No, 12288
I N THE SUPREME C U T O THE STATE OF MONTANA
OR F
1973
GLEN L. HELLICKSON, 1 1
1 ,
P l a f n t i f f and Appellant,
-VS -
BARRETT MOBILE HOME TEUNSPORT, INC.,
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable Truman G. Bradford, Judge p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant :
John C. H a l l argued, Great F a l l s , Montana.
For Respondent:
Swanberg, Koby and Swanberg, Great F a l l s , Montana.
Raymond F, Koby argued, Great F a l l s , Montana.
Submitted: January 22, 1973
Decided: WR 12 l n
g
Clerk
M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e
Court.
This i s an appeal from a judgment entered i n t h e d i s t r i c t
c o u r t of t h e e i g h t h j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , Cascade County, Hon, Truman
G , Bradford presiding. P l a i n t i f f Glen L, Hellickson 111, brought
a c t i o n t o recover money a l l e g e d l y due under a c o n t r a c t with de-
fendant B a r r e t t Mobile Home Transport, Inc. T r i a l without a jury
began on October 29, 1971. Judgment f o r p l a i n t i f f was e n t e r e d on
February 16, 1972. P l a i n t i f f appeals from t h e judgment, except
t h a t p o r t i o n making an award t o p l a i n t i f f ,
Defendant i s a Minnesota corporation doing business i n
Montana and o t h e r s t a t e s , c o n s i s t i n g mainly of t r a n s p o r t i n g mobile
homes i n i n t e r s t a t e and i n t r a s t a t e commerce. To c a r r y on i t s
business defendant employs persons t o d r i v e t r u c k u n i t s t o tow
t h e mobile homes from one l o c a t i o n t o another.
I n January 1964, defendant engaged p l a i n t i f f t o tow mobile
home u n i t s with lai in tiff's truck, The p a r t i e s entered i n t o a
l e a s i n g agreement, on a form provided by t h e s t a t e of North Dakota,
whereby p l a i n t i f f leased h i s 1963 Ford t r u c k t o defendant a t t h e
r a t e of $50 per month. The agreement was f o r a term of one year
from t h e d a t e of execution and on a month t o month b a s i s t h e r e a f t e r ,
The agreement could be terminated by e i t h e r p a r t y upon t h i r t y days
w r i t t e n n o t i c e t o t h e o t h e r party. Although t h e t r u c k was leased
t o defendant, p l a i n t i f f was t o use t h e t r u c k t o c a r r y o u t t h e terms
of t h e employment agreement.
The employment agreement between t h e two p a r t i e s was o r a l ,
A g r e a t e r p o r t i o n of t h e controversy h e r e concerns t h e terms of
t h a t o r a l employment agreement, p a r t i c u l a r l y s i n c e t h e terms of
t h a t agreement were a l t e r e d from time t o time. E s s e n t i a l l y when
t h e agreement began, p l a i n t i f f was t o r e c e i v e 85% of t h e revenue
derived from the operation of p l a i n t i f f ' s t r u c k i n hauling mobile
homes f o r defendant, l e s s c e r t a i n deductions.
The t r i a l c o u r t found t h a t on o r about May 1, 1964, defendant
changed t h e method of compensating i t s d r i v e r s . The compensation
was changed from 85% t o 75% and c e r t a i n deductions were no longer
made. Around June 1965, t h e general scheme of compensation was
again changed so t h a t , f o r i n t e r s t a t e h a u l s , defendant's d r i v e r s
were paid on a mileage s c a l e based on c e n t s per mile.
While employed by defendant, p l a i n t i f f operated a terminal
f o r defendant's business i n Great F a l l s . The p a r t i e s had an o r a l
agreement f o r t h e reimbursement of c e r t a i n c o s t s i n connection
with t h e operation of t h e terminal. P l a i n t i f f claimed c e r t a i n
amounts were s t i l l owed t o him f o r t h e operation of t h e terminal,
along with o t h e r items. Defendant maintained t h a t e i t h e r a l l
items had been paid o r were o f f s e t by amounts owed t o defendant
by p l a i n t i f f . Other items of disagreement w i l l be considered
l a t e r i n t h i s opinion,
P l a i n t i f f and defendant mutually terminated t h e i r agree-
ments i n October o r November 1965, Plaintiff filed his f i r s t
complaint i n June 1966. A f t e r b r i e f s and proposed f i n d i n g s of
f a c t and conclusions of law were f i l e d , t h e c o u r t e n t e r e d i t s
f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of law awarding p l a i n t i f f judgment
i n t h e amount of $415.58, plus c o s t s and i n t e r e s t from November 1,
1965. Because p l a i n t i f f contends t h a t a d d i t i o n a l sums were con-
c l u s i v e l y e s t a b l i s h e d a s s t i l l owing t o p l a i n t i f f , he appeals.
P l a i n t i f f r a i s e s some questions concerning modification
of a w r i t t e n agreement by o r a l testimony. Basically, hwever,
the controlling issue i s p l a i n t i f f ' s third issue: A r e the findings
of f a c t supported by t h e evidence?
The t r i a l c o u r t issued thorough f i n d i n g s of f a c t on a
complicated, complex, and c o n f l i c t i n g f a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n . Collateral
i s s u e s r a i s e d a r e d i r e c t l y dependent upon our duty i n considering
those f i n d i n g s ,
A review of t h e r u l e s p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e function of an
a p p e l l a t e c o u r t i n s i t u a t i o n s such a s i s involved h e r e i s appro-
priate. I n Hornung v. Lagerquist, 155 Mont. 412, 420, 473 P.2d
541, t h i s Court s a i d :
It
Our duty i n reviewing f i n d i n g s of f a c t i n a
c i v i l a c t i o n t r i e d by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t without
a j u r y i s confined t o determining whether t h e r e
i s s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence t o support them.
S t . Highway Com'n v. West Great F a l l s Flood Con-
t r o l and Drainage D i s t r i c t , 155 Mont. 157, 468
P.2d 753, 27 St.Rep. 320, and c a s e s t h e r e i n
s i t e d . It
See a l s o : S t a t e Highway Comm'n v, Vaughan, 155 Mont. 277, 281,
The meaning of " s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidencet' was
thoroughly considered r e c e n t l y i n Staggers v . United S t a t e s
F i d e l i t y & Guaranty Co,, M nt
o . Y 496 P,2d 1161, 29 S t .
Rep, 357, 360.
The judgment of t h e t r i a l c o u r t s i t t i n g without a j u r y
has t h e same e f f e c t a s a v e r d i c t of a jury. S t a t e v. Naughton,
103 Mont. 306, 310, 63 P.2d 123. Certain presumptions a i d us i n
considering t h e f i n d i n g s of f a c t . The f i n d i n g s of t h e t r i a l
c o u r t and t h e judgment based thereon a r e presumed c o r r e c t . Nat,
Farmers Union Prop, v. Gen. Guaranty I n s . , 150 Mont, 297,301, 434
P.2d 708; Christensen v. Hunt, 147 Mont. 484, 490, 414 P.2d 648.
I n examining t h e evidence, we must veiw t h e testimony i n a l i g h t
most favorable t o t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y , E s t a t e of Hosova, 143
Mont. 74, 78, 387 P.2d 305; Holland v. Konda, 142 Mont. 536, 541,
385 P. 2d 272. However, while t h e presumptions i s i n p l a i n t i f f ' s
f a v o r , he i s a l s o t h e appealing p a r t y and a s such, t h e burden i s
upon him t o overcome t h e presumption of t h e c o r r e c t n e s s of t h e
t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s of f a c t , Nissen v , West Const, Equip,Co.,
133 Mont. 143, 146, 320 P.2d 997.
Here, t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of t h e witnesses i s of prime impor-
tance. Since only two people o t h e r than p l a i n t i f f and defendant's
p r e s i d e n t t e s t i f i e d , t h e witnesses found t o be most b e l i e v a b l e
t o t h e t r i a l judge bear p a r t i c u l a r s i g n f i c a n c e . The c r e d i b i l i t y
and weight given t h e w i t n e s s e s , however, i s n o t f o r t h i s Court t o
determine. This i s a primary function of a t r i a l judge s i t t i n g
without a j u r y ; i t i s of s p e c i a l consequence where t h e evidence i s
conflicting. Eliason v , Eliason, 151 Mont. 409, 416, 443 P.2d 884;
Strong v. Williams, 154 Mont. 65, 68, 460 Pe2d 90; Dutton v. Rocky
Mtn, Phosphates, 151 Mont. 54, 7 1 , 438 P.2d 674.
I n l i g h t of t h e p r i n c i p l e s s t a t e d above, we consider t h e
f i n d i n g s of f a c t contested by p l a i n t i f f and determine whether
s u b s t a n t i a l evidence e x i s t s t o support them. P l a i n t i f f excepted
g e n e r a l l y t o a l l b u t t h r e e of t h e f i n d i n g s issued by t h e t r i a l
court, P l a i n t i f f argued t h a t v i r t u a l l y a l l of t h e f i n d i n g s ex-
cepted t o were n o t supported by t h e evidence,
W do n o t f i n d i t necessary t o d e l i n e a t e a l l t h e evidence
e
i n support of each f i n d i n g of f a c t , we a r e concerned h e r e only with
t h e major disagreements. Wherever t h e testimony i s d i r e c t l y con-
f l i c t i n g , we presume t h e t r i a l judge t o be c o r r e c t . Only he had
t h e opportunity t o observe t h e demeanor, candor and spontaneity
of t h e witnesses. A l l minor p o i n t s a r e w i t h i n t h e l e g a l maxim
c o d i f i e d by s e c t i o n 49-125, R.C.M. 1947: "The law d i s r e g a r d s
II
trifles.
Here, one major disagreement was whether t h e l e a s e agree-
ment r e n t a l of $50 per month was i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e compensation
received f o r hauling mobile homes, a s p l a i n t i f f contended; o r
whether i t was a p a r t of t h e compensation, a s defendant contended.
Although p l a i n t i f f maintained a t t r i a l t h a t t h e $50 per month
amounts were due him from t h e inception of t h e employment agreement,
p l a i n t i f f acquiesced i n defendant's manner of payment f o r twenty-
two months. He made no w r i t t e n demand on defendant f o r t h e a l l e g e d
amount due. Richard Ward, p l a i n t i f f ' s witness i n support of h i s
contention, e x h i b i t e d such u n c e r t a i n t y i n r e l a t i n g h i s v e r s i o n
of t h e same o r a l agreement t h a t t h e t r i a l judge could r e a d i l y have
given h i s testimony l i t t l e weight. On t h e o t h e r hand, defendant's
w i t n e s s , E a r l Wallace, who was present when t h e employment agreement
between p l a i n t i f f and defendant was i n i t i a l l y discussed, substan-
t i a t e d defendant's r e c o l l e c t i o n . P l a i n t i f f knew from h i s very
f i r s t pay r e p o r t t h a t t h e $50 per month r e n t a l was a p a r t o f , n o t
i n a d d i t i o n t o , t h e r e g u l a r compensation. Yet, he d i d l i t t l e , i f
anything, t o gain what h e claimed a t t r i a l was due, The t r i a l
c o u r t had s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o f i n d :
"That during t h e e n t i r e period from January,
1964 through October, 1965 t h e o r a l arrange-
ment e x t a n t between p l a i n t i f f and defendant
contemplated t h a t t h e commissions paid by t h e
l a t t e r t o t h e former would include and not be
i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e r e n t a l f: 9: *".
Another element of controversy concerned r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
for repairs. P l a i n t i f f contended a t t r i a l t h a t defendant was
o b l i g a t e d f o r r e p a i r s on t h e truck. True, t h e l e a s e agreement
form d i d indeed impose t h e o b l i g a t i o n f o r r e p a i r s on defendant,
However, a t no time u n t i l t h e commencement of t h i s a c t i o n i n
June 1966, d i d p l a i n t i f f ever present any claim f o r r e p a i r ex-
penses t o defendant, I n about A p r i l 1965, p l a i n t i f f s o l d h i s
1963 Ford t r u c k and t h e l e a s e agreement on t h a t v e h i c l e terminated;
no new agreement was ever executed. The e v i d e n c e = inconclusive
a s t o whether t h e r e p a i r expenses claimed due were f o r t h e t r u c k
i n t h e o r i g i n a l agreement. Further, i t i s not e n t i r e l y c l e a r
whether any r e p a i r expenses were a t t r i b u t a b l e t o t h e operation of
p l a i n t i f f ' s t r u c k while i n defendant's s e r v i c e o r during p l a i n t i f f ' s
own personal use. The t r i a l c o u r t found p l a i n t i f f acquiesced t o
t h e o r a l modification t h a t defendant was n o t o b l i g a t e d f o r r e p a i r
expenses t o e i t h e r of p l a i n t i f f ' s trucks. It concluded t h a t p l a i n -
t i f f was now estopped from recovering those claims. W agree.
e
The f i n a l major disagreement concerns t h e a c t u a l compensa-
t i o n received f o r hauling mobile homes. P l a i n t i f f conceded t h e
agreement could indeed be changed from an 85% compensation r a t e t o
75%, and then t o a mileage b a s i s , However, p l a i n t i f f a s s e r t s t h e s e
changes could not be made u n i l a t e r a l l y ; consent t o t h e changes must
be mutual and must be communicated t o t h e o t h e r p a r t y , While
p l a i n t i f f claimed he was n o t n o t i f i e d of t h e change, t h e r e was
evidence from which t h e t r i a l judge could have found t h a t t h e n o t i c e
of t h e change had been communicated t o a l l terminal o f f i c e s .
It was e s t a b l i s h e d by defendant's witness, Wallace, t h a t
a t t h e time t h e employment agreement was f i r s t discussed defendant's
p r e s i d e n t informed p l a i n t i f f t h e compensation might f l u c t u a t e
during t h e course of employment. I n any event, a l e t t e r from
p l a i n t i f f t o defendant i n d i c a t e d p l a i n t i f f was aware of t h e
change by May 13, 1964, Y e t , p l a i n t i f f continued t o work f o r
defendant; t h i s employment even continued through a subsequent
r a t e change. This course of conduct was s u f f i c i e n t , we b e l i e v e ,
t o preclude recovery f o r t h e compensation claim. The r u l e
s t a t e d i n 53 Am J u r 2d, Master and Servant, $ 73, p. 148, i s
applicable :
"Where, however, t h e r e i s no d e f i n i t e term of
employment f i x e d by c o n t r a c t , [ a s i n t h i s c a s e ]
a n o t i c e by t h e master t h a t f o r t h e f u t u r e he
w i l l pay l e s s wages t o t h e servant and t h e con-
tinued s e r v i c e t h e r e a f t e r of t h e servant without
o b j e c t i o n , c r e a t e s a new c o n t r a c t based upon
s u f f i c i e n t considera t i o n , I t
W f i n d no f a u l t i n t h e conclusions of law rendered by
e
the t r i a l court. P l a i n t i f f ' s appeal does n o t concern i t s e l f with
l e g a l i s s u e s , b u t b a s i c a l l y i s on f a c t u a l grounds. W cannot r e t r y
e
f a c t u a l determinations made by t h e t r i a l c o u r t . W are further
e
persuaded t h a t t h e monetary award was c o r r e c t by t h e f a c t t h a t
p l a i n t i f f f a i l e d t o remit c e r t a i n revenues c o l l e c t e d by him f o r
defendant and due defendant,
There i s ample j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n t h e record f o r t h e t r i a l
c o u r t ' s decision.
The judgment of t h e t r i a l c o u r t i s affirmed,
I