No. 12856
I N T E SUPREME COURT O T E STATE O MONTANA
H F H F
1975
I N THE M T E O THE ESTATE
ATR F
O DAUENHAUER , A T N DAUENHAUER
F NO
e t a l . , Deceased.
KAREN MILLER and JERRY DAUENHAUER,
P l a i n t i f f s and Respondents,
D R T Y DAUENHAUER , CHERALEE JOHNSON,
OOH
CHRISTOPHER DAUENHAUER, DENISE MAZZUCCA,
ROMONA PLANT, and ALLEN KELLER,
Defendants and A p p e l l a n t s ,
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable Jack L. Green, Judge p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel of Record:
For Appellants :
M,Gene McLatchy argued, Missoula, Montana
H , J. P i n s o n e a u l t , Missoula, Montana
J u l i e A. Herak, S e a t t l e , Washington
For Respondents:
C h r i s t i a n , McCurdy, Ingraham and Wold, Polson,
Montana
Douglas J. Wold argued, Polson, Montana
Submitted: A p r i l 10, 1975
Decided : MAY Z 1
m
Filed: MAY 8 61 'g
i?
Mr. Chief J u s t i c e James T . H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of
t h e Court.
T h i s i s a n a p p e a l from a judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ,
Lake County, which d e c r e e d t h a t t h e o n l y h e i r s of Anton Dauenhauer
a r e Dorothy Dauenhauer, s p o u s e , K a r l e n e M i l l e r , d a u g h t e r , and
J e r r y Dauenhauer, son.
Anton Dauenhauer, a l s o known a s Tony Dauenhauer, d i e d
i n t e s t a t e on December 4 , 1971. He was a r e s i d e n t of Montana and
l e f t a n e s t a t e o f r e a l and p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y s i t u a t e d i n Montana.
The s u r v i v i n g s p o u s e , Dorothy Dauenhauer, was a p p o i n t e d a d m i n i s -
tratrix. I n h e r P e t i t i o n f o r L e t t e r s of A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , s h e
a d v i s e d t h e p r o b a t e c o u r t t h a t t h e h e i r s c o n s i s t e d of h e r s e l f ,
K a r l e n e M i l l e r and J e r r y Dauenhauer, d e c e d e n t ' s c h i l d r e n by a
p r e v i o u s m a r r i a g e which t e r m i n a t e d i n d i v o r c e i n 1944. Subse-
q u e n t l y , t h e a d m i n i s t r a t r i x a d v i s e d t h e c o u r t t h e r e were f i v e ad-
d i t i o n a l c h i l d r e n e n t i t l e d t o s h a r e i n t h e e s t a t e , namely Ramona
P l a n t , A l l e n K e l l e r , C h r i s t o p h e r Thorngren, C h e r a l e e Johnson and
Denise Mazzucca. T h e r e a f t e r , p l a i n t i f f s f i l e d a complaint t o
d e t e r m i n e h e i r s h i p under s e c t i o n 91-3801, R.C.M. 1947. During
p r e t r i a l p r o c e e d i n g s , a d e f a u l t judgment was e n t e r e d a g a i n s t
Ramona P l a n t and A l l e n K e l l e r and a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t was e n t e r e d
i n f a v o r of Dorothy Dauenhauer, K a r l e n e M i l l e r and J e r r y Dauenhauer.
A t t r i a l , d e f e n d a n t s C h r i s t o p h e r Thorngren, C h e r a l e e
Johnson and Denise Mazzucca, s o u g h t t o e s t a b l i s h t h e i r h e i r s h i p .
Proof w a s p r e s e n t e d by which t h e y a t t e m p t e d t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h e
d e c e a s e d l i v e d w i t h t h e i r mother, Mildred Thorngren, t h e n known
a s Mildred Dauenhauer, a s man and w i f e i n C a l i f o r n i a from 1947 t o
1951 and t h a t t h e d e c e a s e d was t h e i r f a t h e r . Decedent c e a s e d l i v -
i n g w i t h Mildred Thorngren i n 1951, and n e v e r l i v e d w i t h h e r o r
defendants again.
I n i t s f i n d i n g s o f f a c t , c o n c l u s i o n s of law and judgment,
t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t concluded t h e d e f e n d a n t s a r e n o t h e i r s of t h e
decedent, Anton Dauenhauer, and that defendants
"failed to show that (1) they, or any of them,
are legitimate children of the decedent, or (2)
that the decedent acknowledged, in a writing
signed by the decedent in the presence of a
competent witness, that said Defendants, or any
of them, were illegitimate children of said
decedent, or (3) any other facts sufficient to
establish and perfect a claim of heirship from
this decedent.'I
On appeal these issues are presented for review:
(1) Whether the local law of Montana or that of California
is to be applied to determine defendants' legitimacy?
(2) If the law of California is to be applied to the
legitimacy issue, whether defendants are legitimate or have been
legitimated pursuant to that law?
(3) If defendants are illegitimate, whether the decedent,
during his lifetime, complied with the requirements of section
91-404, R.C.M. 1947?
First, we note it has not yet been determined that de-
fendants are, in fact, the children of the decedent. Although
the record would support such a finding, nothing we say herein
should be construed as to require such a finding. That is a mat-
ter to be determined by the district court on remand.
For purposes of succession, the law of Montana disting-
uishes between legitimate and illegitimate children of a decedent.
Section 91-404, R.C.M. 1947. Our initial inquiry must be to deter-
mine whether the law of Montana or California is to be applied in
the determination of whether defendants are the legitimate or
illegitimate children of the decedent. Defendants were born in
California and are, to this day, California domiciliaries. The
relationship between the decedent and defendants' mother occurred
solely in California. Other than this lawsuit, defendants have
had no contact with Montana. Certainly it cannot be intimated
that the mere fact that decedent later traveled to Montana and
died here, in and of itself, renders defendants legitimate.
We hold the local law of California governs the issue of defend-
ants' legitimacy. Restatement, Conflict of Laws, S S 137-141;
1 Restatement of Conflict of Laws 2d, S 6; 2 Restatement of
Conflict of Laws 2d, S S 287, 288.
Defendants contend Montana decisions in In re Wray's
Estate, 93 Mont. 525, 540, 19 P.2d 1051; and In re Wehr's Estate,
96 Mont. 245, 253, 29 P.2d 836, require that we apply Montana law
to the legitimacy issue. We disagree and find these two decisions
to be consistent with our holding today.
In Wray's Estate, the child was born illegitimate in
Nebraska. The father later moved to Wyoming and the mother and
father intermarried there. The father subsequently died domiciled
in Montana. On the subject of the legitimation of the child,
this Court looked to Wyoming law, stating:
" * * * upon the marriage of the father and mother,
the law of the domicile of the father is controll-
ing. I'
This Court applied the predecessor of section 61-123, R.C.M. 1947,
"A child born before wedlock becomes legitimate by the subsequent
marriage of its parents" solely because there was an absence of
proof as to the Wyoming law and it was presumed to be the same
as Montana's. Section 61-123, R.C.M. 1947, being a statute of
legitimation, the Court properly looked to the law of the place
where the legitimating act occurred,
In Wehr's Estate, the illegitimate child of the decedent
was born and domiciled in Germany. Before moving to Montana, in
a writing executed in Germany, the decedent acknowledged the
illegitimate child as his own. This Court held the acknowledgment
sufficient under the predecessor of section 91-404, R.C.M. 1947,
to entitle the child to share in the decedent's estate and nom-
inate an administrator. The portion of section 91-404 pertaining
to acknowledgments being a statute of succession, the Court
properly looked to local Montana law. While this Court stated
there that "the question of status for the purpose of inheri-
tance depends upon the laws of the domicile of the intestate
as to property there situated" that statement must be viewed as
mere dictum, being broader than the issue at hand.
Here, it is apparent from the record that the district
court never considered the issue of whether the defendants
could be either legitimate or legitimated under California law,
despite the failure of decedent and their mother to enter into any
formal marriage ceremony. The district court, and the attorneys
too, for that matter, apparently believed that such failure
rendered defendants, per se, illegitimate. We find it necessary
to remand this cause to the district court for a determination
of whether defendants are legitimate or have been legitimated
under California law.
From 1933 to 1969, California Civil Code, § 85, read:
"The issue of a marriage which is void or annulled
or dissolved by divorce is legitimate."
From 1945 to date, California Civil Code, S 55, now Civil
Code, S 4100, reads:
"Marriage is a personal relation arising out of a
civil contract, to which the consent of the parties
capable of making that contract is necessary. Con-
sent alone will not constitute marriage; it must be
followed by the issuance of a license and solemniza-
tion as authorized by this code * * *."
In In re Filtzer's Estate, 33 Cal.2d 776, 205 P.2d 377,
379, the California Supreme Court affirmed an award of a reason-
able allowance for support and maintenance to the child of the
decedent father. The mother and father had entered into a cere-
monial Mexican marriage, and thereafter lived together as man
and wife. The father was, at all times until his death, legally
married to another woman. The validity of the Mexican marriage
was not relevant to the child's claim for the support allowance,
the Court stated:
" * * * in order to legitimate the issue of a
bigamous marriage--as is here involved--under
statutes identical with or similar in wording
to section 85 of the Civil Code, it must appear
that at least one of the parties to such attempted
marriage contracted in good faith, believing it
to be a valid marriage. See annotation, 84 A.L.R.
499, 501 * * *."
While the opinion states the trial court found that the mother
and father thereafter "lived together * husband and wife",
that finding appears to have been of mere evidentiary value.
For reasons not pertinent here, defendants in the district
court relied on a purported common law marriage between the dece-
dent and their mother. Common law marriages are not valid in
California. Norman v. Norman, 121 Cal. 620, 54 P. 143, However,
in attempting to establish a common law marriage between the dece-
dent and their mother, defendants placed into evidence certain
facts which indicated the mother, Mildred Thorngren, believed
that she and decedent were validly married. Just as the validity
of the Mexican marriage in Filtzer's Estate was not determinative
of the issue of good faith, likewise the validity of the attempted
union between decedent and defendants' mother in California and
whether or not it would be a valid common law marriage under the
laws of Montana, is not determinative of this appeal. If the
district court, on remand, finds that the mother of defendants
believed in good faith that she and decedent were validly married,
then the children of that union are legitimate.
The law of California further provides in its Civil Code
"The father of an illegitimate child, by pub-
licly acknowledging it as his own, receiving
it as such, with the consent of his wife, if he
is married, into his family, and otherwise
treating it as if it were a legitimate child,
t h e r e b y a d o p t s i t a s s u c h ; and s u c h c h i l d i s
t h e r e u p o n deemed f o r a l l p u r p o s e s l e g i t i m a t e
from t h e t i m e of i t s b i r t h . "
A number of C a l i f o r n i a c a s e s have h e l d t h a t t h e f a t h e r
of a n i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d may a d o p t p u r s u a n t t o S 230, s o t h a t
it w i l l be deemed l e g i t i m a t e , though t h e f a t h e r i s n o t m a r r i e d
t o t h e mother, by r e c e i v i n g i t i n t o h i s home and o t h e r w i s e
f u l f i l l i n g t h e s t a t u t o r y r e q u i r e m e n t s though t h e home i n t o which
he r e c e i v e s it i s one i n which he and t h e mother a r e l i v i n g . In
r e M c G r e w , 183 C a l . 1 1 7 , 190 P. 804; Serway v . G a l e n t i n e , 75
Cal.App.2d 8 6 , 170 P.2d 32. Here, t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d ,
i f believed, i s s u f f i c i e n t t o warrant a f i n d i n g t h a t decedent,
w i t h r e s p e c t t o C h e r a l e e Johnson a n d / o r C h r i s t o p h e r Thorngren,
f u l f i l l e d tile r e q u i r e m e n t s of C i v i l Code g 230 and l e g i t i m a t e d
them. Should t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , on remand, s o f i n d , t h e n t h e y
a r e e n t i t l e d t o a n i n t e s t a t e s h a r e of d e c e d e n t ' s e s t a t e . Denise
lllazzucca i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o t h e b e n e f i t of t h i s s t a t u t e s i n c e
t h e e v i d e n c e shows t h a t d e c e d e n t l e f t t h e mother t h r e e weeks
p r i o r t o Denise's b i r t h .
While t h e e x a c t p o i n t h a s n o t been d e c i d e d by t h e Supreme
C o u r t of C a l i f o r n i a , t h a t C o u r t ' s l i b e r a l i t y i n f i n d i n g l e g i t i -
macy, a s e x e m p l i f i e d by t h e f o r e g o i n g d i s c u s s i o n , l e a d s u s t o
b e l i e v e t h a t i t would f o l l o w t h e r e a s o n i n g e n u n c i a t e d i n Clark--
The Law of Domestic R e l a t i o n s , pp. 132,133, (West 1968) :
"A l a r g e r number of s t a t e s have e n a c t e d b r o a d e r s t a t u t e s
of a second t y p e , which s i m p l y p r o v i d e t h a t t h e c h i l d r e n
of v o i d o r v o i d a b l e m a r r i a g e s o r of m a r r i a g e s deemed
n u l l i n law a r e l e g i t i m a t e . A t f i r s t g l a n c e t h i s s o r t
o f s t a t u t e a p p e a r s r e a s o n a b l y s a t i s f a c t o r y , b u t it t o o
r a i s e s q u e s t i o n s of c o n s t r u c t i o n which any well-drawn
s t a t u t e o u g h t t o a v o i d . The t e r m ' v o i d a b l e m a r r i a g e s '
i s c l e a r enough and c a u s e s no t r o u b l e . But what i s
meant by ' v o i d m a r r i a g e ' ? * * * d o e s i t l e g i t i m i z e t h e
c h i l d r e n of a p u r p o r t e d common law m a r r i a g e which i s
i n v a l i d because t h e s t a t e d o e s n o t r e c o g n i z e cornmon
law m a r r i a g e ? O r d o e s i t l e g i t i m i z e t h e c h i l d r e n of a
l i a i s o n which was c o n c e d e d l y n o t a m a r r i a g e , b u t which
was t h o u g : ~ t by some f r i e n d s of t h e p a r t i e s t o be a
m a r r i a g e , and which l a s t e d f o r a n a p p r e c i a b l e t i m e ?
* * * I f words a r e g i v e n t h e i r u s u a l meaning,
a void marriage i s a non-existent marriage.
T h i s b e i n g s o , t h e l i t e r a l meaning of t h e
s t a t u t e s i s t h a t a l l c h i l d r e n of n o n - e x i s t e n t
m a r r i a g e s a r e l e g i t i m a t e . Presumably no c o u r t
would s o c o n s t r u e t h e s t a t u t e s . The most
s e n s i b l e c o n s t r u c t i o n , and t h e o n e most i n a c c o r d
w i t h t h e s t a t u t o r y p u r p o s e , i s t h a t of t h e S a n t i l l
c a s e [ S a n t i l l v . R o s s e t t i , 178 N.E.2d 633 (Ohio
Com. P1. 1 9 6 1 ) ] , namely, t h a t s u c h s t a t u t e s
l e g i t i m i z e t h e c h i l d r e n of a l l d e f a c t o m a r r i a g e s ,
o f a l l r e l a t i o n s h i p s which l o o k l i k e m a r r i a g e s
and i n which t h e p a r t i e s behave a s husband and
wife. "
The r e c o r d i n t h e i n s t a n t a p p e a l i s s u f f i c i e n t t o s u p p o r t a
f i n d i n g t h e r e was a d e f a c t o m a r r i a g e between d e c e d e n t and de-
f e n d a n t s ' mother. T h e r e f o r e , i f t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t s h o u l d , on
remand, f i n d d e f e n d a n t s a r e t h e i s s u e of s u c h a d e f a c t o mar-
r i a g e , t h e n t h e y a r e e n t i t l e d t o be t r e a t e d a s l e g i t i m a t e h e i r s
of d e c e d e n t .
Defendants n e x t c o n t e n d t h a t , even i f t h e y be found t o
be i l l e g i t i m a t e , t h e y a r e e n t i t l e d t o i n h e r i t from d e c e d e n t be-
c a u s e of h i s compliance w i t h s e c t i o n 91-404, R.C.M. 1947, which
reads :
"Every i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d i s a n h e i r of t h e p e r s o n
who, i n w r i t i n g , s i g n e d i n t h e p r e s e n c e of a
competent w i t n e s s , acknowledges h i m s e l f t o he t h e
f a t h e r of s u c h c h i l d * * *".
I n s u p p o r t d e f e n d a n t s i n t r o d u c e d a copy of a n a p p l i c a t i o n r e c o r d
f o r t h e U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a H o s p i t a l o u t - p a t i e n t d e p a r t m e n t .
On t h e f a c e of t h e document was t h e name o f t h e p a t i e n t , M i l d r e d
B e r n i c e Dauenhauer, and l i s t e d members of t h e household a s
' ' ~ o n yh u s b " , " C h e r a l e e dau 16 mos.", and " C h r i s Son ( h o r n 8-26-51)".
C h r i s was born August 26, 1950. The a p p l i c a t i o n was d a t e d "9-8-48".
A t t h e l i n e e n t i t l e d " I n f o r m a t i o n Given by" was t h e s i g n a t u r e
"Tony Dauenhauer". Mildred Thorngren t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e a p p l i -
c a t i o n was s i g n e d by t h e d e c e d e n t i n h e r p r e s e n c e on September 8 ,
1948, w h i l e s h e was a t t e m p t i n g t o g e t o b s t e t r i c a l c a r e w h i l e
pregnant with Cheralee. A t t h a t t i m e , none of d e f e n d a n t s were
y e t born. There i s no e v i d e n c e a s t o when t h e e n t r i e s "Chera-
l e e dau 16 mos." and " C h r i s Son ( b o r n 8-26-51)" were made b u t
i t must have been a t some d a t e s u b s e q u e n t t o September 8 , 1948.
Thus i t i s e v i d e n t t h a t d e c e d e n t , by t h i s document, d i d n o t
m e e t t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f s e c t i o n 91-404, R.C.M. 1947. W do
e
n o t h o l d t h a t d e c e d e n t c o u l d n o t have acknowledged C h e r a l e e a s
h i s c h i l d p r i o r t o h e r b i r t h , m e r e l y , t h a t by t h i s document, he
d i d n o t do so.
For t h e f o r e g o i n g r e a s o n s , t h i s c a u s e i s remanded t o
t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r f u r t h e r proceedings not i n c o n s i s t e n t with
t h i s o p i n i o n and f o r a d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f (1) whether any o r a l l
of t h e d e f e n d a n t s a r e c h i l d r e n of d e c e d e n t ; ( 2 ) whether any o r
a l l o f d e f e n d a n t s a r e l e g i t i m a t e b e c a u s e of C a l i f o r n i a C i v i l Code
5 85 and t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n p l a c e d t h e r e o n by t h e C a l i f o r n i a
courts; ( 3 ) whether C h e r a l e e and/or C h r i s t o p h e r have been l e g i t i -
mated b e c a u s e of C a l i f o r n i a C i v i l Code S 230 and t h e i n t e r p r e t a -
t i o n p l a c e d t h e r e o n by t h e C a l i f o r n i a C o u r t s ; and ( 4 ) whether any
I
o r a l l of d e f e n d a n t s a r e t h e - l e g i t i m a t e i s s u e of a d e f a c t o m a r r i a g e .
Chief J u s t i c e
W e concur:
................................
Justices