No. 12817
I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O M N A A
F F OTN
1974
EMMA LOIdE ,
P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t ,
-vs -
FRED C. ROOT, e t a ] - . ,
Defendants and Respondents.
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable J a c k L. Green, Judge p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel o f Record:
For Appellant :
R i c h a r d J. C o n k l i n a r g u e d , White S u l p h u r S p r i n g s ,
Montana
F o r Respondents :
G a r l i n g t o n , Lohn and Robinson, M i s s o u l a , Montana
Sherman V . Lohn a r g u e d and Gary L. Graham a r g u e d ,
Missoula , Montana
Submitted: November 2 2 , 1974
Decided: -
rrR
.c - @ 13TZ
Filed:
- r- b
-
- 6 -''k!k
.d .I, Y'
M. J u s t i c e Wesley C a s t l e s d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court.
r
This i s an appeal by t h e l e s s e e , E m Lowe, from a summary
m a
judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Missoula County, g r a n t e d i n favor
of l e s s o r s , Fred C . Root, C a r l E. D r a g s t e d t , Evelyn D r a g s t e d t ,
E l l a R. Clausen, Elmer S. Dragstedt and E l i n o r R. D r a g s t e d t .
On A p r i l 9 , 1970, E m Lowe e n t e r e d i n t o two n e a r l y i d e n t i c a l
m a
l e a s e s w i t h t h e l e s s o r s , each i n v o l v i n g an undivided one h a l f
i n t e r e s t i n t h e same r e a l p r o p e r t y d e s c r i b e d a s t h e Belmont Hotel
i n t h e c i t y of Missoula. One l e a s e i d e n t i f i e d Fred Root a s t h e l e s s o r ,
t h e o t h e r i d e n t i f i e d t h e D r a g s t e d t s and E l l a Clausen a s l e s s o r s .
Each l e a s e provided t h a t t h e term of t h e l e a s e should run
up t o and i n c l u d i n g March 31, 1974. The l e s s o r e x p r e s s l y covenanted
f o r t h e l e s s e e t h e q u i e t enjoyment of s a i d term. Lessee agreed
to:
"* ? * c a r e f o r and maintain t h e i n t e r i o r of s a i d
premises and t h e e x t e r i o r c a s i n g s of a l l windows
l o c a t e d on s a i d premises; t o permit no unlawful
u s e of s a i d premises; t o make no major a l t e r a t i o n s
without permission of t h e l e s s o r ; t o maintain and
r e p a i r t h e h e a t i n g p l a n t and h o t w a t e r h e a t e r ,***
and t o c a r r y adequate i n s u r a n c e t o p r o t e c t t h e lower
f l o o r t e n a n t s from any water damage."
The l e s s o r s , f o r t h e i r p a r t , were:
"* * * t o keep and maintain t h e e x t e r i o r w a l l s of
s a i d premises and t h e r o o f , and t o b e r e s p o n s i b l e
f o r t h e c a r e and r e p a i r of s a i d roof yc."**
A l l p a r t i e s e x p r e s s l y understood and agreed t h a t they had
examined t h e premises and knew t h e c o n d i t i o n t h e r e o f .
While i n possession of t h e premises l e s s e e E m Lowe r e c e i v e d
m a
a l e t t e r f o r t h e f i r e marshal, d a t e d January 23, 1973, o u t l i n i n g
a number of v i o l a t i o n s of t h e L i f e S a f e t y and E l e c t r i c a l Codes
of t h e c i t y of Missoula and s t a t e of Montana. With t h e s o l e excep-
t i o n of d e f i c i e n c e s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e f i r e escape, a l l d e f i c i e n c i e s
enumerated i n t h e l e t t e r involved t h e i n t e r i o r p o r t i o n of t h e
building. The l e t t e r r e f e r r e d t o a l e t t e r d a t e d December 23, 1970
which l i s t e d many of t h e same d e f i c i e n c i e s . E m Lowe admitted
ma
r e c e i v i n g t h i s 1970 l e t t e r . The January 1973 l e t t e r ordered t h e
v i o l a t i o n s t o be c o r r e c t e d by August 1, 1973.
Lessor Root c o n t a c t e d t h e county a t t o r n e y and r e q u e s t e d him
t o i n i t i a t e an a c t i o n t o condemn t h e premises from f u r t h e r u s e
a s a h o t e l , boarding house o r rooming house. O May 1 4 , 1973,
n
an o r d e r of condemnation was f i l e d i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t d e c l a r i n g
t h e premises t o be a f i r e hazard and a p u b l i c n u i s a n c e and o r d e r i n g
a l l p a r t i e s t o t h i s i n s t a n t a c t i o n t o a l t e r and r e p a i r t h e b u i l d i n g
on o r b e f o r e August 1, 1973. On August 3 , 1973, t h e d i s t r i c t
c o u r t g r a n t e d summary judgment, a f f i r m i n g t h e o r d e r of condemnation
and d i r e c t i n g t h e s t a t e f i r e marshal t o proceed w i t h i t s e n f o r c e -
ment.
O June 1 9 , 1973, Lowe f i l e d a complaint i n d i s t r i c t c o u r t
n
a g a i n s t Fred Root s e e k i n g l o s t p r o f i t s f o r t h e remainder of t h e
l e a s e term and renewal term. The p e r t i n e n t grounds of t h e complaint
were: The premises were u n f i t f o r t h e purpose f o r which t h e y were
rented. Defendant Root had f a i l e d t o m a i n t a i n t h e premises i n a
good and proper f a s h i o n so t h a t t h e y could b e o p e r a t e d f o r t h e
purpose f o r which t h e l e a s e was i n t e n d e d . P l a i n t i f f Lowe had
demanded t h a t defendant Root perform a c c o r d i n g t o t h e terms of t h e
c o n t r a c t t o r e s t o r e t h e premises t o a good and proper c o n d i t i o n
f o r t h e purpose f o r which t h e y were r e n t e d and t h a t defendant r e -
fused. E m Lowe had been caused t o become t h e defendant i n t h e
m a
condemnation a c t i o n because of t h e f a i l u r e of defendant t o r e p a i r .
I n Count V I I I of h e r complaint Lowe a l l e g e d i n t h e f o l l o w i n g
garbled fashion:
"* * * That t h e y [ t h e d e f e n d a n t s ] f r a u d u l e n t l y con-
c e a l e d i n f o r m n t i o n concerning t h e d e f e c t s on t h e p r e m i s e s ,
from t h e p l a i n t i f f and f r a u d i i e n t l y w i t h h e l d t h e same i n -
f o r m a t i o n , which was known t o them concerning t h e d e f e c t i v e
c o n d i t i o n of t h e premises and t h a t s a i d d e f e c t s were con-
c e a l e d unobservable by a common examination of t h e premises,
and t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f , i n r e l i a n c e on t h e a s s u r a n c e of t h e
d e f e n d a n t s t h a t t h e premises were, i n f a c t , i n f i t and proper
o r d e r , b a s i s f o r t h e performing of t h e b u s i n e s s of a h o t e l
r e n t a Ilt a s they had been l e a s e s f o r , e n t e r e d i n t o t h e a g r e e -
ment.
Count IX of t h e complaint a l l e g e d :
hat t h e defendant has w i l f u l l y , w r o n g f u l l y , u n l a w f u l l y ,
and i n t e n t i o n a l l y a t t e m p t e d t o d r i v e t h e p l a i n t i f f from
t h e f u l l and q u i e t enjoyment of t h e premises, under t h e
l e a s e . That t h e d e f e n d a n t , Fred C. Root, i s t h e C i t y A t t o r -
ney of t h e C i t y o f Missoula, and was p r i v i t y t o knowledge
concerning t h e d e f e c t s above a l l e g e d i n t h e premises. ***
That s a i d defendant, Fred C. Root, has a c t e d
w i l l f u l l y , m a l i c i o u s l y , and wrongfully i n an
a t t e m p t t o vex, h a r a s s , annoy and i n t i m i d a t e t h e
* *.
p l a i n t i f f gc The defendant h a s , a s an agent
for the *** [Dragstedts and Clausen] and f o r
himself used t h e p o s i t i o n of h i s o f f i c e t o e x e r t ,
through t h e County A t t o r n e y ' s O f f i c e , caused t o b e
f i l e d a complaint a l l e g i n g t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f i s
g u i l t y of allowing t h e premises t o f a l l i n t o decay,
and f u r t h e r t h e defendant h a s , a t h i s s p e c i f i c r e q u e s t
and i n t e n t , caused t h e County through t h e County A t t o r -
n e y ' s o f f i c e , t o i s s u e an Order d e c l a r i n g t h e premises
a f i r e hazard and a t t e m p t i n g t o a b a t e t h e same."
Three days l a t e r Lowe f i l e d a n e a r l y i d e n t i c a l complaint a g a i n s t
t h e remaining defendants. The only s u b s t a n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e i n t h i s
second complaint was she a l l e g e d t h a t Root a c t e d a s t h e a g e n t of
t h e o t h e r defendants.
Subsequent t o t h e condemnation, Lowe vacated t h e premises and
no f u r t h e r r e n t a l s were paid.
The two a c t i o n s h e r e t o f o r e mentioned, p l u s an unlawful d e t a i n e r
a c t i o n f i l e d by defendants a g a i n s t p l a i n t i f f Lowe were c o n s o l i d a t e d .
Defendants moved f o r summary judgment. I n i t s judgment and o r d e r
g r a n t i n g defendants ' motion, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t h e l d t h a t under
t h e t e r n s of t h e l e a s e s defendants were n o t o b l i g a t e d t o make t h e
s u b s t a n t i a l changes and a l t e r a t i o n s r e q u i r e d ; t h a t s e c t i o n 42-202,
R.C.M. 1947, l i m i t s r e c o u r s e by a t e n a n t t o v a c a t i n g t h e premises
o r performing r e p a i r s up t o t h e amount of one month's r e n t a l where,
a s h e r e , t h e l e a s e d premises a r e f o r human h a b i t a t i o n ; t h a t p u n i t i v e
damages cannot b e awarded without a showing of a c t u a l damages; and,
t h a t p l a i n t i f f i n s p e c t e d t h e l e a s e d premises and knew i t s c o n d i t i o n .
Plaintiff a p p e a l s from t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s g r a n t i n g
d e f e n d a n t s ' motion f o r summary judgment.
Three i s s u e s a r e presented f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n on a p p e a l :
Was t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t c o r r e c t g r a n t i n g summary
judgment t o t h e defendants on t h e i s s u e of f r a u d ?
Was t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t c o r r e c t i n i t s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t
s e c t i o n s 42-201 and 42-202, R.C.M. 1947, c o n s t i t u t e a b a r t o t h e
claim of p l a i n t i f f ?
(3) Was t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t c o r r e c t i n i t s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t
p l a i n t i f f ' s complaint d i d n o t p r e s e n t a f a c t u a l q u e s t i o n o f wrongful
d i s r u p t i o n of p o s s e s s i o n ?
W answer a l l q u e s t i o n s i n t h e a f f i r m a t i v e .
e
As t o t h e i s s u e of f r a u d , t h e p r e v i o u s l y quoted Count V I I I
of t h e complaint a l l e g e d f r a u d u l e n t concealment of c e r t a i n informa-
t i o n a s t o defects i n the property p r i o r t o the leases.
Although a p p e l l a n t appears t o have abandoned any argument t h a t
she was defrauded a s t o t h e p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n of t h e premises,
we s h a l l d i s c u s s t h a t i s s u e i n o r d e r t o show t h a t summary judgment
i n f a v o r of respondents was proper w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h a t l e v e l
of f r a u d . I n support of h e r m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n argument, a p p e l l a n t
c i t e s Lee v. Stockmen's National Bank, 63 Mont. 262, 284, 207 P.
623. -sets
Lee f o r t h t h e elements n e c e s s a r y t o prove a c t u a l f r a u d .
i t goes f u r t h e r , however, and s t a t e s :
I1 1
When i t appears t h a t a p a r t y , who c l a i m s t o have
been deceived t o h i s p r e j u d i c e , h a s i n v e s t i g a t e d f o r
h i m s e l f , o r t h a t t h e means were a t hand t o a s c e r t a i n
the truth * 9
; * of any r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s made t o him, h i s
r e l i a n c e upon such r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s made t o him, however
1
f a l s e they may have been, a f f o r d s no ground of complaint.
(Grinrod v. Anglo-American Bond Co., 34 Mont. 169, 85
Pac. 891; Power & Bros. v. Turner, 37 Mont. 521, 97 Pac.
950 ; 26 C . J . 1149. ) I' (Emphasis s u p p l i e d ) .
I n o t h e r words, i f a p p e l l a n t ' s i n s p e c t i o n of t h e premises
r e v e a l e d o r would have r e v e a l e d t h e t r u e p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n of t h e
premises, she would have no r i g h t t o r e l y upon any concealment by
respondents w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n of t h e premises.
Both l e a s e s provide t h a t t h e p a r t i e s "agree t h a t t h e y have
examined t h e premises and know t h e c o n d i t i o n thereof1'. Appellant
admits s h e i n s p e c t e d t h e premises. A review of t h e d e f i c i e n c i e s a s
c i t e d i n t h e o r d e r of condemnation, r e v e a l s t h a t a l l of t h e a l l e g e d
d e f e c t s were open and n o t o r i o u s . A superficial inspection'of the
b u i l d i n g would r e v e a l t h o s e d e f i c i e n c i e s . Applying t h e f a c t s of
t h i s c a s e t o Lee, and p a r t i c u l a r l y t o t h e language quoted h e r e t o f o r e ,
n e c e s s i t a t e s a f i n d i n g t h a t an a c t i o n a b l e c a s e of f r a u d a s t o t h e
p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n o f t h e premises could n o t be found under t h e
circumstances.
The claimed m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n was n o t argued by a p p e l l a n t Lowe
i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t , except i n what may be d e s c r i b e d a s an o b l i q u e
manner. The r a t h e r g a r b l e d a l l e g a t i o n i n Count V I I I of t h e complaint
d i d n o t , by i t s e l f , a l l e g e f r a u d a s t o l e g a l consequences flowing
from t h e p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n of t h e premises.
Following t h e g r a n t i n g of summary judgment, a p p e l l a n t f i l e d
what s h e c a l l e d a motion f o r r e h e a r i p g . For t h e f i r s t t i m e , n o t
i n t h e motion, b u t i n t h e b r i e f f i l e d w i t h t h e motion, a p p e l l a n t
Lowe r a t h e r o b l i q u e l y s t a t e s t h a t :
"* * * t h e premises were n o t i n f a c t , f i t f o r t h e
purpose of l e a s i n g t h e same a s a h o t e l and t h a t t h e
knowledge t h a t t h e premises were n o t f i t f o r t h e
purpose f o r which t h e y were l e a s e d was a s p e c i a l and
p e c u l i a r knowledge a v a i l a b l e t o t h e d e f e n d a n t s through
t h e i r a g e n t , and n o t r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e t o t h e p l a i n t i f f
by mere examination o f t h e premises. That i t r e q u i r e d
an e x p e r t i s e , t h a t t h e defendant possessed and t h e
p l a i n t i f f did not.* * *.I1
With t h i s b a r e r e f e r e n c e a t t h i s p o i n t i n t i m e , t h e t r i a l c o u r t
w i l l n o t be put i n e r r o r . I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o lend credence t o t h e
c l a i m of E m Lowe of f r a u d u l e n t m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n l i g h t o f t h e
m a
i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t a i n e d i n t h e e x h i b i t a t t a c h e d t o t h e o r d e r of
condemnation. The l e t t e r d a t e d January 1973 t o Lowe r e c i t e s t h a t
i n a l e t t e r d a t e d December 23, 1970, many of t h e d i s c r e p a n c i e s were
pointed out. This much l a t e r , beyond t h e p e r i o d of t h e s t a t u t e of
l i m i t a t i o n s , more than an o b l i q u e r e f e r e n c e i n a b r i e f on a motion
f o r r e h e a r i n g would be n e c e s s a r y t o r e s u r r e c t a f a c t i s s u e on motion
f o r summary judgment .
A p p e l l a n t ' s second i s s u e i s whether s e c t i o n s 42-201 and 42-202,
R.C.M. 1947, c o n s t i t u t e a b a r t o t h e c l a i m of a p p e l l a n t . Those
sections provide:
"42-201. The l e s s o r of a b u i l d i n g i n t e n d e d f o r t h e
occupation of human b e i n g s must, i n t h e absence of an
agreement t o t h e c o n t r a r y , put i t i n t o a c o n d i t i o n f i t
f o r such o c c u p a t i o n , and r e p a i r a l l subsequent d i l a p i d -
a t i o n s t h e r e o f which r e n d e r i t u n t e n a n t a b l e , e x c e p t such
a s a r e mentioned i n s e c t i o n 42-105."
"42-202. I f , w i t h i n a r e a s o n a b l e time a f t e r n o t i c e t o
t h e l e s s o r of d i l a p i d a t i o n s which he ought t o r e p a i r , he
n e g l e c t s t o do s o , t h e l e s s e e may r e p a i r t h e same h i m s e l f ,
where t h e c o s t s of such r e p a i r s do n o t r e q u i r e an expendi-
t u r e g r e a t e r t h a n one month's r e n t of t h e p r e m i s e s , and
deduct t h e expenses o f such r e p a i r s from t h e r e n t , o r t h e
l e s s e e may v a c a t e t h e premises. i n which c a s e h e s h a l l be
d i s c h a r g e h from f u r t h e r payment of r e n t , o r performance of
other conditions. II
S e c t i o n 42-105, R.C.M. 1947, simply s t a t e s :
"The h i r e r of a t h i n g must r e p a i r a l l d e t e r i o r a t i o n s
o r i n j u r i e s t h e r e t o occasioned by h i s o r d i n a r y neg-
ligence. tI
I n Landt v. Schneider, 3 1 Mont. 15, 17,18, 77 P. 307, t h e
Court s a i d :
11
I t i s an elementary p r i n c i p l e of law t h a t , i n t h e
absence of a s t a t u t e o r agreement, t h e r e i s no implied
warranty t h a t l e a s e d premises a r e s u i t a b l e f o r t h e
purposes f o r which t h e y a r e demised, o r t h a t t h e l e s s o r
w i l l keep t h e p r o p e r t y i n r e p a i r . 11
See a l s o : Kintner v. Harr, 146 Mont. 461, 482, 408 P.2d 487.
~ o n t a n a ' ss t a t u t e s were d e r i v e d from t h e C a l i f o r n i a C i v i l Code,
s e c t i o n s 1941 and 1942. I n 1881, i n Van Every v. Ogg, 59 Cal. 563,
566, t h e C a l i f o r n i a Supreme Court w e l l s t a t e d t h e reasons f o r t h e
two s t a t u t e s :
"It i s i n s i s t e d t h a t t h e s e c t i o n l a s t c i t e d [42-2011,
by o p e r a t i o n of law, i n s e r t s i n every l e a s e a covenant
on t h e p a r t of t h e l a n d l o r d t o r e p a i r . But b e a r i n g i n
mind t h a t a t t h e common law no such covenant was i m p l i e d ,
and r e a d i n g t h e two s e c t i o n s t o g e t h e r , t h e i n t e n t seems
c l e a r t h a t t h e o b l i g a t i o n of t h e l a n d l o r d should be l i m i t e d
by t h e e x t e n t of t h e p r i v i l e g e c o n f e r r e d upon t h e t e n a n t ;
t h a t i t i s t h e duty of t h e l a n d l o r d t o r e p a i r upon n o t i c e ,
and i f he does n o t perform t h i s duty he i s t o b e compelled
t o pay, by deduction from t h e r e n t , t o t h e e x t e n t of a
month's r e n t a l - - - o r , a t t h e o p t i o n of t h e t e n a n t , t h e term
be concluded w i t h o u t r e d r e s s t o t h e l a n d l o r d . "
Then t h e C a l i f o r n i a Court went on t o p o i n t o u t t h a t p r i o r t o an
amendment i n 1874, s e c t i o n 1942 of t h e i r c i v i l code r e a d :
" " 1 f . w i t h i n a r e a s o n a b l e time a f t e r n o t i c e t o t h e
l e s i o r of d i l a p i d a t i o n s which he ought t o r e p a i r ,
he n e g l e c t s t o do s o , t h e l e s s e e may r e p a i r t h e same
h i m s e l f , and deduct t h e expenses of such r e p a i r s from
t h e r e n t , o r otherwise r e c o v e r i t from t h e l e s s o r . I I 1
I n 1922, t h i s Court decided Noe v. Cameron, 62 Mont. 527, 532,
205 P. 256, a c a s e almost i d e n t i c a l t o t h e i n s t a n t a p p e a l . -
I n Noe
an a c t i o n was brought t o recover damages a l l e g e d t o have been
s u s t a i n e d by p l a i n t i f f a s t h e l e s s e e of a h o t e l because of t h e
f a i l u r e of defendant t o make r e p a i r s a f t e r n o t i c e was given by
plaintiff. This Court, c i t i n g Bush v. Baker, 5 1 Mont. 326, 152 P. 750,
said:
"'2 ** These s e c t i o n s [42-201 and 42-2021, a s we a r e
t o l d i n t h e r e p o r t of t h e Code Commission, were taken
from C a l i f o r n i a , and i n v e s t i g a t i o n d i s c l o s e s t h a t t h e y
came t o us w i t h a c o n s t r u c t i o n upon them which l e a v e s no
room f o r doubt. [Cases c i t e d ] . T h i s c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t o
the e f f e c t t h a t , i f the landlord f a i l s t o r e p a i r a f t e r
n o t i c e , t h e t e n a n t may himself r e p a i r , w i t h i n a c e r t a i n
l i m i t , o r move o u t ; b u t he has no r e d r e s s i n damages f o r
i n j u r y t o person o r p r o p e r t y consequent upon t h e l a n d l o r d ' s
f a i l u r e t o r e p a i r . Whether t h i s c o n s t r u c t i o n be r i g h t
o r n o t , i t was presumably adopted w i t h t h e s e c t i o n s them-
s e l v e s , i t c o n s t i t u t e s a r u l e of p r o p e r t y , and t h e c o u r t s
of t h i s s t a t e a r e w i t h o u t a u t h o r i t y t o a l t e r i t . 1 1 1
Beyond a doubt a h o t e l i s "a b u i l d i n g intended f o r t h e occupa-
t i o n of human beings" and t h u s w i t h i n t h e scope of s e c t i o n s 42-201
and 42-202, R.C.M. 1947. Appellant had t h e c h o i c e o f making t h e
r e p a i r s c a l l e d f o r by t h e l e t t e r of t h e f i r e marshal and deducting
t h e c o s t from t h e r e n t payments, t o t h e e x t e n t of one month's r e n t ,
o r t o v a c a t e t h e premises. She cannot, however, r e c o v e r damages
from respondents f o r t h e i r f a i l u r e t o put t h e h o t e l i n t o a condi-
t i o n f i t f o r t h e occupation of human b e i n g s .
This r e s u l t i s n o t a f f e c t e d by t h e f a c t t h a t one of t h e
d i s c r e p a n c i e s a l l e g e d i n t h e l e t t e r of t h e f i r e marshal was t h e
f i r e escape and t h a t t h e l e s s o r s had covenanted " t o keep and
maintain t h e e x t e r i o r w a l l s of s a i d premises". Conceding f o r t h e
sake of argument t h a t t h e f i r e escape was w i t h i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n
of " e x t e r i o r w a l l s " and t h u s t h e duty of respondents t o r e p a i r i t ,
such c l a u s e i n t h e l e a s e added nothing t o t h e s t a t u t o r y d u t y of
t h e l e s s o r s imposed by s e c t i o n 42-201, R.C.M. 1947. Since t h e
language of t h e l e a s e added nothing t o t h e s t a t u t o r y d u t y , t h e
l i m i t a t i o n of s e c t i o n 42-202, R.C.M. 1947, remains a p p l i c a b l e .
W do n o t want t o be understood a s holding
e t h a t t h e p a r t i e s could
never c o n t r a c t i n excess of t h e s t a t u t o r y d u t i e s w i t h r e s p e c t t o
d i l a p i d a t i o n s which rendered t h e premises u n t e n a n t a b l e . W merely
e
s t a t e t h a t t h i s i s n o t such a c a s e .
I n a p p e l l a n t ' s t h i r d i s s u e on a p p e a l s h e a s s e r t s t h e complaint
s t a t e s a c a u s e of a c t i o n i n t o r t and breach of c o n t r a c t based upon
t h e d i s t u r b a n c e of h e r c o n t r a c t r i g h t t o q u i e t enjoyment of t h e
premises. She i n t i m a t e s t h a t respondents a r e l i a b l e under t h i s
t h e o r y of a c t i o n because respondent Root a l l e g e d l y r e q u e s t e d t h e
county a t t o r n e y t o b r i n g a c t i o n a g a i n s t h e r f o r t h e purpose of
o u s t i n g h e r from t h e l e a s e d premises. Her complaint a l s o h i n t s
a t an a c t i o n f o r m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n and t h a t ~ o o t ' sp o s i t i o n a s
c i t y a t t o r n e y had some r e l e v a n c e t o h e r c a u s e of a c t i o n .
Any h i n t of an a c t i o n f o r m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n can be q u i c k l y
disposed o f . Elements of t h a t a c t i o n , among o t h e r s , a r e : (1) t h e
p r i o r proceeding must have t e r m i n a t e d i n f a v o r of t h e p r e s e n t
p l a i n t i f f , and (2) t h e r e must be an absence of probable c a u s e f o r
t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of such proceeding. 54 C.J.S. 14alicious P r o s e c u t i o n ,
$4. Here, t h e condemnation a c t i o n t e r m i n a t e d i n summary judgment
i n f a v o r of t h e s t a t e .
Cases c i t e d i n t h e Annotation, 4 1 ALR2d 1414, 1442, i l l u s t r a t e
t h e r u l e t h a t where a t e n a n t ' s enjoyment i s i n t e r f e r e d w i t h i n
t h e e x e r c i s e of t h e p o l i c e power, and i s n o t caused by t h e breach
of any o b l i g a t i o n owed by t h e l a n d l o r d t o t h e t e n a n t , such i n t e r -
f e r e n c e does n o t c o n s t i t u t e a b r e a c h of t h e covenant f o r q u i e t
enjoyment. Appellant seems t o a c c e p t t h i s a s a g e n e r a l r u l e b u t
contends t h a t t h e a f f i r m a t i v e a c t i o n s of Root i n i n s t i g a t i n g t h e
condemnation a c t i o n c o n s t i t u t e a b r e a c h of t h e q u i e t enjoyment
covenant.
A f t e r e x h a u s t i v e s e a r c h , we f i n d o n l y one c a s e having s i m i l a r
facts. I n Dolman v. United S t a t e s T r u s t Co. of N . Y . , 134 N.Y.S.2d
508,510, t h e t r i a l c o u r t denied t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s motion t o d i s m i s s
the complaint, s t a t i n g :
"For, i f t h e p l a i n t i f f can s u p p o r t h i s c l a i m t h a t t h e
defendant by i t s a f f i r m a t i v e a c t i n s t i g a t e d and f a c i l i t a t e d
t h e condemnation proceedings [eminent domain] and t h e con-
sequent e v i c t i o n , then i n m view t h e p l a i n t i f f h a s p r e s e n t e d
y
a c a u s e of a c t i o n f o r b r e a c h of t h e covenant of q u i e t en-
.
j oymen t 1 I
However, on a p p e a l Dolman was r e v e r s e d , 2 N.Y.2d 110, 138 N.E.2d 784,
157 N.Y.S.2d 537,541, t h e Court of Appeals h e l d " t h e t e n a n t was
e v i c t e d by reason o n l y of t h e e x e r c i s e of t h e s o v e r e i g n power of
eminent domain" and t h a t t h e l e s s o r ' s c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h t h e c i t y d i d
n o t c o n s t i t u t e a b r e a c h of t h e covenant of q u i e t enjoyment.
We are unwilling to hold that the scope of the covenant of
quiet enjoyment precludes a lessor, knowing of violations of
ordinances and statutes, from reporting such violations to the
authorities. We should not require a lessor to risk damages being
assessed against him because he has taken it upon himself to protect
the public by reporting the facts to the authorities.
Here, the district court in the condemnation action established
that the defects on these premises constituted a fire hazard. The
public interest is served by allowing any person who has knowledge
of a risk to public health of safety, be he lessor or otherwise,
to feel free to report such risk to the authorities without fear
of having later to respond in damages. The intent of the lessor in
reporting such a risk to public health and safety is immaterial,
the public interest being paramount. The fact that lessor was the
city attorney is likewise immaterial, there being no privity
between the city and county attorneys. Root was in the position
of any other private lessor.
Having examined the issues raised and finding no merit, we
affirm the judgment.
We Concur:
Justices /
Hon. Gordon Bennett, sitting for
Chief Justice James T. Harrison.