IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 32881
ANISSA STOUT, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
) Boise, February 2007 Term
v. )
) 2007 Opinion No. 61
KEY TRAINING CORPORATION, dba )
NORTHWEST LINEMAN COLLEGE, ) Filed: April 11, 2007
)
Defendant-Respondent. ) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
)
)
)
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Honorable Kathryn A. Sticklen, District Judge.
District court order denying attorney fees, affirmed.
Michael B. Schwarzkopf, Boise, argued for appellant.
Trout, Jones, Gledhill, Fuhrman, P.A., Boise, for respondent. Rory Rolland Jones
argued.
__________________________________
BURDICK, Justice
This case asks us to decide whether I.C. § 67-5908(3) or I.C. § 12-120(3) allows an
award of attorney fees to an employee bringing a successful employment discrimination claim
under the Idaho Human Rights Act.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant, Anissa Stout, brought four claims against Respondent, Key Training Corp.
(Key Training): (1) violation of the Idaho Human Rights Act (I.C. § 67-5909); (2) termination in
violation of public policy; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (4) breach of
contract. Key Training then moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motion on all claims except for the statutory claim. The district court noted that the parties
agreed there were issues of fact on the statutory claim and that the parties agreed Key Training
was entitled to summary judgment on the public policy claim.
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A jury trial was held on the statutory claim in which Stout contended her former
employer, Key Training, violated the Idaho Human Rights Act by discriminating against her
because of gender and pregnancy. After a trial, the jury awarded Stout $50,927.16. Stout then
moved the district court for an award of reasonable attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3) and
I.C. § 67-5908. The district court denied Stout’s request for attorney fees. Stout timely appealed
that order to this Court.
II. ANALYSIS
The district court’s decision to award attorney fees is reviewed under the abuse of
discretion standard. Contreras v. Rubley, 142 Idaho 573, 576, 130 P.3d 1111, 1114 (2006).
However, when an award of attorney fees depends on the interpretation of a statute, the standard
of review for statutory interpretation applies. Id. “The interpretation of a statute is a question of
law over which this Court exercises free review.” Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. #84,
142 Idaho 804, 807, 134 P.3d 655, 658 (2006). We must construe a statute to give effect to the
legislature’s intent. Id.
Stout argues that she is entitled to an award of attorney fees on her successful
employment discrimination claim pursuant to I.C. § 67-5908(3) and I.C. § 12-120(3).
Additionally, both parties argue they are entitled to attorney fees on appeal. Each argument is
addressed in turn.
A. Stout is not entitled to attorney fees under I.C. § 67-5908(3)
Stout argues that she is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 67-5908(3) because she
would be entitled to attorney fees under federal employment discrimination law and because the
legislature intended the courts have broad remedial discretion when enforcing the Idaho Human
Rights Act.
Idaho Code § 67-5908(3) states:
In a civil action filed by the commission or filed directly by the person
alleging unlawful discrimination, if the court finds that unlawful discrimination
has occurred, its judgment shall specify an appropriate remedy or remedies
therefor. Such remedies may include, but are not limited to:
(a) An order to cease and desist from the unlawful practice specified in the
order;
(b) An order to employ, reinstate, promote or grant other employment benefits
to a victim of unlawful employment discrimination;
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(c) An order for actual damages including lost wages and benefits, provided
that such back pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two (2) years
prior to the filing of the complaint with the commission or the district court,
whichever occurs first;
(d) An order to accept or reinstate such a person in a union;
(e) An order for punitive damages, not to exceed one thousand dollars
($1,000) for each willful violation of this chapter.
We construe a statute so as to give effect to legislative intent. Carrier, 142 Idaho at 807,
134 P.3d at 658. The legislative intent reflected in I.C. § 67-5901 allows our state courts to look
to federal law for guidance when interpreting the Idaho Human Rights Act.1 O’Dell v. Basabe,
119 Idaho 796, 811, 810 P.2d 1082, 1097 (1991).
The district court correctly analyzed Stout’s claim:
Stout asserts that the . . . language of [I.C. § 67-5908(3)], especially when
read in conjunction with the federal statutes it implements, permits an award of
attorney fees. The Idaho Human Rights Act itself does not contain any express
provision relating to attorney fees. The Court has reviewed the relevant federal
statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. That statute contains a provision similar to that set
forth above, in that it allows a court to grant “any other equitable relief.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1). However, unlike the Idaho statute, the federal statute
also contains an express provision for an award of attorney fees. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(k). The Court has compared the above-quoted language to similar
language in the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, Idaho Code § 48-608(1), which
provides that the court may grant “other appropriate relief.” That statute also
contains a specific section relating to attorney fee awards, 48-608(4). The Court
concludes from its review of the foregoing authorities that since the Idaho Human
Rights Act does not make express allowance for an award of attorney fees, the
legislature did not intend that such an award would be available.
In this case, an analysis of federal law does not lead to the conclusion that the Idaho
Human Rights Act includes the remedy of attorney fees. The federal Civil Rights Act
specifically provides for attorney fees while the Idaho Human Rights Act does not. Furthermore,
the federal Civil Rights Act provision allowing for an award of attorney fees had been enacted
1
Idaho Code § 67-5901 states:
The general purposes of this chapter are: (1) [t]o provide for execution within the state of the
policies embodied in the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, and Titles I and III of the Americans
with Disabilities Act.
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long before the Idaho Human Rights Act remedy provision.2 Yet, the Idaho legislature chose not
to include attorney fees in its remedy provision.
No language in the Idaho Human Rights Act indicates that the legislature contemplated
remedies which go toward the legal expense of enforcing the act. As demonstrated by the
language in the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, when the legislature intends to provide for an
award of attorney fees, it does so. It is reasonable, then, to infer that the legislature did not
intend the expense of enforcement to fall under the I.C. § 67-5908(3) statutory remedial
provision especially in light of the fact that the federal civil rights law expressly allowed for an
award of attorney fees when I.C. § 67-5908(3) was enacted. Therefore, we affirm the district
court and hold that I.C. § 67-5908(3) does not allow for an award of attorney fees.
B. Stout is not entitled to attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3)
Stout argues she should be awarded attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3), which
allows attorney fees in actions relating to contract for services, because based on a sequence of
events below it would be unfair to deny her attorney fees under this statute. Key Training argues
that Stout is not entitled to attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) because Stout prevailed on a
statutory claim, not a contract claim.3
We have held that termination of employment at will in violation of public policy is a
contract action which results in contract damages. Hummer v. Evans, 129 Idaho 274, 280, 923
P.2d 981, 987 (1996). In this case, though, the district court dismissed Stout’s termination in
violation of public policy claim on summary judgment. Below, Stout conceded that because
statutory remedies provide full relief to plaintiffs her wrongful discharge claim was unnecessary.
However, Stout argues she only conceded that point because Key Training conceded that federal
law was the appropriate standard of law as to her discrimination claim. Stout asserts that federal
law favorably impacts her attorney fees claim and that Key Training is now arguing federal law
does not apply; therefore it would be unfair to prevent Stout from receiving the remedies she
could have received as a result of pursuing her termination in violation of public policy claim.
2
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) was enacted in 1964. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 259. Idaho Code § 67-5908 was
enacted in 1980. 1980 Id. Sess. Law, ch. 97, § 3, p. 216.
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Key Training also argues that Stout’s request for fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) contains issues not raised below and
therefore that should not be considered on appeal. While Stout’s arguments here for entitlement to an award under
that subsection is not identical to her arguments below, in her motion for attorney fees, she specifically referenced
I.C. § 12-120(3). Thus, the issue of whether she is entitled to attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) was raised below.
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First, Stout’s assertion that it would be unfair to refuse her attorney fees she would have
received from her termination in violation of public policy claim is without merit. Key Training
agreed that the federal definition of “sex discrimination” which includes discrimination based on
pregnancy and childbirth, would apply to the Idaho Human Rights Act. Key Training also
agreed that the Idaho Supreme Court has noted federal case law is instructive to claims under the
Idaho Human Rights Act. However, those concessions in no way require that the provisions of
the Idaho Human Rights Act be ignored and that all federal law provisions be adopted in order to
decide Stout’s Idaho Human Rights Act claim.
Next, Stout is not entitled to an award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) because she
did not prevail on her contract claim; she prevailed only on her statutory claim. As the district
court pointed out:
In Atwood v. Western Construction, Inc., 129 Idaho 234, 923 P.2d 479 (Ct.
App. 1996), which involved claims very similar to those alleged by Stout but
based on age discrimination, the court held that although Idaho Code § 12-120(3)
applies to employment contracts, it generally does not apply to claims in which
the gravamen of the cause of action is a claimed violation of a statute such as the
Idaho Human Rights Act. See also Northwest Bec-Corp. v. Home Living
Service[], 136 Idaho 835, 41 P.3d 263 (2002). Here, the only theory on which
Stout prevailed was one for discrimination based on gender under the Idaho
Human Rights Act. Therefore, Stout is not entitled to attorney fees pursuant to
Idaho Code § 12-120(3).
In Northwest Bec-Corp., we noted that a party was properly denied attorney fees under
I.C. § 12-120(3) when its claims were “based in rights created by statute or tort.” 136 Idaho at
842, 41 P.3d at 270. In this case, Stout was successful only on her statutory claim. Idaho Code §
12-120(3) does not authorize attorney fees on statutory claims. Therefore, we hold Stout is not
entitled to an award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3).
C. Neither party is entitled to attorney fees on appeal
Stout argues she is entitled to attorney fees on appeal on the same basis she is entitled to
attorney fees for the trial below. Since we hold Stout is not entitled to attorney fees for the trial
below, we also hold she is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal.
Key Training argues it is entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-121.
That statute allows an award of “reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party. . . .” I.C. §
12-121. Attorney fees are awarded to the prevailing party only if “the Court determines that the
action was brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.” Baker v.
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Sullivan, 132 Idaho 746, 751, 979 P.2d 619, 624 (1999). Whether I.C. § 67-5908(3) allows an
award of attorney fees to a successful plaintiff is an issue of first impression for this Court.
Thus, we hold Key Training is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s denial of attorney fees to Stout. Furthermore, we decline to
award either party attorney fees on appeal. Costs to Respondent.
Justices TROUT, EISMANN and JONES, CONCUR.
Chief Justice SCHROEDER, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the decision of the Court. Emphasis must be on respectful in
this case, because the Court has properly applied prior case decisions. However, after struggling
for many years with the application of I.C. § 12-120(3), it is time to go back to the statute itself
and apply it as written. The Court’s decisions, in which this author has participated, have created
a patchwork of application that commonly requires more analysis than the substance of the
claims in the lawsuit. The Court signaled a change in attitude in Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler,
LLC, a Maine Limited Liability Company, and Lisa DePalma, filed January 29, 2007. It is
proper to follow the lead of that case and apply I.C. § 12-120(3) as written, allowing attorney
fees:
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note,
bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of
goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless
otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable
attorney’s fees to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.
The term “commercial transaction” is defined to mean all transactions
except transactions for personal or household purposes. The “party” is defined to
mean any person, partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the
state of Idaho, or political subdivision thereof.
Idaho Code § 12-120(3).
In Hummer v. Evans, 129 Idaho 274, 280, 923 P.2d 981, 987 (1996), the Court held that
termination of employment at will in violation of public policy is a contract action which results
in contract damages. The fact that this case proceeded under the Idaho Human Rights Act for
discrimination based upon gender and pregnancy does not alter the fact that this is an action
arising from employment, a contractual relationship. The overlay of limiting attorney fees when
the claim is made pursuant to a statute is one created by the Court not the legislature. The
legislation is broad and inclusive. The Court has constricted the statute and created a myriad of
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exceptions that should not exist. The legislature said that a “commercial transaction” means “all
transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes.” This case does not involve
a personal or household purpose. It can be classified under either a contract relating to services
or a commercial transaction. The fact that there is a statute in place defining a cause of action in
employment does not limit the definition of either contract or commercial transaction. The Court
made the following analysis in Blimka:
A transaction involving the sale of 26,500 pairs of jeans is not made for personal
or household purposes. Rather, it is a business or commercial transaction, as
Blimka obviously intended to market the jeans rather than wear them. From time
to time the Court has denied fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) on the commercial
transaction ground either because the claim sounded in tort or because no contract
was involved. The commercial transaction ground in I.C. § 12-120(3) neither
prohibits a fee award for a commercial transaction that involves tortious conduct
(see Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 141 Idaho 362, 369, 109 P.3d 1104, 1111
(2005)), nor does it require that there be a contract. Any previous holdings to the
contrary are overruled. We hold that Blimka is entitled to a fee award on appeal
with respect to his fraud claim, as he is seeking recovery of damages sustained as
a result of the commercial transaction involved in this case.
Blimka rerouted this Court in the proper direction and interpretation of I.C. § 12-120(3),
overruling cases to the contrary. The same logic is applicable in this case. The Court should take
the same step it took in Blimka with regard to the interpretation of a commercial transaction
when an allegation of tortious conduct was made. If the underlying transaction, though couched
in terms of a statutory right, involves a qualifying contract or a commercial transaction, attorney
fees should be awarded to the prevailing party. The maze of guesswork should be taken off the
table, and those who litigate should be aware that the statute means exactly what it says without
judicial overlay.
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