SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
En Banc
STATE OF ARIZONA, ) Arizona Supreme Court
) No. CR-06-0205-PR
Appellee, )
) Court of Appeals
v. ) Division One
) No. 1 CA-CR 04-0999
JOHN DAVID CRAWFORD, )
) Maricopa County
Appellant. ) Superior Court
) No. CR2004-011318-001 DT
)
)
) O P I N I O N
__________________________________)
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
The Honorable Thomas W. O'Toole, Judge
VACATED; REMANDED
_______________________________________________________________
Memorandum Decision of the Court of Appeals, Division One
Filed Feb. 16, 2006
VACATED
________________________________________________________________
John David Crawford Buckeye
In Propria Persona
TERRY GODDARD, ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL Phoenix
By Randall M. Howe, Chief Counsel,
Criminal Appeals Section
Joseph T. Maziarz, Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for the State of Arizona
________________________________________________________________
H U R W I T Z, Justice
¶1 Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 13-604 (Supp.
2004) subjects a criminal defendant who has a “prior historical
felony conviction” to enhanced sentences. See A.R.S. § 13-
604(W)(2) (defining “prior historical felony conviction”). If
the prior conviction occurred “in any court outside the
jurisdiction of this state,” it is treated as a prior historical
felony conviction only if it involves “an offense which if
committed within this state would be punishable as a felony.”
A.R.S. § 13-604(N). The issue in this case is how a court
determines whether a foreign conviction involves an offense that
would be punishable as a felony under state law if committed
here.
I.
¶2 John David Crawford was convicted after a jury trial
of one count of burglary in the first degree, a class 2 felony
under A.R.S. § 13-1508 (2001), and two counts of aggravated
assault, class 3 felonies under A.R.S. § 13-1204 (Supp. 2004).
The State sought enhanced sentences under A.R.S. § 13-604(D),
alleging that Crawford had two historical prior felony
convictions.
¶3 Crawford admitted the prior convictions, but claimed
that one did not qualify as a historical prior felony under
A.R.S. § 13-604(N). That conviction occurred in the United
States District Court for the District of Arizona in 2003, after
Crawford pled guilty to one count of an indictment alleging that
he had violated 18 United States Code (“U.S.C.”) § 1708 by
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possessing a credit card stolen from the United States mail.
Crawford contended that the federal conviction did not meet the
statutory definition of a prior historical felony conviction
because 18 U.S.C. § 1708 can be violated by conduct that would
not constitute a felony under Arizona law.
¶4 The State did not contest that the federal statute can
be violated by conduct that would not constitute a felony under
Arizona law. The State argued, however, that Crawford’s
actions, as described in the relevant count of the federal
indictment, would have violated either A.R.S. § 13-1802(a)(5)
(2001) (theft) or A.R.S. § 13-2102(a)(1) (2001) (credit card
theft), both felonies. After reviewing the allegations in the
federal indictment, the superior court agreed. Finding that
Crawford had two historical prior felony convictions, the court
imposed the presumptive sentences in A.R.S. § 13-604(D). 1
¶5 The court of appeals affirmed. State v. Crawford, 1
CA-CR 04-0999 (Ariz. App. Feb. 16, 2006) (mem. decision). We
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Because Crawford had committed the crimes for which he was
convicted while on probation, the superior court was required
under A.R.S. § 13-604.02 (2001) to impose no less than the
presumptive sentences specified in A.R.S. § 13-604(D) -- 15.75
years for the burglary conviction and 11.25 years for each of
the aggravated assault convictions.
If the superior court had found only one prior historical
felony conviction, sentencing would have been imposed pursuant
to § 13-604(B). The presumptive sentences would have been 9.25
years for the burglary and 6.5 years for the aggravated
assaults. Id.
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granted Crawford’s petition for review because defining the
method by which a court determines whether convictions in other
jurisdictions should be treated as historical prior felony
convictions involves a recurring issue in our criminal
jurisprudence. We have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section
5(3) of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Rule of Criminal
Procedure 31.19.
II.
¶6 “[W]hether a foreign conviction constitutes a felony
in Arizona . . . raises an issue of law,” which we review de
novo. State v. Heath, 198 Ariz. 83, 84 ¶ 4, 7 P.3d 92, 93
(2000). The defendant’s admission of the prior conviction is of
no consequence in that legal analysis. “Although an admission
by a defendant at trial dispenses with the necessity of proof of
prior convictions, such an admission does not constitute proof
that the foreign conviction would have been a felony under
Arizona law.” Id.
A.
¶7 Before using a foreign conviction for sentencing
enhancement purposes under § 13-604, the superior court must
first conclude that the foreign conviction includes “every
element that would be required to prove an enumerated Arizona
offense.” State v. Ault, 157 Ariz. 516, 521, 759 P.2d 1320,
1325 (1988). The court makes this determination by comparing
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the statutory elements of the foreign crime with those in the
relevant Arizona statute. Id. (comparing California and Arizona
rape statutes to determine if prior California rape convictions
constituted “serious” crimes under previous version of A.R.S. §
13-604(S)); State v. Benenati, 203 Ariz. 235, 242 ¶¶ 24-26, 52
P.3d 804, 811 (App. 2002) (comparing Florida and Arizona robbery
statutes to determine if prior Florida robbery convictions
“constituted a prior felony conviction for sentencing purposes”
under A.R.S. § 13-604(N)). “[T]here must be strict conformity
between the elements of the [foreign] felony and the elements of
some Arizona felony before [A.R.S. § 13-604(N)] can apply.”
State v. Clough, 171 Ariz. 217, 219, 829 P.2d 1263, 1265-66
(App. 1992) (comparing Montana bad check statute with various
Arizona theft and fraud statutes).
¶8 The cases interpreting § 13-604 are consistent with
our case law involving the use of foreign convictions in capital
sentencing. The capital cases make plain that only the
“statutory definition of the prior crime, and not its specific
factual basis” can be considered in determining whether a
foreign conviction is treated as a “serious offense” and thus an
aggravating circumstance under A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(2). State v.
Henry, 176 Ariz. 569, 587, 863 P.2d 861, 879 (1993) (reviewing
California involuntary manslaughter statute to determine if a
statutory element of that crime involved violence in order to
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determine whether the California conviction was an aggravating
circumstance under previous version of A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(2));
accord State v. Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, 216-17 ¶¶ 82-88, 141 P.3d
368, 391-92 (2006) (refusing to “look beyond the language of the
[foreign] statutes” to the complaint describing the defendant’s
conduct in determining whether prior California robbery
conviction constituted a “serious offense” under A.R.S. § 13-
703(F)(2)); State v. Schaaf, 169 Ariz. 323, 334, 819 P.2d 909,
920 (1991) (reviewing Nevada attempted murder statute to
determine if that crime involved violence and holding that
sentencing courts “may consider only the statute that the
defendant [was] charged with violating; it may not consider
other evidence”).
¶9 Under our precedents, the sentencing court focuses
solely on the elements of the foreign statute under which the
defendant was convicted, a purely legal issue, and is freed from
the burden of making factual determinations about the
defendant’s underlying conduct. We thus conserve judicial
resources by avoiding, “in effect, a second trial on defendant’s
prior conviction.” State v. Gillies, 135 Ariz. 500, 511, 662
P.2d 1007, 1018 (1983) (involving previous version of § 13-
703(F)(2)); see also Schaaf, 169 Ariz. at 333, 819 P.2d at 919
(affirming the approach taken in Gillies).
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B.
¶10 The State acknowledges the general rule that prior
foreign convictions are to be analyzed for enhancement purposes
under § 13-604 only by comparing the elements of the foreign
statute to Arizona law, but nonetheless argues that State v.
Thompson, 186 Ariz. 529, 924 P.2d 1048 (App. 1996), supports the
result below. In Thompson, the court of appeals held that
“charging documents” could be examined to “pinpoint the
statutory basis of a prior conviction.” Id. at 532, 924 P.2d at
1051. Such documents could be used for “establishing that the
defendant was convicted under a particular subsection of a
foreign statute, if that subsection encompasses only conduct
that would constitute a felony in Arizona.” Id.
¶11 Thompson is of no avail to the State here. As we made
clear in Roque, Thompson allows use of a charging document “only
to narrow the foreign conviction to a particular subsection of
the statute that served as the basis of the foreign conviction”
and not to establish “the factual nature of the prior
conviction.” 213 Ariz. at 217 ¶ 88, 141 P.3d at 392. The
federal statute at issue here, 18 U.S.C. § 1708, has no
subsections. The courts below used the charging documents not
to “pinpoint” the subsection describing the crime for which
Crawford was convicted, but instead to establish the “factual
nature of the conviction.”
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III.
¶12 The courts below erred in using the federal indictment
to determine whether Crawford’s 2003 federal conviction was a
prior historical felony conviction under § 13-604(N). We
accordingly vacate Crawford’s sentence and the memorandum
decision of the court of appeals and remand to the superior
court for further sentencing proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
_______________________________________
Andrew D. Hurwitz, Justice
CONCURRING:
_______________________________________
Ruth V. McGregor, Chief Justice
_______________________________________
Rebecca White Berch, Vice Chief Justice
_______________________________________
Michael D. Ryan, Justice
_______________________________________
W. Scott Bales, Justice
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