TAYLOR BROWN, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,
v.
LEROY M. WILEY, HUGH R. BANKS, WILLIAM G. LANE, HENRY VAN DERZEE, AND EDWARD H. LANE, MERCHANTS, TRADING UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE OF L.M. WILEY & CO.
Supreme Court of United States.
*443 It was argued by Mr. Reverdy Johnson (upon which side there was also a brief by Mr. Hughes) for the plaintiff in error, and by Mr. Larocque for the defendants.
*447 Mr. Justice GRIER delivered the opinion of the court.
Wiley & Co., plaintiffs below, declared on a bill of exchange drawn by Taylor Brown on Messrs. Campbell & Strong, of New Orleans, to order of plaintiff, dated 23d of March, 1854, and payable on the 1st of May, 1855. It was presented for acceptance on the 10th of June, 1854, and was protested for non-acceptance; of which the drawer had due notice.
It is admitted the bill was given for full value; but the defendant set up by way of special plea, and offered to prove to the jury, a parol agreement between him and the plaintiffs, that this bill should not be presented for acceptance till after a certain other draft, payable in May, 1854, was provided for, by placing funds in the hands of the drawees, who had agreed to accept the last bill after funds had been received to meet their acceptance of the first.
It is the rejection of this defence by the court below that is the subject of exception. It presents the question, whether parol evidence should have been received, to vary, alter, or contradict that which appears on the face of the bill of exchange.
When the operation of a contract is clearly settled by general principles of law, it is taken to be the true sense of the contracting parties. This is not only a positive rule of the common law, but it is a general principle in the construction of contracts. Some precedents to the contrary may be found in some of our States, originating in hard cases; but they are generally overruled by the same tribunals from which they emanated, on experience of the evil consequences flowing from a relaxation of the rule. There is no ambiguity arising in this case which needs explanation. By the face of the bill, the owner of it had a right to demand acceptance immediately, and *448 to protest it for non-acceptance. The proof of a parol contract, that it should not be presentable till a distant, uncertain, or undefined period, tended to alter and vary, in a very material degree, its operation and effect. (See Thompson v. Ketchum, 8 John., 192.)
Any number of conflicting cases on this subject might be cited. It will be sufficient to refer to the decisions of this court, those of Texas, where the suit was brought, and of Louisiana, where the contract was made.
In the Bank of United States v. Dunn, (6 Peters, 56,) this court have declared "that there is no rule better settled or more salutary in its application than that which precludes the admission of parol evidence to contradict or substantially vary the legal import of a written agreement." The case of Brochmore v. Davenport, 14 Texas Rep., 602, a case precisely similar to the present, adopts the same rule. The case of Robishat v. Folse, 11 Louisiana, and of Barthet v. Estebene, 5 Ann. Rep., 315, and several others, acknowledge the same doctrine, thereby overruling some early cases in Louisiana which had departed from it.
This being the only point urged by plaintiff in error as a ground of reversal, the judgment of the court below is affirmed.