Burritt v. City of Butte

No. 12312

I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF 1VIONTANA

1973

KENNETH R e BURRITT, d / b / a BURRITT ANIMAL
HOSPITAL, E & L REAL ESTATE COMPANY, I N C . ,
a Montana c o r p o r a t i o n , BUTTE PLAZA, I N C . ,
a c o r p o r a t i o n , and ROMNEY INTERNATIONAL
HOTEL, I N C . , a Delaware Corpora t i o n ,

P l a i n t i f f s and A p p e l l a n t s ,

CITY OF BUTTE, A M u n i c i p a l c o r p o r a t i o n ,

Defendant and Respondent.
-s%-.".-------

SAFEWAY STORES, I N C . , et a l ,

P l a i n t i f f s and A p p e l l a n t s ,

-vs -
/
CITY OF BUTTE, A Municipal c o r p o r a t i o n ,

Defendant and Respondent.

Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Second J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable Nat A l l e n , Judge p r e s i d i n g .

Counsel o f Record:

For Appel-lants :

Poore, McKenzie and Roth, B u t t e , Montana
Urban L. Roth a r g u e d , B u t t e , Montana

For Respondents:

John A. A l e x a n d e r a r g u e d , and C . L. H a r r i n g t o n a p p e a r e d ,
B u t t e , Montana

Submitted : F e b r u a r y 28, 1973

: MAR 2 6 1973
F i l e d : M&R 2 6 1973

&@@-+ Clerk
M r . J u s t i c e Frank I , Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court.

This i s an a p p e a l by f o u r p r o p e r t y owners and two l e s s e e s
of p a r t of t h e i r p r o p e r t y from a judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t
of S i l v e r Bow County, t h e Hon. Nat A l l e n , d i s t r i c t judge p r e s i d i n g ,
v a l i d a t i n g t h e annexation of t h e i r p r o p e r t y i n t o t h e c i t y l i m i t s
of B u t t e , Montana. From a c o n s o l i d a t e d judgment i n two c a s e s
denying t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n s f o r a w r i t of p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t t h e
C i t y of B u t t e t o prevent annexation, t h e p r o p e r t y owners and t h e i r
l e s s e e s appeal.
For s i m p l i c i t y of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , w e s h a l l r e f e r t o
p l a i n t i f f s a s B u r r i t t , Romney H o t e l s , E & L Real E s t a t e , B u t t e
P l a z a , Safeway, and Third Wallingford, r e s p e c t i v e l y , Defendant
C i t y of B u t t e w i l l b e r e f e r r e d t o a s t h e C i t y . Three of t h e
f o u r landowners of t h e annexed p r o p e r t y a r e c o r p o r a t i o n s , being
Romney H o t e l s , E & L Real E s t a t e , and Third Wallingford. The
f o u r t h landowner i s a p r i v a t e person, B u r r i t t , o p e r a t i n g a n
animal h o s p i t a l b u t n o t r e s i d i n g i n t h e annexed a r e a . Plaintiffs
B u t t e Plaza and Safeway a r e l e s s e e s of a p o r t i o n of t h e annexed
p r o p e r t y from E & L Real E s t a t e and Third Wallingford, r e s p e c t i v e l y .
Two s e p a r a t e s u i t s were f i l e d c o n t e s t i n g t h e annexation which
were subsequently c o n s o l i d a t e d .
The d i s t r i c t c o u r t made t h e following f i n d i n g s of f a c t
which were n o t d i s p u t e d . The land owned by E & L Real E s t a t e
i s l e a s e d by Butte P l a z a , a p a r t n e r s h i p , and used a s a t y p i c a l
r e t a i l shopping c e n t e r which i n c l u d e s a g r o c e r y s t o r e , drug
s t o r e , r e a l e s t a t e o f f i c e , t a v e r n , r e s t a u r a n t , department s t o r e ,
b a r b e r shop, f a b r i c s t o r e , shoe s t o r e , v a r i e t y s t o r e , and a
movie t h e a t e r . The land owned by Romney H o t e l s i s used a s a
motel w i t h a r e s t a u r a n t , b a r , and a gas s t a t i o n l o c a t e d thereon.
The land owned by Third Wallingford i s l e a s e d t o Safeway and used
a s a r e t a i l grocery s t o r e c o n t a i n i n g an i n - s t o r e bakery and meat
counter. The land owned by B u r r i t t i s used f o r a v e t e r i n a r y o f f i c e
and animal h o s p i t a l .
 P l a i n t i f f s excepted only t o Findings X I 1 1 and X I V , which
s t a t e d i n substance t h a t none of t h e p l a i n t i f f s a r e r e s i d e n t
f r e e h o l d e r s of t h e p r o p e r t y sought t o b e annexed and t h a t none
of t h e land annexed was used f o r i n d u s t r i a l o r manufacturing
purposes, w i t h i n t h e meaning of s e c t i o n 11-403, R.C.M, 1947.
P l a i n t i f f s do n o t r a i s e upon t h i s appeal any o b j e c t i o n s
r e g a r d i n g t h e procedure followed by t h e C i t y i n t h e annexation,
T h e r e f o r e , we s h a l l c o n s i d e r t h a t t h e C i t y followed t h e s t a t u t o r y
procedure f o r annexation a s s e t f o r t h i n s e c t i o n 11-403, R.C.M.
1947.
From t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s judgment quashing t h e a l t e r n a -
t i v e w r i t s o f p r o h i b i t i o n p r e v i o u s l y i s s u e d and d i s m i s s i n g t h e
c o n s o l i d a t e d a c t i o n , p l a i n t i f f s now appeal.
The i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d f o r review may be summarized: (1) Is
any o f t h e annexed land used f o r i n d u s t r i a l o r manufacturing
purposes w i t h i n t h e meaning of s e c t i o n 11-403, R..C.M. 1947? (2)
Are any o f t h e p l a i n t i f f s r e s i d e n t f r e e h o l d e r s of t h e annexed
properties? (3) Does s e c t i o n 11-403, R.C.M. 1947, e s t a b l i s h
d i s c r i m i n a t o r y c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s without compelling j u s t i f i c a t i o n
i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e Equal P r o t e c t i o n Clause of t h e Fourteenth
Amendment t o t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n ?
P l a i n t i f f s contend i n i t i a l l y t h a t t h e annexed land was
used f o r " i n d u s t r i a l purposes" w i t h i n t h e meaning o f s e c t i o n
11-403(1), R.C.M. 1947, thereby r e q u i r i n g w r i t t e n consent of t h e
landowners f o r annexation i n t o t h e c i t y . T h i s l i m i t a t i o n was
added by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i n 1961.
The C o u r t ' s f u n c t i o n i s t o c o n s t r u e t h e language of t h e
s t a t u t e i n accordance w i t h i t s u s u a l and o r d i n a r y acceptance,
w i t h a view t o g i v i n g v i t a l i t y t o and making o p e r a t i v e a l l pro-
v i s i o n s of t h e law and accomplishing t h e i n t e n t i o n of t h e l e g i s -
l a t u r e when a s c e r t a i n a b l e . S e c t i o n 93-401-16, R.C.M. 1947; County
of H i l l v . County of L i b e r t y , 62 Mont. 15, 203 P. 500. Inter-
p r e t i n g s e c t i o n 11-403, R.C.M. 1947, i n i t s e n t i r e t y i t i s l o g i c a l
to presume that the legislature intended to make the annexation
process easier in larger cities and at the same time permit
designated residents, freeholders, or businesses a voice in this
process,
Plaintiffs would have us construe "industrial purpose"
in its broad sense to include what are generally termed commer-
cial, mercantile, trade, or professional pursuits. Thus the
businesses involved here --- a commercial shopping center with
a number of retail stores, a motel, a gas station, a barber shop,
a real estate office, a movie theater and a veterinary office
and animal hospital---would be within the definition of "indus-
trial purpose".
Plaintiffs' expert witness, an economist, gave a technical de-
finition of "industrial", one that would be used among economists.
It is not the usual, ordinary, or commonly understood definition
of the word. Likewise, plaintiffs' dictionary definition of
I'
"industrial" is too broad. Defining "industry" as any depart-
ment or branch of art, occupation, or business conducted as a
rneans of livelihood or for a profit; especially, one which
employs much labor and capital and is a distinct branch of trade",
is such a broad classification that it would effectively block
any annexation attempt where a business is involved and thus
destroy the purpose of the statute. l lack's Law Dictionary
4th Ed.)
Plaintiffs cite an 1888 case, Carver Mercantile Co. v.
Hulme, 7 Mont. 566, 19 P. 213, as autho~~ity using a broad
for
definition of "industrial". Carver involved the authority to
organize corporations and adopted a broad definition to accommodate
the purpose of the incorporation statute. The same or similar
purpose does not exist in the annexation statute here so Carver
is readily distinguishable.
The goal of statutory interpretations is to give effect
to the purpose of the statute. County of Hill v. County of
Liberty, supra. To give effect to the purpose of the statute
as intended by the legislature, the context in which the words
are used is more important than precise grammatical rules or a
dictionary definition. Home Bldg, & Loan v. Bd. of Equalization,
141 Mont. 113, 375 P.2d 312.
For the purposes of section 11-403, R.C.M. 1947, we adopt
a more limited definition of industrial purpose. "Industrial
purpose" is limited to any factory, business or concern which
is engaged primarily in the manufacture or assembly of goods
or processing of raw materials unserviceable in their natural
state which are extracted, processed, or made fit for use or
are substantially altered or treated so as to create commercial
products or materials. This definition is similar to that given
by the legislature in establishing a classification and defining
"new industrial" business for purpose of taxation. Section
84-301, R.C.M. 1947. This section specifically excludes property
used by retail or wholesale merchants, commercial services of
any type, agriculture, trades, or professions. That statutory
classification was enacted by the Montana legislature in 1961,
the same year the "industrial and manufacturing" clause was
added to section 11-403, R.C.M, 1947.
11
In addition, the distinction made between commercial"
and "industrial" in Calvert v. City of Great Falls, 154 Mont.
213, 462 P.2d 182, leads us to believe the legislature intended
such limited definition.
Nonetheless, plaintiffs argue that the bakery and meat
market in the Safeway store renders that property, at least,
industrial, We observe that this in-store bakery and meat market
are merely incidental to the operation of Safeway's principal
business on the premises, a retail grocery. Under the foregoing
definition of industrial which we have adopted in this case,
these incidental operations do not convert safeway's principal
business into an "industrial" operation in any event,
None of plaintiffs involved here qualify under this
limited definition of "industrial purpcse".
 The n e x t i s s u e r a i s e d i s whether t h e d e f i n i t i o n of
If
r e s i d e n t f r e e h o l d e r " under s e c t i o n 11-403, R.C.M. 1947, i n -
cludes a corporation, T h i s s e c t i o n provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t :
11J;
-
-1-
t h a t such r e s o l u t i o n [of a n n e x a t i o n ] s h a l l
n o t b e adopted by such c o u n c i l i f disapproved, i n
w r i t i n g , by a m a j o r i t y of t h e r e s i d e n t f r e e h o l d e r s ,
i f any of t h e t e r r i t o r y proposed t o be embraced
-/c ik *
I n Kunesh v. C i t y of Great F a l l s , 132 Mont. 285, 317 P.2d
297, t h i s Court d e f i n e d " r e s i d e n t f r e e h o l d e r " f o r t h e purposes
of t h i s s e c t i o n a s one who i s a r e s i d e n t w i t h i n t h e a r e a t o b e
annexed, h o l d i n g a p r e s e n t l e g a l t i t l e t o a f r e e h o l d e s t a t e i n
r e a l p r o p e r t y l o c a t e d w i t h i n t h e a r e a t o be annexed, Such de-
f i n i t i o n was r e a f f i r m e d i n Brodie v , C i t y of I\lissoula, 155 Mont.
1-85, 468 P.2d 778. N e i t h e r c a s e however, d e a l s w i t h t h e s p e c i f i c
problem of t h e r e s i d e n c e of a c o r p o r a t i o n .
S e c t i o n 11-403, R.C.M. 1947, provides t h a t t h e p r o t e s t e r s
must l i v e i n t h e a r e a t o be annexed and have a f r e e h o l d i n t e r e s t
i n land i n t h e a r e a . I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , f o u r of t h e p l a i n t i f f s
a r e c o r p o r a t i o n s , one i s a p a r t n e r s h i p , and one i s a n a t u r a l
person,
I n Ihnesh a t pages 289,290 of 132 Mont,, t h i s Court
d i s c u s s e d t h e requirements of "residence" a t l e n g t h :
"Residence h a s been d e f i n e d a s t h e p l a c e where
a man makes h i s home 9 ? ; ; and t h a t r e s i d e n c e
'* 9; i s t h e p l a c e where one remains when n o t
J:

c a l l e d elsewhere f o r l a b o r o r o t h e r s p e c i a l o r
temporary purposes; and t o which he [ t h e r e s i d e n t ]
r e t u r n s i n seasons of r e p o s e ' .

" 'While t h e word "residence" h a s been involved i n
many c o n t r o v e r s i e s 9; * =k i t w i l l b e found t h a t i t
i s m t t h e word i t s e l f t h a t h a s been d i f f i c u l t of
understanding. I t h a s been i n t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n
of language e x p r e s s i v e of t h e e f f e c t of r e s i d e n c e ,
and of t h e r i g h t s a r i s i n g therefrom and based on
t h e f a c t of r e s i d e n c e . I n each such c a s e t h e
word becomes a p a r t of a concept l a r g e r than i t -
s e l f , such a s r e s i d e n c e n e c e s s a r y t o t h e r i g h t t o
v o t e , r e s i d e n c e i n e s t a b l i s h i n g a domicile, r e s i -
dence n e c e s s a r y t o c i t i z e n s h i p , e t c . t I I
P l a i n t i f f s and defendant s e p a r a t e l y c i t e c a s e s and
Montana s t a t u t e s which i n some i n s t a n c e s would i n c l u d e a c o r -
p o r t i o n a s a n a t u r a l person having a p l a c e of r e s i d e n c e (Section
19-103, R.C.M. 1947; Quaker City Cab. Co, v, Pennsylvania, 277
U.S. 389, 48 S.Ct. 553, 72 L ed 927) and at other times would
not (Section 83-303, R,C.M. 1947; Pittsburg, C., C. & St.L,Ry.
Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 147 Ind. 292, 46 N.E. 641).
Whether or not a corporation is to be considered the same
as a natural person for residence purposes depends entirely upon
the context of the particular statute in question. From the above
discussion, it is clear that section 11-403, R.C.M. 1947, requires
actual residence on the property sought to be annexed in order to
qualify for protest and thus excludes a corporation which possesses
no actual residence as distinquished from a legal residence for some
purposes. Thus a corporation is not a "resident freeholder"
within the meaning of this statute.
The same reasoning applies to a partnership, likewise a
legal entity with no actual residence.
The final issue is whether the annexation statute, section
11-403, R.C.M, 1947, violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution by
establishing discriminatroy classifications without compelling
justification. The statute allows the right of protest to resident
freeholders, but not to resident nonfreeholders nor nonresident
freeholders.
Plaintiffs contend that several recent United States Supreme
Court decisions dealing with voting rights in school districts,
Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U,S. 621, 89 S.Ct. 1886,
23 L ed 2d 583 (1969); voting rights in bond elections, Cipriano v.
City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 89 S.Ct. 1897, 23 L ed 2d 647 (1969);
in welfare cases, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322,
22 L ed 2d 600 (1969); and other similar cases should be considered
in ruling this statute discriminatory class legislation and uncon-
stitutional.
We note that these cases deal with the protection of the
rights of "natural persons" based on their residence. The United
States Supreme Court has not as yet seen fit to extend the right
t o vote or c o l l e c t welfare benefits t o corporate o r partnership
e n t i t i e s i n t h e absence of s t a t u t e , In the instant case the
p r o t e s t i n g corporations and p a r t n e r s h i p , although t h e i r land i s
s u b j e c t t o t a x a t i o n f o r school l e v i e s , s p e c i a l improvement
d i s t r i c t s , and general t a x e s , have no r i g h t t o v o t e on such l e v i e s ,
Annexation i s g e n e r a l l y regarded a s a p o l i t i c a l matter
e x c l u s i v e l y f o r t h e l e g i s l a t u r e t o r e g u l a t e , unless s p e c i f i c a l l y
r e s t r a i n e d by t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n . The l e g i s l a t u r e can a u t h o r i z e
annexation without t h e consent and even a g a i n s t t h e wishes of
t h e people l i v i n g i n t h e area t o be annexed. Harrison v. C i t y
of Missoula, 146 Mont. 420, 407 P.2d 703, The extension of t h e
c o r p o r a t e l i m i t s of a c i t y i s a n c i l l a r y t o governmental mainten-
ance of t h e h e a l t h , s a f e t y , general w e l f a r e , and good o r d e r of
those communities which a r e formed by dense c o l l e c t i o n s of c i t i z e n s
i n particular localities. Such i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l even though t h e
annexed t e r r i t o r y may r e c e i v e no d i r e c t b e n e f i t from incorporation
i n r e t u r n f o r t h e municipal burdens thereby imposed upon i t .
2 McQuillin M n Corp (3rd Ed) 5 7.10, p. 309,
u
Section 11-403, R.C.M, 1947, was f i r s t declared v a l i d
and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n Harrison v. City of Missoula, supra. In
t h a t c a s e , t h e p r o t e s t e r s claimed s e c t i o n 11-403, R.C.M. 1947,
was " c l a s s l e g i s l a t i o n " i n t h a t a d i s t i n c t i o n i s made between
"freeholder" and " r e s i d e n t freeholder" and t h a t t h e r e had been
a "taking of property1' without due process. W held otherwise.
e
Subsequently t h i s Court upheld t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of t h i s
s t a t u t e i n Calvert v. C i t y of Great F a l l s , supra, where t h e
p r o t e s t e r s challenged t h e l e g i s l a t i v e exemptions r e l a t i n g t o
compulsory annexation of land devoted t o i n d u s t r i a l and manu-
f a c t u r i n g e n t e r p r i s e s and s i m i l a r purposes. The same r e s u l t was
reached by t h i s Court i n Brodie v. C i t y of Missoula, supra. In
Brodie we held t h a t t h e compulsory annexation of t e r r i t o r y "wholly
surrounded" by t h e c i t y d i d n o t v i o l a t e f e d e r a l o r s t a t e c o n s t i t u -
t i o n a l provisions p r o s c r i b i n g t h e taking of p r i v a t e property without
due process of law, See a l s o : S a i l o r s v. Kent Board of Ed,, 387
Pittsburg, 207 U.S. 161, 28 S.Ct. 40, 52 L.ed. 151 (1907).
Nore prticularly, however, plaintiffs attack the consti-
tutionality of that provision in section 11-403, R.C.M. 1947,
which limits protests to "resident freeholders1' cities over
in
10,000 population, while in smaller cities a protester need only
meet the qualification of a "freeholder" without regard to resi-
dence on the property to be annexed,
In Calvert this Court summarized the general rule that
a statute is presumed to be constitutional in language appearing
on pages 218, 219 of 154 Montana:
I I In this state the presumption of constitution-
al-ity becomes specific when the claim of I class
legislation' is raised for much of our legisla-
tion in the field of property law imposes dis-
tinctions and classifications, These distinctions
and classifications have been upheld whenever found
to be reasonable and to operate equally upon every
person or thing in a given class. State ex rel.
Redman v. Meyers, 65 Mont. 124, 128. 210 P. 1064;
State ex rel. Morgan v. White (Ret.Sys.), 136 Mont.
470, 348 P.2d 991."
This Court, however, went on to say:
1 1 I The constitutional safeguard against unjust

discrimination in legislation of this type is
well defined by the decisions everywhere, and
that is, that the classifications must be reason-
able, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation, so that
all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike. (Mills v. State Board of Equalization, 97
Xont. 13, 31, 33 P,2d 563.)"'
The legislature may provide at its discretion the manner
of proresting and the parties privileged to protest. In fact,
statutes often require the consent of only a designated proportion
of the voters, or property owners in the territory to be annexed.

The consent of others not so designated is immaterial, 2 1.IcQuillin
ZIn Corp (3rd Ed) 5 7.16, p, 335. A n0nresiden.t freeholder of
vu
the annexed area may constitutionally be excluded from those per-
mitted to protest. Adams v. City of Colorado Springs, 308 F.Supp.
1397, ~ f f ' d399 U,S. 901, 90 S.Ct. 2197, 26 L ed 2d 555; Rogers
v. City and County of Denver, 161 Colo. 72, 419 P.2d 648.
 There are governmental as well as economic reasons for the
legislature to make annexations easier for larger cities. In
hdams at p. 1404, the court said:
11
The metropolitan area is a single social and
economic unit, yet it has no consolidated
government 7k *[Annexation] permits a united
approach to solving the problems and supplying
the needs of the urban area, in terms of planning
and rendition of service as well as fiscal bal-
ance.I I
Considerable differences exist between cities having a
population in excess of 10,000 and those less than 10,000 popu-
lation. In the instant case, ~utte's Mayor testified to some of
these peculiar problems, i.e., larger cities addressing themselves
to problems in the area of assistance to senior citizens, expanded
youth programs, and the necessity of more sophisticated and speci-
lized sewage treatment and water plants, for exam.ple.
In addition, Montana statutes are full of examples where
the legislature has set forth different requirements for the
different classes of cities according to population. See: Title
11, R.C.M. 1947.
We hold that the classifications established by the legis-
lature in limiting protests to annexation to resident freeholders
in first class cities, while permitting protests by freeholders
without regard to residence in smaller cities is not only a rational
distinction but also promotes a compelling governmental interest
and is therefore constitutional. To summarize,the legislature
in enacting section 11-403, R.C.M. 1947, intended to make the
process of annexation easier in larger cities. Services in the
larger cities are ever increasing due to various and diverse
growth trends. The larger city tends to become the hub of commerce
for a metropolitan area not only in terms of services for its own
citizens but also for persons in its metropolitan area outside the
city limits. Eventually, the two groups become virtually dependent
upon one another. They become a single entity having common needs,
Easier annexation permits such larger city to broaden its tax base
and thus spread the costs among those who use its services.
Easier annexation permits the larger city to provide these
services which are essential for the health,safety, and general
welfare of the entire area.
For these reasons, the consolidated judgment of the
district court is affirmed.

Associate Justice