No. 13032
I N THE SIJPREME COURT O THE STATE O M N A3
F F O T IA
1976
LARRY N. TRIBBLE and LORETTA E. TRIBBLE,
P l a i n t i f f s and Respondents,
. .
J O H N L REELY , WITaLIAM E S REELY ,
DELBERT C. F. ASHMORE, TRIBBLE RANCH
CORPOPATION e t a l . ,
Defendants and A p p e l l a n t s .
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i f t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Hon. LeRoy L. McKinnon, Judge p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel of Record:
For Appellants :
Datsopoulos & Macnonald, M i s s o u l a , Montana
James B. Wheel-is a r g u e d , Missoul'q , Montana
W i l l i a m E. G i l b e r t a r g u e d , Bozeman, Montana
For Respondents :
Morrow, Nash and Sedivy, Bozeman, Montana
James H. 14orrow argued and Donald A. Nash a p p e a r e d ,
Bozeman, Montana
Submitted : September 9 , 1976
Decided: DEC 13 im
M r . Chief J u s t i c e James T . H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f
t h e Court.
T h i s a p p e a l a r i s e s o u t of a n a c t i o n b r o u g h t i n t h e
d i s t r i c t c o u r t , f i f t h j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , J e f f e r s o n County,
wherein p l a i n t i f f s L a r r y N. T r i b b l e and L o r e t t a E . T r i b b l e
a l l e g e d t h a t a lease e x e c u t e d t o them by d e f e n d a n t s K a t h e r i n e
T r i b b l e and W i l l i a m T r i b b l e , d e c e a s e d , c o n t a i n e d a r i g h t o f
f i r s t r e f u s a l t o p u r c h a s e c e r t a i n p r o p e r t y known a s t h e T r i b b l e
farm. The a c t i o n w a s b r o u g h t s e e k i n g d e c l a r a t o r y judgment t o
d e t e r m i n e t h e r e s p e c t i v e r i g h t s of t h e p a r t i e s i n view o f t h e
f a c t t h a t t h e r e had been e x e c u t e d a s a l e s agreement f o r t h e l a n d
i n q u e s t i o n between d e f e n d a n t s T r i b b l e and d e f e n d a n t s John and
W i l l i a m Reely and t o compel d e f e n d a n t s T r i b b l e t o e n t e r i n t o a n
agreement w i t h p l a i n t i f f s t o s e l l t h e p r o p e r t y on t h e same t e r m s .
The c a u s e w a s t r i e d b e f o r e t h e Hon. LeRoy McKinnon, s i t t i n g w i t h -
o u t a jury. F i n d i n g s o f f a c t , c o n c l u s i o n s o f law and judgment
w e r e entered f o r p l a i n t i f f s . Defendants now a p p e a l from t h a t
judgment .
The r e c o r d r e v e a l s : On A p r i l 6 , 1971, d e f e n d a n t s W i l l i a m
and K a t h e r i n e T r i b b l e e n t e r e d i n t o a lease agreement w i t h t h e i r
son and h i s w i f e , p l a i n t i f f s L a r r y and L o r e t t a T r i b b l e . The
p e r t i n e n t terms o f t h a t l e a s e w e r e :
"1. The L e s s o r s a r e t h e owners and i n p o s s e s s i o n
of t h e f o l l o w i n g mentioned p r o p e r t y s i t u a t e i n
J e f f e r s o n County, Montana, t o - w i t :
"The p r o p e r t y known a s t h e T r i b b l e farm i n J e f f e r -
son County, Montana, c o n s i s t i n g of a p p r o x i m a t e l y
1300 a c r e s of farm l a n d s ( l e s s o r s r e s e r v e g r a z i n g
l a n d s ) and hereby a g r e e t o l e t t h e same t o t h e
Lessees f o r t h e p e r i o d of t h r e e y e a r s ending
J a n u a r y 1, 1974.
"7. I t i s u n d e r s t o o d and a g r e e d t h a t t h i s l e a s e
i s made s u b j e c t t o s a l e by L e s s o r s a t any t i m e
from d a t e h e r e o f . I t i s f u r t h e r u n d e r s t o o d , how-
e v e r , t h a t i n t h e e v e n t of s a l e , t h e L e s s e e s s h a l l
have t h e f i r s t r e f u s a l under t e r m s s i m i l a r t o t h a t
o f f e r e d any t h i r d p a r t y , and i n t h e e v e n t of such
s a l e , t h e n t h i s l e a s e s h a l l t e r m i n a t e upon t h e
n e x t J a n u a r y 1 s u c c e e d i n g such sale.
"OPTION TO RENEW
"1. I t i s u n d e r s t o o d and a g r e e d t h a t t h e L e s s e e s
s h a l l have t h e f i r s t o p t i o n t o renew t h i s l e a s e
under t e r m s and c o n d i t i o n s t h e same a s above a g r e e d
f o r a n a d d i t i o n a l t h r e e ( 3 ) y e a r s commencing J a n -
u a r y 1, 1974, and t e r m i n a t i n g J a n u a r y 1, 1977. I t
i s f u r t h e r a g r e e d , however, t h a t i f t h e L e s s o r s
make a s a l e o f t h e p r o p e r t y o r any p o r t i o n t h e r e o f ,
t h e n t h i s l e a s e and i t s o p t i o n t o renew i s s u b j e c t
t o s u c h s a l e a s above a g r e e d w i t h r i g h t of L e s s e e s
t o m e e t any o f f e r o f any t h i r d p a r t y f o r t e n ( 1 0 )
d a y s a f t e r n o t i c e t o L e s s e e s i n w r i t i n g of i n t e n -
tion o r offer t o sell t o a third party.
"2. Time i s e x p r e s s l y made o f t h e e s s e n c e o f t h i s
lease.
"3. T h i s agreement s h a l l be b i n d i n g upon t h e h e i r s ,
e x e c u t o r s , a d m i n i s t r a t o r s and a s s i g n s of t h e res-
pective parties, with t h i s reservation:
"A. T h a t i f b o t h of t h e L e s s o r s s h o u l d n o t s u r v i v e
t h e terms o f t h i s l e a s e , t h e n t h i s l e a s e s h a l l
t e r m i n a t e on t h e n e x t a n n i v e r s a r y t h e r e o f ( J a n . 1) * * *."
Subsequent t o t h e s i g n i n g of t h e l e a s e , W i l l i a m T r i b b l e
began t o c o n s i d e r t h e s a l e of h i s farm. N e g o t i a t i o n s were c a r r i e d
on w i t h s e v e r a l p o t e n t i a l p u r c h a s e r s , a l l w i t h p l a i n t i f f L a r r y
T r i b b l e ' s knowledge. U l t i m a t e l y i n t h e e a r l y p a r t of 1973, nego-
t i a t i o n s began w i t h d e f e n d a n t s Reely b r o t h e r s , a g a i n w i t h p l a i n t i f f
L a r r y T r i b b l e ' s knowledge. I n f a c t a n o f f e r made by t h e p l a i n t i f f s
t o p u r c h a s e t h e farm, d a t e d A p r i l 1 3 , 1973, was t u r n e d down by
d e f e n d a n t s K a t h e r i n e and W i l l i a m T r i b b l e . On A p r i l 2 0 , 1973,
d e f e n d a n t s T r i b b l e e n t e r e d i n t o a w r i t t e n s a l e agreement w i t h de-
f e n d a n t s Reely t o s e l l t h e e n t i r e farm c o n s i s t i n g of a p p r o x i m a t e l y
7,800 a c r e s a t a p r i c e o f $410,000. A week l a t e r , a t t h e i n s i s t e n c e
o f William T r i b b l e a n addendum was made t o t h e s a l e s agreement t o
i n c l u d e t h e lease agreement of A p r i l 6 , 1971 between d e f e n d a n t s
T r i b b l e and p l a i n t i f f s L a r r y and L o r e t t a T r i b b l e .
N c o m p l e t e copy of t h e s a l e s agreement was made a v a i l a b l e
o
to plaintiffs until January 18, 1974. Thereafter on January 23,
1974, plaintiffs notified defendants Reely and Katherine Tribble
of their intention to exercise their right of first refusal. De-
fendant John Reely telephoned counsel for plaintiffs stating he
had no duty towards plaintiffs. No written response was received
from any of the defendants. The action for declaratory judg-
ment and specific performance followed being filed on April 4,
1974.
The judgment filed on March 11, 1975, declared that
plaintiffs had a valid lease with the right of first refusal to
buy the entire Tribble farm consisting of approximately 7,800
acres; that plaintiffs had exercised that right, and enjoined
the defendants Reely from asserting any rights to the property
excepting a right to an accounting for monies paid. In addition,
defendants Tribble were ordered to enter into an agreement for
sale with plaintiffs on the same terms and conditions as those
that had been agreed upon with the defendants Reely. On May 27,
1975, a supplementary judgment based on the proceedings for
accounting was filed ordering plaintiffs to reimburse defendants
Reely in the amount of $34,143.01 for monies expended. Defendants
appeal both judgments.
Several issues are presented for review, but the follow-
ing issues are controlling in the disposition of this appeal:
1) Whether the right of first refusal is sufficiently
definite as to permit specific performance.
2) Whether plaintiffs Tribble received the requisite
notice of the planned sale to defendants Reely.
3) Whether under the terms of the lease the rights of
the plaintiffs Tribble were extinguished by the death of William
Tribble.
4) Whether the judgments filed March 11, 1975 and May
27, 1975, a r e v o i d f o r want of c e r t a i n t y .
The d e f i n i t i o n of t h e r i g h t o f f i r s t r e f u s a l o r p r e e m p t i v e
r i g h t h a s been g i v e n by t h i s C o u r t on s e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s b e g i n n i n g
w i t h t h e c a s e of Weintz v . Bumgarner, 150 Mont. 306, 313, 434
P.2d 712, w h e r e i n w e n o t e d t h e f o l l o w i n g e x p l a n a t i o n g i v e n i n
Volume V I , American Law of P r o p e r t y , S26.64, p. 507:
" ' * * * A pre-emption d o e s n o t g i v e t o t h e
pre-emptioner t h e power t o compel a n u n w i l l -
i n g owner t o s e l l ; it m e r e l y r e q u i r e s t h e
owner, when and i f h e d e c i d e s t o s e l l , t o
o f f e r t h e property f i r s t t o t h e person e n t i t l e d
t o t h e pre-emption, a t t h e s t i p u l a t e d p r i c e .
Upon r e c e i v i n g such a n o f f e r , t h e pre-emptioner
may e l e c t whether he w i l l buy. I f he e l e c t s
n o t t o buy, t h e n t h e owner of t h e p r o p e r t y may
sell t o anyone.'"
See a l s o P h a l e n v . R i l l e y , 159 Mont. 239, 496 P.2d 295.
A s t o whether t h e r i g h t of f i r s t r e f u s a l i s s u f f i c i e n t l y
d e f i n i t e i n t h e agreement i n q u e s t i o n s o a s t o p e r m i t s p e c i f i c
performance, w e f i r s t n o t e t h a t p r o p e r t y which i s t h e s u b j e c t o f
s u c h a p r e e m p t i v e r i g h t must be a d e q u a t e l y d e s c r i b e d t o be en-
forceable. K l e i n v . B r o d i e , 167 Mont. 47, 534 P.2d 1251, 32
St.Rep. 488. Here t h e l e a s e agreement s t a t e s t h a t t h e lease i s
of " * * * t h e T r i b b l e farm i n J e f f e r s o n County, Montana, con-
s i s t i n g o f a p p r o x i m a t e l y 1300 a c r e s o f farm l a n d s * * *." Yet
t h e r e c o r d d i s c l o s e s t h a t t h e T r i b b l e farm a c t u a l l y c o n t a i n s
a p p r o x i m a t e l y 7,800 a c r e s . W e t h u s f i n d t h e amount o f l a n d
i n t e n d e d t o be i n c l u d e d u n c e r t a i n b e c a u s e of a n agreement ambiguous
on i t s f a c e .
A s a means o f r e s o l v i n g t h e problem b e f o r e u s w e n o t e
t h e s e fundamental r u l e s o f c o n t r a c t . A c o n t r a c t must be con-
s t r u e d s o a s t o c a r r y o u t t h e i n t e n t i o n s of t h e p a r t i e s a t t h e
time of c o n t r a c t i n g i f such i n t e n t i o n s are a s c e r t a i n a b l e . Sec-
t i o n 13-702, R.C.M. 1947. I f such a c o n t r a c t i s ambiguous on
i t s f a c e a s t o t h e i n t e n t i o n s of t h e c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s , par01
e v i d e n c e c a n be used t o a s c e r t a i n t h o s e i n t e n t i o n s . McNussen
v. G r a y b e a l , 146 Mont. 1 7 3 , 405 P.2d 447; Kielmann v . Mogan,
156 Mont. 230, 478-P.2d 275; Lehrkind v. McDonnell, 51 Mont.
343, 153 P. 1012. And i n i n t e r p r e t i n g such p a r 0 1 e v i d e n c e w e
note these r u l e s : The i n t e n t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s t o a c o n t r a c t
i s t o be a s c e r t a i n e d from t h e l a n g u a g e t h e r e o f viewed i n i t s
e n t i r e t y and n o t a s it i s p r e s e n t e d i n p a r t i c u l a r s e n t e n c e s
o r paragraphs. S e c t i o n 13-707, R.C.M. 1947. Also a c o n t r a c t
s h o u l d r e c e i v e t h a t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which makes it r e a s o n a b l e
as long a s t h e i n t e n t i o n of t h e c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s i s n o t
v i o l a t e d and t h e c o n t r a c t i s l a w f u l , o p e r a t i v e , d e f i n i t e , and
c a p a b l e of performance. S e c t i o n 13-709, R.C.M. 1947.
Turning t o t h e s p e c i f i c problem of d e t e r m i n i n g t h e amount
of l a n d i n t e n d e d by t h e c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s t o be i n c l u d e d i n a
r i g h t of s p e c i f i c performance, t h i s C o u r t i n i n t e r p r e t i n g a p r e -
emptive r i g h t i n Weintz v . Bumgarner, 150 Mont. 306, 314, 434
P.2d 712, s a i d :
" * * * Applying t h e above r u l e s of c o n t r a c t con-
s t r u c t i o n it seems a p p a r e n t t h a t t h i s c o u r t s h o u l d
f a v o r a c o n s t r u c t i o n t h a t g i v e s s u b s t a n c e and
meaning t o t h e p r o v i s i o n on p u r c h a s e r a t h e r t h a n
a d o p t a c o n s t r u c t i o n t h a t r e n d e r s it m e a n i n g l e s s
and i l l u s o r y , p r o v i d e d such c a n be done w i t h o u t
v i o l a t i n g t h e i n t e n t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s . * * * "
I n view o f t h e f o r e g o i n g r u l e s and a u t h o r i t y w e h o l d t h a t
t h e o n l y r e a s o n a b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t o be p l a c e d on t h e agreement
between t h e e l d e r T r i b b l e s and L a r r y and L o r e t t a T r i b b l e i s t h a t
t h e l e a s e w a s t o i n c l u d e t h e whole T r i b b l e farm. To h o l d o t h e r w i s e
would r e n d e r t h e r i g h t o f f i r s t r e f u s a l " m e a n i n g l e s s and i l l u s o r y "
because of v a r i o u s f a c t s a p p a r e n t i n t h e r e c o r d . F i r s t no new
or a d d i t i o n a l land d e s c r i p t i o n i s i n t h e provisions i n t h e agree-
ment on t h e r i g h t t o f i r s t r e f u s a l . R a t h e r t h e r i g h t of f i r s t
r e f u s a l r e f e r s t o and i s s o l e l y d e p e n d e n t upon t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
g i v e n t o t h e d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e l a n d c o n t a i n e d i n t h e f i r s t
p a r a g r a p h of t h e agreement. Secondly, t h e r e c o r d r e v e a l s t h e
T r i b b l e farm t o be o n e v i a b l e economic u n i t w i t h t h e 1 , 3 0 0 a c r e s
of farmland interspersed with grazing land throughout the farm
so as to make impractical any partition or farming of that land,
separate and apart from the rest of the Tribble farm. Thus the
only means of giving effect to the whole agreement is to con-
strue the lease of the Tribble farm as including the entire 7,800
acres with the accompanying right of first refusal in that land
belonging to the plaintiffs-lessees, and we so hold.
The bracketed reservation of grazing land is also ambig-
uous but from the evidence it appears that plaintiffs used the
grazing land, not exclusively, but it was at all times considered
a part of the leased lands.
We next consider the issue of notice. The agreement
requires written notice by defendants-lessors to plaintiffs-lessees
of any intention or offer to sell the property to a third party.
The plaintiffs-lessees then have 10 days after said notice to
meet the offer of any third party.
Admitting that the written sales agreement with defendants
Reely dated April 20, 1973, was not made available in its entirety
to plaintiffs until January 18, 1974, defendants on appeal cite
several defenses that are intertwined with the written notice re-
quirement.
They first allege plaintiffs had actual notice of the
sale and that was equivalent to written notice. In support of this
contention they cite the fact that plaintiffs knew the defendants
Reely were in the process of buying the farm, that plaintiffs
showed the farm to the defendants Reely, knowing them to be pro-
spective buyers and that plaintiffs even went as far as to try to
negotiate a new lease with the defendants Reely.
We find no merit in this contention for the reason that
there is a difference between merely knowing of a sale and know-
ing all the terms of that sale. Such a distinction is crucial
h e r e b e c a u s e w i t h o u t knowing t h e t e r m s of t h e s a l e , t h e p l a i n -
t i f f s c o u l d n o t m e e t t h e o f f e r of d e f e n d a n t s Reely and t h u s
could not properly e x e r c i s e t h e i r r i g h t of f i r s t r e f u s a l .
A s an a d d i t i o n a l defense t o t h e n o t i c e requirement, de-
f e n d a n t s c l a i m t h e p l a i n t i f f s a c q u i e s c e d i n t h e s a l e and a r e
t h e r e f o r e now e s t o p p e d from r e l y i n g on t h e n o t i c e p r o v i s i o n i n
an attempt t o e x e r c i s e t h e r i g h t of f i r s t r e f u s a l . However, t h e
r e c o r d r e v e a l s no a c q u i e s c e n c e on t h e p a r t o f p l a i n t i f f s b u t
continued e f f o r t s t o e x e r c i s e t h e i r r i g h t s . Prior t o the sale
t o d e f e n d a n t s Reely, t h e a t t o r n e y f o r t h e p l a i n t i f f s informed
t h e a t t o r n e y f o r defendants T r i b b l e t h a t p l a i n t i f f s expected
t h e t e r m s of t h e l e a s e agreement t o be honored. On September
2 1 , 1973, t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' a t t o r n e y w r o t e t o t h e d e f e n d a n t s and
demanded t h e r i g h t of f i r s t r e f u s a l , a copy of any o f f e r t o s e l l
and w r i t t e n n o t i c e . Y e t t h e e n t i r e sales agreement w i t h d e f e n d -
a n t s Reely was n o t f u r n i s h e d t o p l a i n t i f f s u n t i l J a n u a r y 1 8 , 1974,
a l m o s t n i n e months a f t e r t h e s a l e had been completed. It is the
r u l e i n Montana t h a t e s t o p p e l i s n o t f a v o r e d and w i l l o n l y be
s u s t a i n e d upon c l e a r and c o n v i n c i n g e v i d e n c e . F i e r s v. Jacobson,
123 Mont. 242, 2 1 1 P.2d 968. Such c l e a r and c o n v i n c i n g e v i d e n c e
i s lacking i n t h e i n s t a n t case.
A s t h e i r l a s t e q u i t a b l e defense t o p l a i n t i f f s ' preemptive
r i g h t , defendants a s s e r t t h e d o c t r i n e of laches.
W e h o l d t h e d o c t r i n e of l a c h e s d o e s n o t a p p l y t o t h e f a c t s
o f t h i s c a s e f o r two b a s i c r e a s o n s . F i r s t , and most o b v i o u s ,
p l a i n t i f f s c o u l d n o t e x e r c i s e t h e i r r i g h t of f i r s t r e f u s a l u n t i l
t h e y had a c c e s s t o t h e t e r m s o f t h e s a l e . Such n o t i c e of t e r m s
w a s n o t made a v a i l a b l e u n t i l J a n u a r y 1 8 , 1974. T h e r e a f t e r on
January 23, 1974, p l a i n t i f f s g a v e n o t i c e t o d e f e n d a n t s of t h e i r
i n t e n t i o n t o e x e r c i s e t h e i r r i g h t of f i r s t r e f u s a l . Thus o n c e
p r o p e r n o t i c e w a s g i v e n t h e r e was no d e l a y i n a s s e r t i n g t h e i r
rights. Secondly, t h e r e c o r d a s h e r e t o f o r e d i s c u s s e d makes i t
o b v i o u s t h a t d e f e n d a n t s knew p l a i n t i f f s were a s s e r t i n g t h e i r
r i g h t t o n o t i c e and f i r s t r e f u s a l even b e f o r e t h e s a l e s con-
t r a c t was s i g n e d . See Montana Power Co. v . P a r k E l e c t r i c Co-op.,
1 4 0 Mont. 293, 371 P.2d 1.
Defendants n e x t c o n t e n d t h a t any r i g h t s under t h e l e a s e
t e r m i n a t e d on J a n u a r y 1, 1974, b e c a u s e of t h e d e a t h of l e s s o r
W i l l i a m Tribble i n t h e preceding year. Defendants b a s e t h i s con-
t e n t i o n on t h a t p a r t o f t h e l e a s e which s t a t e s :
"A. T h a t i f b o t h of t h e l e s s o r s s h o u l d n o t
s u r v i v e t h e t e r m s of t h i s l e a s e , t h e n t h i s
l e a s e s h a l l t e r m i n a t e on t h e n e x t a n n i v e r s a r y
t h e r e o f ( J a n . 1).* * *"
Without becoming e n t a n g l e d i n a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e
word " b o t h " s i n c e d e f e n d a n t K a t h e r i n e T r i b b l e h a s s u r v i v e d h e r
husband, w e m e r e l y n o t e t h i s C o u r t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n of when a
r i g h t of f i r s t r e f u s a l a c c r u e s a s s t a t e d i n Weintz v . Bumgarner,
150 Mont. 306, 313, 434 P.2d 712:
"Whatever l a n g u a g e i s used t o d e s c r i b e t h e pro-
v i s i o n i n question, it i s c l e a r t h a t t h e r i g h t
o f t h e lessee t o p u r c h a s e a c c r u e s a t such t i m e
a s t h e l e s s o r forms a s p e c i f i c i n t e n t i o n t o s e l l
t h e p r o p e r t y f o r a d e f i n i t e p r i c e on d e f i n i t e
terms. A t such t i m e a s t h e owner forms such
specific intention t o s e l l , the provision i n
q u e s t i o n r i p e n s i n t o a p r e s e n t e n f o r c e a b l e con-
t r a c t r i g h t of t h e l e s s e e . "
H e r e t h e s a l e s agreement between d e f e n d a n t s Reely and d e f e n d a n t s
T r i b b l e was d a t e d A p r i l 20, 1973. Thus t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' r i g h t o f
f i r s t r e f u s a l r i p e n e d p r i o r t o J a n u a r y 1, 1974, and t h e r e f o r e
c o u l d n o t be s u b j e c t t o t e r m i n a t i o n s i m p l y b e c a u s e o f t h e d e a t h
of W i l l i a m T r i b b l e .
D e f e n d a n t s ' f i n a l c o n t e n t i o n i s t h a t t h e judgmentsof
March 1 and May 27, 1975, a r e v o i d f o r want o f c e r t a i n t y .
1 De-
f e n d a n t s having f a i l e d t o d e m o n s t r a t e why t h e y t h i n k t h e judg-
ments a r e u n c e r t a i n , w e s i m p l y hold t h e judgments a s c l e a r l y
a d v i s i n g t h e p a r t i e s of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e r i g h t s and t h u s n o t
v o i d f o r want of c e r t a i n t y .
Believing s u b s t a n t i a l evidence e x i s t s t o support t h e
f i n d i n g s of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , w e hereby a f f i r m t h e judgment
of t h a t c o u r t .
Justices
Hon. R o b e r t syk/ed, D i s t r i c t J u d g e ,
s i t t i n g i n p l a ' d of M r . J u s t i c e
Gene B. Daly.