

nexus to the crime diminishes the weight to be given alleged

mitigation. See, e.g., Anderson, 210 Ariz. at 392 ¶ 97, 111

P.3d at 350; Pandeli, 215 Ariz. at 525-26 ¶ 31, 161 P.3d at 568-

69. Thus, the statements here were not improper. Moreover, the

jury was properly instructed that it could consider any relevant

evidence as mitigation and that it alone should determine the

weight to attach to that mitigation. See Pandeli, 215 Ariz. at

526 ¶ 36, 161 P.3d at 569; Roque, 213 Ariz. at 224 ¶ 126, 141

P.3d at 399.

¶40 Villalobos also argues that A.R.S. § 13-751(G)

unconstitutionally requires a causal nexus between mitigation

and the crime. This is incorrect. Relevance, not a causal

nexus, is the only statutory limitation on the jury’s ability to

consider mitigation evidence. A.R.S. § 13-751(G); see Anderson,

210 Ariz. at 350 ¶ 97, 111 P.3d at 392 (noting distinction

between admissibility and the weight given mitigation).

19
D. REVIEW OF THE DEATH SENTENCE

¶41 Because the murder occurred after August 1, 2002, we

review both the jury’s aggravation findings and the death

sentence for abuse of discretion. A.R.S. § 13-756(A) (2010);

Morris, 215 Ariz. at 340 ¶ 76, 160 P.3d at 219. A jury has not

abused its discretion in finding an aggravating circumstance or

determining that death is the appropriate sentence if there is

“any reasonable evidence in the record to sustain” those

conclusions. Morris, 215 Ariz. at 341 ¶ 77, 160 P.3d at 220

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).5

1. Aggravation Phase

a. (F)(6) Aggravator

¶42 Villalobos argues that the State has not met its

burden of proving the murder was especially cruel because it did

not establish that Ashley was conscious at all times after first

being struck. The especially cruel prong of the (F)(6)

5
A defendant may not be sentenced to death under the Eighth
Amendment unless he “kill[s], attempt[s] to kill, or intend[s]
that a killing will take place or that lethal force will be
employed,” Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982), or is a
major participant in a crime and acts with reckless indifference
to human life, Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987). The
trial court in this case did not ask the jury to make an
Enmund/Tison finding. See A.R.S. § 13-752(P) (2010) (requiring
jury to make all factual determinations required by the
“Constitution of the United States or this state to impose a
death penalty”). Villalobos did not request an Enmund/Tison
finding below, nor does he raise this as an issue on appeal. In
any event, the evidence below overwhelmingly established that
Villalobos was the actual killer.
20
aggravator, however, does not require the victim to be conscious

for all injuries inflicted. McCray, 218 Ariz. at 259 ¶ 31, 183

P.3d at 510.

¶43 The State presented substantial evidence that Ashley

suffered and that Villalobos knew or should have known she was

suffering. Villalobos admitted that he beat Ashley at

approximately 5 p.m. Ashley was conscious until going to bed

around 1 a.m., thus suggesting she was also conscious during the

fatal beating and suffered its effects while conscious. The

medical examiner also testified that Ashley was conscious after

she was punched and would have been in pain comparable to that

from a ruptured appendix. Therefore, the jury properly found

the (F)(6) aggravator. See Morris, 215 Ariz. at 338 ¶ 61, 160

P.3d at 217.

¶44 “A finding of cruelty alone is sufficient to establish

the (F)(6) aggravator.” Id. at 341 ¶ 80, 160 P.3d at 220.

Moreover, Villalobos does not challenge the jury’s separate

finding that the murder was especially heinous or depraved. The

jury was appropriately instructed, without objection from

Villalobos, that it could find heinousness or depravity under

§ 13-751(F)(6) if it concluded that the murder was senseless,

the victim was helpless, and Villalobos had a caregiver

relationship with the victim. See State v. Prince, 206 Ariz.

24, 27 ¶ 10, 75 P.3d 114, 117 (2003); State v. Styers, 177 Ariz.

21
104, 116, 865 P.2d 765, 777 (1993). Ample evidence supported

each of these findings. Thus, the (F)(6) aggravator was

established independent of any finding of especial cruelty. See

State v. Djerf, 191 Ariz. 583, 595 ¶ 44, 959 P.2d 1274, 1286

(1998) (“a finding of . . . heinousness/depravity will suffice

to establish [the (F)(6)] factor”).

b. (F)(7) Aggravator

¶45 The State introduced uncontroverted evidence that

Villalobos was on authorized release from prison for federal and

state drug charges at the time of the offense. The jury

therefore did not abuse its discretion in finding the (F)(7)

aggravator.

c. (F)(9) Aggravator

¶46 The State introduced uncontroverted evidence that

Villalobos was twenty-one when he murdered Ashley, who was five.

The jury therefore did not abuse its discretion in finding the

(F)(9) aggravator.

22
 2. Penalty Phase6

¶47 Villalobos presented four general categories of

mitigation evidence in the penalty phase: prior abuse, mental

health, good behavior, and remorse. His claimed mitigation,

however, was subjected to significant rebuttal by the State.

See A.R.S. § 13-751(D) (allowing state to present evidence

rebutting claimed mitigation).

¶48 For example, although Villalobos alleged two incidents

of childhood abuse by his father, evidence was also presented

that his family was loving and supportive. The jury was

therefore entitled to disbelieve or discount the abuse

allegations. Cf. State v. Hampton, 213 Ariz. 167, 185 ¶ 89, 150

P.3d 950, 968 (2006) (upholding death sentence despite evidence

of childhood abuse); State v. Wallace, 160 Ariz. 424, 427, 773

P.2d 983, 986 (1989) (holding that a difficult family background

does not necessarily mandate leniency). Villalobos’s mental

health claims were similarly undermined by testimony, both from

his own expert and the State’s, that Villalobos’s I.Q. fell

within the normal range and he could tell right from wrong. Cf.

6
Villalobos does not argue that the jury abused its
discretion in determining that any mitigating circumstances were
not sufficiently substantial to warrant leniency. Even when
abuse of discretion review applies, appellate counsel should
“take advantage of all appropriate opportunities to argue why
death is not suitable punishment for their clients.” Morris,
215 Ariz. at 341 ¶ 76 n.10, 160 P.3d at 219 n.10 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
23
State v. Johnson, 212 Ariz. 425, 440 ¶ 65, 133 P.3d 735, 750

(2006) (according mental health mitigation evidence “minimal

weight” on independent review when defendant knew right from

wrong and the evidence did not have a causal nexus to the

crime).

¶49 Villalobos also argued below that he deserved leniency

because he was a high school graduate and behaved properly in

prison. The force of this claimed mitigation was diminished,

however, by evidence that Villalobos was suspended from high

school for excessive absences during a prior incarceration and

was disciplined while in prison for threatening another inmate.

Cf. Pandeli, 215 Ariz. at 533 ¶ 82, 161 P.3d at 576 (giving good

prison behavior mitigation little weight on independent review

because prisoners “are expected to behave and adapt to prison

life”).

¶50 Villalobos argued that the tapes of his police

interview, during which he cried several times and told the

polygrapher he was “sorry,” demonstrate remorse. However,

throughout the same interview, Villalobos deflected

responsibility for Ashley’s injuries by explaining the bruising

on her body as the result of CPR, implying that Verdugo caused

the bruising, justifying the beating as child discipline,

excusing the beating as a “reflex,” and refusing to acknowledge

the extent of the harm he caused. Cf. State v. Dann, 220 Ariz.

24
351, 376 ¶ 150, 207 P.3d 604, 629 (2009) (according evidence of

remorse little weight on independent review because defendant

denied responsibility for his conduct). Villalobos’s failure to

get medical attention for Ashley after she vomited on him, his

efforts to conceal her injuries from Verdugo, and his reluctance

to take Ashley to the hospital because he feared he would be a

suspect also tend to diminish the force of this claimed

mitigation.

¶51 This case involves the senseless murder of a helpless

child. Three aggravating circumstances were clearly

established. On this record, even if we assume that Villalobos

met his burden of establishing all claimed mitigation evidence

by a preponderance of the evidence, we cannot conclude that the

jury abused its discretion in determining that the mitigating

circumstances, taken as a whole, were not sufficiently

substantial to call for leniency. See Morris, 215 Ariz. at 341

¶ 82, 160 P.3d at 220. We therefore affirm the death sentence.

IV. CONCLUSION7

¶52 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Villalobos’s

convictions and sentences.

7
Villalobos also raises twelve claims about the death
penalty to preserve them for federal review. These claims, and
cases Villalobos represents have rejected his arguments, are set
out verbatim in the Appendix. (The numbering of these claims
has been changed to correct Villalobos’s error in skipping the
number five in his original numbering.)
25
 _____________________________________
Andrew D. Hurwitz, Vice Chief Justice

CONCURRING:

_____________________________________
Rebecca White Berch, Chief Justice

_____________________________________
Michael D. Ryan, Justice

_____________________________________
W. Scott Bales, Justice

_____________________________________
A. John Pelander, Justice

26
 APPENDIX

1. The fact-finder in capital cases must be able to consider

all relevant mitigating evidence in deciding whether to give the

death penalty. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,

304, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976). The trial court’s

failure to allow the jury to consider and give effect to all

mitigating evidence in this case by limiting its consideration

to that proven by a preponderance of the evidence is

unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

This court rejected this argument in McGill, 213 Ariz. at 161

¶ 59, 140 P.3d at 944 (2006).

2. The State’s failure to allege an element of a charged

offense in the grand jury indictment-the aggravating factors

that made the defendant death eligible-is a fundamental defect

that renders the indictment constitutionally defective under the

Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments and Article 2,

Section 1, 4, 13, 15, 23, and 24 of the Arizona Constitution.

See United States v. Chesney, 10 F.3d 641, 643 (9th Cir. 1993);

see also Apperendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348,

147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). This court rejected this argument in

McKaney v. Foreman ex rel. County of Maricopa, 209 Ariz. 268,

273 ¶ 23, 100 P.3d 18, 23 (2004).

27
3. Both the United States and the Arizona Constitutions

prohibit ex post facto laws. U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 10, cl. 1;

Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 25. Application of the new death penalty

law to defendant constitutes an impermissible ex post facto

application of a new law. This Court rejected this argument in

State v. Ring, 204 Ariz. 534, 547 ¶¶ 23-24, 65 P.3d 915, 928

(2003).

4. By allowing victim impact evidence at the penalty phase of

the trial, the trial court violated defendant’s constitutional

rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eight and Fourteenth Amendments

and Article 2, Sections 1, 4, 13, 15, 23, and 24 of the Arizona

Constitution. This Court rejected challenges to the use of

victim impact evidence in Lynn v. Reinstein, 205 Ariz. 186, 191

¶ 16, 68 P.3d 412, 417 (2003).

5. The trial court improperly omitted from the penalty phase

jury instructions words to the effect that they may consider

mercy or sympathy in deciding the value to assign the mitigation

evidence, instead telling them to assign whatever value the jury

deemed appropriate. The court also instructed the jury that

they “must not be influenced by mere sympathy or by prejudice in

determining these facts.” These instructions limited the

mitigation the jury could consider in violation of the Fifth,

Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments and Article 2, Sections

1, 4, 15, 23, and 24 of the Arizona Constitution. This Court

28
rejected this argument in State v. Carreon, 210 Ariz. 54, 70-71

¶¶ 81-87, 107 P.3d 900, 916-17 (2005).

6. The death penalty is cruel and unusual in violation of the

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and Article 2, Section 15 of

the Arizona Constitution. This Court rejected this argument in

State v. Harrod, 200 Ariz. 309, 320 ¶ 59, 26 P.3d 492, 503

(2001), vacated on other grounds, 536 U.S. 953, 122 S. Ct. 2653,

153 L.Ed.2d 830 (2002).

7. The death penalty is irrational and arbitrarily imposed; it

serves no purpose that is not adequately addressed by life in

prison, in violation of the defendant’s right to due process

under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution

and Article 2, Sections 1 and 4 of the Arizona Constitution.

This Court rejected these arguments in State v. Beaty, 158 Ariz.

232, 247, 762 P.2d 519, 534 (1988).

8. The prosecutor’s discretion to seek the death penalty lacks

standards and therefore violates the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments, and Article 2, Sections 1, 4, and 15 of the Arizona

Constitution. This Court rejected this argument in State v.

Sansing, 200 Ariz. 347, 361 ¶ 46, 26 P.3d 1118, 1132 (2001),

vacated on other grounds, 536 U.S. 954, 122 S. Ct. 2654, 153

L.Ed.2d 830 (2002).

9. Arizona’s death penalty is applied so as to discriminate

against poor, young, and male defendants in violation of Article

29
2, Sections 1, 4, and 13 of the Arizona Constitution. This

Court rejected this argument in Sansing, 200 Ariz. at 361 ¶ 46,

26 P.3d at 1132.

10. Proportionality review serves to identify which cases are

above the “norm” of first-degree murder, thus narrowing the

class of defendants who are eligible for the death penalty. The

absence of proportionality review of death sentences by Arizona

courts denies capital defendants due process of law and equal

protection and amounts to cruel and unusual punishment in

violation of the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and

Article 2, Section 15 of the Arizona Constitution. This Court

rejected this argument in Harrod, 200 Ariz. at 320 ¶65, 26 P.3d

at 503.

11. Arizona’s capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional

because it does not require the state to prove the death penalty

is appropriate or require the jury to find beyond a reasonable

doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the

accumulated mitigating circumstances. Instead, Arizona’s death

penalty statute requires defendants to prove their lives should

be spared in violation of the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendments and Article 2, Section 15 of the Arizona

Constitution. This Court rejected this argument in Pandeli, 200

Ariz. at 382 ¶ 92, 26 P.3d at 1153.

30
12. Arizona’s death penalty unconstitutionally requires

imposition of the death penalty whenever at least one

aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances exist,

in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and

Article 2, Section 15 of the Arizona Constitution. Arizona’s

death penalty law cannot constitutionally presume that death is

the appropriate default sentence. This Court rejected this

argument in State v. Miles, 186 Ariz. 10, 19, 918 P.2d 1028,

1037 (1996).

31