SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
In Division
PAUL MORENO, ) Arizona Supreme Court
) No. CV-06-0237-AP/EL
Plaintiff/Appellee, )
) Maricopa County
v. ) Superior Court
) No. CV 2006-009745
RUSSELL L. JONES, )
)
Defendant/Appellant, )
) O P I N I O N
)
JAN BREWER, ARIZONA SECRETARY OF )
STATE; EUGENE FISHER, in his )
official capacity as a member of )
the LA PAZ COUNTY BOARD OF )
SUPERVISORS; CLIFFORD EDEY, in )
his official capacity as a )
member of the LA PAZ COUNTY )
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS; MARY SCOTT, )
in her official capacity as a )
member of the LA PAZ COUNTY )
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS; LEONORE )
LONORA STUART, in her official )
capacity as a member of the YUMA )
COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS; )
KATHRYN PROCHASKA, in her )
official capacity as a member of )
the YUMA COUNTY BOARD OF )
SUPERVISORS; MARCO A. REYES, in )
his official capacity as a )
member of the YUMA COUNTY BOARD )
OF SUPERVISORS; GREGORY F. )
FERGUSON, in his official )
capacity as a member of the YUMA )
COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS; )
SHELLEY BAKER, in her official )
capacity as Recorder for LA PAZ )
COUNTY; SUSAN HIGHTOWER MARLER, )
in her official capacity as )
Recorder for YUMA COUNTY, )
)
Defendants. )
__________________________________)
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
The Honorable Kenneth L. Fields, Judge
REVERSED
________________________________________________________________
PERKINS COIE BROWN & BAIN PA Phoenix
By Paul F. Eckstein
Charles A. Blanchard
Rhonda L. Barnes
Patricia A. Alexander
Attorneys for Paul Moreno
TERRI SKLADANY, ACTING ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL Phoenix
By Emma Lehner Mamaluy, Assistant Attorney General
Peter A. Silverman, Assistant Attorney General
Diana L. Varela, Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Jan Brewer
JON R. SMITH, YUMA COUNTY ATTORNEY Yuma
By Robert Lee Pickels, Jr., Deputy County Attorney
William J. Kerekes, Deputy County Attorney
Attorneys for Leonore Lonora Stuart, Kathryn Prochaska, Marco A.
Reyes, Gregory F. Ferguson, and Susan Hightower Marler
WILLIAMS & ASSOCIATES Scottsdale
By Scott E. Williams
Mark Zinman
And
LAW OFFICE OF ROBERT E. MELTON Scottsdale
By Robert E. Melton
Attorneys for Russell L. Jones
ANDREW P. THOMAS, MARICOPA COUNTY ATTORNEY Phoenix
By Geraldine L. Roll, Deputy County Attorney
Attorneys for Eugene Fisher, Clifford Edey, Mary A. Scott, and
Shelley Baker
________________________________________________________________
B A L E S, Justice
¶1 This case concerns elector Paul Moreno’s challenge to
nomination petitions filed by Russell L. Jones, a Republican
2
candidate for State Senate in Legislative District 24. Jones
appealed from a superior court decision finding that he had
committed petition forgery, disqualifying him from the primary
election ballot, and declaring him ineligible for elected office
for five years. The expedited appeal was considered by a
division of this court consisting of Chief Justice McGregor,
Justice Hurwitz, and Justice Bales. On July 20, 2006, this
court issued an order holding that Jones should remain on the
ballot and stated that a written opinion would follow. This is
that opinion.
I. Procedural Background
¶2 A person seeking to appear on the ballot for a
partisan primary election must submit nomination petitions
signed by a sufficient number of qualified electors who either
belong to the candidate’s party or are not members of another
party represented on the ballot. Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) §§
16-314, -322 (Supp. 2005). Signatures on nomination petitions
must be obtained by circulators who are themselves eligible to
register to vote and who appropriately certify their collection
of the signatures. A.R.S. § 16-321(D) (Supp. 2005). The
circulator, the person “before whom the signatures were
written,” must verify, among other things, “that each of the
names on the petition was signed in his presence on the date
indicated . . . .” Id. A nomination petition is void if
3
verified by someone other than the person who actually obtained
the signatures. Brousseau v. Fitzgerald, 138 Ariz. 453, 456,
675 P.2d 713, 716 (1984).
¶3 Jones needed to submit 207 valid signatures. He filed
twenty-nine nomination petitions, containing 315 signatures,
with the Arizona Secretary of State, and he personally verified
nineteen petitions as their circulator.
¶4 On June 28, 2006, Moreno filed a timely challenge to
Jones’ petitions pursuant to A.R.S. § 16-351 (Supp. 2005).
Moreno argued that Jones should be disqualified from the ballot
because some petitions omitted information required by A.R.S. §
16-314(C); certain signatures were invalid; and Jones had
verified petitions containing signatures that he had not himself
obtained and that this conduct constituted petition forgery.
Under A.R.S. § 16-351(F), if a candidate is found guilty of
petition forgery, all of the candidate’s nominating petitions
are disqualified and the candidate is ineligible for elected
office for five years.
¶5 At trial on July 3, 2006, Jones testified that seven
petitions, which he had verified as the circulator, contained
signatures obtained at a town hall meeting in Yuma on April 17,
2006. Jones said he was present at this event while two adult
males (whose names he could not recall) were circulating his
nomination petitions, but Jones acknowledged that he had not
4
personally obtained all of the signatures. Jones also said
that, while he was generally aware that people were signing his
nomination petitions, he could not see what each person was
writing or identify particular signers.
¶6 Moreno called two witnesses who testified that they
were each approached at the April 17 town hall by a young high-
school-aged woman and asked to sign petitions for Jones.
Neither witness saw Jones in the vicinity.
¶7 With regard to petitions signed other than on April
17, Jones testified that he personally obtained all the
signatures on the petitions he verified as the circulator.
¶8 After the July 3 trial, the judge ruled that Jones was
not in fact the circulator for certain signatures obtained on
April 17. Consistent with Brousseau, the judge held that the
seven nominating petitions containing these signatures were
void, which invalidated sixty-three signatures. The trial judge
determined, however, that Jones had not committed petition
forgery with respect to these petitions, noting that Jones
attended the event at which they were circulated.
¶9 Twenty-four signatures (including nine that appeared
in the rejected nominating petitions) were found to be invalid
because the signer was ineligible or had signed more than once
on the same day. See A.R.S. § 16-321(C) (providing that if
elector signs more than one petition for the same office and the
5
signatures are dated on the same date, “all signatures by that
elector on that day are deemed invalid”). As a result, Jones
was left with 237 valid signatures. On July 5, the trial judge
entered judgment for Jones, qualifying him for the 2006 primary
election ballot.
¶10 On July 7, Moreno moved to re-open the judgment, Ariz.
R. Civ. P. 60(c), and for a new trial, Ariz. R. Civ. P. 59. The
motion alleged that Jones had testified falsely that he
personally circulated petitions on May 1 and May 2, 2006. In
support of this motion, Moreno submitted legislative attendance
records showing that Jones (currently a State Representative)
was in Phoenix at 1:30 p.m. on May 1 and on May 2. Moreno also
submitted a declaration by Barbara Harrison, who stated that she
had signed Jones’ petition in Yuma on the afternoon of May 1,
that the circulator was a woman, and that Harrison did not
recall seeing Jones there.
¶11 During a July 11 hearing on Moreno’s motion, Harrison
testified that one of Jones’ female relatives had asked her to
sign Jones’ petition in Yuma on May 1 between 2 p.m. and 3 p.m.
Harrison said she did not see Jones in the room when she signed.
The trial judge granted Moreno’s motion and held a new trial on
July 11 and 12. At this trial, Jones testified that, although
he had been in Yuma on the morning of May 1, he then flew to
Phoenix for legislative proceedings, and he remained in Phoenix
6
all day on May 2. Jones acknowledged that he could not have
obtained any signatures on May 2.
¶12 After the second trial, the judge entered a new
decision holding that not only were the seven petitions
containing signatures dated April 17 void, but that two other
petitions with signatures dated May 1 and May 2 were also void
because Jones had verified these petitions when in fact he was
in Phoenix when the signatures were obtained in Yuma. The judge
further held that Jones, by submitting these petitions to the
Secretary of State, had committed petition forgery. The judge
disqualified all of Jones’ 315 signatures, held Jones ineligible
for the primary election ballot, and barred him from seeking
elected office for five years pursuant to A.R.S. § 16-351(F).
¶13 Jones filed a timely appeal with this court pursuant
to A.R.S. § 16-351(A).
II. Indispensable Parties
¶14 As a threshold issue, Jones argues that the trial
court erred by not dismissing Moreno’s lawsuit for failure to
name indispensable parties. In a nomination petition challenge,
the plaintiff must name as defendants, among others, the board
of supervisors of the county responsible for preparing the
ballots. A.R.S. § 16-351(C)(3). Moreno, Jones argues, did not
name the Yuma County Board of Supervisors and the La Paz County
Board of Supervisors as distinct entities. Moreno, however, did
7
name each supervisor in his or her official capacity. This
satisfies the statutory requirement. Cf. Kyle v. Daniels, 198
Ariz. 304, 9 P.3d 1043 (2000) (ruling on the merits where
plaintiff had named supervisors in their official capacities).
III. Re-opening the Judgment
¶15 Jones also argues that the trial court erred in
granting Moreno’s motion to re-open the judgment under Rule
60(c)(3). This rule allows a trial judge to re-open a judgment
due to “fraud . . . , misrepresentation or other misconduct of
an adverse party” if the motion is made “within a reasonable
time” and no more than six months from entry of the order or
judgment. We review a trial judge’s decision to grant a Rule
60(c) motion for an abuse of discretion. City of Phoenix v.
Geyler, 144 Ariz. 323, 328, 697 P.2d 1073, 1078 (1985).
¶16 Although A.R.S. § 16-351(A) provides short time limits
for challenges to nomination petitions, the statute does not
categorically preclude the filing of a Rule 60(c) motion.
Moreno filed his motion on July 7, just two days after the trial
judge entered his initial order denying relief and well within
Moreno’s five-day deadline under A.R.S. § 16-351(A) to appeal
the decision. The trial court’s prompt disposition of the
motion did not impede this court in deciding the related appeals
in advance of the deadlines for preparing the ballot. Even
within the constrained time limits of A.R.S. § 16-351(A), we
8
find that Moreno filed his motion “within a reasonable time.”
Ariz. R. Civ. P. 60(c).
¶17 Jones also argues that the trial court erred in
granting Moreno’s Rule 60(c) motion because Jones did not
substantially impair or interfere with Moreno’s ability to
present his case. Instead, Jones argues, Moreno simply failed
to timely discover evidence that was available before trial. We
reject this argument. Although evidence regarding Jones’
legislative attendance on May 1 and May 2 was available before
the July 3 trial, Moreno did not make his Rule 60(c) motion
simply to introduce evidence he had failed to uncover earlier.
Moreno instead sought to prove that Jones had made
misrepresentations to the court in his July 3 testimony. The
false testimony that Jones had personally obtained all the
signatures he verified other than those dated April 17 clearly
influenced the trial court’s initial ruling. In these
circumstances, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in
re-opening the judgment pursuant to Rule 60(c) or, having done
so, in granting a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(b).
IV. Petition Forgery
¶18 The trial court found that Jones had presented
petitions to the Arizona Secretary of State, which he had signed
as the circulator, knowing that he had not obtained the
signatures in his presence as required by A.R.S. § 16-321(D).
9
This conduct, the trial court further concluded, constituted
“petition forgery” within the meaning of A.R.S. § 16-351(F).
The latter statute provides that “all petitions that have been
submitted by a candidate who is found guilty of petition forgery
shall be disqualified and that candidate shall not be eligible
to seek election to a public office for a period of not less
than five years.” A.R.S. § 16-351(F).
¶19 Jones argues both that there was insufficient evidence
to support the trial court’s finding that he was not the
circulator of the petitions containing signatures dated April
17, May 1, and May 2, and that, even if he did not circulate
those petitions, his conduct in verifying them does not
constitute petition forgery under A.R.S. § 16-351(F).
¶20 We uphold a trial court’s findings of fact unless
clearly erroneous as not either “supported by reasonable
evidence or based on a reasonable conflict of evidence.” O’Hern
v. Bowling, 109 Ariz. 90, 92-93, 505 P.2d 550, 552-53 (1973).
¶21 The trial court did not clearly err in finding that
Jones was not the circulator of petitions containing signatures
dated April 17, May 1, and May 2. At trial, Jones admitted that
he personally collected only one of the signatures dated April
17 and did not know who otherwise had signed his petitions that
day. With regard to the May 1 and May 2 signatures, Jones first
testified during the July 3 trial that he personally obtained
10
them. During the second trial, however, Jones admitted that he
was in Phoenix for legislative proceedings on the afternoon of
May 1 and all day on May 2. He acknowledged that he could not
have collected signatures in Yuma at the same time.
¶22 Substantial evidence also supports the trial court’s
finding that Jones had presented to the Secretary of State
nomination petitions that he had verified as the circulator
knowing that he had not obtained the signatures in his presence
as required by A.R.S. § 16-321(D). This statute identifies the
circulator as the person “before whom the signatures were
written” and requires the circulator to verify that the
petitions have been signed in his presence. Similarly, the
petition forms that Jones signed expressly state, immediately
before his signature, “that each of the names on the petition
were signed in my presence on the date indicated.” Jones could
not have been present when petitions were signed in Yuma on the
afternoon of May 1 or on May 2, yet he nonetheless submitted
petitions that he verified had been signed in his presence on
these dates.
¶23 We must next determine whether, as a matter of law, a
candidate who falsely verifies a nomination petition as the
circulator commits petition forgery under A.R.S. § 16-351(F).
We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. City of
11
Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 209 Ariz. 544, 547 ¶ 8,
105 P.3d 1163, 1166 (2005).
¶24 “Petition forgery” is not defined in A.R.S. § 16-
351(F) or elsewhere in Arizona statutes. Because the term is
undefined and subject to more than one reasonable meaning, we
must look to other materials to determine the legislature’s
intent. “To discern the intent the court will examine the
policy behind the statute, the evil sought to be remedied, the
context, the language, and the historical background of the
statute.” Clifton v. DeCillis, 187 Ariz. 112, 114, 927 P.2d
772, 774 (1996).
¶25 Jones argues that “petition forgery” should be
understood to refer to the conduct proscribed in A.R.S. § 16-
1020 (1996), the penal provision of the election laws concerning
the improper signing of nomination petitions.1 Jones argues that
he signed his own name and did not violate A.R.S. § 16-1020.
¶26 Moreno, on the other hand, argues that “petition
forgery” occurs if a person violates the Criminal Code’s general
1
Under A.R.S. § 16-1020, “[a] person knowingly signing any name
other than his own to a nomination petition . . . except in a
circumstance where he signs for a person, in the presence of and
at the specific request of such person who is incapable of
signing his own name because of physical infirmity, or knowingly
signing his name more than once to a nomination petition . . .
or who is not at the time of signing a qualified elector
entitled to vote at the election initiated by the petition, is
guilty of a class 1 misdemeanor.”
12
prohibition on forgery in A.R.S. § 13-2002(a)(3) (2001), and
that this statute makes it a class four felony for a person,
with the intent to defraud, to offer or present “a forged
instrument or one that contains false information.” Id. Moreno
argues that Jones “forged” his name as the circulator of
petitions actually circulated by others.
¶27 Although the issue of statutory interpretation is not
clear cut, for several reasons we believe the most plausible
reading of A.R.S. § 16-351(F) is that “petition forgery” is
meant to refer to the conduct proscribed by A.R.S. § 16-1020,
not A.R.S. § 13-2002. First, we believe that “petition forgery”
would ordinarily be understood to refer to falsely signing
another’s name to a petition or to otherwise fabricating signed
petitions. See, e.g., Webster’s New Third International
Dictionary 891 (1976) (noting that forgery usually refers to
“the crime of falsely and with fraudulent intent making or
altering a writing or other instrument”). The definition of
“forgery” in the Criminal Code is more expansive, embracing not
only “forged” instruments (those falsely made, altered, or
completed), but also documents merely containing “false
information.” Compare A.R.S. § 13-2001(8) (Supp. 2005)
(defining “forged instrument”) with A.R.S. § 13-2002 (defining
“forgery”).
13
¶28 Second, to the extent it is necessary to look to other
statutes to interpret A.R.S. § 16-351(F), the most logical place
to look is in other provisions of the election laws. “If the
statutes relate to the same subject or have the same general
purpose-that is, statutes which are in pari materia-they should
be read in connection with, or should be construed together with
other related statutes, as though they constituted one law.”
State ex rel. Larson v. Farley, 106 Ariz. 119, 122, 471 P.2d
731, 734 (1970). Without some indication that the legislature
actually intended to define petition forgery pursuant to A.R.S.
§ 13-2002, we look to other provisions within title 16. Neither
A.R.S. § 16-351(F) nor other provisions of the election laws
contain any suggestion that “petition forgery” should be defined
by reference to the Criminal Code’s general forgery provision in
A.R.S. § 13-2002.
¶29 Nor do we find persuasive Moreno’s reference to A.R.S.
13-102(D) (2001), which states: “Except as otherwise expressly
provided, or unless the context otherwise requires, the
provisions of this title shall govern the construction of and
punishment for any offense defined outside this title.” Section
16-351(F) does not define a “criminal offense,” but rather
provides a civil penalty (disqualification from the ballot and
ineligibility for public office) for certain conduct.
14
¶30 Our conclusion regarding the meaning of the term
“petition forgery” also is consistent with the somewhat murky
legislative history of A.R.S. § 16-351(F). This provision was
added by the legislature in 1996 as part of general amendments
to the election laws. These amendments, as initially approved
by the House of Representatives as House Bill (“H.B.”) 2329, did
not alter the pre-existing version of A.R.S. § 16-351.
¶31 When H.B. 2329 was considered by the Senate Government
Committee, Senator Chesley offered an amendment that would have
both amended A.R.S. § 16-1020 and added a new A.R.S. § 16-
351(F). Hearing on H.B. 2329 Before the Senate Comm. on Gov.,
42d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 1996). The amendment to A.R.S. §
16-1020 would have labeled the proscribed conduct as “petition
forgery” and increased the penalty from a class one misdemeanor
to a class four felony. Id. Senator Chesley’s amendment also
would have added a new A.R.S. § 16-351(F) with this language:
ALL PETITIONS THAT HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED BY A CANDIDATE
THAT IS FOUND GUILTY OF PETITION FORGERY PURSUANT TO
SECTION 16-1020 SHALL BE DISQUALIFIED AND THAT
CANDIDATE SHALL NOT BE ELIGIBLE TO SEEK ELECTION TO
PUBLIC OFFICE FOR A PERIOD OF NOT LESS THAN TWO YEARS.
Chesley Proposed Amendment, Hearing on H.B. 2329 Before the
Senate Comm. on Gov., 42d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 1996).
¶32 During the Senate committee discussion of the Chesley
amendment, Senator Noland and a research analyst contended that
forgery concerning nomination petitions was not subject to
15
prosecution under the general Criminal Code.2 Hearing on H.B.
2329 Before the Senate Comm. on Gov., 42d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess.
(Ariz. 1996) (statements of Senate Research Analyst Tami Ryall
and Arizona State Senator Patricia Noland). Senator Noland also
remarked that it would be difficult to prove criminal charges
and that a class four felony could result in severe penalties.
Id. After this discussion, the committee approved Senator
Noland’s motion to delete the language from the Chesley
amendment that would have amended A.R.S. § 16-1020 to label the
conduct “petition forgery” and to increase the penalty to a
class four felony. Id. The committee, however, approved
Senator Chesley’s amendment to add the new A.R.S. § 16-351(F).
Id.
¶33 The Senate Rules Committee then proposed an amendment
to the proposed A.R.S. § 16-351(F) to delete its reference to
2
Senator Noland and the analyst may have been mistaken in their
belief that a defendant must be motivated by pecuniary gain in
order to be convicted for forgery under the Criminal Code. See
State v. Thompson, 194 Ariz. 295, 297 ¶ 15, 981 P.2d 595, 597
(App. 1999) (holding that A.R.S. § 13-2002 does not require
proof of intent to cause pecuniary loss). We need not determine
here the precise contours of A.R.S. § 13-2002; the significant
point is that because at least one legislator thought “petition
forgery” was not subject to prosecution under A.R.S. § 13-2002,
it is less likely that the phrase “petition forgery” in § 16-
351(F) was meant to refer to conduct violating § 13-2002.
Moreover, there is no evidence that any legislator contemplated
violations of the general forgery statute would trigger the
civil penalties under proposed A.R.S. § 16-351(F).
16
A.R.S. § 16-1020. Senate Comm. on Rules Proposed Amendment,
Hearing on H.B. 2329 Before the Senate Comm. on Rules, 42d Leg.,
2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 1996). This action, however, does not
necessarily imply any substantive change in the proposed
legislation. Pursuant to legislative rules, the Rules Committee
is limited to considering the “constitutionality and proper form
and the reasonable germaneness” of the bill and proposed
amendments. Senate Rule 7(C)(5) (1995-96). The Rules Committee
can propose corrective and technical amendments, but it cannot
propose substantive amendments without concurrence from the
bill’s sponsor. Id. at 7(C)(4).
¶34 During a Committee of the Whole proceeding, the Rules
Committee amendment was withdrawn and Senator Chesley proposed a
floor amendment, to substitute for the Senate Government
Committee amendment, that omitted the reference in proposed
A.R.S. § 16-351(F) to A.R.S. § 16-1020. Bill Status Overview
for H.B. 2329, 42d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 1996). The
pertinent language of Senator Chesley’s floor amendment is as
follows:
IN ADDITION TO THE PROCEDURES SET FORTH IN THIS
SECTION, ALL PETITIONS THAT HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED BY A
CANDIDATE THAT IS FOUND GUILTY OF PETITION FORGERY
SHALL BE DISQUALIFIED AND THAT CANDIDATE SHALL NOT BE
ELIGIBLE TO SEEK ELECTION TO A PUBLIC OFFICE FOR A
PERIOD OF NOT LESS THAN TWO YEARS.
17
Chesley Proposed Floor Amendment #2, Hearing on H.B. 2329 Before
the Senate Comm. of the Whole, 42d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz.
1996).
¶35 Senator Hartley then proposed amending this language
to increase the disqualification period from two to five years.
Hartley Proposed Floor Amendment to Chesley Proposed Floor
Amendment #2, Hearing on H.B. 2329 Before the Senate Comm. of
the Whole, 42d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 1996). The Senate
adopted Senator Chesley’s floor amendment as amended by Senator
Hartley. Bill Status Overview for H.B. 2329, 42d Leg., 2d Reg.
Sess. (Ariz. 1996). The House of Representatives concurred with
the amended bill without substantive comment. H.B. 2329, as
amended by the Senate, enacted the language currently found in
A.R.S. § 16-351(F).
¶36 The legislative history, in summary, shows that
Senator Chesley initially proposed both to increase the penalty
for any person’s violating A.R.S. § 16-1020 to a class four
felony and to add a new § 16-351(F) providing that a candidate
found guilty of violating § 16-1020 would also have all
petitions disqualified and would be ineligible for elected
office for two years. The Legislature ultimately determined not
to increase the penalty for violating A.R.S. § 16-1020 to a
class four felony, to preserve the reference to “petition
forgery” in A.R.S. § 16-351(F) but to delete the phrase
18
“pursuant to A.R.S. § 16-1020,” and to increase the
disqualification from elected office to five years for
candidates found guilty of petition forgery. There is no
indication that any legislator contemplated that the proposed
legislation would also expand the sanctions when a person
improperly verifies nomination petitions circulated by others –
conduct that, although not reached by A.R.S. § 16-1020, results
in the voiding of the petitions under this court’s 1984 decision
in Brousseau.
¶37 We do not believe that this history suggests that the
Legislature intended the disqualification in A.R.S. § 16-351(F)
to be triggered by forgery under the general Criminal Code
provision (which is a class four felony) rather than by a
violation of A.R.S. § 16-1020. Senator Chesley introduced his
amendment to increase the penalty for violating A.R.S. § 16-1020
to a felony and to add additional sanctions for candidates who
violated this statute. This background suggests that the
Legislature thought that the conduct subject to A.R.S. § 16-1020
coincided with “petition forgery” for purposes of A.R.S. § 16-
351(F). The latter statute, as enacted, does omit the phrase
“pursuant to A.R.S. § 16-1020” after the words “found guilty of
petition forgery.” This change, however, most likely reflects a
desire to avoid suggesting that the finding that a candidate is
guilty of petition forgery must occur through a criminal
19
conviction under A.R.S. § 16-1020. Requiring a conviction to
trigger A.R.S. § 16-351(F) would largely render ineffective the
statute’s provision disqualifying all of a candidate’s submitted
petitions, as a criminal conviction rarely could be obtained
before the relevant election occurs.
¶38 We hold that petition forgery under A.R.S. § 16-351(F)
refers to conduct violating A.R.S. § 16-1020. Although Jones
improperly signed his name to the petitions of April 17, May 1,
and May 2 as the circulator, and certainly misled the court in
his July 3 testimony, his conduct did not violate A.R.S. § 16-
1020. The trial court thus erred in finding Jones guilty of
petition forgery.3
V. The Validity of Petition 20
¶39 Given our conclusion that Jones did not commit
petition forgery, whether he qualifies for the ballot turns on
the validity of petition 20. This petition was circulated by
someone other than Jones and contains fourteen signatures.
Apart from these signatures, Jones submitted 202 signatures that
3
Our decision concerning the scope of “petition forgery” under
A.R.S. § 16-351(F) does not, of course, express any view whether
a candidate’s false verification of a nominating petition or
related false testimony might merit prosecution under A.R.S. §
13-2002 (forgery), A.R.S. § 13-2702 (2001) (perjury), or other
criminal provisions.
20
have not been successfully challenged, and he needs at least 207
signatures to qualify for the ballot.4
¶40 In his cross-appeal, Moreno argues that the trial
court erred in not disqualifying the signatures on petition 20
because the petition form, by omitting the specific date of the
primary election, failed to substantially comply with the
requirements of A.R.S. § 16-314(C). Whether a petition form
substantially complies with the statutory requirements is a
“pure question of law” that we review de novo. See Clifton, 187
Ariz. at 113, 927 P.2d at 773 (reviewing sufficiency of
petitions for “nomination other than by primary” pursuant to
A.R.S. § 16-341 (1996)).
¶41 The form of nomination petitions is addressed in
A.R.S. § 16-314(C). Nomination petitions must include, in
language substantially in the form of the statute, certain
information, including the elector’s county and party
registration, the candidate’s name and address, the office in
question, and when the election is “to be held.” Here, petition
20 states that it concerns “the primary election to be held
4
As noted above, Jones submitted 315 signatures to the Secretary
of State. Eighty-three of these signatures are invalid under
Brousseau because they appear on petitions that Jones improperly
signed as the circulator (sixty-three on the seven petitions
containing signatures dated April 17 and another twenty on two
petitions containing signatures dated May 1 or May 2). Another
fifteen signatures are invalid because they are from ineligible
signers or persons who signed twice on the same day.
21
__________, 2006” without specifying the day or month of the
election.5
¶42 In determining whether a nomination petition form
substantially complies with the statutory requirements, this
court has focused on whether the omission of information could
confuse or mislead electors signing the petition. See Marsh v.
Haws, 111 Ariz. 139, 140, 526 P.2d 161, 162 (1974). Because
“the statute allows a measure of inconsistency by only requiring
substantial compliance,” Clifton, 187 Ariz. at 116, 927 P.2d at
776, “no mere irregularity can be considered, unless it be shown
that the result has been affected by such irregularity,” id.
(quoting Territory ex rel. Sherman v. Bd. of Supervisors, 2
Ariz. 248, 253, 12 P. 730, 732 (1887)).
¶43 Marsh illustrates the standard for determining
substantial compliance. In that case, two candidates had noted
on their petitions that they were running for justice of the
peace but had failed to identify the particular precinct. 111
5
With regard to nominations for partisan primary elections or
for non-partisan elections, A.R.S. § 16-314(C) (Supp. 2005)
directs, among other things, that the petitions shall include
language substantially stating “the primary election to be held
________.” In contrast, the statute governing nominations for
partisan elections other than by primary, A.R.S. § 16-341(D),
states that such petitions shall include language substantially
stating “election to be held on the _______ day of _________,
__________.” We need not decide here whether the omission of
any date whatsoever would invalidate nominating petitions
governed by A.R.S. § 16-314(C) or whether the inclusion of only
the year of the election would substantially comply with A.R.S.
§ 16-341(D).
22
Ariz. at 140, 526 P.2d at 162. The justice court precinct
boundaries did not coincide with voter registration precincts.
Id. Given this fact, this court concluded that the petitions
did not substantially comply with the statutory requirements
because there was a potential for voter confusion. Id. A voter
signing a petition “would [not] automatically know that he was
nominating a candidate for the office of ‘Justice of the Peace’”
of any particular precinct. Id.
¶44 Here, we do not believe that petition 20, by omitting
the particular day and month of the 2006 primary, created a
significant danger that electors would be confused or misled.
Moreno, citing A.R.S. § 16-204(B) (Supp. 2005), notes that under
Arizona election laws, governmental entities could hold primary
elections on four different dates in 2006. This statute,
however, concerns elections for certain local offices. Petition
20 specifies that Jones is seeking nomination to run for the
Arizona State Senate. There is only one primary election for
state legislative office – the eighth Tuesday prior to the
general election for state office, A.R.S. § 16-201 (1996), which
is held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November,
A.R.S. § 16-211 (1996).
¶45 In contrast to Marsh, electors would “automatically
know” for which primary election they were signing because the
petition specified the year and there is only one primary that
23
year for state legislative office. Thus, the 2006 primary
election date provided on petition 20 is in substantial
compliance. Cf. Adams v. Bolin, 77 Ariz. 316, 322, 271 P.2d
472, 476 (1954) (putting the phrases “hereinafter designated”
and “the precinct designated or indicated by my address” in the
blank provided to indicate the relevant precinct was legally
sufficient to identify elector’s precinct).
VI. Conclusion
¶46 Because we determine that improperly verifying
petitions that others actually circulated is not petition
forgery, and because Jones otherwise obtained a sufficient
number of signatures to appear on the primary election ballot,
we reverse the trial court’s judgment in favor of Moreno and
vacate the trial court’s order enjoining the public defendants
from placing Jones’ name on the primary election ballot. We
remand with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Jones.
¶47 Although we have resolved this case in Jones’ favor,
our decision is not intended to diminish the importance of the
integrity of the nomination process. By requiring the
circulator to verify the petitions, “[t]he legislature has
sought to protect the process by providing for some safeguards
in the way nomination signatures are obtained and verified.”
Brousseau, 138 Ariz. at 455, 675 P.2d at 715. Falsely
certifying a petition is a “serious matter involving more than a
24
technicality.” Id. Accordingly, we recognized in Brousseau
that petitions that are improperly certified are void. It is
for the legislature to consider, however, whether additional
sanctions – such as automatic disqualification from the election
in question or the five-year disqualification under A.R.S. § 16-
351(F) – are appropriate when a candidate falsely affirms that
he is the circulator of petitions actually circulated by others.
We conclude today only that the current version of A.R.S. § 16-
351(F) does not so provide.
________________________________
W. Scott Bales, Justice
CONCURRING:
__________________________________
Ruth V. McGregor, Chief Justice
__________________________________
Andrew D. Hurwitz, Justice
25