State v. Collins

No. 13804
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1978

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs-
WILLIAM JOHN COLLINS,
Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from: District Court of the Eiqhth Judicial District,
Honorable Truman G. Bradford, Judqe presidinq.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:

Smith, Emmons, Baillie & Walsh, Great Falls, Montana
Robert J. Emmons arqued, Great Falls, Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Allen B. Chronister, Assistant Attorey General, argued,
Helena, Montana
J. Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana
Nick Browning, Deputy County Attorney, appeared, Great
Falls, Montana

Submitted: April 20, 1978
Decided :
Filed: AuC 1, 1978
Mr. J u s t i c e John C. Sheehy d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e C o u r t .

Defendant W i l l i a m John C o l l i n s was c h a r g e d i n t h e D i s -

t r i c t C o u r t , Cascade County, w i t h t h e o f f e n s e of d e l i b e r a t e

homicide. Upon h i s p l e a of n o t g u i l t y , a f t e r t r i a l , t h e

j u r y r e t u r n e d a v e r d i c t of g u i l t y o f m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e

homicide. Judgment of c o n v i c t i o n was e n t e r e d , and d e f e n d a n t

was s e n t e n c e d t o imprisonment f o r a term of f o r t y y e a r s .

From judgment and d e n i a l of a new t r i a l , d e f e n d a n t a p p e a l s .

Without q u e s t i o n , on A p r i l 2 3 , 1973, d e f e n d a n t s h o t

D a r r e l l David G a r d i p e e , who d i e d a s a r e s u l t . The s h o o t i n g

o c c u r r e d on Wire M i l l Road, n o r t h o f G r e a t F a l l s . The o n l y

w i t n e s s e s t o t h e e v e n t s p r i o r t o t h e s h o o t i n g were t h e
d e f e n d a n t and C a r l a Brave. Two o t h e r s , R o b e r t M. B r e t z and

h i s w i f e , d r o v e upon t h e s c e n e v e r y s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e

shooting. The o n l y w i t n e s s t o t h e a c t u a l s h o o t i n g was

defendant.

From t h e e v i d e n c e i t a p p e a r s d e f e n d a n t , a 4 8 y e a r o l d
unemployed p a i n t e r , a t and p r i o r t o t h e t i m e of t h e s h o o t i n g

w a s l i v i n g i n a camper mounted on h i s p i c k u p t r u c k . H e had

been i n G r e a t F a l l s 4 o r 5 d a y s , w i t h no d e f i n i t e l o c a t i o n ,

p a r k i n g h i s pickup and camper u n i t i n v a r i o u s p l a c e s from

time t o time. B e f o r e r e t u r n i n g t o G r e a t F a l l s , h e had been

i n Arizona s i n c e t h e p r e v i o u s September d o i n g some p r o s -

pecting there.
C a r l a Brave, t h e n i n h e r t w e n t i e s , a s i n g e r w i t h a band

t h a t p l a y e d i n l o c a l n i g h t s p o t s i n G r e a t F a l l s , met G a r d i p e e ,
t h e n 2 1 , a b o u t s i x months b e f o r e t h e i n c i d e n t . They became
good f r i e n d s . I n t h e afternoon preceding t h e shooting,

G a r d i p e e went t o t h e p l a c e where C a r l a was r e h e a r s i n g .
A f t e r t h e p r a c t i c e s e s s i o n , he i n v i t e d C a r l a t o accompany
him t o t h e B r a s s R a i l , a l o c a l b a r . There t h e y had some
d r i n k s and p l a y e d p o o l a t a t a b l e a t t h e r e a r of t h e p r e m i s e s .

While C a r l a and G a r d i p e e were a t t h e B r a s s R a i l , a b o u t
6:30 o r s o i n t h e evening, defendant e n t e r e d t h e b a r . He

had been d r i n k i n g b e f o r e h e a r r i v e d , and upon e n t e r i n g h e
o r d e r e d a round of d r i n k s f o r t h e house. He n o t e d G a r d i p e e
and C a r l a p l a y i n g p o o l and f e l l i n t o c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h them,

a l t h o u g h h e d i d n o t know them. H e bought a round o r two of

drinks. They a l l t a l k e d and p l a y e d some p o o l and c o n t i n u e d

t o consume l i q u o r .

F i n a l l y t h e y d e c i d e d t o go t o a n o t h e r p l a c e . Defendant

had t h e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n f a c i l i t i e s s o he d r o v e them t o t h e

C i t y Bar, where G a r d i p e e went i n and r e t u r n e d w i t h a b o t t l e

of wine.

C a r l a t e s t i f i e d t h a t a l l t h r e e i n s p e c t e d t h e i n s i d e of
t h e camper w h i l e t h e y w e r e s t o p p e d a t t h e C i t y Bar; defend-

a n t remembers t h e l o c a t i o n a s a t t h e B r a s s R a i l . A t any

r a t e , t h e camper was i n s p e c t e d and admired by c a r l a and

Gardipee. C a r l a p a r t i c u l a r l y t e s t i f i e d t h a t a t t h e t i m e of

t h e i n s p e c t i o n , s h e saw no r i f l e l y i n g on a bed i n t h e
camper, nor i n d e e d d i d s h e o b s e r v e one i n t h e camper o t h e r -

wise.

When t h e y l e f t t h e C i t y Bar, C a r l a wanted t o go t o h e r

p l a c e , b u t G a r d i p e e wanted t o r i d e around. Defendant d r o v e

t h e u n i t o u t of t h e c i t y on t h e Havre highway, and t h e n
t u r n e d o f f t h a t highway t o t h e Wire M i l l Road, t h e n c e t o a
p l a c e n o t f a r from t h e M i s s o u r i R i v e r , where h e p a r k e d . All

t h r e e were s i t t i n g i n t h e c a b of t h e p i c k u p .
When t h e y s t o p p e d , C a r l a and G a r d i p e e g o t o u t and

wandered towards t h e r i v e r . The n i g h t was c o l d , b u t t h e y

t a l k e d and k i s s e d a b o u t a n hour b e f o r e s h e r e t u r n e d t o t h e
c a b , where d e f e n d a n t had remained. H e had c o n t i n u e d t o

d r i n k , consuming b e e r t h e y had b r o u g h t from t h e B r a s s R a i l ,

and some whiskey h e had p r o c u r e d from t h e camper. Gardipee
w a s d r i n k i n g from t h e wine b o t t l e .

C a r l a and d e f e n d a n t t a l k e d i n t h e c a b f o r a t i m e , w h i l e

G a r d i p e e remained o u t s i d e . Defendant t o l d C a r l a t h a t h e

t h o u g h t ''everybody s h o u l d make l o v e t o everybody". The

remark " k i n d of spooked" h e r . Then he a s k e d h e r i f s h e

would l i k e t o go t o t h e camper i n back and d r i n k whiskey

w i t h him. C a r l a a l s o t e s t i f i e d a b o u t a n o t h e r m a t t e r he

d i s c u s s e d , t o which w e w i l l a l l u d e more f u l l y l a t e r i n t h i s

opinion.

Carla l e f t t h e c a b , and d e f e n d a n t remained i n s i d e . She
r e j o i n e d G a r d i p e e , b u t d i d n o t t e l l him of t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n

i n t h e cab.

Meanwhile, G a r d i p e e was a c t i n g s t r a n g e l y . He was

r a i s i n g t h e wine b o t t l e t o t h e s k y , jumping up and down, and

he appeared t o defendant t o be " f l i p p i n g o u t . "

F i n a l l y , near midnight, they decided t o leave. All

t h r e e g o t i n t h e cab, Carla s i t t i n g i n t h e middle. Defend-
a n t d r o v e up t o t h e p o i n t of a g a i n e n t e r i n g Wire M i l l Road.

Here G a r d i p e e grabbed t h e s t e e r i n g wheel and wanted t o t u r n

r i g h t . Defendant, however, wanted t o go back t o G r e a t F a l l s ,

which was t o t h e l e f t . Meanwhile G a r d i p e e was complaining

how t h e w h i t e man had messed up t h e I n d i a n l a n d , and s a i d
" T h i s i s o u r l a n d . " Then he slammed h i s f i s t on t h e d a s h of
t h e c a b and s a i d "Even t h i s b e l o n g s t o me." ~efendant
t e s t i f i e d t h a t a t t h a t p o i n t , G a r d i p e e s t a r t e d punching him

i n t h e head w h i l e h e was d r i v i n g .
~ e f e n d a n ts t o p p e d t h e t r u c k i n t h e l a n e of t r a f f i c of
t h e roadway. G a r d i p e e g o t o u t o n h i s s i d e of t h e p i c k u p .
Defendant t e s t i f i e d h e jumped o u t of t h e t r u c k on t h e

d r i v e r ' s s i d e and r a n back t o t h e rear of t h e camper. He

opened t h e r e a r d o o r and g o t i n t o t h e camper, and a t t e m p t e d
t o l o c k t h e camper d o o r behind him.

Defendant t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e n t h e d o o r of t h e camper

was j e r k e d open by G a r d i p e e , who s a i d " I ' v e g o t you now" o r

words t o t h a t e f f e c t . Defendant was i n s i d e t h e camper,

p o s s i b l y i n t h e m i d d l e of t h e camper. G a r d i p e e was a t t h e

d o o r w i t h o n e hand o n a h a n d l e t o h e l p h i m s e l f i n and de-

f e n d a n t s a i d he saw something " b r i g h t c o l o r e d " i n h i s o t h e r

hand. Defendant d i d n o t know what it was, nor was i t e v e r

further identified a t the t r i a l .

The i n t e r i o r of t h e c a b was d a r k . Defendant had n o t

t u r n e d on t h e i n t e r i o r camper l i g h t s . The o u t s i d e l i g h t s of

t h e camper u n i t w e r e o n , i n c l u d i n g t h e c l e a r a n c e l i g h t s .

Defendant t e s t i f i e d t h a t i t was d a r k enough however t h a t he

c o u l d n o t have i d e n t i f i e d t h e p e r s o n a s G a r d i p e e coming i n t o

t h e t r u c k , n o r c o u l d he see G a r d i p e e ' s e y e s .

Defendant had i n t h e camper a b o l t - a c t i o n .22 caliber

r i f l e h e had purchased i n G r e a t F a l l s , p r i o r t o g o i n g t o

Arizona f o r p r o s p e c t i n g . Defendant t e s t i f i e d t h a t a f t e r

G a r d i p e e j e r k e d t h e camper d o o r open, d e f e n d a n t r a n a s t e p

o r two t o t h e f r o n t of t h e camper and p i c k e d up t h e r i f l e

from t h e bed where i t was l y i n g . H e turned without r a i s i n g

t h e gun t o h i s s h o u l d e r , keeping i t i n h i s r i g h t hand, and

fired. H e s t a t e d he d i d n o t intend t o shoot Gardipee a t t h e

t i m e ; t h a t h e t h o u g h t i t would s c a r e him o f f ; and, t h a t t h e

gun went o f f a c c i d e n t a l l y .

Because of t h e make and t y p e of r i f l e i n v o l v e d , t h e gun

must have been r e a d y t o f i r e , w i t h a b u l l e t i n p o s i t i o n i n

t h e chamber. Defendant s a i d n o t h i n g and gave no warning

b e f o r e he f i r e d t h e s h o t .
 The b u l l e t e n t e r e d t h e body of G a r d i p e e n e a r l y i n t h e

m i d d l e f r o n t a t t h e l e v e l of t h e s e v e n t h r i b and t r a v e l e d
downward a t a n approximate f o r t y - f i v e d e g r e e a n g l e t h r o u g h

h i s diaphragm, t h e p o s t e r i o r of h i s l i v e r , t h r o u g h h i s vena

cava and lodged n e x t t o h i s s p i n e i n t h e abdomen. Gardipee

f e l l back from t h e camper t o t h e ground. H e was i n a doubled-

up p o s i t i o n on t h e ground when C a r l a came from t h e c a b ,

where s h e had remained a f t e r t h e men g o t o u t , u n t i l s h e

h e a r d t h e s h o t which sounded l i k e a n " e x p l o s i o n " .

Defendant was g e t t i n g down from t h e camper when C a r l a

came t o t h e s c e n e . H e s t i l l had t h e r i f l e i n h i s hand. At

t h a t moment a n o t h e r c a r d r o v e up, d r i v e n by R o b e r t B r e t z ,

with h i s wife a s a passenger. Defendant p l a c e d t h e r i f l e on

t h e f l o o r of t h e camper, went around t o t h e c a b of t h e

p i c k u p , g o t i n , and d r o v e o f f , l e a v i n g G a r d i p e e on t h e

roadway, w i t h C a r l a bending o v e r him. Defendant d r o v e t o

t h e Cascade County s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e , where he t u r n e d h i m s e l f

in.

Meanwhile R o b e r t B r e t z , h i s w i f e and C a r l a p u t t h e

b l e e d i n g G a r d i p e e i n t o t h e B r e t z c a r and went t o t h e h o s p i t a l ,

where he e x p i r e d of h i s wounds a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 12:55 a.m.

An a u t o p s y w a s l a t e r performed which e s t a b l i s h e d t h e c a u s e

of d e a t h .

The f o r e g o i n g o u t l i n e of f a c t s i s t a k e n mainly from

d e f e n d a n t ' s testimony. There a r e c e r t a i n d i s c r e p a n c i e s

between h i s t e s t i m o n y and o t h e r w i t n e s s e s i n o t h e r m a t t e r s ,

b u t t h e s t o r y of t h e events surrounding t h e a c t u a l shooting

came mainly from d e f e n d a n t .

The j u r y l i s t e n e d t o t h e t e s t i m o n y , c o n s i d e r e d t h e
r e l e v a n t f a c t s proven, and b r o u g h t i n i t s v e r d i c t of g u i l t y

of m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t .
 D e f e n d a n t ' s a p p e a l c o n c e r n s mainly f i v e i s s u e s which

a t t a c k t h e v e r d i c t and s u b s e q u e n t judgment:

1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t p r o p e r l y a d m i t t e d t e s t i -
mony of a n a l l e g e d s t a t e m e n t of d e f e n d a n t t h a t he had been

imprisoned f o r r a p e .

2. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t p r o p e r l y i n s t r u c t e d t h e

jury .
3. Whether d e f e n d a n t was d e n i e d a speedy t r i a l .

4. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n a d m i t t i n g
c e r t a i n photographs i n evidence.

5. Whether t h e e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t s t h e j u r y v e r d i c t .
The f i r s t i s s u e , t h e a l l e g e d s t a t e m e n t of d e f e n d a n t

t h a t h e had been imprisoned f o r r a p e , a r o s e d u r i n g t h e

t e s t i m o n y o f C a r l a Brave a b o u t h e r c o n v e r s a t i o n i n t h e c a b
of t h e p i c k u p w i t h d e f e n d a n t w h i l e G a r d i p e e was o u t s i d e . In

a d d i t i o n t o t h e s u b j e c t s o u t l i n e d above, C a r l a w a s p e r m i t t e d

t o t e s t i f y , over objection, t h a t defendant t o l d her during

t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n t h a t d e f e n d a n t knew Merle G a r d i p e e , t h e

b r o t h e r of D a r r e U G a r d i p e e ; t h a t he had m e t him i n p r i s o n .
She asked d e f e n d a n t "what were you i n t h e r e f o r ? " and h e

" s a i d h e was i n f o r r a p e . "

The s t a t e contended t h e e v i d e n c e was r e l e v a n t t o t h e

e v e n t s and t o t h e a t t i t u d e and i n t e n t of t h e d e f e n d a n t t h a t

evening. Defendant's counsel objected t h a t t h e o f f e r e d

t e s t i m o n y w a s h e a r s a y , and was a n a t t e m p t by t h e s t a t e t o
g e t i n t o t h e r e c o r d a s t a t e m e n t of a f a c t t h a t was n o t a
fact a t all. A l s o , t h a t i n r e b u t t i n g such t e s t i m o n y , de-
f e n d a n t would p e r f o r c e open h i m s e l f up t o q u e s t i o n i n g on
state's cross-examination a s t o a p r i o r prison record. (In
argument b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t , t h e s t a t e a r g u e d t h e e v i d e n c e i s

p a r t of t h e " r e s g e s t a e " , w h i l e d e f e n d a n t argued t h e t e s t i -

mony was a n improper showing of a n o t h e r u n r e l a t e d c r i m e . )
 When s h e was cross-examined by d e f e n d a n t , C a r l a ad-
m i t t e d s h e had been t o l d i n t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y ' s o f f i c e

t h a t d e f e n d a n t had n o t been c o n v i c t e d of r a p e . I n defend-

a n t ' s c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n by t h e s t a t e , h e a d m i t t e d he had

been c o n v i c t e d of a p r i o r f e l o n y , n o t s p e c i f i e d , and t h e

m a t t e r was n o t f u r t h e r pursued.

The n e t e f f e c t of t h e e v i d e n c e t h e n was t h a t d e f e n d a n t
t o l d C a r l a h e had once been i n p r i s o n f o r r a p e ; s h e a d m i t t e d

t h a t l a t e r s h e was informed i t was n o t t r u e ; and d e f e n d a n t

a d m i t t e d h e had a p r i o r f e l o n y c o n v i c t i o n on h i s r e c o r d .

The o b j e c t i o n on a p p e a l t h a t t h e t e s t i m o n y c o n s t i t u t e d

proof of a p r i o r u n r e l a t e d o f f e n s e d o e s n o t b e a r a n a l y s i s .

The s t a t e d i d n o t p r o v e t h a t d e f e n d a n t committed a n un-
r e l a t e d c r i m e ; i t d i d p r o v e t h a t d e f e n d a n t claimed h e com-

m i t t e d s u c h an o f f e n s e . The d i f f e r e n c e c o u l d be monumental.

I t i s t h e same d i f f e r e n c e as a n unmarried woman who -
is

p r e g n a n t and a n unmarried woman who c l a i m s t o be p r e g n a n t .

A s u b s e q u e n t m a r r i a g e founded upon t h e r e a l i t y may be j u s t i -

f i e d ; b u t a m a r r i a g e founded upon t h e s u p p o s i t i o n may n o t

be.

The s t a t e m e n t of d e f e n d a n t i s i n t h e same c a t e g o r y of

e v i d e n c e , o c c u r r i n g a t t h e same t i m e a s t h e o t h e r v e r b a l

a c t s t e s t i f i e d t o by C a r l a , such as d e f e n d a n t ' s s t a t e m e n t

a b o u t everybody making l o v e t o everybody, and h i s i n v i t a t i o n

t o h e r t o d r i n k whiskey w i t h him i n t h e camper. These

remarks went i n w i t h o u t o b j e c t i o n .
The s t a t e m e n t o f d e f e n d a n t was r e l e v a n t as a p a r t of
t h e whole f a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n t o be c o n s i d e r e d by t h e j u r y i n
weighing t h e g u i l t o r i n n o c e n c e of d e f e n d a n t . Especially i s

t h i s t r u e where, a s h e r e , t h e d e f e n d a n t a s s e r t e d s e l f -

defense a s j u s t i f i c a t i o n . H i s s t a t e of mind l e a d i n g up t o
t h e s h o o t i n g was a m a t t e r b e a r i n g on h i s g u i l t o r i n n o c e n c e

f o r t h e j u r y t o c o n s i d e r i n t h e l i g h t of t h a t d e f e n s e . The
s t a t e m e n t was t h e r e f o r e a " v e r b a l a c t " r e l e v a n t t o t h e

i s s u e s , and t h u s a d m i s s i b l e . A s n o t e d i n Overton v . United

States, ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 403 F.2d 4 4 4 , 447, t h e v e r b a l a c t d o c t r i n e

i s technically n o t an exception t o t h e hearsay r u l e . The
words o f d e f e n d a n t w e r e n o t o f f e r e d f o r t h e purpose of

p r o v i n g t h e t r u t h of t h e a s s e r t i o n s t h e y c o n t a i n e d , b u t

merely f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e f a c t t h a t t h e

words had been s a i d by t h e d e f e n d a n t . Ward v . United S t a t e s ,

( 1 9 6 1 ) , 296 F.2d 898.

On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e s t a t e m e n t was n o t a d m i s s i b l e a s

p a r t of res g e s t a e , a s t h a t e x c e p t i o n t o t h e h e a r s a y r u l e

t a k e s i n s t a t e m e n t s made under s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t

r e f l e c t i o n and f a b r i c a t i o n a r e u n l i k e l y . S t a t e v. F a i r b u r n ,

( 1 9 5 9 ) , 135 Mont. 449, 340 P.2d 157. Standing alone t h e

s t a t e m e n t might n o t b e r e l e v a n t o r m a t e r i a l , b u t it formed a

p a r t of t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , a l i n k which, when c o n n e c t e d t o

o t h e r e v i d e n c e , becomes r e l e v a n t and m a t e r i a l i n t h e c a s e .

29 Am J u r 2d, Evidence 8255. A s s u c h t h e s t a t e m e n t was

c l e a r l y a d m i s s i b l e and t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t committed no e r r o r

i n p e r m i t t i n g it. W e f i n d no s u b s t a n c e i n d e f e n d a n t ' s f i r s t

issue.

I n h i s second i s s u e , t h e d e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s t h e D i s t r i c t

C o u r t committed e r r o r i n i n s t r u c t i n g t h e j u r y . This i s s u e

i n v o l v e s two sub-heads, ( a ) whether a " l a d d e r " i n s t r u c t i o n

s h o u l d have been g i v e n t o t h e j u r y , and ( b ) whether t h e j u r y

w a s properly instructed with respect t o self-defense.

I n c o n s i d e r i n g t h i s i s s u e , we f i r s t a n a l y z e t h e law

a p p l i c a b l e t o d e l i b e r a t e homicide, and t h e i n f e r i o r g r a d e s

of homicide t h e r e u n d e r , a s w e l l a s t h e a p p l i c a b l e law of

j u s t i f i c a t i o n o r exoneration.
 When Montana adopted its Criminal Code of 1973 (Title
94, Chapters 1-8, Revised Codes of Montana 1947), it wiped
out the theretofore existing statutory provisions defining
the crimes of murder and of manslaughter. In lieu, the new
code provided that criminal homicide includes deliberate
homicide, mitigated deliberate homicide, and negligent
homicide. Section 94-5-101 et seq., R.C.M. 1947. In capsule,
the grades of criminal homicide can be defined as: an
unlawful death caused by a negligent actor is negligent
homicide; an unlawful death purposely or knowingly caused by
an actor under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
stress for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse
is mitigated deliberate homicide; and, an unlawful death
caused by one acting purposely or knowingly is deliberate
homicide. Section 94-5-102; 94-5-103; 94-5-104, R.C.M.
1947.
It is to be noted from the definitions that committing
the homicide "purposely or knowingly" is an element of
deliberate homicide, and also of mitigated deliberate homi-
cide. In the case of mitigated deliberate homicide, even
though the act may have been committed purposely or knowingly,
it is one that is committed under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional stress for which there is a reasonable
explanation or excuse.
In considering the instructions given by the court, we
must also look to the law on justification or exoneration,
more popularly known, perhaps, as "self-defense". Under the
old code, a homicide committed in self-defense was "excusable
homicide". Under the Criminal Code of 1973, conduct necessary
to defend oneself or another against the imminent use of
unlawful force may result in such conduct being a justifiable
u s e of f o r c e . S e c t i o n 94-3-103, R.C.M. 1947. When a p e r s o n

i n a n o c c u p i e d s t r u c t u r e u s e s such f o r c e as i s n e c e s s a r y t o

prevent o r terminate a n o t h e r ' s unlawful e n t r y i n t o t h e

o c c u p i e d s t r u c t u r e , even t o t h e e x t e n t of c a u s i n g d e a t h by

t h e u s e of t h e f o r c e , f o r t h e purpose of p r e v e n t i n g a n

a s s a u l t o r p e r s o n a l v i o l e n c e upon a n i n d i v i d u a l o r t o p r e -
v e n t t h e commission of a f o r c i b l e f e l o n y i n t h e o c c u p i e d

s t r u c t u r e , such u s e o f f o r c e i s j u s t i f i e d . S e c t i o n 94-3-103,

R.C.M. 1947.

A t a l l events, t h e d e g r e e of f o r c e used by t h e a c t o r

must b e r e a s o n a b l e , based upon what a r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n

would b e l i e v e under t h e same c i r c u m s t a n c e s . S e c t i o n s 94-3-

103, 94-3-104, R.C.M. 1947; S t a t e v. Brooks, ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 150

Mont. 399, 436 P.2d 9 1 .

The f o r e g o i n g a r e t h e c o n c e p t s i n a c r i m i n a l homicide
c a s e , s u c h a s t h e o n e c h a r g e d h e r e , which must be conveyed

t o t h e j u r y by t h e judge i n t h e body of h i s i n s t r u c t i o n s .

He may f l e s h o u t s u c h c o n c e p t s a s may be n e c e s s a r y b u t i f

t h e body o f t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s c o n t a i n s t h e f o r e g o i n g e l e m e n t s ,
f a i r l y and f u l l y conveyed t o t h e j u r y , t h e n we must c o n s i d e r

t h e j u r y h a s been p r o p e r l y i n s t r u c t e d b o t h f o r t h e s t a t e and

t h e defendant.

A g a i n s t t h a t background, we examine t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s

given i n t h i s case. The e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t s a r e t h e r e . The
t r i a l c o u r t d e f i n e d t h e g r a d e s of c r i m i n a l homicide ( I n s t r u c -

t i o n No. 3 2 ) ; i t d e f i n e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide ( ~ n s t r u c t i o n
No. 3 1 ) , m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide ( I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 8 ) ,
and n e g l i g e n t homicide, ( I n s t r u c t i o n 19) . Moreover, t h e
j u r y was i n s t r u c t e d on t h e j u s t i f i a b l e u s e of f o r c e t o

d e f e n d o n e s e l f a g a i n s t t h e imminent u s e of u n l a w f u l f o r c e ,

and t h e j u s t i f i a b l e u s e of f o r c e a g a i n s t a p e r s o n b r e a k i n g
i n t o a n o c c u p i e d s t r u c t u r e , s u b s t a n t i a l l y i n t h e l a n g u a g e of

the statutes. Using t h e t e s t a p p l i e d i n S t a t e v . P o r t e r ,

( 1 9 6 4 ) , 143 Mont. 528, 539, 391 P.2d 704, t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s

g i v e n on j u s t i f i a b l e f o r c e gave t h e d e f e n d a n t ample oppor-

t u n i t y t o expound t o t h e j u r y i n argument h i s t h e o r y w i t h

r e s p e c t t o t h e u s e of f o r c e a s self-defense a g a i n s t an
unlawful a c t .

On o r a l argument, d e f e n d a n t s t r e n u o u s l y a r g u e d t h a t

nowhere i n t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s d i d t h e c o u r t a d v i s e t h e j u r y ,

w i t h r e s p e c t t o m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide, i n what
circumstances t h e jury should a c q u i t t h e defendant. De-

f e n d a n t p o i n t s o u t t h a t i n I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1, t h e c o u r t

o u t l i n e d t h e e l e m e n t s o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide and s t a t e d t h a t

d e f e n d a n t s h o u l d be a c q u i t t e d i f t h e e l e m e n t s were n o t

proved. I n I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 7 , i t p o i n t e d o u t t h e e l e m e n t s

of n e g l i g e n t homicide and s t a t e d t h a t i f t h o s e e l e m e n t s w e r e

n o t proven beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t d e f e n d a n t s h o u l d

be found n o t g u i l t y . Contrasting those i n s t r u c t i o n s with

t h e l a c k of a s i m i l a r i n s t r u c t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t t o m i t i g a t e d
t. ! kf
dLX q2
de-abl-e homicide, d e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s g r i e v o u s e r r o r on
t h e p a r t of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t . I n essence defendant i s

c o m p l a i n i n g t h a t i f t h e j u r y found a j u s t i f i a b l e f o r c e used

by d e f e n d a n t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s d i d n o t s a y t h a t i n such e v e n t

t h e jury should a c q u i t t h e defendant.

Two t h i n g s m i l i t a t e a g a i n s t t h i s p o s i t i o n of d e f e n d a n t .
F i r s t , s u c h a n i n s t r u c t i o n w a s n o t o f f e r e d by d e f e n d a n t ; and
second, t h e r u l e i n Montana i s t h a t i f t h e j u r y i s p r o p e r l y
i n s t r u c t e d on t h e law p e r t a i n i n g t o j u s t i f i a b l e f o r c e i n a
homicide c a s e , t h e c o u r t need n o t go f u r t h e r and t e l l t h e

j u r y t h a t i t must a c q u i t t h e d e f e n d a n t , i f i t f i n d s t h a t

j u s t i f i a b l e f o r c e was u s e d . S t a t e v . Smith, ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 168
Mont. 93, 100, 541 P.2d 351; S t a t e v . London, (1957), 131

Mont. 4 1 0 , 433, 310 P.2d 571.

~ e f e n d a n tf u r t h e r a r g u e s t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d

i n r e f u s i n g t o g i v e d e f e n d a n t ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n No. 6,
which would have t o l d t h e j u r y t h a t i f i t had a r e a s o n a b l e

d o u b t whether t h e homicide was j u s t i f i a b l e , t h s n i t must g i v e
t h e d e f e n d a n t t h e b e n e f i t of t h a t d o u b t and a c q u i t him.

T h a t s p e c i f i c i n s t r u c t i o n w a s r e f u s e d i n S t a t e v . Logan,
( 1 9 7 0 ) , 156 Mont. 48, 66, 473 P.2d 833, and t h i s C o u r t

approved. The C o u r t i n Logan i n d i c a t e d t h a t such i n s t r u c -
t i o n was u n n e c e s s a r y where t h e j u r y i s o t h e r w i s e p r o p e r l y
i n s t r u c t e d on r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . In t h i s case, Instruction

No. 2 f u l l y c o v e r e d t h e j u r y ' s d u t y w i t h r e s p e c t t o r e a -
sonable doubt.

Defendant f u r t h e r a r g u e s t h a t h i s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n
No. 4 which would have i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y w i t h r e s p e c t t o

j u s t i f i a b l e homicide, t h a t i s t h e u s e of j u s t i f i a b l e f o r c e ,

w a s improperly refused. A s s t a t e d however, t h i s s u b j e c t was

f u l l y c o v e r e d by t h e c o u r t i n o t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n s , and i t

a p p e a r s t h a t i n i t s I n s t r u c t i o n Nos. 23 and 2 4 , t h e c o u r t

p a r t i c u l a r l y i n s t r u c t e d t h e jury t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t t h e

p e r s o n u s i n g f o r c e , i f a c t i n g a s a r e a s o n a b l e man, i s j u s t i -
f i e d i n a c t i n g a s h e d i d . I n d e e d , i n I n s t r u c t i o n flo. 2 4 , it

i s s t a t e d t h a t a p e r s o n may a c t under t h e a p p e a r a n c e of

p e r i l i f t h a t a p p e a r a n c e makes t h e p e r s o n a c t i n g b e l i e v e
t h a t he i s i n d e a d l y p e r i l of h i s l i f e o r of r e c e i v i n g g r e a t
b o d i l y harm, and i f a r e a s o n a b l e man, i n t h e same s i t u a t i o n

s e e i n g and knowing what t h e a c t o r knows, would b e j u s t i f i e d
i n b e l i e v i n g himself i n danger. Since counsel w a s not

l i m i t e d under t h o s e i n s t r u c t i o n s from f a i r l y p r e s e n t i n g h i s

defense t o t h e jury, t h e defendant w i l l n o t be heard t o
complain t h a t t h e c o u r t f a i l e d t o g i v e t h e many d i f f e r e n t

nuances on a t h e o r y of d e f e n s e t h a t m i g h t have been d e v i s e d .

F i n a l l y , under t h i s i s s u e , w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e c o n t e n -

t i o n made a t o r a l argument t h a t t h e c o u r t s h o u l d have g i v e n

a "ladder" i n s t r u c t i o n which would have (1) encompassed t h e

v a r i o u s g r a d e s of homicide under c r i m i n a l homicide, (2)

i n s t r u c t e d a s t o t h e e l e m e n t s , and ( 3 ) a d v i s e d t h e j u r y t o

c o n v i c t o r a c q u i t w i t h r e s p e c t t o each such p o s s i b l e o f f e n s e
o r i n f e r i o r g r a d e of o f f e n s e , t h e answer remains t h e same:

such a n i n s t r u c t i o n was n o t o f f e r e d , and i n any e v e n t t h e

i n s t r u c t i o n s a d e q u a t e l y c o v e r e d t h e o f f e n s e s of which t h e

d e f e n d a n t c o u l d b e c o n v i c t e d and h i s d e f e n s e s t h e r e t o . It

i s n o t t o be f o r g o t t e n t h a t i n t h i s c a s e t h e c o u r t s e n t four

p o s s i b l e v e r d i c t s t o t h e j u r y , i n c l u d i n g one f o r e a c h g r a d e
o f c r i m i n a l homicide and o n e f o r a c q u i t t a l , and d e f e n d a n t

made no o b j e c t i o n a t t h a t t i m e t o t h e forms of v e r d i c t s

being submitted t o t h e jury f o r i t s use.

W c o n c l u d e t h e r e f o r e t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t committed no
e

e r r o r w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e second i s s u e r a i s e d by d e f e n d a n t .

Defendant i n h i s t h i r d i s s u e a r g u e s t h a t he was d e n i e d

a speedy t r i a l a s r e q u i r e d by t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amendment t o

t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n and by A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n

2 4 , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . Counsel f o r d e f e n d a n t i n

o r a l argument conceded t h a t t h e p r e j u d i c i a l d e l a y d o e s n o t

e x t e n d beyond t h e f i r s t e l e v e n months.
The f o l l o w i n g t i m e t a b l e of e v e n t s i s p e r t i n e n t t o a
d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h i s i s s u e :
A p r i l 2 3 , 1975 Date of a r r e s t .
A p r i l 2 8 , 1975 Information f i l e d .
~ p r i l
29, 1975 Defendant a r r a i g n e d .

~ p r i 3 0 , 1975
l Defendant p o s t e d bond.
 May 2, 1975 Defendant f i l e d motion
t o produce c o n f e s s i o n -
s t a t e m e n t on demand f o r
d i s c o v e r y and produc-
t i o n of e v i d e n c e f o r
inspection.
May 2 1 , 1975 Defendant d i s q u a l i f i e s
Judge Nelson.

May 23, 1975 Judge Bradford c a l l e d i n .

August 23, 1975 Defendant f i l e s n o t i c e of
i n t e n t t o r e l y on s e l f -
d e f e n s e and motion f o r
order t o take t h e deposi-
t i o n of C a r l a Brave.

October 1975 Defendant l e a v e s Montana
f o r Arizona t o s e e k
employment.

J a n u a r y 29, 1976 T r i a l d a t e set f o r
March 29, 1976.

March 3, 1976 Defendant r e t u r n s t o
Montana from A r i z o n a .

March 29, 1976 T r i a l d a t e vacated a t
defendant's request.

Under d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n c e s s i o n - - t h a t only the f i r s t

e l e v e n months a r e t o be c o n s i d e r e d under t h e speedy t r i a l

i s s u e , w e have a p e r i o d of 336 d a y s e l a p s i n g from t h e d a t e

t h e I n f o r m a t i o n was f i l e d u n t i l t h e f i r s t t r i a l d a t e . This

number of d a y s i s g r e a t e r t h a n t h e p r e s u m p t i v e p e r i o d e s t a b -

l i s h e d i n S t a t e ex rel. Sanford v . District Court, (1976),

Mont. , 551 P.2d 1005, 33 St.Rep. 644, a s a prima

f a c i e c a s e of d e l a y . A c c o r d i n g l y , we a r e c a l l e d on t o

b a l a n c e t h e f a c t o r s s e t o u t i n Barker v . Wingo, ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 407

U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2128, 33 L Ed 2d 1 0 1 , t o d e t e r m i n e t h e

speedy t r i a l i s s u e . These f a c t o r s a r e - - l e n g t h of d e l a y ; t h e

r e a s o n f o r d e l a y ; d e f e n d a n t ' s a s s e r t i o n of h i s r i g h t ; a n d ,

prejudice t o t h e defendant.

The f i r s t f a c t o r , l e n g t h of d e l a y , i s e s t a b l i s h e d . The

second and t h i r d f a c t o r s we c o n s i d e r t o g e t h e r . I t appears

t h a t d e f e n d a n t s o u g h t and r e c e i v e d p e r m i s s i o n t o l e a v e
Montana f o r Arizona w h i l e h i s t r i a l was pending. The r e a -

sons f o r h i s leaving w e r e personal t o defendant. The p e r i o d
of t i m e h e was away from t h e s t a t e on p e r s o n a l b u s i n e s s

c a n n o t be counted a g a i n s t t h e s t a t e . T h a t p e r i o d encom-

p a s s e s t h e month of October 1975 t h r o u g h t h e f i r s t t r i a l

d a t e o f March 29, 1976, which d a t e was v a c a t e d a t defend-

a n t ' s request. The r e c o r d shows n e g a t i v e l y f o r t h a t p e r i o d
t h a t d e f e n d a n t wanted o r was r e a d y f o r a t r i a l , much l e s s

t h a t he was a s s e r t i n g h i s r i g h t t o t r i a l .

Of s i g n i f i c a n c e a l s o i s t h e f a c t t h a t d e f e n d a n t d i d n o t

f i l e h i s i n t e n t t o r e l y on s e l f - d e f e n s e u n t i l August 23,

1975. I n e x p l a i n i n g h i s d e l a y i n s o f i l i n g , d e f e n d a n t s t a t e d

h e needed t h e i n t e r v e n i n g t i m e t o c o m p l e t e h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n ,

and o n l y on c o m p l e t i o n d i d h e d e t e r m i n e t o r e l y on s e l f -

defense. Again, d e f e n d a n t i s n o t i n a p o s i t i o n t o c h a r g e

t h e s t a t e w i t h t h e time he himself r e q u i r e d t o complete t h e

i n v e s t i g a t i o n necessary f o r h i s defense. I t i s obvious t h a t

i n t h e p e r i o d from h i s a r r a i g n m e n t u n t i l August 23, 1975, he

was n o t r e a d y f o r n o r d i d h e want a t r i a l of t h e c h a r g e

a g a i n s t him.

T h a t l e a v e s t h e o n l y u n e x p l a i n e d t i m e , a p e r i o d from

August 23, 1975 u n t i l a n u n s p e c i f i e d d a t e i n October 1975,

t o be a c c o u n t e d f o r . T h a t p e r i o d of t i n e , even i f i t w e r e

t o be c o u n t e d f u l l y a g a i n s t t h e s t a t e , would h a r d l y q u a l i f y

a s a p r e j u d i c i a l d e t e r r e n t t o d e f e n d a n t ' s f a i r and speedy

t r i a l , e s p e c i a l l y when i n t h a t p e r i o d d e f e n d a n t was p l a n n i n g

t o l e a v e t h e s t a t e , and no p r e j u d i c e i s shown t o t h e defend-

ant's rights.

The f o u r t h f a c t o r t o b e c o n s i d e r e d , t h e p r e j u d i c e t o

t h e d e f e n d a n t , h a s no s u p p o r t i n t h e r e c o r d . ~ o t h i n g as
h

been b r o u g h t t o o u r a t t e n t i o n t h a t would show t h e d e l a y
hampered d e f e n d a n t i n any way i n p r e s e n t i n g h i s d e f e n s e .

~ e f e n d a n tc l a i m s t h e d e l a y c a u s e d him c o n c e r n and a n x i e t y ,
b u t t h e s e a r e i n h e r e n t i n any c r i m i n a l c a s e . Barker v .

Wingo, s u p r a . Here, t h e s t a t e accommodated d e f e n d a n t t o

ease h i s anxiety. I t v a c a t e d a t r i a l d a t e b e c a u s e of h i s

up-coming s u r g e r y . I t a l l o w e d him t o l e a v e t h e s t a t e t o

s e e k a job. I f a n x i e t y and c o n c e r n w e r e p r e s e n t , t h e y were

a s much t h e r e s u l t o f t h e needs of t h e d e f e n d a n t , as of any

d e l a y i n t h e speedy t r i a l p r o c e s s .

W f i n d t h e r e f o r e t h a t d e f e n d a n t f a i l s t o meet t h e
e

c r i t e r i a n e c e s s a r y t o show h e had been d e n i e d a speedy t r i a l

by t h e s t a t e . S t a t e e x r e l . S a n f o r d v. D i s t r i c t C o u r t ,

s u p r a ; B a r k e r v. Wingo, s u p r a ; S t a t e v . Steward, ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 168

Mont. 385, 388, 5 4 3 P . 2 d 178, 181.

D e f e n d a n t ' s f o u r t h i s s u e d e a l s w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n of

whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n a d m i t t i n g c e r t a i n photo-

graphs i n t o evidence. Defendant a r g u e s t h e p h o t o g r a p h s were

s o highly p r e j u d i c i a l a s t o cause r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . Defend-

a n t r e l i e s on S t a t e v. B i s c h e r t , ( 1 9 5 7 ) , 1 3 1 Mont. 152, 308

P.2d 969, f o r t h i s c o n t e n t i o n .

In the instant case, D r . John Henneford, a p a t h o l o g i s t ,

t e s t i f i e d a s a p r o s e c u t i o n w i t n e s s t o e s t a b l i s h t h e c a u s e of

death. Two b l a c k and w h i t e p h o t o g r a p h s of t h e d e c e a s e d

taken during D r . H e n n e f o r d ' s a u t o p s y w e r e o f f e r e d and ad-

m i t t e d over d e f e n d a n t ' s o b j e c t i o n s . The d o c t o r t e s t i f i e d

t h a t w h i l e i t would be p o s s i b l e t o e x p l a i n t h e a u t o p s y and
d i a g n o s i s w i t h o u t t h e p i c t u r e s , h i s t e s t i m o n y would b e

c l e a r , p r e c i s e , and e a s i e r t o u n d e r s t a n d i f t h e p h o t o g r a p h s

w e r e used. The d o c t o r t h e n used t h e p h o t o g r a p h s t o d e s c r i b e

t h e a n g l e of t h e e n t r y wound and i t s p a t h t h r o u g h t h e body.

The d e m o n s t r a t i o n of t h e a n g l e of t h e e n t r y wound was
important in determining the credibility of defendant's
testimony that the victim was attempting entry into the
camper when the fatal shot was fired.
Bischert is distinguishable from the instant case. In
Bischert the colored photographs depicted the emaciated body
of a child with a ghastly skin disease not related to malnu-
trition, from which the child died. In the instant case
there is no showing that the black and white autopsy photo-
graphs showed any inflammatory or prejudicial conditions
unrelated to the crime charged.
In State v. Rollins, (1967), 149 Mont. 481, 428 P.2d
462, the Court upheld the admissibility of photographs of a
victim's gunshot wounds, distinguishing Bischert upon the
grounds the photographs in that case were "particularly
distasteful" and did not contribute to the development of
the case. In the instant case these photos helped the jury
to understand the facts of the case and therefore they were
properly admitted into evidence.
The final issue raised by defendant is whether the evi-
dence supported the jury verdict. One of defendant's claims
is that the prosecutor's major witnesses' testimony was in-
consistent and unreliable. There is no question that some
of the evidence in this case was contradictory; nonetheless
the jury viewed the witnesses as they testified and weighed
their testimony.
The standard of this Court in measuring a jury deter-
mination is stated in State v. Merseal, (1975), 167 blont.

"This Court remains ever mindful of one
fundamental rule--that questions of fact must
be determined solely by the jury, and that
given a certain legal minimum of evidence,
 t h i s C o u r t on r e v i e w w i l l n o t s u b s t i t u t e i t s
judgment f o r t h a t of t h e j u r y . * * *

"On a p p e a l w e examine t h e e v i d e n c e t o
d e t e r m i n e whether t h e v e r d i c t i s s u p p o r t e d by
s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e . I n s o d o i n g , we view
t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o
t h e S t a t e . * * *"

See a l s o : S t a t e v. Farnes, (1976), Mont. , 558
P.2d 472, 3 3 St.Rep. 1270; S t a t e v . S t o d d a r d , ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 147

Mont. 402, 4 1 2 P.2d 827. Therefore, t h i s Court i s l i m i t e d

t o a n e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e

t o t h e s t a t e and a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of whether t h e r e was sub-

s t a n t i a l evidence t o support defendant's conviction. The

evidence supports t h e v e r d i c t .

One o t h e r c o n t e n t i o n under t h i s f i n a l i s s u e i s t h a t t h e
v e r d i c t of t h e j u r y i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e e v i d e n c e i n

t h a t s i n c e t h e d e f e n d a n t was c o n v i c t e d of m i t i g a t e d d e l i b -

era.te homicide, t h e j u r y must have found d e f e n d a n t w a s

a c t i n g under extreme m e n t a l o r e m o t i o n a l stress b r o u g h t

a b o u t by t h e a p p a r e n t i n t e n d e d a t t a c k upon h i s p e r s o n and

h i s property. Defendant c o n t e n d s t h e o n l y p o s s i b l e m e n t a l
o r e m o t i o n a l stress f o r which t h e r e w a s a r e a s o n a b l e e x p l a n a t i o n

o r e x c u s e s u g g e s t e d by t h e e v i d e n c e i s t h a t d e f e n d a n t f e a r e d

f o r himself i n t h e circumstances described. Therefore,

d e f e n d a n t a r g u e s , i f t h e j u r y found s u c h stress t o e x i s t , i t

c o u l d o n l y b e s u c h stress a s would p e r m i t s e l f - d e f e n s e .

Then d e f e n d a n t r e t u r n s t o h i s former argument t h a t s i n c e t h e
c o u r t d i d n o t i n s t r u c t t h e jury t h a t it should a c q u i t t h e
d e f e n d a n t when s e l f - d e f e n s e was e s t a b l i s h e d , t h e v e r d i c t i s
i n c o n s i s t e n t with t h e evidence.
What t h i s c o n t e n t i o n of d e f e n d a n t o v e r l o o k s i s t h a t

w h i l e under t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e t h e j u r y c o u l d have found

d e f e n d a n t was a c t i n g under m e n t a l o r e m o t i o n a l stress
b r o u g h t a b o u t by t h e a t t a c k by G a r d i p e e , t h e j u r y c o u l d a l s o

have found t h e c o u n t e r - f o r c e used by t h e d e f e n d a n t w a s s o

e x c e s s i v e a s n o t t o be r e a s o n a b l e and j u s t i f i e d . Section

94-3-102, R.C.M. 1947. The j u r y c o u l d have concluded t h a t

t h e f o r c e used i n s e l f - d e f e n s e by d e f e n d a n t , t h e s h o o t i n g ,

w a s n o t t h e a c t i o n o f a r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n under t h e circum-

stances. I n t h a t s i t u a t i o n , a v e r d i c t of mitigated d e l i b -

e r a t e homicide i s j u s t i f i e d . I t i s n o t g i v e n t o u s , however,

t o l o o k i n t o t h e minds of t h e j u r o r s t o a s c e r t a i n how t h e y

arrived a t their verdict. When, a s h e r e , w e f i n d t h e j u r y

w a s f a i r l y i n s t r u c t e d , w e must l e a v e t h e weighing of t h e

e v i d e n c e and d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e f a c t s t o t h a t j u r y . It is

n o t within our province t o s e t a s i d e t h e v e r d i c t here.

The judgment of c o n v i c t i o n i s a f f i r m e d .

W Concur:
e

Chief J u s t i c e

J u d g e , s i t t i n g i n p l a c e of M r .
J u s t i c e Daly
 Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea dissenting:

Defendant should be granted a new trial. Testimony
of Carla Brave relating to defendant being in prison for rape
was not only prejudicial, it was not relevant. Moreover, the
court failed to instruct the jury on the essential elements of

the offense for which defendant was convicted.

Before witness Carla Brave testified to the statement

made by defendant that he had been in prison for rape, defense
counsel moved that the statement be suppressed. The prosecution
then made an offer of proof as to the relevancy of the statement

to the following effect:
"Your Honor, we offer to prove by the
testimony of Carla Brave, in light of the
question asked her, that William Collins
volunteered that he had been in prison,
and that he had been in prison for the
-
crime of rape. And we, in that regard,
suaaest this is relevant, inasmuch as it
a a

isn't true, that that fact is not true.
It shows what was on Mr. Collins' mind
at that time, namely sex with Carla Brave.
And that certainly bears on the events
as they later transpired. Who did what
for what purpose. In that regard it is
strictly relevant, it is material. And
because it is an admission, a statement
made by the defendant, and because it is
relevant and material, we suggest that the
Court hear the testimony." (Emphasis added)

The court then let the jury hear the testimony. During
cross-examination Carla Brave admitted that in talking to a
deputy after the shooting that he had told her that defendant

had not been in prison for rape.
Defendant asserted self-defense and while testifying
in his own behalf stated that he had not made the statement to
Carla Brave. However, he was also impeached under the old rule
in Montana which was mechanically followed by trial judges which

allowed the state to ask the defendant if he had ever been convicted
of a felony. Defendant admitted that he had, but the nature
of the felony was never stated to the jury. The situation was

such that at the end of the prosecution's case the jury did not
know whether defendant had been in prison for rape. The

situation was not alleviated by the defendant's testimony. He
denied that he had been in prison for rape, but also admitted
that he had been convicted of a felony, although the jury did
not know the nature of that felony. It would certainly be

understandable that a jury would conclude that defendant did not

tell the truth when he denied making the statement to Carla Brave.

For this reason alone, the jury may have decided to distrust
defendant in the remainder of his testimony.

The majority has concluded that the statement, although
known by the prosecution to be false, was relevant to the
defendant's state of mind preceding the shooting. Relevant to

what? On this point the opinion is silent. If true, what did
the statement tend to prove? Even if made, this statement was
clearly not relevant to any issue in the case. Moreover, its

prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value it may have
had.
At trial, before going any further, the trial court
should first have made a determination that the alleged state-
ment to Carla Brave was relevant. There is nothing in the

record from which we can determine if the trial court concluded

that the alleged statement was relevant to any issue in the case.
It is true that the prosecution argued that it shows defendant's
state of mind as desiring to have sex with Carla Brave. (But

even if true, that fact, as will be explained later, had nothing
to do with issues at trial.)
It is clear here, that the state admitted (at least to

the trial judge in chambers) that defendant had not in fact been
convicted of rape. This being so, the trial court had the

further duty of determining the likelihood of defendant having
made the statement to Carla Brave. In the nature of things,
a person does not normally go around exclaiming to the world
that he has been in prison for rape. Particularly would this

be so when such is not the fact. Clearly the probabilities

were that defendant did not make this statement to Carla Brave

at all. It could be that she was deliberately not telling the
truth or that she had misinterpreted what defendant had stated
to her. She admitted that she had not revealed this in her

statement first given to the prosecution--and the statement

extensively covered the events of the evening--including the
conversation she had with defendant in his pickup truck.
Given this situation, the prejudice to defendant was

manifest. There was a strong probability that defendant did
not make this statement but if the jury heard the evidence
they might get the idea that defendant, in stating he had been

in prison for rape, was in fact implying to Carla Brave that
if she did not go along with his desire for sex that he would
force her. The further implication from this is that the state
was implying that defendant was an evil person and would stop

at nothing to have his way--including taking of another person's
life. But the fact is that the circumstances of the shooting

had nothing to do with any alleged statement made to Carla Brave

that defendant had been in prison for rape.
The events of the evening of the shooting did not
transpire at one time. There was a great deal of drinking by

all parties concerned throughout the evening and the alleged
statement of defendant to Carla Brave took place a considerable
time before the shooting. There is not a shred of evidence that
the alleged statement had any connection directly or indirectly
with the shooting. If defendant had a desire to have sex with
Carla Brave, Gardipee was not aware of his desires. There is

no evidence that Gardipee knew what defendant and Carla Brave

talked about. Indeed, the evidence is that he did not. Under
these circumstances, the desire of defendant to have sex with
Carla Brave is totally unrelated to his willingness to take

Gardipee's life. Moreover, the circumstances of the assault

upon defendant leading to the shooting are totally unrelated to
any desire of defendant to have sex with Carla Brave.
The fight in the pickup truck while defendant was driving

Carla Brave and Gardipee back to town, was instigated solely by

Gardipee. Gardipee suddenly started getting wild about the loss
of his ancestral rights and in the process started pounding on

defendant while defendant was driving the truck down the road.
It is not at all difficult to understand why defendant stopped

his truck, got out, and climbed into the back of the camper.

Whatever reasons Gardipee had for pounding on the defendant,

they certainly did not relate to any knowledge Gardipee had of
the conversations defendant had with Carla Brave. Nor does the
alleged statement by defendant to Carla Brave have any connection

to defendant's state of mind when he stopped his truck and
climbed into the back of his camper in order to avoid Gardipee's
assault. It is difficult for me to see how defendant had sex on

his mind at that time.
to
The only purpose for the prosecutor / elic2t the state-
ment from Carla Brave was to put defendant in as bad a light as
possible in the eyes of the jury. To a degree, this is always
the objective of the prosecution, but there must be a sound
evidentiary basis for doing so. Here there was none. The

testimony was not relevant and was clearly prejudicial.
 I would also reverse the conviction because the trial
court failed to instruct the jury on the elements of deliberate
homicide and mitigated deliberate homicide. The jury was only
given a definition of deliberate homicide and mitigated

deliberate homicide; it was not provided with instructions
setting forth the elements of deliberate homicide and mitigated

deliberate homicide, and telling them that each of the elements
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Without such
instructions the jury did not know what the elements of mitigated
deliberate homicide were and the burden of proof required to

prove each element. I cannot conceive that a trial court would

allow a case to go to a jury without such instruction, nor can
I conceive how an appellate court would give its stamp of approval.

The duty to instruct the jury on the law, has been
stated as follows in McBride, The Art of Instructing the Jury
(1969, Anderson Publishing Company) (quoting from California

Jury Instructions, Criminal, page 8):
"'In recent years we have witnessed a
distinct trend of decision away from the
rule of earlier days when it was held not
to be error for a court to fail to instruct
the jury, in the absence of a request, on
even such vital rules as those of reasonable
doubt and self defense. This later trend
has established as a basic principle that
the trial judge has the duty, even in the
absence of request, to instruct the jury
as to all rules of law that necessarily
will be involved in a decision of the cause.
People v. Holt, 25 Cal. 2d 59, 153 P.2d 21,
24. We do not have sufficient modern
precedents to enable us to make a complete
list of the instructions that must be given,
in the absence of a request therefor, under
the modern rule. Generally the trend points
to the likelihood of reversal of a conviction
if the trial court fails to give any proper
and appropriate instruction which, were it
given, might result in a different verdict.
In instructing jurors, we must assume that
they have no knowledge of the rules of law
and that, therefore, they must be instructed
on all points of law which, under any reason-
 able theory, might be involved in their
deliberations, to the end that their
decision will be according to the law
and the evidence and untinged by any
private and possibly false opinion of
the law that they may entertain.'"
(Emphasis added)

Under any view of a case, the elements of the offenses
charged will be involved in a decision of the cause. The
failure to instruct the jury on those elements must be
reversible error.
It appears that this Court is holding that the duty

to properly instruct the jury can be delegated to counsel--

and if the trial court does so, he is relieved of any burden
either for erroneous instructions submitted to the jury or for
failure to instruct the jury on important aspects of the case.
While the failure of counsel to submit instructions on the

important aspects of the case is surely a sign of ill-prepared-

ness, I fail to see how this relieves the trial court of a duty
to properly instruct the jury. This is a situation where the
jury was not instructed on the essential elements of the offense

for which defendant was convicted. The duty is not only that

of defense counsel to see that proper instructions are prepared
and offered for the court's consideration; there is a correspond-

ing duty on the state to see that the jury is instructed on the
essential elements of the offenses charged. But regardless of
which side provides the instructions, or is derelict in not

providing the instructions, the ultimate duty to fairly instruct
the jury on the law resides with the trial judge. If he does

not receive proper instructions he should refuse to send the
case to the jury until he is convinced he has the proper
instructions. I cannot believe that the only duty of the trial

judge is to accept or reject the instructions which are offered
to him by counsel for both sides. If instructions are either
improperly worded, or are omitted, he should direct counsel

to properly word the instructions or to supply the omitted

instructions. Only then can we say that the trial judge has

properly discharged his obligations to the law. That was not

done in this case.