No. 13924
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1978
DAVID B. CfiACiFORD and
JOHN ISAACSON,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
-vs-
PHILIP E. ROY,
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from: District Court of the Ninth Judicial District,
Honorable R. D. McPhillips, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellants:
Dola N. Wilson argued, Great Falls, Montana
For Respondent:
Philip E. Roy argued, Browning, Montana
Submitted: January 2 7 , 1978
Decided: APR 12 wB
Filed: Bp& j 1878
Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Glacier County
~istrictCourt dismissing their complaint without prejudice against
defendant on an action in debt.
Defendant Roy is an attorney in Browning, Montana, which
is located within the exterior boundaries of the Blackfeet Indian
Reservation. Roy is an enrolled member of the Blackfeet Indian
Tribe. Plaintiffs Crawford and Isaacson are investigators who
had offices in Great Falls at the time this action commenced. They
performed investigations and legal research for Roy, which involved
work both on and off the Blackfeet reservation. Their work involved
another Montana Indian tribe, the Belknap, and Federal Court cases
involving both Indian and non-Indian parties in this state.
The parties negotiated an initial agreement for services
in a series of meetings which took place in Roy's law office and
in Great Falls, The investigators reported to Roy in Browning.
Prior to the contract in dispute here, Roy had given the investi-
gators a note for $18,000.00 in payment for their services. The
investigators surrendered this note to Roy at the time the contract
in dispute was signed.
The parties signed the contract in Roy's law office in
Browning on December 26, 1975. It provided in relevant part that
Roy owed the investigators $24,000.00; that he was paying them
$10,800.00; that the $18,000.00 note was returned to him by the
investigators; and that Roy would pay the balance due of $13,200.00
in installments sent to the investigators at a post office box in
Great Falls.
The investigators filed an action in ~istrictCourt on
November 16, 1976, to collect the debt of $13,200.00 plus interest
and costs. Roy moved to dismiss the complaint on December 9, 1976,
on the grounds that the state ~istrictCourt lacked jurisdiction
over the subject matter. The contention was that only the Black-
feet Tribe had jurisdiction. The court received affidavits and
documentary evidence and on June 17, 1977 entered its findings
and conclusions and dismissed the complaint.
In concluding that Williams v. Lee, (1959), 358 U.S. 217,
79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L ed 2d 251, precluded the District Court from
asserting jurisdiction, the District Court made the following
findings: That the parties entered into and signed the agreement
in Roy's law offices on the reservation; that some of the services
to be performed were on the reservation and others off the reserva-
tion; that Roy was to make payment to the plaintiffs' assignee
through the United States mail and delivery was completed upon
posting within the reservation; and that no testimony was introduced
to vary the terms of the written agreement.
It is agreed that the federal government did not expressly
grant jurisdiction to the state, nor has the state expressly assumed
jurisdiction over the subject matter under federal law. Even so,
this does not preclude state jurisdiction. The United States
Supreme Court stated in Williams v. Lee, supra:
" * * * Essentially, absent governing Acts of
Congress, the cpestion has always been whether
the state action infringed on the right of
reservation Indians to make their own laws and
be ruled by them. * * * " 3 L ed 2d at 254.
This Court, quoting from Organized Village of Kake v. Egan,
(1960), 369 U.S. 60, 82 S.Ct. 562, 7 L ed 2d 573, stated in Iron
Bear v. Dist. Court, (1973), 162 Mont. 335, 344, 512 P.2d 1292:
" * * * 'even on reservations state laws may
be applied unless such application would inter-
fere with reservation self-government or would
impair a right grabed or reserved by federal
law.' * * * '
I
Absent federal law, this state has asserted jurisdiction over
a transaction involving an Indian party when that transaction in-
volved significant contacts with the state outside reservation
boundaries. When the transaction in dispute, or any part of it,
has occurred outside the reservation but within the geographic
boundaries of the state, this Court in several cases has held an
Indian party has voluntarily subjected himself to state jurisdic-
tion over that transaction. Little Horn State Bank v. Stops, (1976),
Mont . , 555 P.2d 211, 33 St.Rep. 959, cert.den. U.S.
, 97 S.Ct. 1171, 51 L ed 2d 580 (where Indian parties had ob-
tained a loan from non-Indians off the reservation); State ex rel.
Old Elk v. District Court, (1970), Mont . , 552 P.2d 1394,
33 St-Rep. 637 (where the reservation Indian was a suspect in an
off-reservation shooting); and Bad Horse v. Bad Horse, (1974), 163
Mont. 445, 517 P.2d 893, cert-den. 419 U.S. 847, 95 S.Ct. 83, 42
L ed 2d 76 (where the Indian couple had been married off the reserva-
tion). See also United States ex rel. Cobell v. Cobell, (9th Cir.
1974), 503 F.2d 790, where the Federal District Court for Montana
upheld continuing state jurisdiction over a child custody conflict
when the Indian couple had obtained a divorce in State District
Court; and Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, (1973), 411 U.S. 145,
93 S.Ct. 1267, 36 L ed 2d 114, where the Indian-operated ski area
located off the reservation was held subject to state income tax.
Here, we have a situation where two non-Indians outside
reservation boundaries were hired by Roy to perform services both
on and off the reservation; negotiations leading up to the contract
were made through phone calls and correspondence outside the
reservation; and payment on the contract was to be made to a post
office box outside the reservation. These activities are sufficient
to give a state court jurisdiction and cannot be held to infringe
on the rights of the reservation Indians to make their own laws
and to be ruled by their own laws. The reservation provides no
sanctuary to Roy in this situation.
We note also that Roy employed these people to aid him in
his law practice. To maintain his law practice, Roy not only had
to be initially licensed by the State of Montana and be qualified
by the State of Montana, but he also must pay his annual license
fee to the State. (Section 93-2010 and 93-2012, R.C.M. 1947).
Moreover, as an attorney, Roy is subject to the rules of this Court
under Art. VII, Section 2, 1972 Montana Constitutution. Roy was
not acting as an individual at the time, but was acting in his
capacity as an attorney. He employed these people to work on legal
matters off the reservation as well as on the reservation.
It is clear, therefore, that one licensed to practice law
in this state cannot make a contract as an attorney to be performed
both on and off the reservation and then use his status as an Indian
to defeat state jurisdiction when he is sued on the contract involved.
It is equally clear that there were sufficient contacts in this case
to allow state jurisdiction even if Roy had not made the contracts
in his capacity as a lawyer. The hiring of the investigators, the
negotiations on the contract and payment for services all occurred
off the reservation. It is immaterial that the actual signing of
the contract occurred on the reservation in Roy's law office.
Accordingly, we hold that Roy's status as an attorney
licensed by this state and the nature of the transaction involved,
are both reasons to allow proceedings in State District Court
rather than on the Indian reservation.
The order of the District Court is reversed, and the case
remanded for further proceedings.
n
We Concur:
~ L A
Chief Ju tice I J L ~ ~ ~ ~